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SLOC’s Module – Backlines



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SLOC’s Module – Backlines


No Maritime Deal now, Obama = pushing

*** Note to students: this all-purpose card also appears under the header A-to “Soft power high now” – for Energy Transit Scenarios


( ) Obama’s pushing ASEAN on maritime crime agreement now. Could go either way.



Cheney-Peters ‘14

Scott Cheney-Peters is the founder and vice president of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), a graduate of Georgetown University and the U.S. Naval War College, and a member of the Truman National Security Project’s Defense Council. “US, Japan to Boost ASEAN Maritime Security” – The Diplomat – April 30, 2014 – http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/us-japan-to-boost-asean-maritime-security/


But while the TPP’s logjam received its share of publicity, another mooted initiative escaped much attention in the run up to Friday’s U.S.-Japan Joint Statement, except for a tantalizing hint offered by the Yomiuri Shimbun. Citing unnamed sources, the paper said that Japan and the United States had developed a “plan” to help member nations of ASEAN to “strengthen their maritime surveillance capabilities,” in a move “apparently aimed at pressuring China to curb its growing regional ambitions.” The article went on to suggest that this plan would be unveiled during the Joint Statement. In the event, the statement was short on details, stating in the third-to-last paragraph only that: The United States and Japan are collaborating to assist Southeast Asian littoral states in building maritime domain awareness and other capacities for maritime safety and security so that they can better enforce law, combat illicit trafficking and weapons proliferation, and protect marine resources. It appears that the aim is two-fold: “preventing China’s unilateral maritime advance,” as sources in the Yomiuri Shimbun piece suggested, and more generally countering maritime crime, such as piracy and illicit weapons, people, and drug trafficking. At this point we can only speculate as to what the collaboration will entail in concrete terms, but the challenges are no mystery. To the first of these goals, the challenge of providing assistance is largely political. Many ASEAN countries prefer not to risk antagonizing their large trading partner (and militarily powerful neighbor) by accepting overt “counter-China” aid. Two possible exceptions to this practice are the Philippines and Vietnam, both of whom were not surprisingly singled out in the Yomiuiri Shumbun article as the main recipients of U.S.-Japanese maritime surveillance assistance. Meanwhile, many other nations could receive aid ostensibly to boost their efforts against maritime crime. Much of the items under discussion – such as patrol boats and surveillance assets – could be of dual use, and resource protection efforts in the region’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) frequently take on tones of enforcing claims of territorial sovereignty. This is not to say there isn’t a real utility for regional cooperation focused on maritime crime. While incidents of piracy and robbery in the Strait of Malacca are down drastically from highs in the early 2000s, other areas near Singapore and Indonesia are generating record-breaking numbers. Yet, as if to warn against complacency in the former, last Tuesday pirates aboard speedboats hijacked a Japanese tanker in the Straits of Malacca and pumped out approximately 3 million liters of its diesel cargo before fleeing. The details of the incident – three crew members were taken with the cargo – suggest an inside job, illustrating the modus operandi (M.O.) of criminals in the region, who also prefer to target tugs or ships at anchor, in contrast with their headline-grabbing counterparts in East and West Africa. Yet one should not think the M.O.s or geographic hotspots will remain static. As Karsten von Hoesslin emphasizes in his work on Southeast Asian maritime crime, patterns of piracy and seaborne armed robbery are fluid and the crime syndicates are adaptable. In one example of a potential change, Kevin Doherty of Nexus Consulting, a private maritime security company that operates in the region, notes that “when criminals in the region figure [out] how to negotiate with first-world underwriters, the crew will be the prize, not a tug or cargo.” Nor is the need focused merely on Singapore, as last year’s invasion of Borneo by the so-called Sultan of Sulu exposed the porous nature of maritime