A constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963
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| Foreign Affairs 39 (April 1961). Wohlstetter was not in the government, but he had close ties with a number of key defense department officials, and had played a major role in developing the policy outlined in the Acheson NATO report. The "Nuclear Sharing" article was a powerful argument against nuclear forces under European national control, and it is important to note that Wohlstetter had favored such capabilities just a couple of years earlier. In his most famous article, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," which appeared in Foreign Affairs in January 1959, he had considered the development of independent capabilities in Europe to be in principle "a useful thing" (p. 227). This shift on his part is one measure of how radically and how quickly thinking on the nuclear sharing issue had been transformed by the beginning of 1961.
1148. Draft Presidential Memorandum, "Recommended FY 1964-FY 1968 Strategic Retaliatory Forces," November 21, 1962, pp. 5-9; OSD-FOIA. On the DPM's, which were quite important during the McNamara period, see, for example, Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, p. 281, and Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 53-58. For his views in early 1961, see n. xxx above. 1149. NSC meeting, September 12, 1963 (discussion of NESC report), FRUS 1961-63, 8:499-507. 1150. David Rosenberg, "Nuclear War Planning," p. 178; Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 296-301; Taylor to Kennedy, September 19, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 8:126-129; Kaysen interview, August 1988; Taylor to Lemnitzer, September 19, 1961 (for Kennedy's evident interest in the idea), FRUS 1961-63, vols. 7-9, mic. supp., no. 242; and above all, for a detailed description of the proposal, Smith to Taylor, September 7, 1961, DDRS 1996/2496. 1151. Wainstein, "Evolution of U.S. Strategic Command and Control," pp. 285-294, 326, 336-337, 346-347, 431. 1152. For a brief description of how the basic war plan was changed, see David Rosenberg, "Nuclear War Planning," pp. 178-179; on the new guidance introduced in early 1962, see Wainstein, "Evolution of U.S. Strategic Command and Control," pp. 290-291. On the relative superficiality of the changes introduced during the McNamara period, see Rosenberg, "Reality and Responsibility," pp. 46, 48. General Bruce Holloway, director of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff at the time--this was the SAC-dominated unit that worked out the SIOP, the basic plan for general nuclear war--noted in an oral history interview that the military officers under his command were relatively free to work out war plan as they saw fit. McNamara, he noted, never overruled them on the SIOP while he headed the JSTPS. Holloway oral history, p. 359, Office of Air Force History, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C. There is also a NATO aspect to this story. One of the reasons SACEUR wanted land-based MRBMs was that they were a good deal more accurate than sea-based weapons, thus making it possible to use warheads with much smaller yields; this was in line with Norstad's "constraints policy"--i.e., his policy for limiting collateral damage. If the U.S. government had been serious about the strategy of "controlled and discriminate nuclear war," this would have been an important consideration in favor the MRBM deployment, but in reality this factor evidently did not count for much. For SACEUR's argument about the MRBMs and the "constraints policy," see Finletter to Rusk, October 17, 1962 (report of Norstad's briefing that day to North Atlantic Council), NSF/216/MLF--General--Stikker Paper/JFKL; for more information on the "constraints policy" (also called the "restraints policy"), see chapter five, n. xxx above. 1153. The most compelling piece of evidence in support of this interpretation is an excerpt from the tape of a July 30, 1963, meeting between Kennedy, McNamara and Bundy. McNamara informed the president here that a "very controversial force proposal" was in the making, and that counterforce was going to be abandoned as a goal, at least for force sizing purposes. The reason was that counterforce would not substantially reduce casualties in the event of war. For Kennedy, that point was self-evident, but he wondered what this shift in doctrine would do to what he called the "McNamara thesis." McNamara's attachment to the no-cities/counterforce doctrine was so weak that the president had to explain that he was referring to the "idea that we were just going to attack their means of delivery"--that is, the line laid out in the Athens speech. Kennedy then went on to add: "That was just that. . ."--but his voice trailed off, as though a point had registered in his mind and he saw no need to verbalize it fully. The use of the word "just" implies clearly enough that the McNamara doctrine, as outlined at Athens, is not to be taken at face value and that its real purpose lay elsewhere. It is also quite clear from this conversation that the coming and going of the "no-cities" doctrine was not taken too seriously: it was a source of some amusement to these top officials that these strategies had a short shelf-life and tended to get used up rather rapidly. This particular one, Bundy jokingly remarked here, "was only good for about a year," and McNamara, in the same spirit, added: "we're running out of them, Mr. President." White House meeting, July 30, 1963, tape 102/A38, cassette one, side two (discussion begins after first excision), POF, JFKL. 1154. Kennedy-Krock meeting, October 11, 1961, KP/1/3/343/ML. Note also his comment in an NSC meeting in January 1963 that "we will have a difficult time protecting the free areas of Asia if the Chinese get nuclear weapons." NSC meeting, January 22, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 8:462. 