The [first/next] off-case position is the india da: First, us-india relations are high and driven by mutual distrust towards China
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- US-India relations are low — deep-seated division inevitable. This takes into account recent Modi efforts.
- US-India relations are low at the core of relations – Obama administration has ruined previously good cooperation
- US-Indo ties low; laundry list of reasons – symbolic gestures don’t resolve
- India can’t expect the US to step in against China
- US India won’t cooperate just because they’re democracies—alt causes
- Relations Low Now — India Says No
- Relations Low — A2: Burns
- Relations Low — Pakistan Coop
- Alt causes to relations — Pakistan.
- US-India relations will never be high – too many political differences.
- US-India relations failing – different strategic interests
- Alliance has structural barriers – can’t solve South Asian instability
- US-Indo Relations inevitable
- US-Indo Relations inevitable as long as China is a regional power
- Alt Cause to relations – laundry list
Affirmative AnswersUniquenessRelations Low Now — GeneralUS-India relations low now — Congress.Chandran 6/6 — Nyshka Chandran, writer for CNBC, focus on Asia-Pacific economies and politics, bachelor’s degree in Political Science and History from University of Toronto, 2016 (“Modi Looks to Cement US-India Ties before Obama’s Term Ends,” CNBC, June 6, Available Online at http://www.cnbc.com/2016/06/06/modi-looks-to-cement-us-india-ties-before-obamas-term-ends.html, Accessed 07/20/16, JZ) But potential deals may be hampered by growing anti-India sentiment within Congress. In May, a hearing on U.S.-India relations held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) produced numerous complaints about Indian policies that discouraged U.S. investment. "We're not as brutally honest about our relationship with India as we should be, and it benefits neither them nor us," remarked Bob Corker, U.S. senator and SFRC chairman, pointing to "unparalleled bureaucratic red tape", "serious concerns" about intellectual property and high tariffs as examples. New Delhi also came under criticism for its human rights record. "How does a country like this have 12 to 14 million slaves?" Corker said in May. "Do they have just zero prosecution abilities, zero law enforcement; I mean how could this happen? On that scale, it's pretty incredible." A report released this month showed the heavyweight Asian economy had 18 million people--the world's highest--living in slavery, i.e. situations where a person's freedom is restricted for exploitation. Issues like these could force Modi to test his skills and mark a sharp contrast from the hype that dominated his first U.S. visit in September 2014, Gateway House remarked. "Now, the pendulum has swung a little from that happy place." US-India relations are low — deep-seated division inevitable. This takes into account recent Modi efforts.Mehta 6/5 — Aaron Mehta, 6-5-2016, " Modi Visit Underlines Changed India-US Relationship," Defense News, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/2016/06/05/modi-visit-underlines-changed-india-us-relationship/85188894/ In essence, its passage would send a new, friendly signal from Congress to India's defense establishment, which according to Schwartz, may be holding back on deals with the US for a fighter jet or other major systems because it remembers the era of US sanctions and hence views the US as an unreliable partner. Deepening ties do not mean everyone in Washington and New Delhi see eye to eye. In a Feb. 25 letter to Modi, a bipartisan group of 32 US lawmakers raised concerns over intolerance toward non-Hindu faiths in India. Rep. Joe Pitts, R-Pa., led the letter's signatories and was one of one of the key players behind denying Modi a US visa some years back over his alleged negligence during the 2002 anti-Muslim massacre in Gujarat. A Modi spokesman called the letter "unfortunate" and said it focused unduly on a few aberrant incidents. An Indian court on Thursday convicted 24 people of involvement in the 2002 riots, in which 1,000 people died. "I’m a firm supporter of greater engagement with India, including a deepening of our military relationship," Pitts said in a June 2 statement. "However, many observers are concerned that the human rights climate is heading in the wrong direction. Prioritizing high human rights standards, especially with regard to religious freedom, is essential to navigating this deepening friendship and bolstering security in the region.” Another argument in Washington against special status for India, according to Schwartz, has been that because India is not a treaty ally and has not sent soldiers to fight alongside US troops in recent wars, it's not deserving. Yet the US needs India, with its demographic and economic weight, to provide a counterweight to China, and must help sew up India's gaps in military technology, he said. "This shouldn't be about giving out gold stars when deepening the relationship is a fundamental national security interest," Schwartz said. US-India relations are low at the core of relations – Obama administration has ruined previously good cooperationSirohi 14 — Seema Sirohi, January 3rd, 2014, "Indo-US relations: A big chill descends," No