The United States federal government should pursue a defensive space control strategy that emphasizes satellite hardening, replacement, redundancy and situational awareness



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Extend Solvency – Space Mines



[ ] Plan solves for the threat from Small Satellites – space situational awareness and maneuverability
Ghoshroy 2004, Research Associate at MIT [Subrata Ghoshroy. “Ensuring America’s Space Security: Report of the FAS Panel on Weapons in Space.” The Federation of American Scientists. September 2004. http://www.fas.org/pubs/_pages/space_report.html. Accessed June 22, 2011.]
Perhaps the most significant security issue associated with small satellites is that they might not be easily detectable by U.S. space surveillance systems, a situation that could be at least partially countered by quite feasible improvements in these surveillance capabilities. It will be critical to periodically assess U.S. surveillance capabilities and the capabilities adversaries have for fielding stealthy satellites. Within the next five years, however, it appears unlikely that an adversary could field a non-detectable space mine. The Panel concludes that the best way to counter the threat posed by space mines is not, as some have suggested, to field armed sentinel satellites in space, but rather to continue to improve space situational awareness and enhance the maneuverability of critical satellites in the event that evasive action needs to be taken.
[ ] Hardening and redundancy improve security – they reduce the risk of space mines
Ghoshroy 2004, Research Associate at MIT [Subrata Ghoshroy. “Ensuring America’s Space Security: Report of the FAS Panel on Weapons in Space.” The Federation of American Scientists. September 2004. http://www.fas.org/pubs/_pages/space_report.html. Accessed June 22, 2011.]
A broad set of U.S. space vulnerabilities can be addressed by enhancing the robustness of critical space systems. This can be done by ensuring redundancy, utilizing multiple orbits and developing quick launch capabilities to replace lost satellites. To address the threat posed by space mines, an international treaty governing the "rules of the road" for space should be established thus providing more lead time to respond to a hostile action. Improved space surveillance would greatly reduce the possibility of undetectable space mines fielded by a potential adversary. All military satellites, particularly those in LEO, should be hardened against radiation, as suggested by the 2001 Defense Threat Reduction Agency study, "High Altitude Nuclear Detonations (HAND) Against Low Earth Orbit Satellites (HALEOS)."


They Say “International Backlash”




[ ] Space militarization won’t cause an international backlash – our allies would back us up
Ghoshroy 2004, Research Associate at MIT [Subrata Ghoshroy. “Ensuring America’s Space Security: Report of the FAS Panel on Weapons in Space.” The Federation of American Scientists. September 2004. http://www.fas.org/pubs/_pages/space_report.html. Accessed June 22, 2011.]
Lambakis also finds fault with opponents' wish to "draw a line in space;" he argues that such a line is strictly conceptual. Nothing in the tactics and strategy of war-fighting nor the logic of deterrence says there must be such a line, he adds. The example of Soviet efforts to develop the MIRV was a case in point, he says. Many people argued at the time that the Soviet MIRV nuclear weapon was a direct response to the U.S. action in developing such a weapon. But Lambakis writes that the Soviets had embarked on the MIRV program on their own and would have exploited their innovation irrespective of the U.S. action. Could we stop the historical progression of weaponry at the edge of the earth, he asks. It is a political decision, he contends, adding that the absence of universal political will means there is no practical way to enforce any treaty or law. As for critics' assertion that the United States will lose international support if it deploys space weapons, Lambakis offers the following rebuttal. He says that when the stakes are high, the United States must act in self-defense and that our allies will judge U.S. actions appropriately. For example, despite widespread antiAmericanism, the United States was able to put together a large coalition to fight the Gulf War in 1991.
[ ] Space militarization is not perceived as Offensive, because it cannot capture territory
Dolman 2005, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies [Everett C. Dolman. “US Military Transformation and Weapons.” September 14, 2005. http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space_hearing_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20%26%20Space.pdf. Accessed June 24, 2011.]
At a time when many are calling for increased capability to pacify and police foreign lands, in light of the no-end-in-sight occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, space weapons proponents must advocate reduction of these capabilities in favor of a system that will have no direct potential to do so. Hence, the argument that the unilateral deployment of space weapons will precipitate a disastrous arms race is misplaced. To be sure, space weapons are offensive by their very nature. They deter violence by the omnipresent threat of precise, measured, and unstoppable retaliation. They offer no advantage if the target set considered is not global. But they also offer no advantage in the mission of territorial occupation. As such, they are far less threatening to the international environment than any combination of weapons employed in their stead. A state employing offensive deterrence through space-weapons can punish a transgressor state, but is in a poor position to challenge its sovereignty. The transgressor state is less likely to succumb to the security dilemma if it perceives its national survival is not at risk. Moreover, the tremendous expense of space weapons inhibits their indiscriminate use. Over time, the world of sovereign states will recognize that the US does not threaten self-determination internally, though it challenges any attempts to intervene militarily in the politics of others, and has severely restricted its own capacity to do so. America will maintain the capacity to influence decisions and events beyond its borders, with military force if necessary. The operational deployment of space weapons would increase that capacity by providing for nearly instantaneous force projection worldwide. This force would be precise, unstoppable, and deadly. At the same time, the US must forego some of its ability to intervene directly in other states because its capacity to do so will have been diminished in the budgetary trade-offs required. Transformation of the American military assures that the intentions of current and future leaders will have but a minor role to play in international affairs. The limited requirement for collateral damage, need for precision to allay the low volume of fire, and tremendous cost of space weapons will guarantee they are used only for high value, time sensitive targets. Whether or not the United States desires to be a good neighbor is not necessary to an opposing state’s calculation of survival. Without sovereignty at risk, fear of a spacedominant American military will subside. The US will maintain its position of hegemony as well as its security, and the world will not be threatened by the specter of a future American empire.



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