A2: Democracy Impact — Democratic Peace Theory

India green tech deals already done — benefits both sides. Relations not key.

WASHINGTON: The Nuclear Power Corporation of India and US firm Westinghouse have agreed to begin engineering and site design work immediately for six nuclear power plant reactors in India and conclude contractual arrangements by June 2017, the White House said on Tuesday. Culminating a decade of partnership on civil nuclear issues, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and US President Barack Obama during their White House meeting "welcomed" the start of preparatory work on site in India for six reactors to be built by Westinghouse, officials here said. The two leaders also noted the intention of India and the US Export-Import Bank to work together toward a competitive financing package for the project, the White House said. Once completed, the project would be among the largest of its kind, fulfilling the promise of the US-India civil nuclear agreement and demonstrating a shared commitment to meet India's growing energy needs while reducing reliance on fossil fuels. Obama and Modi also welcomed the announcement by the Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPCIL) and Westinghouse that engineering and site design work will begin immediately and the two sides will work toward finalising the contractual arrangements by June 2017, the White House said. These reactors would bring clean energy to India and generate thousands of jobs in the US, Brian Deese, Senior Advisor to the US President, told reporters in a conference call. The White House said the steps that the two governments have taken in the last two years through the US-India Contact Group, including by addressing the nuclear liability issue, inter alia, through India's ratification of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, have laid a strong foundation for a long-term partnership between US and Indian companies for building nuclear power plants in India.

India has no impact to climate change—beyond the tipping point

Times of India 15 — TNN, December 2, 2015- The Times of India, Amitav Ghosh: India seems to be home of lost causes, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/environment/global-warming/Amitav-Ghosh-India-seems-to-be-home-of-lost-causes/articleshow/50005108.cms @yangtri 7/26/16

NEW DELHI: Brace for impact, because the catastrophic fallout of climate change will happen no matter what actions world leaders pledge to take at the Paris summit. That was the grim message of author Amitav Ghosh, who has just completed a non-fiction work on the subject. "I have a dark view of things, as anyone who engages with the issue of climate change would. These impacts are going to very powerfully destabilise our society," he said. During the course of an interaction with TOI's editorial team, Ghosh said the world had lost the window of opportunity to contain global temperature-rise by 2 degrees. "No human crisis has found people so unprepared. 2015 was the cutoff year for emission cuts.We've already reached carbon levels of 400 ppm in the atmosphere... We need to be afraid of the tipping point." "Two degrees is a global mean average. The rise is not going to be equal in all parts of the world. We (India) are probably going to get a 4-degree rise," he cautioned. That will have an enormous impact on India and the role of a responsible media must be to "prepare us for what's coming". In this context, Ghosh found the government's push for `make in India' anachronistic. Quoting economist Joseph Stiglitz he said it was quite clear that the door was closing on manufacturing-driven growth in less developed countries. "But India seems to be a home for lost causes. We are adopting this doomed model of consumerism at a time when it's collapsing in its birthplace, the US... When the Soviet Union was collapsing we had Bengal adopting the communist model."

China better at fighting warming than India

Times of India 15 — TNN, December 2, 2015- The Times of India, Amitav Ghosh: India seems to be home of lost causes, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/environment/global-warming/Amitav-Ghosh-India-seems-to-be-home-of-lost-causes/articleshow/50005108.cms @yangtri 7/26/16