Publication, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/01/indo-us-relations-big-chill-descends-2014135227564694.html The Barack Obama administration seems to be losing the plot on India. Otherwise why would it burn India-US relations over a nanny’s wages? But that in a nutshell is the current state of play. It threatens to destroy years of hard work behind this important relationship, one that was meant to reconfigure the geopolitics of Asia. The unexpected and entirely avoidable crisis was triggered by the humiliating treatment of an Indian diplomat at the hands of the US law enforcement officers. It provoked massive outrage in New Delhi but Washington doesn’t understand why. The American surprise and bafflement at the extent of the Indian anger shows a curious lack of political insight. It also shows a failure to understand the basic governing principles of good relations. The public arrest and strip-search of Devyani Khobragade, India’s deputy consul general in New York, on December 12 last year has the Indian establishment fuming. And for good reason. A diplomat embodies the sovereignty of a country and must be treated with dignity. More so because the US diplomats in India and other countries enjoy benefits far in excess of what they grant in return. But their complete disregard for diplomatic conventions, norms and courtesies in Khobragade’s case has put a knife through bilateral relations. They have ensured that 2014 will be spent mostly fixing what should never have been broken. A defining partnership President Obama, who has called India-US relations the "defining partnership of the 21st century", has kept his distance. The White House political managers too are missing in action. Surely, they understand the need to box the problem before it spreads through the entire system. Hard work and political acumen are required in American-style extra-large helpings. Washington must consider the long-term implications: India-US relations are important for regional stability in South Asia, for the security of Afghanistan as US troops depart and for the long fight against the forces of religious conservatism. Above all they are important for ensuring a fair balance of power in Asia and China’s peaceful rise. US-Indo ties low; laundry list of reasons – symbolic gestures don’t resolveLadwig 15 — Walter C. Ladwig III, Lecturer in International Relations, Department of War Studies at King’s College London, 2015 (“Relations between the US and India Look Better Today,” The Telegraph, January 24, Available Online at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/11366903/Relations-between-the-US-and-India-look-better-today.html, Accessed 07/20/16, JZ) The importance of symbolic gestures and warm personal ties between leaders should not be underestimated, but what of the substance of Indo-US ties? The bilateral relationship has never been short of critics who contend that its benefits were oversold. Such critiques are certainly not without merit. On a number of key issues, such as trade, climate change, and aspects of foreign policy, the US and India have found themselves on the opposite sides of the debate. The United States would like to deepen its commercial ties with India, however, the two sides have been actively locked in a trade dispute over access to the Indian market for agricultural imports that nearly brought down the Doha round of trade negations in the World Trade Organisation. When it comes to the climate, the United States would like to encourage India’s move towards renewable energy and perhaps even secure an agreement to cap emissions of greenhouse gases. Conversely, the priority for India is economic development, not reduction of carbon emissions. Indeed, New Delhi is keen to gain access to America’s burgeoning supply of natural gas to fuel its growing economy. Finally, the US and India have been at odds on a range of foreign policy issues in recent years, such as intervention in the crises in Libya and Syria or response to Iran’s nuclear program, not to mention the efforts of the so-called BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) countries to establish a New Development Bank that rivals the World Bank and IMF. India can’t expect the US to step in against ChinaSibal 16 — Dr. Kanwal Sibal joined the Indian Foreign Service in July 1966, eventually serving as the Foreign Secretary of India from July 2002 to November 2003. Dr. Sibal served as Ambassador of India to Egypt, France, and Turkey. He was a member of India’s National Security Advisory Board from November 2008 to November 2010. 2/9/16, What to Expect from US-India Relations in 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/what-to-expect-from-us-india-relations-in-2016/ @yangtri 7/21/16 U.S. trade and financial relations with China are vast; India too seeks stable and economically productive ties with China. India has the difficult task ahead of managing the China threat by both engaging closely with the United States and reaching out to China. At the same time, the credibility of the U.S. rebalance to Asia and the Pacific is yet to be tested. As part of closer India-U.S. understandings on the Indo-Pacific region, India and the United States have decided to include Japan in the bilateral India-U.S. Malabar naval exercises. The trilateral India-U.S.