Tampa Prep 2009-2010 Impact Defense File
AT: Iran Blocks Strait of Hormuz
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- AT: Iran – Central Asian Expansion
- AT: Iran Prolif 1/2
AT: Iran Blocks Strait of HormuzIran would not and could not block the Straits of Hormuz: Empirical examples and allies prove Fattouh 07 (Bassam, Consultant Senior Research Fellow at Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, specialist in the international oil pricing system, “How Secure are Middle East Oil Supplies?”, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, September) http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/WPM33.pdf Many believe that the narrowness of shipping lanes and the difficulty of oil tankers to manoeuvre make the Straits of Hormuz vulnerable to politically-motivated disruptions. However, history suggests otherwise. In 1983, the Iranians threatened to close the Straits of Hormuz following the delivery of French planes to Iraq. In a radio announcement, Hashimi Rafsanjani (the Speaker of the Parliament) threatened that Iran would block the Straits of Hormuz by sinking a VLCC at the mouth of the Persian Gulf (El-Shazly, 1998). In what was known as the Iraq–Iran ‘Tanker War’, there were 554 attacks on oil tankers in the Straits of Hormuz which resulted in the deaths of 400 sailors and the wounding of 400 more. These attacks did not result in a full blockage of transit. Even when the fight was at its most intense, it disrupted no more than 2% of ships passing through the Persian Gulf (Blair and Lieberthal, 2007). In the current confrontations between the US and Iran on Iran’s nuclear program, threats to block the straits of Hormuz are again being made. In 2006, the Iranian deputy Basij commander, General Majid Mir Ahmadi, threatened to block oil traffic if the West hurt Iran’s economy over its nuclear program. It is, however, very difficult to envisage a scenario in which the Straits of Hormuz would be blocked for a long period of time. Blocking the Straits of Hormuz would defy international conventions and would increase Iran’s isolation. The closure of this oil transit route would alienate Iran’s allies in Asia and elsewhere as the adverse impacts of the blockade would spread across the globe. In other words, the use of this ‘weapon’ is completely indiscriminate and if Iran attempted to block international shipping, it would face a very wide and powerful coalition. AT: Iran – Central Asian ExpansionIran can’t expand into Central Asia, there are differences in Islamic ideology Amland – US Army Colonel 4/7/03 (George S., USMC, United States Army War College “GLOBALIZATION AND US FOREIGN POLICY WITH IRAN” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA413445) MFR On the northern borders of Iran, a different form of economic globalization is affecting US containment policy. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the US took immediate steps to recognize the independence of all the former Central Asian Republics. By mid-1992 all 5 new states received US diplomatic missions and in October 1992 the US Congress had passed the Freedom Support Act to provide aid to the new Eurasian states. Ostensibly the US also admitted to the dangers the region faced from Iranian sponsored fundamentalism and was determined not to let the opportunity of exerting regional influence pass by.73 An interesting phenomenon of this northern Iranian geo-strategic region is that while the adjoining states are predominantly Muslim, the long term secular Russian presence has made their form of religious ideology incompatible with that of Iran.74 Across central Asia, a parallel form of Islam existed during the Soviet domination. Sufi orders established a pervasive form of Islam that is founded on private piety and not in political activism.75 Iran erroneously assumed that with the fall of the Soviet Union it would fill the void with a more fundamentalist and revolutionary Islamic presence in order to consolidate its position in the Caspian region. Fortunately for US policy, the years of Marxist ideology and Russian technocracy appears to have irretrievably altered the religious complexion of regional Muslims.76 The best that Iran can hope for in the future is some form of economic cooperation with its northern neighbors.77 An interesting political irony also has evolved throughout this process. Despite the overwhelming Islamic prominence in this region, the acceleration of the integration of Central Asia into the global economy is strongly supported by the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America. As this is one of the founders of the Jewish political lobby in the US, this support has sent strong signals to the European, Asian and Middle East Jewish communities and created implications for Iranian integration in the process.78 AT: Iran Prolif 1/21. The U.S. will apply sanctions, which solve the impact Michael Jacobson (senior fellow in the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a former senior adviser in the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence at the U.S. Department of the Treasury) 2008: Sanctions against Iran: A Promising Struggle. http://www.twq.com/08summer/docs/08summer_jacobson.pdf The Treasury Department’s role at the center of a major national security initiative is part of a broader shift in the department’s post–September 11 mission. In the past, the department, like other finance ministries around the world, focused largely on economic and financial issues and was often reluctant to get involved in these types of matters. Although there are several reasons for the Treasury Department’s relative success, the most important factor relates to the United States’ status as the world’s leading financial center. Paulson stated that the Treasury Department “can effectively use these tools largely because the United States is the key hub of the global financial system; we are the banker to the world.”25 Losing access to the U.S. market is not a worthwhile risk for most banks for the sake of maintaining business ties to designated terrorists or WMD proliferators.26 As such, banks from around the world refer to the Treasury Department designation list, which exists not only for Iran-related targets, but also for terrorists, drug traffickers, and other rogue actors, and implement U.S. unilateral sanctions voluntarily. As