Ghosh though appeared deeply sceptical of the Breakthrough Energy Coalition launched by global billionaires who have pledged to put in money on climate change research. "They are trying to industrialize climate change if you like," he said. "Bill Gates has put in a lot of money but he is also one of the biggest investors in geo engineering. Some of these solutions could completely kill the monsoons." Ghosh felt China was better prepared for climate change than India. "China's circumstance in climate change is completely different from ours. We don't recognize this, but China has been moving very, very fast. I heard Lord Nicholas Stern say that last year, for the first time, China's coal consumption had actually dipped by 5%. "In China, when they make up their mind, they're able to move at incredible speed. Another author, Naomi Oreskes, says if there's one country that will weather the impacts of climate change, it is China," the 59-year-old author stated. At the same time, he held up a number of Indians as trailblazers in their fields -people such as Debal Deb, who has been collecting heritage seeds, Ashish Kothari who has worked on adaptability and Sunita Narain for her path-breaking work on climate justice. "It's not that we don't have expertise, we have good reporters. But what is very striking in India is the absence of any broad public engagement with climate change," Ghosh added. "People don't want to engage with climate change because it's not sexy . The effect is felt in out-of-way places, on unseen people. But when the impact is really felt, people like us -who frankly have a carbon footprint equivalent to anyone in the West -will be hit the worst. We are absolutely not climate-resilient.Take away our electricity and we're dead."

A2: SCS Impact

India has no impact to checking SCS conflict

Perlez 15 — Jane Perlez is the chief diplomatic correspondent in the Beijing bureau of The New York Times. She covers China and its foreign policy, particularly relations between the United States and China, and their impact on the Asian region. U.S.-India Ties Deepen; China Takes It in Stride, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/28/world/asia/china-tries-to-stay-aloof-from-warming-us-india-relationship.html?_r=0 @yangtri 7/25/16

Still, China has paid close attention to the active foreign policy of Mr. Modi, who since assuming office has cultivated not only the United States but also Japan, China’s main rival in East Asia. China has taken comfort in its economic relationship with India, to which it sells far more than India sells to China. But during a visit to New Delhi last year, the Japanese prime minister, Shinzo Abe, outstripped China on the economic front in advance. Mr. Xi promised $20 billion in investments in India over the next five years, something of a letdown in New Delhi. Word before his visit had put the investment at $100 billion. In contrast, Mr. Abe had already pledged $32 billion to help improve India’s weak infrastructure. Mr. Modi enjoys a close personal bond with Mr. Abe, and it was at Mr. Modi’s suggestion that Japan was invited last year to join naval exercises with the United States and India. Beijing was displeased. Mr. Modi did not stop there: During his talks with Mr. Obama, he suggested revitalizing a loose security network involving the United States, India, Japan and Australia, a grouping that China views with suspicion. Mr. Obama persuaded Mr. Modi to sign a statement that implicitly criticized China for its provocative moves in the South China Sea. India had already expressed concerns about China’s behavior in that arm of the western Pacific and is cooperating with Vietnam, another critic of China, on an oil-drilling venture in the area’s waters. “China feels unhappy but not surprised” about India’s siding with the United States on the South China Sea, said Wu Xinbo, the director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai. “Will that have any impact on China’s maritime policies? No. What India can do is not substantive in the regional situation.”

India not key in SCS; will not get involved in joint patrols

Pasricha 3/11 — Anjana Pasricha, writer for VOA, 2016 (“India Rejects Joint Naval Patrols with US in South China Sea,” Voice of America, March 11, Available Online at http://www.voanews.com/content/india-rejects-joint-naval-patrols-with-us-in-south-china-sea/3231567.html, Accessed 07/25/16, JZ)