-Japan political dialogue has also been raised from the official to Ministerial level. However, India’s problems with China are principally related to ongoing border disputes arising from a boundary disagreement and Beijing’s deepening relationship with Islamabad. In both cases, India cannot count on the United State to take a position supportive of India. This points to the limits of the strategic partnership, as such a partnership falls short of supporting India’s territorial sovereignty. When it comes to deepening bilateral economic relations between the two countries, progress has been mixed. For one thing, U.S. businesses remain reluctant to invest in India because of their beliefs that the Indian government has not yet delivered on promises to ease doing business in India including taxation issues, and implement general economic reforms in the country. Nevertheless, the IT sector has brought the knowledge economies of India and the United States closer together and it constitutes the strongest link Washington has with the drivers of India’s modernization and innovation. However, the United States is unfortunately targeting this sector with higher visa costs and increased restrictions. US & India won’t cooperate just because they’re democracies—alt causesBoggs 15 — Robert Boggs, Professor of South Asia Studies at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, in Washington, D.C., and previously worked for the U.S. State Department for 32 years. The views expressed here are his own. Jan/Feb 2015 Edition, Friends Without Benefits Is the U.S.-Indian Relationship Built to Last? https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/friends-without-benefits @yangtri 7/120/16 In his critique of U.S. President Barack Obama’s India policy, Nicholas Burns (“Passage to India,” September/October 2014) correctly identifies the issues that have bedeviled U.S.-Indian relations, such as differences over international agreements on climate change and trade. But he overestimates both India’s desire to improve the relationship and the benefits doing so would bring. Like many advocates of stronger U.S.-Indian ties, Burns fails to recognize that two countries with the same system of government do not necessarily develop similar interests or policies. In the case of India, the burdens of colonialism and economic underdevelopment have led it to oppose much of the U.S. agenda. Like China, India continues to view the United States as a presumptuous superpower and competitor. And if India realizes its goal of becoming an economic powerhouse with global influence, New Delhi’s rivalry with Washington, particularly in South Asia, will likely intensify. Relations Low Now — India Says NoNo US-Indo coop now—India doesn’t want toBoggs 15 — Robert Boggs, Professor of South Asia Studies at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, in Washington, D.C., and previously worked for the U.S. State Department for 32 years. The views expressed here are his own. Jan/Feb 2015 Edition, Friends Without Benefits Is the U.S.-Indian Relationship Built to Last? https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/friends-without-benefits @yangtri 7/120/16 Although Burns writes that “the United States and India should continue to strengthen their defense and political coordination in the Asia-Pacific region,” he neglects to mention that India appears uninterested in cooperating on this front. The United States has included India in multilateral strategic discussions on the Asia-Pacific region, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, with Australia and Japan, which sought to respond to increased Chinese power, but India has not made such meetings a priority. New Delhi has also been conspicuously absent from the two combined naval task forces the United States assembled to combat terrorism and piracy in the Indian Ocean. And despite providing development assistance to Afghanistan, India has refused to participate in the International Security Assistance Force, NATO’s security mission in Afghanistan. When India does participate in multilateral organizations, it routinely opposes initiatives proposed by the United Statesl and other Western powers. India’s opposition to interfering in other countries’ domestic affairs has led New Delhi to vote against human rights resolutions in the UN General Assembly and to openly criticize UN involvement in such crises as the civil wars in Libya and Syria. New Delhi has also opposed the West on many economic issues, working with the other so-called BRICS nations—Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa—to create alternatives to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other Bretton Woods institutions. Still, Burns holds out hope that Obama and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will “work together to promote stability in India’s South Asian neighborhood.” If India’s actions are anything to go on, however, it appears that the country prefers to work alone to maintain its regional dominance—and it views the United States as a threat. As a U.S. diplomat serving in South Asia from 1985 to 2004, I watched Indian officials repeatedly pressure neighboring countries not to cooperate with Washington, often because New Delhi believed, erroneously, that such cooperation would raise the U.S. military’s profile in South Asia. In early 2014, India protested U.S. calls for fair and inclusive elections in Bangladesh because it feared that voters would not elect a pro-India party. To gain leverage over its neighbors, India has had its foreign intelligence agency provide financial support to antigovernment insurgencies in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Two of the insurgent groups India has backed—Maoist militants in Nepal and Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka—have killed thousands of civilians and been designated as terrorists by the U.S. government. Burns suggests that an increasingly powerful China may spur a stronger U.S.