States cp ddi 2012


Permutation - New federalism solves



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Permutation - New federalism solves


Regan 95 – (HOW TO THINK ABOUT THE FEDERAL COMMERCE POWER AND INCIDENTALLY REWRITE UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ) , Page 6, http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/mlr94&div=32&g_sent=1&collection=journals

If we are prepared to rethink more fundamentally, we can produce¶ a theory of the commerce power that is internally consistent,¶ that is faithful to the general intention of the Framers, that does no¶ more damage to the text of the Commerce Clause than our current¶ theory, that justifies the results - though not all of the arguments¶ - in the major commerce power precedents, and that embodies an¶ attractive conception of our federalism. Such a theory should appeal¶ to originalists and believers in an evolving tradition alike.

Natives – solvency deficit



Federal involvement prevents tax revenues on tribal lands.


Guedel 09

Greg Guedel, Chair of the Native American Legal Services group at Foster Pepper PLLC, Newstex, Native American Legal Update, “Should Tribes Be Allowed to Tax Trust Lands?” 6/18/09.




In nearly every jurisdiction throughout the United States, local governments derive a significant portion of their operating revenue from property taxes. The money land owners pay in property taxes goes to fund basic infrastructure such as roads and schools and services such as police and fire protection. There is however one jurisdiction within which the local government cannot collect property taxes: Tribal lands held in federal trust. Tribal governments cannot impose property taxes on reservation land that has been taken into trust by the federal government, which is typically most if not all of the land owned by Tribal members within the bounds of a reservation. Tribes are thus deprived of the benefit of countless millions of dollars in revenue that would normally be available to any other municipality. With poverty and sub-standard facilities still endemic on reservations throughout America, there is a sad irony in the fact that the place where property taxes could do the most good are the only places they cannot be collected and put back into the community.The denial of taxing authority to Tribes also has another negative impact on Native Communities, this time in the context of the national consciousness. In order to make up for unavailable property tax revenue, many Tribes utilize alternative income sources such as casino gaming and discounted tobacco products to finance basic services within their reservations. Since in most states these offerings are only available within the sovereign territory of a Tribe, many Americans hold an ill-informed view that Native Americans enjoy "special privileges", and that other benefits and services to Tribes should therefore be curtailed. The lack of understanding of why these alternative revenue sources are necessary could perhaps be overcome by touring the decrepit infrastructure with which many Tribal Communities continue to be saddled, but such ventures by non-Natives are far from routine. There's no insurmountable obstacle to allowing Tribes to tax land within their jurisdictions. The federal government could enter into taxing agreements with Tribes that would allow for collection of some form of property tax, which Tribes could help structure so as to increase revenue without placing an undue financial burden on Tribal members. Numerous models for such agreements already exist, in the form of retail sales tax compacts between state and Tribal governments for business activities occurring on reservations.
Race to Bottom

States cause race to the bottom and decrease public services


Oates 99 [William E. Oates, September 1999, “An Essay on Fiscal Federalism”, Journal of Economic Literature, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/2564874] aw
The general idea of decentralizing the provision of public services to the jurisdictions of concern has been widely recognized. It manifests itself clearly on both sides of the Atlantic. We see it in Europe under the nomenclature of the "principle of subsidiarity," where it is explicitly enshrined in the Maastrict Treaty as a fundamental principle for European union. In the U.S., it often appears more informally as an aversion to the "one size fits all" approach. Somewhat paradoxically, however, this view is the subject of a widespread and fundamental challenge both at the theoretical and policy levels. The source of this challenge is the claim that interjurisdictional competition among decentralized levels of govern- ment introduces serious allocative dis- tortions. In their eagerness to promote economic development with the crea- tion of new jobs (so the argument goes), state and local officials tend to hold down tax rates and, consequently, out- puts of public services so as to reduce the costs for existing and prospective business enterprise. This results in a "race to the bottom" with suboptimal outputs of public services.24

States are “racing to the bottom” to attract business


Cornell and Taylor 2000

(Stephen Cornell, Director


Professor of Sociology and of Public Administration and Policy
Faculty Associate, Native Nations Institute At Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy, Jonathan Taylor, research fellow at the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, and a senior policy scholar at the Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy at the University of Arizona 06-26-00, “Sovereignty, Devolution, and the Future of Tribal-state Relations” http://nni.arizona.edu/pubs/tribal%20state%20relations.pdf

Some of the critics of devolution argue that it pits government against government in a “race to the bottom” to make regulations less and less stringent in order to attract business. For example, the critics of the New Federalism argue that as states compete with each other for business, they will move toward the least common denominator in environmental or workplace regulation, welfare benefits, taxation, and the like, trying to capture business from or shift costs to other states. Similarly, critics of tribal sovereignty argue that less developed tribes will be more willing to accept hazardous wastes, relax worker safety regulation, or be otherwise overeager to attract businesses by lowering standards. Tribal sovereignty, in this argument, means lax regulation that will either (a) force the state to compete with the tribe by loosening its own standards, eventually harming the public good, or (b) put the state economy, state workers, or the state environment at risk as the effects of lax tribal standards spill off the reservations into nonIndian communities and the state as a whole. Adherents of these various views use them to argue against recognizing the inherent sovereignty of tribes and as justifications for asserting state jurisdiction rather than establishing government-to-government partnerships with Indian nations. They promote a devolutionary pattern in which state power grows relative to tribal power, and tribal self-determination becomes increasingly hostage to state actions.
Race to Bottom



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