Turns Case — South China Sea US-Indo coop on security is key to check SCS conflict.
Sibal 16 — Dr. Kanwal Sibal joined the Indian Foreign Service in July 1966, eventually serving as the Foreign Secretary of India from July 2002 to November 2003. Dr. Sibal served as Ambassador of India to Egypt, France, and Turkey. He was a member of India’s National Security Advisory Board from November 2008 to November 2010. 2/9/16, What to Expect from US-India Relations in 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/what-to-expect-from-us-india-relations-in-2016/ @yangtri 7/21/16
In the past, the United States had virtually no defense ties with India. Today, apart from a renewed Defense Framework Agreement, the U.S. has become a large supplier of defense equipment to India, and even the biggest in the last few years, with contracts worth almost $13 billion. In addition, the largest number Indian joint military exercises are with the United States. Robust language has appeared in joint India-U.S. statements in 2013, 2014, and 2015 on defense cooperation. However, so far, less than expected progress has been made in the area of defense manufacturing under the so-called Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI). During Obama’s visit to India, four “pathfinder” projects under the DTTI rubric involving relatively minor technologies were announced. Contacts between the two sides under this U.S. initiative continue. Two other projects of note, one on aircraft carrier technology and the other on jet engine technology, are also under discussion. U.S.-China tensions are growing, and, India too has longstanding disputes with China. The 2015 U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region specifically addresses maritime territorial disputes involving China and, among other things, affirmed the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and freedom of the air throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea.
US-Indo Relations key to check SCS conflict—Indian Model Checks
Biswal 16 — Nisha Desai Biswal is an Indian-American who is Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs in the United States Department of State. She was previously Assistant Administrator for Asia at the US Agency for International Development (USAID). She was nominated for the post of Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia by US President Barack Obama on 19 July 2013. Biswal immigrated to the U.S. from India with her parents. May 24, 2016, U.S.-India Relations: Balancing Progress and Managing Expectations, http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2016/257665.htm, @yangtri 7/19/16
The impressive bilateral architecture of the U.S.–India partnership reflects the investment both countries have made in building ties between our people, our industries, our governments, and our security establishments. It has created a platform for an unprecedented level of cooperation meant to grow our respective economies and make our citizens more secure. India represents a key part of the Administration’s Asia policy. To be sure, India’s Act East strategy and the U.S. Rebalance to Asia are complementary and mutually reinforcing, promising to bring greater security and prosperity to the Indo-Pacific region. And at a time of new challenges from both state- and non-state actors to the modern international rules-based order, India has increasingly taken a strong stand in defending a system that has sustained global security and prosperity for over seven decades. Nowhere is this expressed more clearly than in our Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, issued by President Obama and Prime Minister Modi last year, which enshrined our mutual commitment to safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight throughout the region, including in the South China Sea. And India has provided the world with an excellent model of how a large power can peacefully resolve territorial and maritime disputes with its smaller neighbors. By accepting the results of international arbitration on disputed maritime claims in the Bay of Bengal, India – along with Bangladesh and Burma – created a template for others to follow. Taken together, it is clear that a strong and long-term strategic partnership with India is the best way we can ensure open and secure access to the global commons across the Indo-Pacific and beyond.
Turns Case — China Relations Strong India relations key to prevent war with China.
Mehta and Gould 16 — Aaron Mehta, Senior Pentagon correspondent, Joe Gould, Congressional reporter, 2016 ”Modi Visit Underlines Changed India-US Relationship,” June 5, Available Online at http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/2016/06/05/modi-visit-underlines-changed-india-us-relationship/85188894/ Accessed 07-20-2016, PAM)
Ashley Tellis, a former State Department official now with the Carnegie Endowment, calls the Modi visit “a culmination of what Obama has tried to do since he came into office, adding that “executive branch to executive branch — that is a dramatic transformation where the US today sees India as a security partner of choice in the broader Indo-Pacific region.” Once chilly over India's nuclear tests, the US-India defense relationship now features technology exchanges, joint military exercises and, of late, an intensified maritime security dialogue undoubtedly meant to send a signal to China. Frank Wisner, an ambassador to India under President Clinton, said for all these reasons, the barriers to the relationship are no longer political, but based only on bureaucracy for the US and defense budgets for India. "This is one of the biggest, fastest moving defense relationships in the world, period," said Wisner, now with the international law firm Squire Patton Boggs, adding later: "We have an interest in an India that is robustly armed. India is not a predatory power, and she is big enough and important enough that she helps anchor the balance of power in Asia. A good relationship with India is part of a good relationship with China.”
Turns Case — Chinese Aggression US-India ties critical to check Chinese aggression, keep sea lanes open, and combat terrorism
Leaf 14—Paul J. Leaf, formerly worked for the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, a regular commentator on foreign policy, attorney at an international law firm, and a former editor of the Stanford Law Review, 2014. (“With China on the Rise, America Must Woo India,” The National Interest, September 15th, Available Online http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-the-rise-america-must-woo-india-11275, Accessed 07-21-2016, p. 1, aqp)
There are many motivations for wooing India. It has the world’s second largest population and is projected to surpass China’s by 2028. As measured by GDP, India’s economy is the third largest in Asia. New Delhi fields the world’s second largest army, its military budget exceeds $38 billion (up 12 percent over the previous year), it is expected to become the world’s fourth largest defense spender by 2020, and it has been the world’s top arms importer since 2010. India is enhancing its power-projection capabilities, including by developing long-range nuclear missiles and manufacturing indigenous nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers. The country shares a 2,500-mile border with China and sits near critical chokepoints in the Indian Ocean, through which over 80 percent of the world’s seaborne oil passes, along with almost one third of global trade. Given its strength and location, India can shape Asia’s balance of power in favor of or against China, depending on whether it deepens its cooperation with the United States and China’s competitors.