-Indian nexus in Asia. But even though border clashes with China have aggravated security concerns in New Delhi, Modi openly admires China’s development model and may prefer to engage China diplomatically and economically rather than try to contain it. And many Indian analysts do not believe that the United States would come to India’s defense if a U.S.-Indian military partnership provoked Chinese aggression. Modi still remains a mystery to U.S. policymakers. He appears to want the United States to help revitalize India’s economy, but it is unclear if he wants the longer-term political and defense partnership that the United States seeks in South Asia. A staunch Hindu nationalist, Modi likely wants to continue India’s quest for regional dominance, a move that would not endear him to the United States. His endorsement of his party’s vision of Akhand Bharat, or “undivided India,” which sees most of South Asia as belonging to India, does not bode well for a more accommodative regional foreign policy. Of course, India is firmly within its rights to define its own interests and chart its own strategies. But U.S.-Indian relations—and U.S. strategic interests—would be best served by a realistic appraisal of Indian values and goals, which Burns fails to provide. Contrary to Burns’ assertions, India is unlikely to become a “critical partner” to the United States anytime soon. New Delhi will strengthen its ties with Washington only if doing so serves its interests; Washington should do the same. Relations Low — A2: BurnsBurns is wrong—India has no incentive to cooperate with the USBoggs 15 — ROBERT BOGGS is Professor of South Asia Studies at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, in Washington, D.C., and previously worked for the U.S. State Department for 32 years. The views expressed here are his own. Jan/Feb 2015 Edition, Friends Without Benefits Is the U.S.-Indian Relationship Built to Last? https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/friends-without-benefits @yangtri 7/120/16 In his critique of U.S. President Barack Obama’s India policy, Nicholas Burns (“Passage to India,” September/October 2014) correctly identifies the issues that have bedeviled U.S.-Indian relations, such as differences over international agreements on climate change and trade. But he overestimates both India’s desire to improve the relationship and the benefits doing so would bring. Like many advocates of stronger U.S.-Indian ties, Burns fails to recognize that two countries with the same system of government do not necessarily develop similar interests or policies. In the case of India, the burdens of colonialism and economic underdevelopment have led it to oppose much of the U.S. agenda. Like China, India continues to view the United States as a presumptuous superpower and competitor. And if India realizes its goal of becoming an economic powerhouse with global influence, New Delhi’s rivalry with Washington, particularly in South Asia, will likely intensify. Although Burns writes that “the United States and India should continue to strengthen their defense and political coordination in the Asia-Pacific region,” he neglects to mention that India appears uninterested in cooperating on this front. The United States has included India in multilateral strategic discussions on the Asia-Pacific region, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, with Australia and Japan, which sought to respond to increased Chinese power, but India has not made such meetings a priority. New Delhi has also been conspicuously absent from the two combined naval task forces the United States assembled to combat terrorism and piracy in the Indian Ocean. And despite providing development assistance to Afghanistan, India has refused to participate in the International Security Assistance Force, NATO’s security mission in Afghanistan. When India does participate in multilateral organizations, it routinely opposes initiatives proposed by the United States and other Western powers. India’s opposition to interfering in other countries’ domestic affairs has led New Delhi to vote against human rights resolutions in the UN General Assembly and to openly criticize UN involvement in such crises as the civil wars in Libya and Syria. New Delhi has also opposed the West on many economic issues, working with the other so-called BRICS nations—Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa—to create alternatives to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other Bretton Woods institutions. Still, Burns holds out hope that Obama and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will “work together to promote stability in India’s South Asian