Tampa Prep 2009-2010 Impact Defense File



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Ext #1 – Not A Threat



China conflict unlikely – two reasons.

Desker 6/25/08 – dean Rajartnam School of International Studies, NTU [Barry, “Why war is unlikely in Asia,” The Straits Times, 6/25/08, http://www.asiaone.com/News/the%2BStraits%2BTimes/Story/A1Story20080625-72716.html]

the rise of China does not automatically mean that conflict is likely. First, a more assertive China does not mean a more aggressive China. Beijing appears content to press its claims peacefully (if forcefully) through existing avenues and institutions. Second, when we examine the Chinese military buildup, we find that there may be less there than some might have us believe. The Chinese war machine is not quite as threatening - although still worrisome - as some fear.>
China military weak – lack of experience.

Record 12/6/01 – professor strategy and international security Air War College, senior research fellow Center for International strategy, Technology, and Policy [Dr. Jeffrey, “Thinking about China and war,” Aerospace Power Journal, 12/6/01, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/win01/record.html]

China’s sole strategically impressive war-fighting suit has been the quantity of its ground forces, which counts for little in the pursuit of offshore imperial ambitions. Asserting and maintaining dominance over Taiwan and the South China Sea require mastery of air and naval power—arenas in which the United States is peerless and likely to remain so for decades (assuming no retreat to isolationism plus a determination to maintain both conventional military supremacy and a forward military presence in East Asia—neither to be taken for granted). Chinese naval and air forces are rudimentary by US standards, but perhaps an even greater deficiency is the absence of any modern combat experience. China has not fought a major war since Korea (where US airpower pummeled the PLA), whereas the United States has had a virtual cornucopia of such experience since the end of the Cold War. Practice may not make perfect, but it is surely better than sitting on the military bench for almost half a century. (China’s brief and highly restricted invasion of Vietnam in 1979 pitted masses of poorly armed and trained Chinese troops against better-equipped North Vietnamese combat veterans.)>
China lacks allies.

Record 12/6/01 – professor strategy and international security Air War College, senior research fellow Center for International strategy, Technology, and Policy [Dr. Jeffrey, “Thinking about China and war,” Aerospace Power Journal, 12/6/01, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/win01/record.html]

<In addition to naval and air inferiority, China would approach war with the United States with significant strategic disadvantages. Regionwide suspicion of China’s imperial ambitions has deprived Beijing of significant allies and even friends in East Asia, whereas the United States is rich in both. India remains a strategic competitor, and Chinese behavior in the South China Sea has alienated most of Southeast Asia. The post–Cold War rapprochement between China and Russia has not eliminated centuries-old national and racial animosities between the two countries, animosities that can be heightened only by the growth of Chinese economic influence and demographic “aggression” in the RFE. In any event, Russian military power has virtually evaporated in Asia. A robust, land-based strategic nuclear deterrent is the only real asset that Moscow could make available to China in a Sino-American war, but it staggers the mind to imagine that Russia would invite its own destruction on behalf of promoting Chinese interests in East Asia.>
US NAVAL SUPERIORITY IS HUGE FOR LOTS OF REASONS 

Rosemont, 2/9/08 [Contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus (www.fpif.org), is distinguished professor emeritus at St. Mary's College of Maryland and a visiting scholar in the Religious Studies department at Brown University, http://www.speroforum.com/site/article.asp?id=14304] 

China’s weakest link is naval. It has no blue ocean navy,6 and it is difficult to imagine how it could dream of building one. Of the 21 large aircraft carriers operational in the world right now, 12 are American, with a total landing space of 75 acres.7 The carriers belonging to the rest of the world have 15 acres altogether. None of the other aircraft carriers belongs to China. So, the score is rather lopsided on the naval front: the United States 12, China 0.  The picture is similar for submarines. In a 2005 Atlantic Monthly article Robert Kaplan issued the dire warning that “The Middle East is just a blip. The American military contest with China in the Pacific will define the 21st century. And China will be a more formidable adversary than Russia ever was.” Kaplan cites as one important piece of “evidence” supporting his doom and gloom scenarios the fact that “ The Chinese are investing in both diesel-powered and nuclear-powered submarines – a clear signal that they intend not only to protect their coasts but also to expand their influence far out into the Pacific.” [italics added]  In the first place, the Chinese might have a hard time “expanding their influence far out into the Pacific” because so many U.S. soldiers, sailors, marines, and air force personnel are already stationed in the region. There are 18,000 troops stationed in Alaska, 60,000 in Hawai’i, 37,000 in Japan, 5,000 on Guam, and 30,000 in South Korea. Again, the Chinese number is zero. The United States has over 700 military installations outside its borders overall, while the Chinese have none at present.8  Kaplan’s supposedly “clear signal” of expansion rests on the fact that the Chinese already have 55 submarines, and have a few more under construction. But 50 of these are diesel-powered9 and hence must surface or near-surface every few days to take in oxygen. This makes them more vulnerable to detection and destruction (by U.S. reconnaissance satellites and missile launchers) than nuclear submarines. Although formidable vessels, these diesel submarines are in the end not even a secure defense against the highly sophisticated technology of the world’s sole superpower, let alone a military threat to it. Strictly in terms of deterrence, then, it is unsurprising that the Chinese would like more nuclear-powered submarines than the five that are currently operational for protecting their shores.10  On the other hand, the United States currently has 72 submarines, all of which are nuclear-powered. And more are on the way, including the Virginia-class attack submarine, not a vessel designed for defense. Perhaps most frightening for the Chinese are the U.S. underwater capabilities in the Pacific, where the Navy maintains two-thirds of its strategic submarine forces. “At least 2 of these submarines are kept on “hard alert” in the Pacific at all times, meaning they’re ready to fire within 15 minutes of a launch order,” write Keir Lieber and Daryl Press. “Since each submarine carries 24 nuclear-tipped missiles with an average of six warheads per missile, commanders have almost 300 warheads ready for immediate use. This is more than enough to assign multiple warheads to each of the 18 silos in which the Chinese have nuclear missiles capable of reaching the US. Chinese leaders would have little or no warning of the attack.” 



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