Eliot A. Cohen. Why the Gap Matters - gap between military and civilian world. The National Interest. http://www.dtic.mil/miled/pamphlet/AFO18.pdf.
The major doctrinal statements about the use of force in the last twenty years--Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's six rules for intervention, and General Powell's doctrine of overwhelming force--reflect views dominant in the officer corps, views in turn molded by the military's understanding of the Vietnam War. They were echoed by politicians who believed, or found it convenient to declare that they believed, that the job of politicians was merely to set objectives, not scrutinize military plans, monitor the conduct of operations, and adjust strategy to circumstances. This trend reflects a combination of developments, including a common (mis)reading of the Vietnam War, an unwillingness on the part of civilian leaders to accept the responsibilities levied upon them by their offices, and a confidence in the technical expertise of soldiers. Recent doctrine, however, has flaws of the most terrible kind, for it presumes a kind of universal, apolitical and objective military expertise, when military judgmen t is, in fact, highly contextual and contingent, intimately connected with the politics of a situation and subject to a variety of prejudices and personal experiences. Still, the truth is that for the most part civilian political leaders have given up on the kind of hard questioning and probing that characterized the leadership style of those presidents who believed in civilian control and exercised it best--Lincoln, Roosevelt and Eisenhower among them. Each of these leaders, in different and large ways, violated massively the simplistic doctrine of civilian control that is current in the military and Congress: namely, politicians should set objectives and then get out of the way.
3. Impact is exaggerated
Cohen 2000. Former Secretary of Defense.
Eliot A. Cohen. Why the Gap Matters - gap between military and civilian world. The National Interest. http://www.dtic.mil/miled/pamphlet/AFO18.pdf.
THE PARADOX of increased social and institutional vulnerability on the one hand and increased military influence on narrow sectors of policymaking on the other is the essence of the contemporary civil-military problem. Its roots lie not in the machinations of power hungry generals; they have had influence thrust upon them. Nor do they lie in the fecklessness of civilian leaders determined to remake the military in the image of civil society; all militaries must, in greater or lesser degree, share some of the mores and attitudes of the broader civilization from which they have emerged. The problem reflects, rather, deeper and more enduring changes in politics, society and technology. The challenge to American policymakers and soldiers lies in admitting that there is a problem without exaggerating its size and scope. There is no danger of a coup, but there is dry rot. There is no threat even of a MacArthur-sized crisis between political and military high commands, but there is a level of mistrust, antipathy and condescension that is worrisome. There is no fear of collapse of civilian control, but there is erosion in some areas, distortion in others, and, more than anything else, confusion about the meaning of military professionalism under the new conditions--plus sheer ignorance and forgetfulness about what civilian control entails. What are the solutions?
AT: Chavez
We should ignore Chavez rather than try to isolate him -- he uses US opposition to increase support and influence
Jennifer McCoy Professor, Political Science Georgia State University CQ Congressional Testimony July 17, 2008 The Bush Administration has learned to ignore rather than respond to much of Chavez' inflammatory rhetoric. This change in attitude will help to mitigate the U.S. role as a "foil" to Venezuela's anti-imperialist stance and should be continued. The U.S. refusal to extradite to Venezuelan citizen Luis Posadas Carriles on charges of terrorism (accused of masterminding the 1976 bombing of a Cuban plane) presents a U.S. double-standard on issues of terrorism.
Lessons for the future - what can and should the U.S. do?
A new U.S. administration offers the opportunity to begin anew with Venezuela in a more amicable and cooperative relationship. However, Washington should not expect major change given the fundamental foreign policy goals of the Chavez administration and the Bolivarian Revolution: to increase Venezuela's national autonomy, to increase the global South's autonomy vis-a-vis the North, and to lessen U.S. dominance in the region and the world. Venezuela will continue its attempts to diversify its oil export markets and to build coalitions to create a more multipolar world and a more integrated South.
A new U.S.foreign policy toward Venezuela should start with positive signals and focus on pragmatic concerns of interest to both countries - commercial relations, counter-narcotics, and security on the Venezuelan-Colombia border. The U.S. should make clear that it respects the sovereign right of the Venezuelan people to choose their leadership (as they have done consistently in voting for Hugo Chavez) and that the U.S. has no intent to engineer regime change in Venezuela. A more consistent policy across the executive branch would help to reinforce this message, as in the past the Pentagon has continued negative descriptions of the Chavez administration even while the State Department tried to moderate its rhetoric.
Chavez's own policies are bringing him down The New York Times June 15, 2008 It turns out that Hugo Chavez is an adaptable man. The Venezuelan president, who has championed -- and almost certainly helped arm -- Colombia's FARC rebels, called last week for the rebels to lay down their weapons and unconditionally surrender their hostages. We suspect this change of heart has been driven more by self-interest than conviction. Mr. Chavez is increasingly unpopular at home and increasingly isolated abroad, especially as evidence has mounted of his meddling in Colombia. The change nevertheless is welcome and well timed.
The FARC, which long ago chose drug trafficking over liberation, has been under assault from Colombia's Army and looks as if it is unraveling. The United States, Colombia and all of Venezuela's neighbors should press Mr. Chavez to use all of his influence to get the rebels to demobilize.
There is good news inside Venezuela too. On the same weekend that Mr. Chavez turned on the FARC, he suspended a chilling new law he had enacted by decree that would have forced Venezuelans to cooperate with the intelligence services or go to jail. He has also withdrawn a school curriculum that blasted capitalism as a force to subjugate the people.
With Venezuela's economy slowing and its inflation rate the highest in Latin America, Mr. Chavez's approval rating has plunged since December, when he narrowly lost a referendum that would have given him even more power and allowed him to run for re-election indefinitely. With gubernatorial elections coming in November, he apparently decided he needed a political makeover.