States cp ddi 2012
Centralization is key to uniform transportation and communication
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- Competition for investors will cause not only a race to the bottom but also a race to defraud the top.
- Competition prods states to illegally attract investors.
Centralization is key to uniform transportation and communication.Nagel 96 [Robert F. Nagel, Spring 1996, “The Future of Federalism”, HeinOnline, p.660, http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/cwrlrv46&div=25&g_sent=1&collection=journals] aw The sorts of considerations and possibilities that I have been mentioning would not be especially important if the general politi- cal culture of the United States were strongly supportive of decen- tralization. While we do have deeply held habits and beliefs about political practices at the state and local level, in this century many aspects of our culture have favored centralization. Some of these, such as the psychic effects of the national government's association with the war power and with a vast capacity to tax and spend, are built in. Other causes of our national political culture are not inevi- table but seem close to it. These include ease of mobility, nation- wide channels of communication, and an optimistic, pragmatic spirit that does not easily abide the variations and imperfections that are inevitable consequences of decentralization. Private Funding deficit Competition for investors will cause not only a race to the bottom but also a race to defraud the top.Hongbin Cai, Professor in Economics and Associate Dean at Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, and Daniel Treisman, Professor at the Department of Political Science University of California, Los Angeles, October 2002, Forthcoming: Journal of Public Economics, ‘State Corroding Federalism’, pg. 2-3, http://www.econ.ucla.edu/people/papers/Cai/Cai251.pdf, TB In this paper, we challenge this sanguine view, at least in its application to developing countries. We argue that the central government’s ability to correct distortions introduced by interregional competition should be considered endogenous. Moreover, interregional competition for capital may itself encourage regional governments to act in ways that corrode the capacities of the central state. The result is not just a ‘race-to-the-bottom’ but a race to escape—or defraud—the top. In countries from China to Russia and Argentina, increased interregional competition for capital in recent decades coincided with falling central government revenues, high or increasing tax evasion, and intense political conflict—overt or covert—over the distribution of revenues and regulatory authority.3 Previous models of tax competition generally assumed that local governments would compete for capital in growth-promoting ways. Even the works that focused on distortions crucially assumed a framework of constitutional order in which the central government could autonomously set its tax rates, collect taxes, and enforce regulations. In some contexts—municipal finance in the US, for instance—this is an innocuous assumption. However, in many countries where decentralization is a live political issue—even the US on occasion—central law enforcement is imperfect and constitutional arrangements insecure.4 In such cases, the struggle to attract mobile capital can take less benign forms. Building more infrastructure and spending tax revenues prudently are not the only ways that subnational governments can woo businesses. Another way is to promise to protect firms from the need to pay central taxes in full or comply with central regulations. Subnational governments reduce local business costs by deliberately undermining central policies and capacity. Such protection occurs in many guises, some illegal, some legal, others of unclear status. A mayor may lobby or pressure central tax collectors to look the other way when they audit a certain firm; a state governor may throw obstacles in the way of central regulatory agents. If regional courts rule first on such matters, they may delay or even impede resolution in the center’s favor. While such activities may be rare in developed countries, we believe they are extremely common in developing and even middle income countries. Competition prods states to illegally attract investors.Hongbin Cai, Professor in Economics and Associate Dean at Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, and Daniel Treisman, Professor at the Department of Political Science University of California, Los Angeles, October 2002, Forthcoming: Journal of Public Economics, ‘State Corroding Federalism’, pg. 2-3, http://www.econ.ucla.edu/people/papers/Cai/Cai251.pdf, TB Under certain conditions, decentralization and the interjurisdictional competition it stimulates can have large desirable effects. The need to attract capital may render local officials more honest and efficient, and prompt them to invest more in infrastructure. However, under other conditions, decentralization can have serious negative consequences, eroding the institutional foundations that make competition work to the benefit of all. If federalism—or more generally, decentralization—can sometimes preserve markets, at other times it may help to corrode the central state and with it the benefits of economic integration and legal order.¶ Most previous models assumed that local governments compete to attract capital in growthpromoting ways, for instance by investing in infrastructure or providing public goods cost-effectively. We showed that if competition for capital is intense, businesses are hard to attract with infrastructure, and central bureaucracies are weak or have devolved enforcement powers downward, then local officials may instead compete by offering firms covert protection against central taxes and regulations.24¶ In response, central government will reduce central tax collection effort and investment in law-and-order. If the central government is much more predatory than local governments, this could increase welfare. But if both level governments are equally benevolent or predatory, welfare would be higher under complete centralization. Fed key Federalism fails to account for regional differences; national leadership is key. Rico Maggi, Socioeconomic Institute, University of Zurich, ’92, Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, “SWISS TRANSPORT POLICY FOR EUROPE?¶ FEDERALISM AND THE DOMINANCE OF LOCAL ISSUES” AS is well known, transport infrastructure has a¶ network character. This has two important implications¶ in the case of transport policy proposals relating¶ to the national or international road-network¶ (for the ease of the argument the analysis will be¶ restricted to road transport, but the model could easily¶ be adapted to other modes). First, the road network¶ creates spatial externalities because any single¶ link in a specific location can have impacts on the¶ national economic development (e.g. if it solves a¶ bottleneck problem of national relevance). With regard¶ to the national development, these externalities¶ would lead to a suboptimal provision of (large-scale)¶ transport infrastructure in the case of a federalist¶ solution, because local or regional units would take¶ a free-rider position. This is the reason why, traditionally,¶ motorway networks, train systems etc. are¶ planned on a national level. A second implication of¶ the network character of transport is that the costs¶ and benefits of a specific transport policy project¶ may be unequally distributed among the nodes of a¶ network and, moreover, an imbalance may also exist¶ between the areas along the link and those surrounding¶ the nodes. Thus, (internal) economic benefits will¶ often occur in the nodes whereas (external) ecological¶ disbenefits are felt in the areas along the links.¶ The consequence of these externalities is a growing¶ local resistance against the planning and implementation¶ of national or international transport infrastructure¶ projects. Especially in Austria and Switzerland,¶ it has also provoked an increasing demand for restrictive¶ regulation of transit traffic on roads.¶ These distributional aspects become relevant for¶ democratic decision-making. Given a normal spatial¶ settlement pattern, the majority of the people (voters)¶ will normally live in the centers (nodes) and the¶ minority in the areas along the links. To find majorities,¶ the policymakers will therefore usually propose¶ transport projects establishing more performing¶ links between the big nodes. This solves the externality¶ problems in the case of simple majority rules.¶ However, if federalist elements are introduced in¶ decision-making on centrally provided goods (or regulations),¶ the local perspective will become relevant¶ and may lead to a dominance of local issues in national¶ policy. Fed key Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 0.94 Mb. Share with your friends:
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