Theology beacon dictionary of theology

W. T. Purkiser

When the Psalmist declares (Ps. 2:7) "Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee," he is teaching the eternal generation of this Second Trinitarian Person. The phrase "this day" denotes the universal present, the everlasting now which is put for eternity (cf. W. G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, 1:326). And when the Gospel of John (1:18; cf. 3:16, 18; 1 John 4:9) refers to Jesus as the "only begotten God" (monogenes theos) (nasb), it teaches the unique and solitary nature of His Sonship and eternal Deity. When, in Heb. 1:6, the writer speaks of God bringing "the first-begotten [prototokon] into the world," he is indi­cating a unique, metaphysical relationship of essence that constitutes Christ's prehistorical ex­istence with the Father—an existence which ex­cludes all becoming. The same truth is taught by Paul in Col. 1:15 as he speaks of the Son as be­gotten before all creation. It is the apostle's con­tention that Christ is prior to all things (ta panta, the created universe) "for by him were all things created" (v. 16).

The phrase therefore indicates the pre­existence of Christ and the metaphysical union of essence between Christ and God the Father, and it speaks of a Sonship that reaches back into eternity and depends upon this original rela­tionship of identity of essence. Christ has a pre-temporal existence in a continuous and abiding union with the Father. Hence He could declare that "before Abraham was born, I AM" (John 8:58, nasb). Furthermore, He can pray, "And now, glorify Thou Me together with Thyself, Fa­ther, with the glory which I ever had with Thee before the world was" (17:5, nasb). Jesus pos­sessed the consciousness of having personally existed previous to His life on earth in an essen­tial life fellowship with God, to which He knew that He should return after His work here on earth was finished. "This sonship is something super-terrestrial and eternal" (G. B. Stevens, Jo-hannine Theology, 126).

See ARIANISM, CHRIST, TRINITY (THE HOLY), UNITAR­IANISM, ETERNAL GENERATION, FIRSTBORN.

Ross E. Price

Following this line of thought, the NT uses the Greek kairos. The coming of Christ was the great kairos. "The time [kairos] has come . . . The king­dom of God is near. Repent and believe the good news!" (Mark 1:15, niv). The life of Jesus is more than a birthday to be celebrated, followed by 30 or more years before He was crucified. It would be missing the mark to measure that life in years or judge it by its length. It was the great "Christ event" of God's ceaseless activity in His quest for man's salvation.

The NT uses still another term, aion. Kairos time gives promise of aion time, an age to come above and independent of chronos time and the consummation of the kairos time of Christ. This is the chief word for the concept of eternity. Eter­nal life is experienced by all who believe in Jesus Christ; they are already living in the aion, that unbroken age which is to come but which through Christ is already present. The adjective aidois, "everlasting," is used only twice in the NT.

Eternity, then, is what may be called the mode or manner of God's existence and self-revealing activity in history. It is infinity, immutability, timelessness—mysterious, inscrutable, sublime. It has to do with righteousness and holiness and

In this context, eternal punishment (which is another subject) must be seen as part of God's redemptive activity, the purging of His creation which was mutilated by the fall of man.

The promises of kairos time are fulfilled in the aion when God's enemies will be put under His feet, when the Son himself will be made subject to Him that put everything under Him, "that God may be all in all" (1 Cor. 15:26-28). This is eternity which can only be known or experi­enced as it is revealed in the sovereign power of God. In Christ can be seen the true nature of both time and eternity. "This is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent" (John 17:3).

See chronos, eternal life, eternal punishment.

For Further Reading: Richardson, A Theological Word Book of the Bible; Gilkey, Naming the Whirlwind; Quick, Doctrines of the Creed. HARVEY J. S. BLANEY

ETHICAL RELATIVISM. This is the position in ethical theory that right and wrong are purely relative to human factors, rather than deter­mined by divine revelation or any form of moral absolutes. In so-called situation ethics, as popu­larized by Joseph Fletcher and others, the human factor is the concrete situation which alone can provide the basis for making the ethical judg­ment pertinent to it. Rules are not sufficiently flexible to anticipate all the unique complexities of a given set of circumstances, therefore rules are unable to specify in advance what will be the right thing. Some situationists do acknowledge one universal law, viz., love, so that the ethical obligation is to exercise judgment in determining what is the most loving thing to do.