a result, according to the department, U.S. unilateral sanctions are “anything but.”27 Financial institutions are particularly eager to avoid being the “next ABN AMRO,” the Dutch bank fined $80 million by the United States in 2005 for having an inadequate program in place to ensure compliance with the U.S. sanctions against Iran and Libya. The Financial Times noted that the fine sent “seismic waves through the international banking system” and that “reverberations are still being felt today.”28 The specific warnings issued by Treasury Department leadership have greatly amplified the impact of U.S. unilateral measures. In a March 2007 speech, Stuart Levey, undersecretary of the treasury for terrorism and financial intelligence, stated that “those who are tempted to deal with targeted high-risk actors are put on notice: if they continue this relationship, they may be next.”29 Although the speech itself received little public attention, it was duly noted by financial institutions throughout the world.30 Recent reports that two British banks, Lloyds TSB and Barclays, are under investigation by the Department of Justice and the Manhattan district attorney’s office for possible violations of the Iran sanctions regime should only heighten the financial sector’s concern.31 The fact that the oil market has traditionally been priced in dollars gives the United States additional leverage against Iran. To complete oil-related transactions, foreign banks convert assets into dollars, generally through the U.S. system, thus exposing their institution to potential U.S. sanctions. Stuart Eizenstat, former deputy secretary of the treasury, explained that this is why “[s]anctions involving banks and financial institutions are the most significant” aspect of the U.S. government’s overall Iran strategy.32 The financial institutions’ decisions have also been driven by reputational risk considerations. Maintaining stellar reputations is one of a bank’s top priorities. Avoiding the type of specific risk outlined by the Treasury Department makes sense from a business perspective.33 Furthermore, as Paulson observed, once some private-sector entities have taken action, it becomes “a greater reputational risk for others not to follow, and so they often do.”34 Targeted financial measures themselves also have a number of advantages over traditional, broad-based trade sanctions. First, targeted financial measures are designed to be regime hostile and people friendly, causing economic harm to the entities designated but not to innocent civilians.35 Second, the Treasury Department has employed these tools in a graduated manner, giving Iran numerous opportunities to alter their behavior before further measures are imposed. As a result, the department is able to demonstrate that the purpose of such measures is not simply to punish the Iranian regime, but also to encourage a change in behavior. This has facilitated U.S. efforts to build international support for these actions, which is key to their overall success.36 2. UN action will prevent a nuclear Iran – China will be on board Dingli Shen (professor and executive dean at the Institute of International Studies and deputy director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai) 2006: Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions Test China’s Wisdom. http://www.twq.com/06spring/docs/06spring_shen.pdf The Iranian nuclear issue has reached a turning point. Iran claims that it is entitled to nuclear sovereignty over civilian nuclear power and has denied that it has had a nuclear weapons program. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not been able to present definitive evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program over the past two decades1 or for the UN Security Council to take action until March 2006.2 Meanwhile, in his 2002 State of the Union speech, President George W. Bush signaled his intention to keep a spotlight on Iran when he labeled it part of the “axis of evil,” alongside North Korea and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.3 In the years since, however, Washington has not been able to thwart Iran’s pursuit of uranium enrichment diplomatically4 or to reach a political consensus to use force. For the past two years, the European Union-3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) have been making reconciliatory efforts with Iran but have met with little success. The EU-3 have proposed to offer Iran a lightwater reactor (LWR), nuclear fuel, and technology, but such offers are contingent on Iran suspending its uranium conversion.5 Otherwise, the EU-3 will not help to resolve this issue within the IAEA. Efforts to deal with the Iranian nuclear issue through an even broader concert of global powers, the permanent members of the UN Security Council (P-5) and Germany, could lead the Security Council to consider the matter in March unless a settlement can be reached, such as the Russian enrichment offer.6 In the face of these past failures and present challenges, China, a P-5 member, could be forced to consider acting with the other major powers to curb Iran’s nuclear ambition. The Iranian nuclear case thus presents China’s leaders with a prime opportunity to demonstrate their ability to balance their domestic interests with their responsibilities as a growing global power. China’s rise has brought its multifaceted national interests to the fore and into competition with one another, including securing stable and cooperative relations with other major powers; developing peaceful relations with neighbors and nearby states, including Iran; and gaining access to sufficient and reliable resources to sustain the nation’s growing economy. On one hand, China has been increasingly supportive of the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, eager to be viewed as a “responsible stakeholder” within the international community.7 At the same time, however, China’s economic boom has resulted in an energy thirst that is now affecting Beijing’s foreign policy. Conventional wisdom holds that the friendly relationships that Beijing is cultivating with Iran, Myanmar, Sudan, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe, among others, all of which have strained relations with the United States, are more or less tied to its petroleum needs. 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