borders between the Philippines and Malaysia, while illicit resource exploitation afflicts nearly every nation in the region and is exacerbated by the competing territorial claims in the South China Sea. So with a continued need for counter-piracy and maritime law enforcement, it’s worth looking at previous efforts to discern the challenges facing Japan and the United States in pursuing this second goal. Here again the barriers to providing substantive assistance are largely political. It bears remembering that several ASEAN members have territorial disputes not only with China but with each other too, and historical sensitivities over “settled” disputes chill the receptiveness towards joint patrols in each other’s territories. Additionally, key nations like Indonesia and Malaysia have been wary of allowing those whom they perceive as “outside” actors to maintain a presence in their waters. When the United States proposed its ill-fated Regional Maritime Security Initiative in 2004, the two nations objected partly on the grounds that it would have brought American “special forces on high-speed boats” participating in joint patrols. The two have also abstained from the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). Upheld as a model of maritime information sharing, ReCAAP developed as a Japanese-led initiative and involves surveillance and incident-report coordination from 19 countries, including several European shipping states, fed to the purpose-built Information Sharing Centre (ISC) in Singapore. ReCAAP is credited with contributing to the decline in piracy in the Malacca Straits, although some have suggested that incidents may be underreported in order to bolster the ReCAAP’s claims of success. So what would further assistance from Japan and the United States look like? According to the quoted sources, “joint assistance …would include provision of patrol vessels, help with training their coast guard members and other relevant personnel, and assistance with establishing a framework to share information between the countries regarding pirate boats and other suspicious vessels.” Some of this is already ongoing. Japan and the United States have been proactive over the past decade in providing counter-piracy training and equipment to the littoral nations of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Additionally, Japan agreed to “donate” 10 patrol boats to the Philippines Coast Guard beginning in 2015, doubling its fleet, with a soft loan from Tokyo. Vietnam has likewise asked to procure patrol boats from Japan, although continues rumors of an impending agreement have so far come to naught. As for addressing the “framework to share information,” or coordinated maritime domain awareness (MDA), questions revolve around the intelligence-sharing architecture and facilities. With regards to the architecture, who will provide inputs, how will they provide inputs, who will collate inputs, how will the data be disseminated, and who will receive the data? On one end of the spectrum, Japan and the United States could select and combine several of their own inputs and offer a data stream to any ASEAN state willing to receive it. On the other end, this could be augmented by several of the members’ inputs in a two-way process. One approach could see the initiative develop a framework of tiered partners given access to different data sets depending on their sensitivities and own willingness to share. For the aforementioned political reasons, however, maritime data-sharing is easier said than done, as demonstrated by the United States, Japan, and South Korea’s difficulty in sharing such data among themselves. And this is just at the policy level – intelligence sharing intentions have to be supported by physical links and data protocols, trained personnel, and facilities. The Japan-U.S. initiative could stand up a new intelligence fusion center along the lines of ReCAAP’s ISC, raising questions of staffing, hosting, and of course funding. Or, perhaps in the interests of unity and “breaking down stovepipes,” it would be better to aim to integrate ReCAAP’s existing structure, perhaps with a co-located annex to the ISC, and work to address the concerns of Indonesia and Malaysia so as to bring them on board. In any case, it will be interesting to see what solutions are put forward. While President Obama’s trip will was not without concrete deals with ASEAN members, notably the 10-year defense deal with the Philippines, his trip’s most long-lasting outcome may be what develops from the vague words in the joint statement with Japan.