neighborhood.” If India’s actions are anything to go on, however, it appears that the country prefers to work alone to maintain its regional dominance—and it views the United States as a threat. As a U.S. diplomat serving in South Asia from 1985 to 2004, I watched Indian officials repeatedly pressure neighboring countries not to cooperate with Washington, often because New Delhi believed, erroneously, that such cooperation would raise the U.S. military’s profile in South Asia. In early 2014, India protested U.S. calls for fair and inclusive elections in Bangladesh because it feared that voters would not elect a pro-India party. To gain leverage over its neighbors, India has had its foreign intelligence agency provide financial support to antigovernment insurgencies in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Two of the insurgent groups India has backed—Maoist militants in Nepal and Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka—have killed thousands of civilians and been designated as terrorists by the U.S. government. Burns suggests that an increasingly powerful China may spur a stronger U.S.-Indian nexus in Asia. But even though border clashes with China have aggravated security concerns in New Delhi, Modi openly admires China’s development model and may prefer to engage China diplomatically and economically rather than try to contain it. And many Indian analysts do not believe that the United States would come to India’s defense if a U.S.-Indian military partnership provoked Chinese aggression. Modi still remains a mystery to U.S. policymakers. He appears to want the United States to help revitalize India’s economy, but it is unclear if he wants the longer-term political and defense partnership that the United States seeks in South Asia. A staunch Hindu nationalist, Modi likely wants to continue India’s quest for regional dominance, a move that would not endear him to the United States. His endorsement of his party’s vision of Akhand Bharat, or “undivided India,” which sees most of South Asia as belonging to India, does not bode well for a more accommodative regional foreign policy. Of course, India is firmly within its rights to define its own interests and chart its own strategies. But U.S.-Indian relations—and U.S. strategic interests—would be best served by a realistic appraisal of Indian values and goals, which Burns fails to provide. Contrary to Burns’ assertions, India is unlikely to become a “critical partner” to the United States anytime soon. New Delhi will strengthen its ties with Washington only if doing so serves its interests; Washington should do the same. Relations Low — Pakistan CoopUS aid to Pakistan causes backlash from IndiaPant 16 —Harsh V. Pant is professor of international relations in the Defence Studies Department and the India Institute at King’s College London. He is also an adjunct fellow with the Wadhwani Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC. His current research is focused on Asian security issues. Author of novel- India’s Afghan Muddle. The Important Difference in the US-India and US-Pakistan Relationships It’s time for New Delhi to reimagine the U.S.-Pakistan-India triangle. http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/the-importance-difference-in-the-us-india-and-us-pakistan-relationships/ @yangtri 7/21/16 Last month, the Obama administration announced that it had approved the sale of up to eight F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan in a deal valued at $699 million. Immediately the decision led to a strong pushback in the U.S. Congress. The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sen. Bob Corker, raised serious concerns, stating, “They (Pakistan) continue to support the Taliban, the Haqqani network, and give safe haven to al Qaeda.” Sen. John McCain, chairman of the U.S. Senate’s influential Armed Services committee, called for a hearing in the Senate’s Foreign Relations committee to further question the timing of the United States’ sale of fighter jets to Pakistan and suggested that he “would rather have seen it kicked over into the next administration.” His colleague from Kentucky, Sen. Rand Paul, separately called for a resolution that would block U.S. arms sales to Pakistan. Members of Congress have 30 days to block the deal before it becomes official, but the Obama administration has strongly defended its decision. David McKeeby, a spokesman for the U.S. State Department – the agency responsible for conducting the deal – said, “Pakistan’s current F-16s have proven critical to the success of these operations to date. These operations reduce the ability of militants to use Pakistani territory as a safe haven for terrorism and a base of support for the insurgency in Afghanistan.” Secretary of State John Kerry himself has been at the forefront of this defense, suggesting that the Pakistani military “has been deeply engaged in the fight against terrorism.” India’s reaction to the sale was strong. It disagreed with the U.S. stand that this sale would help in the fight against terrorism and instead has argued that it would be used against India. The U.S. ambassador to India was summoned to underscore India’s displeasure. New Delhi is seriously concerned about the changing balance of air power in the region as Pakistan today has four squadrons of F-16 