The United States federal government should pursue a defensive space control strategy that emphasizes satellite hardening, replacement, redundancy and situational awareness

They Say “Alternate Causality - Ground Stations vulnerable”

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• They Say “Alternative Causality – Ground Based ASATs”
• They Say “Alternative Causality – Cyber ASATs”
• They Say “Space Weapons Impossible”

They Say “Alternate Causality - Ground Stations vulnerable” [ ] “Satellite hardening” includes increasing development and protection of ground infrastructure too. Lewis 2005 - Director and Senior Fellow, Technology and Public Policy Program [James A. Lewis. November 1, 2005. House Armed Service Committee, Panel on Asymmetric and Unconventional Threats Center for Strategic and International Studies. http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:Cr-YrlZ_4YJ:csis.org/files/media/csis/congress /ts051101_lewis.pdf+hardening+satellites&hl=en&gl=us&pid= bl&srcid=ADGEES jqa8YKzjyP3GZoZvlk1KzXGHAwK2bzuk03clno4BciLnY3pLmf12TN75rlMuAJFzw3E5JmOGq lWin0d1Ldf9UWz9NEeduREpcsvzljHCJIJUjNEHfpnuem7nvvZ7gEdyHm4&sig=AHIEtbT9LZ1I2M32TCFG4GFWgdeaoiEjEQ. Accessed June 21] Hardening is particularly important for ground facilities. Effective use of satellite services requires a support infrastructure of analysts and operators and the integration of satellite data and services into military plans and operations. Damaging these terrestrial support infrastructure can reduce the U.S. advantage from space and may be cheaper and technically less difficult for an opponent. One aspect of the hardening of ground facilities that is easy to overlook involves information and network security. An opponent who can, using cyberweapons, disrupt the control of satellites, the flow of data from the satellites to the analysts and planners, or damage the integrity of that information can gain a real advantage at relatively low cost. Improved information and network security through the use of security and monitoring software, data encryption and authentication, is a crucial element for hardening the U.S. military space system against asymmetric attack. They Say “Alternative Causality – Ground Based ASATs” [ ] Redundancy and replacement are key to offset ground based ASATs Ghoshroy 2004, Research Associate at MIT [Subrata Ghoshroy. “Ensuring America’s Space Security: Report of the FAS Panel on Weapons in Space.” The Federation of American Scientists. September 2004. http://www.fas.org/pubs/_pages/space_report.html. Accessed June 22, 2011.] Since residual atmospheric drag is significant at 300 kilometer altitude, photoreconnaissance satellites would probably operate at altitudes higher than 300 kilometers. North Korea could therefore only reach satellite operational altitudes with a Scud in the event that a photo-reconnaissance satellite was in an orbit lower than 300 km. A Nodong would have to be used if they were to attempt to attack a reconnaissance satellite stationed above 300 km. The locations of both the Scud-C and Nodong are shown at 5-second intervals. It takes the Scud-C about four to five minutes (240 to 300 seconds) to reach apogee while the Nodong takes some six to seven minutes (360 to 420 seconds) to apogee. This time to apogee is long enough that even a very minor maneuver of the reconnaissance satellite (one to two meters per second) after the launch of a Nodong will greatly reduce the chances of the Nodong doing any damage to the satellite in an attack. It would be quite straightforward for the US to detect launches at engine ignition, which would then make it possible to issue maneuver orders to an approaching reconnaissance satellite minutes before the Nodong could reach the satellite's orbital altitude. Capabilities of North Korean missiles are further analyzed in David Wright's article in the Appendix F of this report. The Panel concludes that the threat posed by ground-based ASATs is best countered by ensuring redundancy of critical systems, developing quick launch capabilities to field replacements, using conventional forces to destroy enemy launch sites, and, if proven effective, utilizing land- and sea-based missile defenses. They Say “Alternative Causality – Cyber ASATs” [ ] The US is increasing its cyber security for space assets – USCYBERCOMM and RAIDRS Jakhu 2010 - Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University (Dr. Ram , with Cesar Jaramillo Managing Editor, Project Ploughshares, Phillip Baines (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada),), John Seibert (Project Ploughshares), Dr. Jennifer Simmons (The Simmons Foundation), Dr. Ray Williamson (Secure World Foundation). “Space Security 2010.” Spacesecurity.org. August 2010. http://www.spacesecurity.org/space.security.2010.reduced.pdf. pp. 119-167. Accessed June 21, 2011 The creation of USCYBERCOM can help the US achieve not only advanced capabilities to