SLOC’s in Indian Ocean = key to global economy




Securing SLOC’s in the Indian Ocean is key to the global economy.



A.I.I. ‘13

(The Australia India Institute, Task Force on Indian Ocean Security – editor and principal contributor is Dr. Dennis Rumley. He is an Associate Professor at the University of Western Australia.[1] He gained a PhD in political geography at the University of British Columbia. He is chairperson of the Indian Ocean Research Group Inc. He is also Chief Editor of The Journal of the Indian Ocean Region. “The Indian Ocean Region: Security, Stability and Sustainability in the 21st Century” – March 2013 – http://www.aii.unimelb.edu.au/sites/default/files/IndianOceanSecurityTaskforce.pdf.)



It goes almost without saying that the security of sea lanes (also referred to as sea lines) of communication is vital to the functioning of the global economy. In 2001, 80% of world trade by value and 90% by volume was in the form of sea trade, and this involved 1.2 million seafarers, 46,000 vessels and 4,000 ports123. Maximising the economic security of sea trade thus necessitates the maximisation of security within and among all five essential elements in the maritime trading process – seafarers (for example, background and nationality), vessels (for example, registration and seaworthiness), cargoes (for example, nature and destination), ports (for example, location and security of access and surveillance) and SLOCs. However, any understanding of the security of SLOCs cannot be fully appreciated in isolation from the overall maritime security environment. In terms of international trade, the Indian Ocean is clearly the world’s most important energy routeway. In 2007, for example, half of global daily oil production was transported by tankers on fixed maritime routes124. Since approximately 36 per cent of the world’s oil imports derive from the Middle East, secure interregional oil shipments through the Indian Ocean are vital to world prosperity. Oil import security is especially important for Japan (80% of oil imports from the Middle East), China (39%), Europe (21%) and the United States (16%)125 . Furthermore, in 2006, more than 80% of the world’s seaborne trade in oil passed through only three Indian Ocean choke points (Figure 19).

( ) Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean is key to the global economy



Potgieter ‘12

Prof. TD (Thean) Potgieter is currently Chief Director Research and Innovation at PALAMA (Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy). His previous appointment was as Director of the Centre for Military Studies, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University. He is also the Secretary-General of the South African of Military History Commission and is the recipient of a number of academic and military awards. “Maritime security in the Indian Ocean: strategic setting and features” – Institute for Security Studies – PAPER 236 – AUGUST 2012 – http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper236.pdf


Indian Ocean security is now no longer the domain of colonial states or superpowers, but has become multifaceted and dynamic. New role players such as India and China have become major powers, and new national alliances are changing the scene. But current global realities have introduced maritime security problems as non-state actors are influencing security in the area directly and fundamentally. This is a serious development since the rich Indian Ocean maritime trade, which includes much of the world’s energy trade, is crucial to the global economy. It seems that many of the lessons of centuries gone by are again being learned – rather than doing battle, navies have to project power and play a diplomatic role to maintain good order at sea.


Coop low now

( ) Coop insufficient now – boosting it solves maritime threats.



Potgieter ‘12

Prof. TD (Thean) Potgieter is currently Chief Director Research and Innovation at PALAMA (Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy). His previous appointment was as Director of the Centre for Military Studies, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University. He is also the Secretary-General of the South African of Military History Commission and is the recipient of a number of academic and military awards. Note: this card ends with a colon – but afterwards is simply a new set of bullet points listing off regional organizations. “Maritime security in the Indian Ocean: strategic setting and features” – Institute for Security Studies – PAPER 236 – AUGUST 2012 – http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper236.pdf


Much can be gained from a cooperative regional approach between states that promotes consultation not confrontation, reassurance not deterrence, transparency not secrecy, prevention not correction, and interdependence not unilateralism. In such circumstances navies can contribute much towards enhancing maritime security, managing disasters, providing humanitarian assistance and limiting environmental security challenges. Regional cooperation can therefore be a force multiplier and is certainly desirable in the vast, relatively poorly policed Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean region is noted for its complex sub-regional geopolitical and geostrategic associations, each with its own vested interest. Cooperation occurs mostly in the spheres of economy and trade, rather than in security, and is to a large extent hampered by distrust and lack of interaction. On a sub-regional level cooperation exists in the Persian Gulf, South Asia, South-East Asia, East Africa, the Horn of Africa, Southern Africa, and the south-west Indian Ocean islands. There are overlapping regional systems in the greater Middle East, Africa and the Asia Pacific region. The following are the most pertinent examples of regional and sub-regional cooperation: 80

Coop Key to Solve risks to SLOC’s




( ) Enhanced coop is the best way to solve for Indian Ocean SLOC’s.