fighters, all built with U.S. assistance. The anti-U.S. sentiment of Indian elites once again came to the fore with suggestions in sections of the media that the United States cannot be trusted. Alt causes to relations — Pakistan.Sibal 16 — Kanwal Sibal, Member of Indian Foreign Service since July 1966, Foreign Secretary of India from July 2002 to November 2003, former Ambassador of India to Egypt, France, and Turkey, 2016 (“What to Expect from US-India Relations in 2016,” The Diplomat, February 9, Available Online at http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/what-to-expect-from-us-india-relations-in-2016/ Accessed 07-18-2016, PAM) India-U.S. ties have been transformed in recent years, best exemplified with the newly declared global strategic partnership between the two countries. Yet, what is the reality of the partnership in terms of achievements on the ground? And, what could be the future expectations? For starters, the United States’ Pakistan policy remains a problematic issue. The objective of the two countries to advance regional security together is impeded by the continuation of U.S. military aid to Pakistan. This is done through presidential waivers to overcome the provisions of the Kerry-Lugar legislation, which requires Pakistan to act verifiably against terrorist groups on its soil before U.S. aid can be released. Furthermore, the United States does not consider the Taliban as a terrorist organization. The U.S. is, in reality, engaged in an effort to accommodate the Taliban politically in Afghanistan in a Pakistan-brokered deal, which is a risk to India’s security. It is thus difficult to see how, in these circumstances, the counter-terrorism partnership between India and the U.S. can be a defining one for the 21st century. Relations ImpossibleUS-India relations will never be high – too many political differences.Joshi et al 13 Sunjoy Joshi, C. Raja Mohan, Vikram Sood, Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Ph.D., James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Walter Lohman, Lisa Curtis and Derek Scissors, Ph.D., writers at Heritage, 2016 (“Beyond the Plateau in U.S. – India Relations,” Heritage, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/beyond-the-plateau-in-us-india-relations, accessed 7/15/16) WP The second factor is rooted in the reality that significant sections of the vast bureaucracies in both countries remain tied to default positions toward the other that are not conducive to a deeper bilateral partnership. It must be borne in mind that the dramatic changes in India–U.S. relations were driven from the top by political leaders on both sides and pushed through the customary inertia of reluctant bureaucracies by a few energetic decision makers. The same forces of habitual inertia may have struck back after the heady days of conceptualizing and implementing the civil nuclear initiative between 2005 and 2008. Both New Delhi and Washington need continuous tending of the bilateral relationship at the highest political level. In both democracies, it is not unusual that political leaders find it difficult to devote sustained attention to a single issue. The inability to do so in the past few years has had a negative effect on India–U.S. relations. The cycles of political clarity and activism in New Delhi and Washington have not been in sync. US-India relations failing – different strategic interestsRehman 15 — Iskander Rehman, writer at The National Interest, 2015 (“Would America Back India in a War?” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/would-america-back-india-war-12701, accessed 7/15/16) WP And therein lies the rub. Even though the Indo-U.S. entente is perhaps this century’s single most important bilateral relationship, with the greatest potential to positively shape the Asian security environment, it is not-nor will it ever be-a formalized alliance. The reasons for this singular state of affairs are well known. Indeed, since independence, New Delhi’s grand strategy has always been coterminous with a quest for greater strategic autonomy, and with a solid aversion for any form of partnership that could lead to entanglement. This autonomy is perceived as a key enabler, allowing India to practice a “multi-vectored” diplomacy that maximizes freedom of maneuver, while minimizing the risks of friction that could flow from more solidified alignments. Historical studies have pointed to the inherent plasticity of any successful grand strategy. This is something that India’s foremost strategists have fully interiorized, with a much-discussed-and unfairly lampooned-2012 study placing a strong emphasis on subtlety over “narrow linear narratives about what serves our (India’s) national interest,” in a world which is described as both fragmented and in flux. India’s grand strategy, the authors pursue, “will require a skillful management of complicated coalitions and opportunities in environments that may be inherently unstable and volatile rather than structurally settled.” As India’s growth in wealth, influence and power becomes more manifest, it has presented the United States with a unique form of diplomatic challenge. While Chinese nationalists have argued in favor of a “new model of great power relations,” India’s political leadership seeks, first and foremost, a new model of strategic partnership. This partnership may come to yield a number of rich dividends in the defense realm, in terms of technology and intelligence sharing, joint training, or arms sales. Yet singularly absent are the most important components of any alliance—a clear strategic direction, and a sense of reciprocal security commitments and/or guarantees. Alliance has structural barriers – can’t solve South Asian instabilityBoggs 15 (Robert Boggs is a retired US diplomat with experience in South Asia, specifically India and Professor of South Asia Studies at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, Article in response to Nicholas Burns’ article: “What Washington can do to revive relations with New Delhi,” “Friends Without Benefits: Is the U.S.