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Climate change related disasters do not cause war
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AT: WarClimate change related disasters do not cause war Päivi Lujala (Department of Economics & Department of Geography NTNU) 2012 Climate-related natural disasters, economic growth, and armed civil conflict http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/49/1/147.full By using ordinary least squares (OLS) and panel data on climate-related disasters and short-run economic growth,2 we confirm that climate-related disasters have a negative impact on growth. However, our analysis of disaster data and conflict onset shows that climate-related natural disasters do not have any direct effect on conflict onset. We then instrument economic growth using our disaster measure in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) analysis to study whether climate-related disasters have an indirect effect on conflict onset via slowdown in economic growth. By doing this, we also address the simultaneity problem between income and conflict: we recognize that slow and negative economic growth may cause conflict, but also that an approaching conflict may lead to slow growth, for example, when extractive industries withdraw from unstable countries that are on the brink of sliding into conflict. Instrumenting growth using climatic disasters allows us to impose exogenous variation in growth. However, we do not find any evidence that economic shocks caused by climate-related disasters have an effect on conflict onset. This result differs from the negative causal link between economic growth and conflict found in other studies, including Collier & Hoeffler (2004) and Miguel, Satyanath & Sergenti (2004). However, our findings are similar to those in the recent cross-country study by Ciccone (2011).
Whether increasing local or regional climate variability due to large-scale, human-induced changes in the global atmosphere is associated with an increased risk of violent conflict remains contested, both among policymakers and in academic circles. In this article we contribute in two ways to the existing literature on the climate change–conflict nexus. First, we conceptualize this nexus in terms of a two-stage process in which climatic variability affects the probability of violent intrastate conflict via climate effects on economic growth, and where these effects may be contingent on political system characteristics. Second, we employ a measure of climatic variability that has advantages over those used in the existing literature, primarily because it takes into account the adaptation of economic activity to persistent climatic changes. Our results suggest that climate variability, measured as deviations in temperature and precipitation from their past, long-run levels (a 30-year moving average), does not affect violent intrastate conflict through economic growth. This finding is important because the causal pathway leading from climate variability via (deteriorating) economic growth to conflict is a key part of most theoretical models of the climate–conflict nexus. While our empirical results provide no support for the climate change–economic growth–conflict pathway, further research is required before we can move towards closure of the debate. In particular, it would be very useful to improve on existing indicators of climatic variability, adaptation to climate variability, and relevant (from the viewpoint of violent conflict) economic performance. For instance, in the absence of appropriate indicators for adaptation it remains difficult to estimate the effect of climatic variability on economic performance and hence on the probability of violent conflict. AT: Resource WarsWarming promotes peace – history and multiple studies prove Liang Chen et al Karin A.F. Zonnevelda, b, Gerard J.M. Versteegh Fachbereich Geowissenschaften, Universität Bremen October 2011, Short term climate variability during “Roman Classical Period” in the eastern Mediterranean http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0277379111003039 To date, there have been a lot of studies devoted to understand the relationship between climate change and ancient civilization. Most of these investigations suggest that cooling and drying climate might have played a significant role in the collapse of cultures as it might have caused crop failure and the enhancement of the occurrence of cultural conflicts caused by adverse environmentalconditions (e.g. [Hodell et al., 1995], [Binford et al., 1997], [Haug et al., 2003] and [Yancheva et al., 2007]). Our study shows that the investigated part of the Roman Period might have been warmer than the 20th century, and it is interesting to note that our study interval is more or less the same as the “Pax Romana” (27 BC to 180 AD), which denotes a long period of relative peace (Gibbon and Saunders, 2001). We speculate that the booming period “Pax Romana” might be related to this relatively warm and stable situation. Interestingly, wars between Roman and neighboring cultures became more frequent along with the subsequent Roman decline after 200 AD, shortly after our records show a declining temperature trend. It would therefore be extremely interesting to dedicate more studies to this time interval to be able to pinpoint the relationship between climate and civilization. AT: FloodingWarming causes reduced flooding-empirically proven Monique M. Stewart et al Martin Grosjeana, Franz G. Kuglitscha, Samuel U. Nussbaumerb, Lucien von Guntena 15 November 2011Reconstructions of late Holocene paleofloods and glacier length changes in the Upper Engadine, Switzerland (ca. 1450 BC–AD 420) http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0031018211004597 Insight into the relationship between floods and climate, under a wide range of climate variability in Central Europe from ca. 1450 BC to AD 420, can be found in the sediments of Lake Silvaplana (Upper Engadine, Switzerland). The frequency of local paleofloods can be reconstructed from turbidite frequency. Long-term cool and/or wet and warm and/or dry climate phases can be reconstructed from anomalies in low-frequency Mass Accumulation Rates (MAR). This is because low-frequency MAR reflects glacier length changes in the Swiss Alps and glacier lengths are a response to long-term climate conditions. Transitions between cool and/or wet and warm and/or dry climate phases can be inferred from centennial trends in low-frequency MAR. Furthermore, quantitative absolute June-July–August (JJA) temperatures reconstructed from Biogenic Silica (BSi) flux and chironomids in the sediments of Lake Silvaplana are available from ca. 570 BC to AD 120 (Stewart et al., 2011). Comparison of turbidite frequency to MAR-inferred climate phases (ca. 1450 BC–AD 420) and JJA temperatures (ca. 570 BC–AD 120) suggests an increase in the frequency of paleofloods during cool and/or wet climates and windows of cooler JJA temperatures. Specifically, the frequency of turbidites was reduced during warm and/or dry climates of ca. 1450 BC to AD 420. Following the transition to cool and/or wet climates, the frequency of turbidites increased. However, no discernable relationship between the rate of transition from warm and/or dry to cool and/or wet climate and turbidite could be found.
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