Potgieter ‘12

Prof. TD (Thean) Potgieter is currently Chief Director Research and Innovation at PALAMA (Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy). His previous appointment was as Director of the Centre for Military Studies, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University. He is also the Secretary-General of the South African of Military History Commission and is the recipient of a number of academic and military awards. “Maritime security in the Indian Ocean: strategic setting and features” – Institute for Security Studies – PAPER 236 – AUGUST 2012 – http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper236.pdf


Discussion in this paper concentrated on the Indian Ocean’s strategic value, maritime security characteristics and threats, possible solutions, and international and regional cooperation. Nations in the region are keen to facilitate vibrant maritime commerce and economic activities at sea since these underpin economic security. At the same time they endeavour to protect their maritime domains against ocean-related threats such as piracy, criminal activities, terrorism, pollution, etc. These objectives can best be achieved by blending public and private maritime security activities, and by tackling maritime threats by integrating their efforts, ideally within a specific legal framework. Cooperation on maritime security is essential, since virtually all nations benefit from maritime activity.


A-to “Can’t Solve unless solve Somalia”

( ) International Coop can overcome Somalia’s lack of naval capacity.



Potgieter ‘8

Prof. TD (Thean) Potgieter is currently Chief Director Research and Innovation at PALAMA (Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy). His previous appointment was as Director of the Centre for Military Studies, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University. He is also the Secretary-General of the South African of Military History Commission and is the recipient of a number of academic and military awards. “THE MARITIME SECURITY QUANDARY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA REGION: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND RESPONSES” – East African Human Security Forum Discussion Paper January 2008 –http://www.grid.unep.ch/FP2011/step1/pdf/005_Potgieter_2009.pdf