While in many respects, India is a natural U.S. ally, its partnership should not be assumed. These democracies’ overlapping interests include avoiding a hostile Chinese rise, maintaining open sea-lanes to meet their energy needs and combatting terrorism. But New Delhi’s history of nonalignment dampens its willingness to militarily partner with other countries. After all, India seeks favorable relations with all countries to maximize its benefits from each, and Modi came to office promising significant economic development after India’s average annual growth dipped from approximately 9 percent for over seven years to under 5 percent since 2012. Given doubts about U.S. security commitments in Asia and India’s deep economic ties to China (which is New Delhi’s largest trade partner and a growing investment source), these preferences are amplified vis-à-vis anti-China coalitions. Indeed, during the recent summit between Modi and Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe, the leaders struck economic deals, but failed to finalize pending security agreements. Perhaps Modi sought to encourage Chinese investment in his country and avoid upsetting Chinese president Xi Jinping before his scheduled India visit later this month.
US-India alliance key to deter China and ensure peace
Kumar 16—Sumit Kumar, ICSSR Doctoral Fellow at the UGC Centre for Southern Asian Studies, Pondicherry Central University, M.Phil, International Relations, Pondicherry Central University, 2016. (“How Modi Changed the India–US Relationship,” East Asia Forum, May 10th, Available Online at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/10/how-modi-changed-the-india-us-relationship/, Accessed 07-20-2016, aqp)
Defence [sic] cooperation has been a pillar of the two countries’ burgeoning relationship. There is a growing sentiment among US security officials and experts that, given its economic slowdown as well as security crises in the Asia Pacific, the Middle East and other regions, it is not possible for the United States alone to ensure peace and security. It needs to engage rising powers like India.
As the Modi government has accelerated the process of military modernisation, buoyed by increased foreign direct investment in the defence sector, Washington sees economic opportunities in deepening defence ties with New Delhi. The rise of China and its assertive posturing in the South China Sea is another reason for the United States to expand security and military relations with India.
India is concerned by China’s position on disputed territories and by the growing nexus between Beijing and Islamabad. New Delhi feels that the presence of the United States in South Asia would help maintain the balance of power in its favour. The Modi government also knows it cannot aggressively pursue military modernisation without access to advanced US weaponry and technology.
Turns Case — Contain China US-India ties key to contain China
Leaf 14—Paul J. Leaf, formerly worked for the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, a regular commentator on foreign policy, attorney at an international law firm, and a former editor of the Stanford Law Review, 2014. (“With China on the Rise, America Must Woo India,” The National Interest, September 15th, Available Online http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-the-rise-america-must-woo-india-11275, Accessed 07-21-2016, p. 2-3, aqp)
At least in the short term, while China’s aggression is focused on the East and South China Seas, India will continue its policies of strategic autonomy and playing its suitors off of each other to maximize concessions from each. But in the longer run, China will likely accelerate its current push into India’s backyard. For example, controlling the East and South China Seas is insufficient for Beijing because the flow of oil and trade to China through those waters can be blocked by New Delhi at chokepoints in the Indian Ocean. Accordingly, India may eventually be willing to oppose China alongside the United States.
But even if no U.S.-Indian mutual-defense treaty ever arises, Washington should solidify its relationship with New Delhi. First, doing so will reduce doubts about U.S. staying power in Asia. China will be more likely to hesitate before challenging America’s regional friends, and those countries will be emboldened to resist China’s bullying. Second, strengthening India economically and militarily will help to contain China, even if those efforts take place independent of America’s. Indeed, the gap between Indian and Chinese power will narrow and India will be better positioned to enhance its neighbors’ military capacities and to lead (or at least co-lead) those smaller countries in balancing China (which, given India’s sensitivity to playing America’s deputy sheriff, New Delhi may prefer over a U.S.-Indian alliance led by Washington).
The Obama-Modi meeting will take place shortly after Xi visits Modi. Obama must take bold steps to show Modi that India’s future is best secured by closer ties to the United States and its partners.
Turns Case — Prevents China Rise Strong US-Indo Relations ensures deterrence of China and peace in Asia
Curtis & Cheng 11- Lisa Curtis is Senior Research Fellow for South Asia, and Dean Cheng is Research Fellow in Chinese Political and Security Affairs, in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation. July 18, 2011, The China Challenge: A Strategic Vision for U.S.–India Relations http://www.afriquechine.net/en/2011/The-China-Challenge-A-Strategic-Vision-for-U-S-India-Relations.pdf @yangtri 7/19/16
The U.S. should pursue robust strategic and military engagement with India in order to encourage a stable balance of power in Asia that prevents China from dominating the region and surrounding seas. The U.S. and India share a broad strategic interest in setting limits to China’s geopolitical horizons and can work together to support mutually reinforcing goals without becoming “allies” in the traditional sense. The U.S. should support India’s military modernization campaign, including its quest for increasingly sophisticated technologies, and develop new initiatives for keeping the Indian Ocean safe and secure. Additionally, the U.S. should remain closely engaged with the smaller South Asian states and temper any expectations that the U.S. and China can cooperate in South Asia, where India remains the predominant power.
Share with your friends: |