[ ] Other countries are using ground based lasers as ASATs Kahn 2007 - Deputy Foreign Editor of the New York Times [Joseph, China Shows Assertiveness in Weapons Test, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/20/world/asia/20china.html?pagewanted=1, Accessed June 22, 2011] At the annual military fair in Zhuhai, held in November, the Guangdong-based newspaper Information Times and several other state-run media outlets carried a short interview with an unidentified military official boasting that China had “already completely ensured that it has second-strike capability.” The analyst said China could protect its retaliatory forces because it could destroy satellites in space. American officials have also noted the development. This month, Lt. Gen. Michael Mapes of the Army testified before Congress that China and Russia were working on systems to hit American satellites with lasers or missiles.And over the summer, the director of the National Reconnaissance Office, Donald M. Kerr, told reporters that the Chinese had used a ground-based laser to “paint,” or illuminate, an American satellite, a possible first step to using lasers to destroy satellites. “China is becoming more assertive in just about every military field,” said Mr. Behm, the Australian expert. “It is not going to concede that the U.S. can be the hegemon in space forever.”
Space Race – Crisis Stability Impacts
[ ] Space militarization undermines crisis stability – it invites preemption during a crisis because it undermines deterrence. An arms race is inherently unstable because it favors asymmetry
MacDonald 2008 – Council on Foreign Relations [Bruce, Council Special Report No. 38 September China, Space Weapons, date accessed : June 24th, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-space-weapons-us-security/p16707]
Attacking others’ satellites would invite retaliation, putting at risk a “vital national interest” where the United States has much more to lose than the attacker. In the nuclear arena, keeping the option open to retaliate with nuclear weapons if U.S. vital interests are attacked is firmly anchored in a doctrine of deterrence, not war fighting. The absence of discussion on deterrence in U.S. space policy beyond a brief mention is disturbing and requires clarification. Threatening to attack the space assets of competitors who also possess offensive counterspace capability could only be in the security interests of the United States if: – the United States can successfully defend its space assets; or – the right to attack others is implied in terms of deterrence rather than war fighting; or – the effects of attacks on satellites are fully reversible; or – attacks are limited and localized (i.e., tactical in nature, not strategic). Even the latter two cases would involve significant risk of escalation. The administration has stated that “the current preferred approach to protect U.S. terrestrial forces from space threats is through the use of temporary and reversible effects,” though this has not been confirmed as official policy.14 China’s ASAT test, however, led to a major U.S. reaction, and a potential action-reaction cycle appears likely. If China deployed direct ascent ASATs (ground-launched missiles that fly directly at their space targets, such as the ones China tested in 2007), these would become high-priority targets for the United States in a crisis or actual conflict due to the threat they would pose. General James E. Cartwright told Congress that the United States is prepared to strike land-based Chinese ASAT launchers if China shoots down U.S. satellites. Such a statement may help dissuade China from attacking U.S. satellites in a crisis, but, if actually carried out, it would inflict many casualties and risk serious escalation. This highlights the disparity between deterrence and war-fighting strategies. At a minimum, such statements would give China an incentive to make their ASAT systems mobile. The administration has not adequately addressed the political and military risks associated with an unconstrained offensive counterspace competition. There is an inherent potential for instability when a relatively modest investment of military resources can produce a disproportionate effect on an adversary’s military capabilities, as with space assets. In the context of an escalating crisis, such potential instability could be magnified to critical proportions. While the United States currently enjoys substantial space superiority, should China—or others— assert comparable rights and buttress these assertions with counterspace weapons programs, the potential for future space- and earthbound instability would be substantial and worrisome. In the near to mid term, threatening to attack Chinese satellites, which China depends on far less than the United States does its military satellites, appears counterproductive and could easily provide a Chinese rationale for a response in kind that could seriously damage U.S. military capability. In response to the security message of the Chinese ASAT test, press reports indicate that the Bush administration has been developing countering strategies in the Departments of Defense and State and drafting a funding plan to procure technologies. The president is reported to have issued a classified memo calling for agencies to improve U.S. space situational awareness (SSA), avoid future foreign ASAT launches, and address defensive and offensive measures.15
[ ] Increasing Chinese space capabilities increase the threat of preemption – they enable a first strike capability MacDonald 2008 – Council on Foreign Relations [Bruce, Council Special Report No. 38 September China, Space Weapons, date accessed : June 24th, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-space-weapons-us-security/p16707]
There are many issues this doctrinal approach raises that are well beyond the scope of this report and that urgently require attention. One in particular merits special mention: the countermeasures that the United States would have to take to operate in a conflict where an enemy would have to worry only about temporary and reversible U.S. counterspace capabilities. In several years, China will probably be able to take pictures from space of U.S. ports and bases in the western Pacific and relay those images in minutes to Chinese missile systems and air crews, an advantageous capability heretofore only possessed by the United States since the first Gulf War. While such a Chinese capability would increase China’s space dependence and thus “raise the ante” for it to strike first in space, new U.S. tactics and countermeasures will be required to maintain the current U.S. advantage under a future deterrence regime.
[ ] Space Conflicts are inevitable – empirically – they have already started Hyten 2001 Director, Space Programs, Office of the Ass Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, [4 January 01. Air & Space Power Journal . A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War: Dealing with the Inevitable Conflict in Space. Lt Col John E. Hyten. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/Hyten.html Accessed June 21, 2011.] The United States is, however, in spite of the warnings of President Kennedy and many others, proceeding "unprotected" into the future. Should any adversary on any level—national, commercial, or even individual—choose to interfere with our space systems, the United States has no coherent policy or means to deal with such a threat. Opponents of an expanded military space program (beyond the current capability to support terrestrial forces) charge that, with the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, there no longer exists any threat of the hostile misuse of space. They argue that space has indeed become the "sea of peace" that President Kennedy dreamed of, where space is being mastered and explored without threat of warfare or conflict. In fact, in spite of indications to the contrary, conflict in space is inevitable—and on a limited basis, has already occurred. Nations have already interfered with the space systems of other nations—through jamming and interference—solely for commercial advantage.4 All the nations of the world have learned from the Persian Gulf War how critically dependent the United States is on the use of space assets to successfully operate in a theater of war. No nation would dare to challenge the United States in conventional military operations without attempting to somewhat level the information dominant battlefield that the U.S. currently enjoys; and this dominance, in great part, comes from space.