-Indian Relationship Built to Last?” Foreign Affairs January/February 2015 issue, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/friends-without-benefits) aj Still, Burns holds out hope that Obama and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will “work together to promote stability in India’s South Asian neighborhood.” If India’s actions are anything to go on, however, it appears that the country prefers to work alone to maintain its regional dominance—and it views the United States as a threat. As a U.S. diplomat serving in South Asia from 1985 to 2004, I watched Indian officials repeatedly pressure neighboring countries not to cooperate with Washington, often because New Delhi believed, erroneously, that such cooperation would raise the U.S. military’s profile in South Asia. In early 2014, India protested U.S. calls for fair and inclusive elections in Bangladesh because it feared that voters would not elect a pro-India party. To gain leverage over its neighbors, India has had its foreign intelligence agency provide financial support to antigovernment insurgencies in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Two of the insurgent groups India has backed—Maoist militants in Nepal and Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka—have killed thousands of civilians and been designated as terrorists by the U.S. government. Relations ResilientUS-India ties resilientSingh 16 Arjun Singh, Ambassador, 2016, (The Embassy, https://www.indianembassy.org/press_detail.php?nid=2352, March 26th, accessed 7/22/16) WP There is universal recognition in both our countries of the necessity to make the India-U.S. Global Strategic Partnership truly global in outlook, strategic in content and transformative for India's development. The U.S. on its part was quick to offer to partner with India in realizing the goals that our current Government set for India's transformation, and as a result, the narrative in our relations has begun to reflect newfound energy and optimism. The challenges that we are taking up together --- development and deployment of clean energy through joint research, climate resilience partnership, conservation of biodiversity, high energy physics, synthetic aperture radar, fight against Ebola and development of affordable vaccine, agricultural productivity, and disaster preparedness --- are global in scale. As India unveils ambitious and transformative economic programmes at home --- be it infrastructure, smart cities, Make in India, Digital India and renewable energy --- the potential for doing business with India and to work for India's rise as an economic powerhouse has looked appealing for the U.S.. We see the U.S. as an indispensible partner in achieving these goals, which are intrinsic to our national vision.By investing in India's rise, the U.S. has pledged its friendship to a country where 800 million youth under the age of 35 years are impatient for change and eager to achieve it. Going forward, it is certain that India and the U.S. will look at each other with greater degree of understanding than in the past. Public opinion in each country about the other, particularly among the youth, has shifted clearly in a favorable direction. However, we need to remain alive to the challenges of managing an expanding relationship without sufficient past history of deep engagement. Problems and differences will inevitably arise from time to time. They will need to be addressed and managed keeping in mind mutual interests and a longer term framework. Relations InevitableUS-Indo Relations inevitableCurtis & Cheng 11- Lisa Curtis is Senior Research Fellow for South Asia, and Dean Cheng is Research Fellow in Chinese Political and Security Affairs, in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation. July 18, 2011, The China Challenge: A Strategic Vision for U.S.