While the concrete situation is the locus of at­tention with the situationists, the human factor most determinative for the anthropologist and most sociologists has been the standards of the community. Accordingly "the sense of duty is purely relative to the customs of society in which it occurs, so that the proper form of ethics is sim­ply a description of mores in different societies" (L. Harold DeWolf, Responsible Freedom, 26). Rather than such ethical relativism being solely private—relative only to one's personal opinion —it is standardized in the sense that it carries the sanctions of that particular society. As a part of a particular society, a man ought to be faithful to its mores. Theoretically, this leads to a solidarity of moral action which the usual understanding of moral relativism does not hold. In this respect it is an improvement over the extreme individu­alism of situationism, and certainly superior to the exaggerated freedom of antinomianism.

However, neither personal judgment in the sit­uation nor the customs and mores of a society can be trustworthy guides for determining right and wrong. This is precluded by human sin­fulness which is swayed more by passion than principle, by the limitations of personal judg­ment, and by the pagan and demonic elements in non-Christian cultures. The Christian builds on the practical necessity and the historical fac-tuality of divine revelation, in which God has given to man His moral law, and made available both the Bible and the Holy Spirit for the under­standing and application of this law. The law is absolute in at least two respects: (1) its principles are timeless, universal, and unchangeable; (2) it carries the supreme authority of God himself, therefore is not optional, and cannot be super­ceded by the vagaries of social custom.

Therefore, while there is some truth in ethical relativism, viz., that some secondary details are relative to times, situations, and cultures, as a ba­sis for ethical theory it alone is not adequate.

See ethics, christian ethics, morality, sin, rev­elation (special), antinomianism.

For Further Reading: DeWolf, Responsible Freedom;
Strauss, Baker's DCE, 219; Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The
New Morality; Brunner, The Divine Imperative; Thielicke,
Theological Ethics, vol. 1. OSCAR F. REED

ETHICAL SIN. See legal sin.

ETHICS. The Greek ethos is found only once in the NT (1 Cor. 15:33), and then it is in a current proverb. Originally, the word meant "dwelling" or "stall." To this word, the Latin mos was given, from which morality is derived.

There is a real distinction, however, between ethics and morality. The original sense of "sta­bility" or "stall" suggests that ethics deals with the stability and security which is necessary if one is to act at all. "It was really the primary of­fice of custom to do in the human area what the stall did for animals: to provide security and sta­bility" (Paul Lehmann, Ethics in a Christian Con­text, 23-25). Ethics, then, is concerned with what holds human society together. In the developing discipline, ethics deals with reflection upon the principles that govern behavior, while morality deals with the behavior according to approved standards.

1. 
   Normative ethics deals with what is right and wrong, good or bad, virtuous or evil in ac­cordance with standards. In this area, ethics is concerned with establishing norms by which moral action can be evaluated. While it draws in­formation from many descriptive sciences, its primary focus is on what ought to be followed by what persons ought to do.
   

The dialogue between utilitarianism and for­malism is particularly crucial today in medical ethics. With the increasing application of "util­itarian cost benefit analyses to social policy," the physician is confronted with decisions which from the standpoint of utility may be nor-matively justifiable (utilitarian). On the other hand, his obligation to each patient may lead him to life-saving procedures regardless of utility (formalistic) (Dyck, On Human Care, 14-21).

2. 
   Metaethics deals analytically with the kind of language that ethics works with. Metaethics is theoretical and critical. The discipline is not as remote as one might think. If a medical authority takes the position that professional judgments are not moral judgments, the ethicist is obligated to analyze whether the judgment is moral or nonmoral. Practical ethical judgments are state­ments about actions, such as "This is right (or wrong). Metaethical judgments define and ap­praise the standards, rules and principles that justify those practical decisions" (Dyck).
   
3. 
   Moral policy is the design that ethicists use to make descriptive and critical analyses of what to do in specific situations. Whether the issue re­lates to a nation's decision in war and peace, re­sponsibility to a civil code, or medical decisions, the perplexities encountered demand decisions which are moral in content. Moral policy can pro­vide descriptive and critical analyses of the sources of agreement and disagreement. But it can also make judgments which in light of the known (descriptive) can control historical events and human destiny. The hostage issue with Iran was filled with moral judgments coming from such moral policy. Empirical definitions, affir­mations of loyalty, the range of human freedom, and the interests of the nation all entered the pic­ture.