The United States federal government should pursue a defensive space control strategy that emphasizes satellite hardening, replacement, redundancy and situational awareness



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Redundancy Solvency



[ ] Micro satellites increase security by providing redundancy
Lewis 2005 - Director and Senior Fellow, Technology and Public Policy Program [James A. Lewis. November 1, 2005. House Armed Service Committee, Panel on Asymmetric and Unconventional Threats Center for Strategic and International Studies. http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:Cr-YrlZ_4YJ:csis.org/files/media/csis/congress /ts051101_lewis.pdf+hardening+satellites&hl=en&gl=us&pid= bl&srcid=ADGEES jqa8YKzjyP3GZoZvlk1KzXGHAwK2bzuk03clno4BciLnY3pLmf12TN75rlMuAJFzw3E5JmOGq lWin0d1Ldf9UWz9NEeduREpcsvzljHCJIJUjNEHfpnuem7nvvZ7gEdyHm4&sig=AHIEtbT9LZ1I2M32TCFG4GFWgdeaoiEjEQ. Accessed June 21]
The U.S. can increase redundancy within its own satellite fleet by making use of a mixture of platforms. The most important development in this regard is the progress made in the capabilities of small satellites as reinforcement for the large, sophisticated (and expensive) satellites that now make up the bulk of the U.S. fleet. Small satellites, in combination with a rapid launch capability, could reinforce damaged elements in a space architecture made up of larger platforms that are more sophisticated, if one of these large, primary platforms was removed from operation by an attack. The use of a constellation of small (or smaller) satellites in place of a single large platform also complicates an attacker’s task. Damaging one satellite in a constellation of three or four will degrade, but not eliminate, the service being provided and will require multiple attacks to gain an advantage. Small satellites and pseudo-satellites cannot yet duplicate the range or sophistication of services provided by the larger satellites used by the US. What they offer is a cheaper and more responsive set of alternatives. Their potential utility, however, should be conditioned on the assumption that the U.S. will continue to accelerate development of space and sensor technology. Advances in technology that improve small satellites will help mitigate the risk of an asymmetric attack by making it easier for the U.S. to respond and replace damaged capabilities. The use of ‘pseudo-satellites’ can also provide redundancy. A pseudo-satellite is an aerial vehicle that provides the same or similar services as a space-based platform. Unmanned aerial vehicles that provide imagery and sigint can take the place of or reinforce space platforms. Pseudo-satellites could also provide communications or navigation services. A UAV or aircraft can orbit a conflict area, collecting information or broadcasting data. Current UAVs can only linger for a relatively short time over a conflict area, but research programs are developing platforms with greater capabilities. The ideal military space architecture would allow the U.S. to take a core of high value military space satellites and combine them with civilian, commercial and foreign space services, and with pseudo-satellites to respond to potential attacks. If, for example, an imagery satellite was blinded by enemy action, the U.S. wants to be in a position where a combination of pseudo-satellites, commercial services and special purpose small satellites can be rapidly assembled to fill the gap.
[ ] Redundancy, maneuverability and hardening increase satellite survivability
Hui 2007 - Research associate at Harvard University [Zhang http://www.wsichina.org/space/focus.cfm?)focusid=94&charid=1 Space Weaponization And Space Security: A Chinese Perspective Accessed June 24
There are technical approaches, which, if implemented unilaterally, could improve the survivability of space systems. The United States and others could, for example, harden or shield the most vulnerable parts of their satellites (such as the solar cells and the focal planes) against nuclear, laser, or other conventional attacks. In some cases (e.g. nuclear explosion), hardening satellites would be difficult but technically feasible. To avoid paralysis of a whole system, redundant capabilities could be made available for rapid replacement of satellites in orbit. Increased maneuverability, enhanced situational awareness, and improved stealth capability, would also make it easier to evade a hostile attack.21


Situational Awareness – Inherency



[ ] Status quo is not focusing on Space Situational Awareness – funding is inadequate
Kyl 2007 – US senator and Attorney. [Jon Kyl. Published on February 1, 2007. Delivered on January 29, 2007. China's Anti-Satellite Weapons and American National Security. The Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/Chinas-Anti-Satellite-Weapons-and-American-National-Security. Accessed June 21]
A sixth example: cutting Space Situational Awareness. In March 2006, Lt. Gen. Frank Klotz of U.S. Space Command told the House Armed Services Committee that present space situational awareness capabilities "are not adequate to counter future threats."[15] Despite this testimony, the Air Force has recently cancelled one critical SSA program, the Orbital Deep-Space Imager,[16] and cut FY 2008 funding for another, modernization of the "Space Fence," by more than 70 percent.[17] Once again, the Air Force has validated requirements for both sys­tems, but according to a Space Command spokes­man, "the decision was made to move those funds toward higher...Air Force priorities." Meanwhile, systems that have survived, such as the Space-Based Surveillance System (SBSS), are not scheduled for deployment until at least 2012 or 2013.



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