The United States federal government should pursue a defensive space control strategy that emphasizes satellite hardening, replacement, redundancy and situational awareness



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Extend Solvency – Preemption



[ ] Hardening satellites deters attacks on satellites and prevents the need for preemption
Jakhu 2010 - Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University (Dr. Ram , with Cesar Jaramillo Managing Editor, Project Ploughshares, Phillip Baines (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada),), John Seibert (Project Ploughshares), Dr. Jennifer Simmons (The Simmons Foundation), Dr. Ray Williamson (Secure World Foundation). “Space Security 2010.” Spacesecurity.org. August 2010. http://www.spacesecurity.org/space.security.2010.reduced.pdf. pp. 119-167. Accessed June 21, 2011.
Most space systems remain unprotected from a range of threats, assessed by experts to include (in order of decreasing likelihood): 1) electronic warfare such as jamming communications links, 2) physical attacks on satellite ground stations, 3) dazzling or blinding of satellite sensors, 4) hit-to-kill anti-satellite weapons, 5) pellet cloud attacks on low-orbit satellites, 6) attacks in space by microsatellites, and 7) high-altitude nuclear detonations (HAND).3 Other potential threats include radio frequency weapons, high-powered microwaves, and “heat-to-kill” ground-based lasers. Growing awareness of the vulnerabilities of space systems has led actors to develop space system protection capabilities to better detect, withstand, and/ or recover from an attack. Nonetheless, there are no effective physical protections against the most direct and destructive types of negation such as the use of kinetic or high-powered energy forces against satellites. The development of effective protection capabilities can have a positive impact on space security by increasing the ability of a space system to survive negation efforts, thus helping to assure secure access to and use of space, and potentially to deter negation attempts. Space actors may refrain from interfering with well protected space systems if such attacks would seem both futile and costly. Moreover, the use of protective measures to address system vulnerabilities could offer a viable alternative to offensive means to defend space assets.
[ ] Developing space military capabilities is key to preventing surprise attacks – failing to prepare leaves us vulnerable
Hyten 2001 Director, Space Programs, Office of the Ass Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, [4 January 01. Air & Space Power Journal . A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War: Dealing with the Inevitable Conflict in Space. Lt Col John E. Hyten. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/Hyten.html Accessed June 21, 2011.]
Failure to fully develop and test such capabilities and such weapons could make the United States vulnerable to surprises from other nations in the future. Gen. John L. Piotrowski, former commander of the United States Space Command said, on many occasions, that when it came to space weapons the one thing the United States couldn’t afford to be was second.23 A robust program developing capabilities for space control should be laid out to explore new technologies, integrate them into new weapons systems, and fully test them both in laboratory and field demonstrations. Since the goal would be not to deploy such weapons until absolutely required (and when that time would come is unknown), an urgent "crash" program is not needed. However, unless aggressive programs (in terms of funding and schedules) are developed, little progress will be made. In this time of strategic pause, programs can be implemented that are aggressive but take the necessary time—time to fully explore different technologies and thoroughly test and check out systems when developed. If the systems actually reach maturity, and there is still no pressing need for deployment, they can be set aside until such a situation arises.
[ ] Defensive counterspace programs ensure peace – they deter Chinese attacks



Putnam, 2009 Maj. United States Air Force - Marine Corps Command and Staff College [Christopher, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA510842&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf Countering the chinese threat to low earth orbit satellites: Building a defensive space strategyOMB No. 0704-0188
The fundamental U.S. security interest in the wake of China's 2007 anti-satellite test should be deterring China and others from attacking U.S. assets in space, using both a combination of declaratory policy, military programs, diplomacy, and promoting a more stable and secure space environment.57 The United States government requires a comprehensive plan to counter the threat to its LEO systems posed by Chinese anti-satellite weapons. Failing to protect these key satellites would severely degrade US military capabilities in a conflict with China. The United States should rely on a defensive space strategy to deter Chinese anti-satellite actions. The strategy must include robust space situational awareness, preplanned actions, small satellites, rapid and variable launch capability, decreased dependence on space systems and institutional changes. In total, these actions would complicate the ability for Chinese anti-satellite weapons to easily strike US assets while providing the means to operate through an attack and then reconstitute lost capability. The DoD's ORS effort can be used as springboard, but must be accelerated to meet the rapidly emerging threat. Finally, its growth as a space faring nation may eventually be the best deterrence against a Chinese attack on United States satellites. However, the actions outlined in this paper can also be used to counter threats from other nations or natural phenomena. A rapid comprehensive defensive deterrence approach most effectively counters the Chinese threat and meets Presidential guidance to establish "contingency plans to ensure that U.S. forces can maintain or duplicate access to information from space assets and accelerating programs to harden U.S. satellites against attack.58



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