–India Relations http://www.afriquechine.net/en/2011/The-China-Challenge-A-Strategic-Vision-for-U-S-India-Relations.pdf @yangtri 7/19/16 Although India’s recent decision to forgo American planes to fulfill its fighter aircraft needs has added a dose of realism to Indo– U.S. relations, the complex challenge presented by a rising China will inevitably drive the U.S. and India to elevate ties and increase cooperation across a broad range of sectors in years to come. India is keeping a wary eye on China’s rapid global ascent. Unresolved border issues that resulted in the Sino–Indian War of 1962 have been heating up again in recent years. Indian policymakers are scrambling to develop effective policies to cope with a rising China by simultaneously pursuing both a robust diplomatic strategy aimed at encouraging peaceful resolution of border disputes and forging strong trade and economic ties and an ambitious military modernization campaign that will build Indian air, naval, and missile capabilities. By bolstering its naval assets, India will solidify its position in the Indian Ocean and enhance its ability to project power into the Asia Pacific. New Delhi also will continue to boost its medium-range missile programs to deter Beijing and to strengthen its air capabilities to deal with potential flare-ups along their disputed borders. Meanwhile, China has also been paying increasing attention to India. China’s interests on its southern flank have led the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to strengthen its forces in the Lanzhou and Chengdu Military Regions bordering India. US-Indo Relations inevitable as long as China is a regional powerPanda 16 — Ankit Panda is a foreign affairs analyst, writer, and editor with expertise in international relations, international security, and geopolitics. He is currently an editor at the Council on Foreign Relations, an editor at The Diplomat Magazine, and a political risk consultant. At The Diplomat, Panda authors daily analysis and commentaries on international politics, security, economics, and culture, focusing on the broader Asia-Pacific region. He is a Carnegie New Leader at the Carnegie Council on Ethics in International Affairs. 6/8/16 5 Takeaways on US-India Relations After Modi's Meeting With Obama, http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/5-takeaways-on-us-india-relations-after-modis-meeting-with-obama/ @yangtri 7/20/16 (Modi’s been counting on Washington’s continued backing for India’s accession to the Nuclear Suppliers Group–though that’ll hinge largely on the support of China and other countries at a plenary later this month.) India becomes a ‘Major Defense Partner.’ As I noted after their meetings in 2014 and 2015, India and the United States are seeing a steep period of convergence on defense issues, fostered in part by U.S. desires to set up a network of security partners in the broader Asia-Pacific amid China’s increasingly assertive behavior and facilitated by the change of government in New Delhi in 2014. Today, Washington designated New Delhi a “Major Defense Partner.” The joint statement outlines what that means: •The United States will continue to work toward facilitating technology sharing with India to a level commensurate with that of its closest allies and partners. The leaders reached an understanding under which India would receive license-free access to a wide range of dual-use technologies in conjunction with steps that India has committed to take to advance its export control objectives. Alt Causes to RelationsAlt Cause to relations – laundry listHersh and Lele 16— Melissa Hersh and Vejay Lele, Melissa S. Hersh is a Washington, D.C.-based risk analyst and consultant and Truman National Security Fellow. Dr Ajey Lele is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, 2016 ”Why India Is Still Hedging Its Bets on US, January 26, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-india-still-hedging-its-bets-us-12115?page=2 Accessed 07-18-2016, PAM) Many Indians are likely to view Mr. Obama’s presence at the Indian Republic Day celebration as a sign of India’s increased global importance and influence. Still, challenges—on both sides—threaten the sunny relationship. There is a pressing need to share both the benefits and risks bi-directionally across a number of areas, including foreign direct investments; technology co-creation; security and defense trade and cooperation; and energy and environment matters. If the U.S. can wrap its head around the fact that India will be India, inevitably trading with Russia and China and not always agreeing or siding with the U.S., then there is some hope for a positive set of outcomes this week. Likewise, India has challenges as well, with the need to manage liability, create more transparent procurement processes, and understand that Buy American can conditionally work with Make in India. Moreover, both countries need to come to terms with policies vis-à-vis Pakistan that can actually enable South Asia to be stable and peaceful. What will be on the agenda this week has been largely kept under wraps, fueling cross-border, Indian-Pakistani media antagonism. The tit-for-tat media volley has New Delhi claiming that inside sources in Washington told Islamabad to clamp down on cross-border terrorism during Obama’s visit. Islamabad has dismissed these allegations as propaganda. If the allegations are true, they would be tacit confirmation that India faces an unwieldy “Pakistan problem” in which Washington would not likely interfere either before or after the U.S. visit. Moreover, Indian perceptions that the America’s lack of condemnation through actions—such as using aid as a bargaining tool—only adds insult to injury to those worried about the alleged condition for Obama’s visit. Secretary of State John Kerry’s most recent visit to Pakistan, where he offered $250 million in emergency aid, did not go unnoticed in New Delhi. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 0.85 Mb. Share with your friends:
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