India has ruled out participating in joint patrols in the South China Sea proposed by the United States. Experts say that India wants to focus on containing Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean and despite a growing strategic partnership, it remains wary of being part of a military alliance with Washington. The proposal that the navies of Japan, Australia and India could join the U.S. in preserving freedom of navigation in the contested waters of South China Sea was voiced recently by chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Harry B. Harris. But within days, Indian Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar said, "As of now, India has never taken part in any joint patrol; we only do joint exercises. The question of joint patrol does not arise.” “The biggest example in contemporary times is the Gulf of Aden patrols. From 2008 onwards when piracy has infested the Gulf of Aden and North Aegean Sea, India has not joined hands with any NATO or any other construct,” said Sharma. Wary of China’s push in South China Sea, where maritime and territorial disputes are festering, India has shed its traditional diffidence and been vocal in calling for freedom of navigation and maritime security in the disputed waters. At the same time, strategic experts say that New Delhi wants to be seen as a “neutral player” in an area where it is not directly involved. Wary of provoking China Manoj Joshi at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi says India is concerned about the potential ramifications in the Indian Ocean if its ships take part in U.S.-led patrols in waters close to China. “India is worried that if we do joint patrols with the U.S, the Chinese could do it to us with Pakistan. That is really the worry -- the US navy can operate globally, but India is not that powerful and that same thing could be turned on its head as far as we are concerned,” says Joshi. Beijing’s bid to expand its presence in the Indian Ocean remains a huge concern for India and has partly prompted its growing defense partnership with Washington. Overriding Chinese objections, last year India invited Japan back into annual naval exercises held with the U.S. for the first time in eight years. Planned exercises This year, the three countries are scheduled to hold naval drills in waters off the northern Philippines near the South China Sea — a move that is likely to irk Beijing. But for the time being, joint exercises is as far as India is willing to go. “If India and the U.S. have not contemplated similar kind of patrol in Indian Ocean, what could justify India and U.S. patrolling waters of South China Sea?” asks Chintamani Mahapatra, a foreign policy professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. India’s decades-long border dispute in the Himalayas with Beijing where their armies face off is also likely to hold New Delhi back from wading into the contentious waters of South China Sea. “We have a long border and it is just us and them on that border. We will certainly stand firm in our position, but we don’t want to provoke,” says Jayadeva Ranade, a China specialist at India’s National Security Advisory Board.

A2: China Rise Impact

China shouldn’t fear containment by the US and India – economic ties, India’s independent mindset, and inevitable rise prove

Chen 15 Dingding Chen , The Diplomat, 2-2-2015, "Why China Doesn't See India As a Threat," Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/why-china-doesnt-see-india-as-a-threat/) WP

The recently concluded trip by U.S. President Barack Obama to India was hailed by many as a turning point in U.S.-India relations. A short list of achievements includes agreements in defense, nuclear cooperation, climate change, and security. In particular, there is considerable hype that India has agreed to join the U.S. to contain China’s rise. There are also reports that (here and here) that China is now worried about the warming relationship between the U.S. and India. Is this really so? A warm U.S.-India relationship will not worry China. In fact, the outcome might disappoint those in India and the U.S. who want to actively balance the rise of China. There are three primary reasons for this. The first reason is that India has always maintained an independent foreign policy since its independence, thus making it very difficult for it to join any major power as an ally. As the book Wronged by Empire convincingly argues, India has a strong sense of victimization that still is relevant today to its foreign policy. In practice, this means that India will always remain suspicious of any major power’s potential threat to India’s independence and security. No matter how successful president Obama’s trip to India was this time, it is very unlikely that India would completely trust the U.S. intentions in helping India to balance China. Modi perfectly understands that India and the U.S. need each other at the moment and there is no harm in welcoming American assistance in balancing a possible China threat. The second reason is quite straightforward. Very simply speaking, India needs Chinese investment to develop its economy in the long run. Sure, India does not want to be dominated by China economically, but in the long run there is no better alternative than China to help India’s huge appetite for investment in infrastructure. For example, Obama announced that the U.S. would invest $4 billion in India over the coming years, a number that pales in comparison to China’s pledge of $20 billion for India, announced during President Xi Jinping’s visit to India in 2014. Of course, there is no reason for India to reject investment from other powers as long as India resists economic colonization. Moreover, although India has some advantages with its democratic system, there is a lot to learn from China with regard to China’s unique model of economic development. If India can learn the right lessons from China and avoid China’s mistakes, then indeed the 21st century might be a century for Asians. Lastly, policymakers in India fully understand that it is pointless and even counterproductive to contain a rising China. The truth is that China has already risen and any plan to contain China would be a huge mistake. This is not to say that a containment strategy would not cause damage to China’s national interests (it would). But the point is rather that any power who initiates this containment strategy would suffer vastly itself. Thus, no rational state would choose such a suicidal strategy. Despite the fact that there is some kind of security and economic cooperation between India and Vietnam, no evidence suggests that India truly wants to intervene in the South China Sea dispute. India’s strategy in the South China Sea is more likely a response to China’s increasing inroads into the Indian Ocean and continued support for Pakistan. If China is willing to make some concessions in those areas, India will also likely make some concessions in the South China Sea. To conclude, despite the disputes and differences between India and China, the potential gains in this relationship are greater than the costs. Like any other bilateral relationship between major powers, there is always both cooperation and conflict in China-India relations. Both countries are rational enough to understand this important point and will maintain a good and friendly relationship in the future. The fact that Modi will visit Beijing in May proves the point that India still needs China badly. China does not see India as a threat, and India certainly should not see China that way either.