Complex situations call for complex solutions. Maritime policing and navies alone cannot rectify the situation and ensure maritime security. Much of the solution to the maritime security problems of the region is essentially ashore and the typical business of restoring order in a country requires the establishment of a proper, operating civilian system of law and order as well as functioning policing ashore. In the case of Somalia, experience showed that even efforts to secure law and order through military intervention would be fraught with incredible difficulties. This, however, is a cycle does not only stop at proper law and order and policing ashore. Lack of law and order at sea also contribute towards making things worse ashore, specifically as organisations engaged in transnational crime such as human trafficking and drug smuggling poses a threat to proper state authority and undermines the rule of law and security. The unique challenge is therefore to create order ashore and at sea. Various agencies, bodies and states, would have to work together to improve maritime safety and security, harbour security and environmental care. Often the mere presence of a coastguard and civilian policing agencies does much to enhance maritime security in ports and in a country’s territorial waters. However, civilian systems of maritime policing and coast guards are insufficient in the region. This paper will therefore essentially explore the possible role of navies can play in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and on the high sea. Furthermore, due to the complexity of the maritime security problems in the Horn of Africa region, international naval cooperation off the Horn has become a necessity. The contribution navies could make is based on their ability to use force and to project power. Naval forces have a unique advantage over armies and air forces in the sense that they do not necessarily appear menacing. They can easily perform diplomatic roles in foreign ports, but can also quickly switch from a peaceful or diplomatic role to belligerent. In managing the tumultuous post-Cold War environment, navies will seldom conduct high level operations, while the frequency of operational duties, often termed “maritime operations other than war” will continue to be high. This can include everything, from low level policing to diplomacy and coercion. In strategic terms navies can typically protect and facilitate merchant shipping and military supplies, deny an opponent the use of the sea, protect resources along the coast and offshore, acquire bases from which to operate, move and support troops and gain and maintain air and sea control in support of operations both at sea and on land.35 Most navies and coast guards are essentially concerned with securing their EEZ, while many of the bigger navies is also concerned with maintaining good order on the high seas, at maritime choke points and even in the EEZ of other countries. Many naval planners and theorists maintain that naval forces will in future be more involved in expeditionary forces conducting operations in littorals far from home, rather then in the open ocean, while at the same time they might be called upon to assist operations ashore. For operations of this kind navies are ideally suited to provide strategic lift, logistic support to operations ashore or to act as command platforms. Such forces are bound to be multinational in character, joint, with other services participating, while they will have limited means and limited aims.36 The issue, however, is to what extent decision makers are prepared to get involved in problem areas, how much effort are they prepared to commit and what would the mandate be that navies receive. Though the tasks navies could be called upon to fulfil in the Horn of Africa region might include traditional tasks such as responses to military threats, the focus will be on control of the sea and sea lanes of communication, illicit trade and traffic, threats relating to piracy and terrorism, humanitarian and disaster relief, environmental concerns like the exploitation or overexploitation of maritime resources, pollution control and general enforcement of law at sea. These tasks require the physical presence of naval forces, as well as advance electronic and scientific knowledge, intelligence and multinational cooperation. Currently piracy is endemic in the Horn of Africa region and there is a clear need to reduce the risk to shipping. States with a vested interest in limiting piracy should support and maintain sufficient coastal and offshore patrols. The International Maritime Bureau warned that if the international naval vessels operating around the Horn of Africa do not do more, for example to also intercept and apprehend suspicious craft, unrestrained piracy will continue.37 It is not necessary to suppress piracy with large sophisticated and expensive warships, since smaller ship can do the work. The reality is that it is mostly sophisticated naval vessels operating in the region and if pirates seize or threaten shipping, it is the priority of any warship in the vicinity to act. Naval vessels have achieved a number of successes against pirates. For example, after the Indian registered Al Bisarat was captured by pirates it was used as a mother ship more attacks. The American destroyer, USS Winston S. Churchill, tracked down the Al Bisarat, forced the pirates to surrender and transferred them to Kenya for trial.38 Late in October 2007 two American warships sank two pirate vessels after answering a distress call from a hijacked Japanese tanker (apparently carrying benzene), while another American warship, the guided-missile destroyer USS James E. Williams came to the assistance of a North Korean freighter, the Dai Hong Dan. A helicopter from the destroyer investigated the Dai Hong Dan after receiving a message that she was hijacked and ordered the hijackers to surrender. The North Korean crew overpowered the pirates, killed two and captured five others. Three North Korean crewmen were seriously wounded and were taken aboard the American destroyer for treatment.39 The fight against piracy surely makes for strange bedfellows. Pirates are not always on the winning side as many attempted attacks and hijackings fail. Furthermore, the Dai Hong Dan incident was the third time that Somali pirates were overpowered by their potential prey. The crew of the MV Alpha Mitchel overpower their captors in 1989, while the crew of the MT Jenlil also overpowered their captors in Somalia territorial waters in 2004.40 There is a general need to safeguard shipping, control cargoes, limit illicit arms trafficking, human smuggling and the dumping of toxic waste. Controlling smuggling and illegal cargoes will not only improve regional and maritime security, but can also add to state revenue through taxes and tariffs. Navies can certainly assist with these tedious tasks.


( ) Aff solves irrespective of Somalia – they’re no longer key to piracy.



The Economist ‘13

This evidence internally quotes The International Maritime Bureau, a body that monitors crime at sea – “What happened to Somalia’s pirates? – May 19th 2013 – http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/05/economist-explains-11#sthash.fpifOA8P.dpuf


ON MAY 10th pirate-busters celebrated the fact that one year had passed since a ship was successfully seized by Somali hijackers. Pirates have been attacking vessels passing the Horn of Africa since at least 2005, when they received a $315,000 ransom for Feisty Gas, a ship owned by a company in Hong Kong. Since then, payments have risen continuously, reaching a high last year of $9.5m for the Smyrni, a Greek tanker, and her crew of 26. But since its capture on May 10th 2012, the pirates have not hijacked any more vessels. Why are the pirates at bay? Though the spoils are rising, pirate attacks have been falling off. Just 75 attacks took place in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia in 2012, down from more than 200 in 2011. Currently, 71 sailors are being held hostage by pirates, according to the International Maritime Bureau, a body that monitors crime at sea; in early 2011, the figure was 758. Estimates for how much Somali piracy has cost the world economy range from $7 billion to $18 billion, the latest estimate by the World Bank. One theory is that the pirates have spent the past few months stock-taking, clearing their stock of hostages and ships before restarting their campaign. Another possibility is that their business model is shifting towards kidnapping foreign aid-workers and tourists on land.