1155. Anglo-American meeting, December 19, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 13:1094. For the impact that the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba had on America's ability to escalate during the missile crisis, see Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, pp. 250-253. 1156. NSC meeting, January 22, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 8:460 and 13:486. Note also the president's assumption that Europe was becoming less dependent on the United States as the French built up their own nuclear force, a point which ran counter to the official position that the French force had no value whatsoever. NSC Executive Committee meeting, January 25, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:487. 1157. Denigrating European nuclear forces was a tactic that the U.S. government deliberately adopted for political reasons. McNamara, for example, noted at one point that "disparaging French nuclear capabilities" was something that could be done for political purposes. NSC Executive Committee meeting, January 25, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:490. The assumption was that even small nuclear capabilities would have major (but, from the U.S. point of view, undesirable) political effects; it was therefore important to dissuade other countries from going nuclear; and to do that one had to deny that relatively small nuclear forces were of much value. The Gilpatric Committee report on the nuclear proliferation problem, although prepared a bit later, provides a good illustration of this kind of thinking. The report recognized how new nuclear capabilities would affect the distribution of power in the world, and noted that as more countries went nuclear, American "diplomatic and military influence would wane." It then argued that in order to "minimize the incentives for others to acquire nuclear weapons," the Americans had to "avoid giving an exaggerated impression of their importance and utility," and that the United States needed to "stress the current and future important role of conventional armaments"--which is yet another example of how the flexible response doctrine is to be understood, to a extent, in instrumental terms. Report to the President by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, January 21, 1965, pp. 2, 20, DDRS 1991/2928. 1158. Kennedy-Macmillan meeting, April 28, 1962, Prem 11/3783, PRO. 1159. Kennedy-Khrushchev meetings, June 4, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:87-98. For another example of Kennedy's tendency to think in spheres of influence terms, see the report of his meeting with Adzhubei in January 1962. When the Soviets had problems with Hungary, they felt free to use force; the U.S., he implied, should be able to deal with the Cuban problem the same way. See Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964 (New York: Norton, 1997), pp. 152-153. 1160. Kennedy-Khrushchev meetings, June 4, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:87-98. 1161. Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis, July 25, 1961, PPP Kennedy, 1961: 537-538. The phrase had been suggested by the famous television journalist Edward R. Murrow, then head of the United States Information Agency. 1162. Rusk-Fanfani meeting, August 9, 1961, NSABF. 1163. Khrushchev speeches on August 7 and August 11, 1961, New York Times, August 8, 1961, p. 8, and U.S. Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, Documents on Germany, 1944-1961 (New York: Greenwood, 1968), pp. 718-720. For the Konev quotation (which I have put into English slightly differently), see Helmut Trotnow, "Who Actually Built the Berlin Wall? The SED Leadership and the 13th of August 1961," paper presented at OSD and U.S. Army Center of Military History Conference on Cold War Military Records and History, Washington, March 1994, p. 6. For Khrushchev's original threat at Vienna to block access, see Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting, June 4, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:91. 1164. Hope Harrison has shown that the East German regime pressed for Soviet action, and in particular for a closing of the "door to the West," but that the USSR resisted these demands. For the Soviets, the refugee problem was never the central issue, and they made it clear that they had bigger fish to fry. The most important document here is a letter from the Soviet ambassador in East Germany, Pervukhin, to Gromyko of May 19, 1961. The East German "friends" were pressing for the sealing of the border in Berlin, Pervukhin wrote, but this reflected "a somewhat one-sided approach to this problem," and they did not take adequate account of "the interests of the entire socialist camp." See Harrison, "Ulbricht and the Concrete 'Rose,'" appendix D. 1165. See, for example, Schwarz, Adenauer, 2:660-665; Alphand, L'Etonnement d'être, p. 361 (for Couve's remark); western foreign ministers' meeting, December 11, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:652 (for another example of Couve's very accepting attitude). For U.S. views: Kennedy remarks in NSC meeting, July 13, 1961; Rusk comments in western foreign ministers' meeting, August 5, 1961, and in a meeting of the Berlin steering group, August 15, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:194, 286, 334. Ambassador Thompson had earlier argued that a sealing of the border would have to happen if the Communists were to accept the status quo in West Berlin. See Thompson to Rusk, March 16, 1961, ibid., p. 32. 