A2: China Containment Impact

India doesn’t add anything to weak US containment of China – support would be limited and India wouldn’t give up connection to China

White 15 Hugh White, professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra. His book The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power was published in the US last year by Oxford University Press. 3-13-2015, "Sorry, America: India Won't Go to War with China," National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/sorry-america-india-wont-go-war-china-12415

In his latest contribution to our debate, Shashank Joshi raised some excellent points against my skeptical view of the emerging India-U.S. strategic partnership. But I'm still unpersuaded. To explain why, it helps to step back and clarify the question we are debating here. It is not whether strategic relations between Delhi and Washington have grown closer in recent years, because clearly they have. It is what these closer relations mean for the geo-political contest between America and China. India's position is clearly important to this contest. Many Americans, and many of America's friends in Asia, have long believed that India's growing wealth and power will be vital in helping America counterbalance China's growing strategic weight, and resist China's challenge to U.S. regional leadership. Indeed, the belief many people have that India will play this role is central to their confidence that America can and will preserve the status quo against China's challenge. It is therefore important to decide whether the progress we have seen in U.S.-India relations justifies that confidence. I have argued that in a geopolitical contest of the kind we see unfolding between America and China today, India's relations with America will only make a difference to the extent that India is seen to be willing to support America in a U.S.-China conflict. That is because who wins the contest between the American and Chinese visions of Asia's future order ultimately depends on which is seen to be more willing to fight for their vision. Each power wants the other to believe that it will go to war to impose its vision, and hopes that, if all else fails, this will persuade the other to back off. This way of describing what is happening will surprise those who think that this kind of old-fashioned power politics disappeared after 1989, but it seems to me the only way to understand events in Asia today. In fact, power politics never went away; people simply started to think that America was the only power that was indulging in it. It has been taken for granted that America will fight to support its vision of regional order, but that no one would be willing to oppose them. Now China is proving that false. We can no longer assume that China isn’t any more determined to change the current order than America is to preserve it. That is why India's role in this contest depends on how far it appears willing and able to materially support the U.S. in a conflict with China. In a game played for these stakes, nothing less counts for much. As I read him, Shashank makes two key points about this question. One is that, while India might not be willing to send combat forces to fight alongside America's in a coalition against China, it would provide other, non-combat support such as basing and refuelling facilities. That sounds like what the diplomats call “all support short of actual help.” It would do very little either practically or symbolically to bolster America's position against China, and certainly much less than American boosters of the relationship expect. His second key point is that perhaps India would be willing to provide America with more substantial support if it saw really fundamental issues of regional order at stake in a U.S.-China conflict. He cites the example of the wide support given to America in opposing Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 by countries who saw basic questions of international order being tested there. I agree with Shashank that very important issues for India would be at stake in a U.S.-China clash. But deciding to support America against China would be much harder than joining the coalition against Iraq. In every way China is both a much more valuable partner and a much more dangerous adversary. The key question for India, and for America's other friends in Asia, is what would have to be at stake for them to make that decision? So it boils down to this: would India go to war with China to help America preserve the current order based on U.S. primacy? If the answer is no, then I don't think the new warmth between America and India matters much to the future of Asia, and America's position in Asia is rather weaker than most people assume.

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