combat cyber threats, but also higher levels of security in space missions. Although the implementation of a single cyber command has the benefit of higher levels of integration among different government and military forces, it is still unclear how such integration is to be achieved. Other issues to be solved include the specification of minimum requirements, roles, and responsibilities of the entities involved in its operation. Although RAIDRS B-10 has been scaled down to five deployable sites, its development has continued and deployment is scheduled for 2010. As a result, the US military will be able, in the near future, to detect and identify attacks against their ground and space assets, which would have a positive impact on space security. They Say “Space Weapons Impossible” [ ] Effective weapons in space are possible – empirical examples and constantly evolving technology prove Dolman 2005, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies [Everett C. Dolman. “US Military Transformation and Weapons.” September 14, 2005. http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space_hearing_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20%26%20Space.pdf. Accessed June 24, 2011.] Why Not Space Weapons? There are essentially two classes of arguments in opposition to the weaponization of space; 1) that it cannot be done, and 2) that it should not be done. Space Weapons Are Possible Arguments in the first category spill the most ink in opposition, but are relatively easy to dispose of, especially the more radical variants. History is littered with prophesies of technical and scientific inadequacy, such as Lord Kelvin’s famous retort, ‘Heavier-thanair flying machines are impossible.’ Kelvin, a leading physicist and then president of the Royal Society, made this boast in 1895, and no less an inventor than Thomas Edison concurred. The possibility of spaceflight prompted even more gloomy pessimism. A New York Times editorial in 1921 (an opinion it has since retracted), excoriated Robert Goddard for his silly notions of rocket-propelled space exploration. ‘Goddard does not know the relation between action and reaction and the need to have something better than a vacuum against which to react. He seems to lack the basic knowledge ladled out daily in high schools.’ Compounding its error in judgment, in 1936, the Times stated flatly, “A rocket will never be able to leave the Earth’s atmosphere.” We have learned much, it would seem, or else bluntly negative scientific opinion on space weapons has been weeded out over time. Less encompassing arguments are now the rule. As the debate moved completely away from the impossibility of weapons and wars in space to more subtle and scientifically sustainable arguments that a particular space weapon is not feasible, mountains of mathematical formulae are piled high in an effort, one by one, simply to bury the concept. But these limitations on specific systems are less due to theoretical analysis than to assumptions about future funding and available technology. The real objection, too often hidden from view, is that a particular weapons system or capability cannot be developed and deployed within the planned budget, or within narrowly specified means. When one relaxes those assumptions, opposition on technical grounds falls away. The devil may very well be in the details, but if one’s stance opposing an entire class of weapons is premised upon analyses that show particular weapons will not work … what happens when a fresh concept or new technology cannot be disproved? If one bases policy decisions on discrediting the particulars of proposed operations, what happens when technology X, the unexpected (perhaps unforeseeable) scientific breakthrough that changes all notions of current capabilities, inevitably arrives? Have we thought out the details enough we can say categorically that no technology will allow for a viable space weapons capability? If so, then the argument is pat; no counter is possible. But, if there are technologies or conditions that could allow for the successful weaponization of space, then ought we not argue the policy details first, lest we be swept away by a course of action that merely chases the technology wherever it may go? Space Weapons Should be Deployed: The opponents of space weapons on technical or budgetary grounds are not advocating space weapons in the event their current assumptions or analyses are swept aside. Because a thing can be done does not mean it ought to be. Of course, prescience is imperfect. Technologies will be found that were not or could not be foretold, and the foolish policymaker eschews adapting to it until its utility is beyond a doubt. Indeed, it is concern for the unanticipated arrival of technology X that initially motivates my own preference for a policy advocating immediate deployment of space weapons. 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