1166. Kennedy to McNamara, August 14, 1961, NSF/82/Germany--Berlin--General/JFKL; Bundy to Kennedy, August 14, 1961, and McNamara in Berlin steering group, August 17, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:330-331, 347; Rusk-Alphand meeting, August 26, 1961, NSABF. 1167. Acheson in Berlin coordinating group, June 16, 1961, and Acheson report, June 28, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:119, 139, 148, 151. 1168. Bundy to Kennedy, May 29, 1961, POF/126/Vienna documents (A)/JFKL. 1169. Meeting on Berlin, July 17, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:210. 1170. Bundy to Sorensen, July 22, 1961, NSF/81/German--Berlin--General/JFKL. 1171. NSC meeting, July 13, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:194. 1172. Acheson Report, June 28, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:151. 1173. Bundy to Kennedy, August 28, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:379n. 1174. Kennedy to Rusk, August 21, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:359-360; Rusk-Alphand meeting, August 26, 1961, NSABF; Bundy to Kennedy, August 28, 1961, NSF/82/Germany--Berlin--General/JFKL. Emphasis in original text. 1175. Kennedy to Rusk, September 12, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:403. 1176. Kennedy to Rusk, August 21, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:359. 1177. On September 5, Kennedy had asked the State Department to consider including a "limitation or prohibition of nuclear arms in either part of Germany" as part of a Berlin settlement, and Rusk did in fact make it clear that the U.S. was willing to discuss the issue when he met with Gromyko later that month. Kennedy-Rusk meeting, September 5, 1961, and Rusk-Gromyko meetings, September 28 and 30, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:393, 439-441, 459. See also Kennedy-Adzhubei interview, November 25, 1961, PPP Kennedy, 1961: 751. 1178. Kennedy-Gromyko meeting, October 6, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:471, 472, 474. See also Nitze-Menshikov meeting, July 15, 1961, and Rusk-Gromyko meeting, September 30, 1961, ibid., pp. 204, 459. 1179. Bohlen to Rusk, October 3, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:465. See also Rusk-Bruce meeting, October 2, 1961, and Bundy to Kennedy, October 2, 1961, ibid., pp. 460n, 460-461. 1180. Home to Macmillan, August 6, 1961, FO 371/160541, PRO. 1181. Killick to Schuckburgh, September 25, 1961, FO 371/160553, PRO. 1182. Kohler-Winckler meeting, August 22, 1961 (for a report of Couve's views), FRUS 1961-63, 14:368n; Alphand-Rusk meeting, August 26, 1961, NSABF. 1183. Acheson-Grewe meeting, October 11, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:490-491. 1184. Schwarz, Adenauer. 2:684. 1185. Steel to Foreign Office, October 30, 1962, FO 371/163583, PRO. 1186. Sorensen remark at dinner in mid-October, reported in Thomson to Killick, October 20, 1961, FO 371/160559. 1187. Acheson-Grewe meeting, October 11, 1961 (for the quotation), FRUS 1961-63, 14:492; Kohler to Rusk, October 4, 1961, with Kohler-Grewe meeting, September 29, 1961, 611.62a/10-461, RG 59, USNA. Note the president's reference to "hesitation and delay" in the military area "on the part of some who talk as if they were firm and resolute"; Kennedy to Clay, October 8, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:484. Kennedy's feelings came out very clearly in a talk with Ormsby Gore, which the British ambassador reported to Home on February 19, 1962; FO 371/163567, PRO. On German unwillingness to face the risk of nuclear war, or even to make a serious military effort of any kind, see, in general, Schwarz, Adenauer, 2:493-494, 654-659, 663, 694, and Clay to Kennedy, October 18, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:512. Even today, some leading German authorities, while recognizing that Adenauer was against the use of force under any circumstances, nonetheless insist on applauding Adenauer for his toughness and on characterizing Kennedy as an appeaser. Note especially Schwarz's frequent references to Kennedy's "appeasement" policy: Schwarz, Adenauer, 2:732, 733, 743, 745, 750. 1188. Roberts to Foreign Office, September 5, 1961, FO 371/160548, PRO. 1189. Shuckburgh-Kohler-Rusk meeting, September 17, 1961, FO 371/160552, PRO. 1190. Steel to Shuckburgh, October 7, 1961, FO 371/160555, PRO. 1191. Acheson-Adenauer meeting, November 21, 1961, and Acheson to Shulman, November 23, 1961, AP/65/SDWHA/HSTL; Rusk meeting with Ormsby Gore, November 24, 1961, NSABF; Kennedy-Adenauer meeting, November 21, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, vols. 13-15, mic. supp., no. 247. 1192. Krone diary, November 19, 1961, Adenauer-Studien, 3:164; Horst Osterheld, "Ich gehe nicht leichten Herzens. . ." Adenauers letzte Kanzlerjahre: Ein dokumentarisches Bericht (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald, 1986), pp. 85-88; Alphand, L'Etonnement d'être, p. 367; Robert d'Harcourt, L'Allemagne d'Adenauer à Erhard (Paris: Flammarion, 1964), p. 99; Anglo-American meetings, December 21-22, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:701-703. 1193. Adenauer-Kennedy meeting, November 21, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:615. 1194. Kennedy to Macmillan, November 22, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:633. 1195. Western foreign ministers' meeting, September 15, 1961, p. 2, FO 371/160551, PRO. 1196. Western foreign ministers' meeting, September 15, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:419. 1197. Couve-Home-Rusk meeting, August 5, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:277. 1198. Western foreign ministers' meeting, September 15, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:418-419. 1199. See, for example, de Gaulle remarks, December 21, 1961, in Alphand, L'Etonnement d'être, p. 367. This, incidentally, was the way American analysts came to interpret French policy. In their view, the French had looked at the various components of the new U.S. policy on NATO issues, put two and two together, and reached the conclusion that America was out to denuclearize and perhaps neutralize Europe. Such suspicions had probably begun to take shape in 1961. By July 1962, what de Gaulle delicately referred to as the "departure of General Norstad" was added to the list of indicators, and after the Cuban missile crisis, the American decision to withdraw the Jupiter missiles from Turkey was also cited in this context. Draft airgram, n.a. and n.d. but probably from late June 1962, reporting meetings Bowie and Rowen had with French officials on NATO nuclear issues, pp. 6-7, DDRS 1990/1372; Lemnitzer-de Gaulle meeting, July 24, 1962, NSF/71a/France--General/JFKL; Kissinger meeting with French officials, May 23, 1963, DDRS 1996/2000. The French interpretation was shared by Taylor's assistants Legere and Ewell, who criticized the "anti-nuclear wrecking crew" within the government, a group which they thought was out to "denuclearize Europe." Legere to Taylor, May 3, 1962, and Ewell to Taylor, April 16, 1962, quoted in FRUS 1961-63, 8:300n. There are many other memoranda in the Taylor Papers, especially from Legere, developing similar arguments. And in fact there was some talk at high levels within the administration about denuclearizing central Europe. See, for example, Carl Kaysen, "Thoughts on Berlin," August 22, 1961, p. 10, and Harriman to Kennedy, September 1, 1961, both NSF/82/Germany--Berlin--General/JFKL. But the fundamental tendency of the Kennedy administration was to keep Europe nuclearized by maintaining a strong, American-controlled nuclear force there, while keeping the Germans from acquiring a nuclear force of their own. 1200. Rusk-Home-Couve meeting, August 5, 1961, and western foreign ministers' meetings, September 15 and December 12, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:272, 416, 675, 677. 1201. Rusk-de Gaulle meeting, August 8, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:313-314. 1202. Dixon to Foreign Office, October 9, 1961, FO 371/160555, PRO. 1203. Hood to Foreign Office, October 13, 1961, FO 371/160555, PRO; Alphand-Bohlen-Kohler meeting, October 14, 1961, NSABF. 1204. Alphand, L'Etonnement d'être, entries for August 23 and December 21, 1961, pp. 363, 367; Rusk-Home-Couve meeting, August 5, 1961, and western foreign ministers' meeting, December 11, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:270, 273, 650, 652. On this general issue, see also pp. xxx-yyy above. 1205. Account of de Gaulle remarks to MRP representatives, quoted in Rumbold to Shuckburgh, September 27, 1961, FO 371/160554, PRO. See also Couve-Heath meeting, November 9, 1961, FO 371/160563, PRO. 1206. De Gaulle-Macmillan talks, in Foreign Office to Washington, November 27, 1961, FO 371/160565; also in Prem 11/3338; both PRO. See also the prime minister's reflections on this meeting, in Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p. 426. 1207. Couve-Heath meeting, November 9, 1961, FO 371/160563, PRO; Krone diary, December 15, 1961, Adenauer-Studien, 3:165. 1208. De Gaulle-Adenauer meeting, March 4, 1959, DDF 1959, 1:278-279. See also de Gaulle's comments to two Italian leaders, March 20, 1959, ibid, p. 400; de Gaulle-Adenauer meeting, September 14, 1958, and especially de Gaulle-Spaak meeting, September 24, 1958, DDF 1958, 2:344, 430. 1209. See, for example, Rusk-Home-Couve meeting, August 5, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:269. 1210. On de Gaulle's general strategic concept, see the references cited in chapter six, n. xxx above. For specific references by de Gaulle to two distinct and successive battles in a European war--a "battle for Germany" to be followed by a "battle for France"--see de Gaulle-Eisenhower-Macmillan meeting, December 20, 1959, DDF 1959, 2:770; de Gaulle-Macmillan meeting, June 3, 1962, Prem 11/3712, PRO; and de Gaulle-Alphand meeting, June 26, 1962, Alphand, Directory: polisci -> faculty -> trachtenberg trachtenberg -> The United States, France, and the Question of German Power, 1945-1960 polisci -> Transylvania university committee on program and curriculum polisci -> Pos 6933: History of American Political Thought Course Description polisci -> Urban politics political science polisci -> International political economy polisci -> J. B. 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