( ) Their assumption that “Somalia is key” is outdated.



Minto ‘13

Rob Minto is a writer / editor on the Financial Time's emerging markets desk in London. “Piracy shifts from Somalia to Nigeria” – Beyond Brics, a blog sponsored by The Financial Times – June 18th – http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2013/06/18/piracy-shifts-from-somalia-to-nigeria/


When you think of piracy (aside from the digital kind), what comes to mind? The answer is probably “Somalia”. But a new report reveals that it is an outdated assumption. Piracy around the Horn of Africa is declining. Instead, it is increasing on the other side of the continent, in the Gulf of Guinea. For many years, Somalia was the centre of maritime lawlessness. The pirates were so well-established that one of the most notorious, Mohamed Abdi Hassan, announced his retirement at a press conference. That was seen as a potential shift in Somalian piracy, and so it has turned out. The report by Oceans Beyond Piracy, co-authored by the ICC Martime Bureau, notes that “the risks of piracy and armed robbery are intensifying in some parts of the world, such as the Gulf of Guinea region. Despite the growing number of seafarers affected by violence in that region, the area has not yet received the attention that was brought to Somalia.”


A-to “Indian Ocean is too vast”




( ) Enhanced international coop checks problems policing the vast Indian Ocean.



Cordner ‘11

Lee Cordner is a strategic analyst who worked as a Principal Research Fellow at the University of Wollongong, Australia, and was formerly CEO of Future Directions International, an independent Australian strategic think tank. He is a 1993 graduate of the U.S. Naval War College’s Naval Command College and served for over thirty years in the Royal Australian Navy – “PROGRESSING MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN” – Naval War College Review, Autumn 2011, Vol. 64, No. 4 – https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/92887ed7-4617-4ff7-adbc-edac05c97613/Progressing-Maritime-Security-Cooperation-in-the-I.aspx.



The international system is fundamentally anarchic, with states acting in accordance with their perceived national interests.3 If progress is to be made toward effective maritime security cooperation among nation-states, there needs to be a strong sense that commonly held interests are threatened, at risk, or vulnerable and that cooperative action among states will help to protect them. States are most likely to embrace cooperative security measures when there is a compelling, shared belief that the defense of their own interests can be usefully enhanced through that course. Pertinent questions that arise include: What are the common regional security interests? Whose national interests are affected? How are those interests threatened? What are the key strategic vulnerabilities? Critically, how would maritime security cooperation help manage the risks posed? Short- and long-term regional risk assessments and strategic-level analyses are required to answer these questions. The evolving strategic environment in the IOR is profoundly impacted by divergent perceptions about its unique regional political and geographic circumstances. For many in this region, especially South Asians, the Indian Ocean has historically been one of the region’s strongest unifying factors. For centuries, its waters have carried religions, languages, traditions, and indeed people across thousands of miles and bound them together in a cultural brotherhood. According to thosewho hold this view, it is only the failure of the inhabitants to record the region’s maritime history that has deprived it of the status of a cohesive regional entity. For most others, however, the IOR appears to be a largely disaggregated oceanic and littoral zone, more a collection of subregions than a coherent, single region.4 This view appears to have been reinforced by its division by the United States between the Pacific, Central, and Africa unified commands, whose trijunction is in the northwest Indian Ocean.5 The IOR is demonstrably maritime. The national interests of its states range from the need to ensure the unfettered flow of maritime trade to support burgeoning, or emerging and struggling, economies to the need for effective management of the Indian Ocean’s vast “maritime commons,” both national jurisdictions and high seas.6 It is in the maritime domain that the interests of IOR states largely converge, and it is at sea that the need for cooperative security is most pressing.7 It is also at sea that the best opportunities lie to develop mechanisms, and ultimately habits, of security cooperation that may in the future have application to more controversial security agendas.
(Note: IOR = stands for “Indian Ocean Region”)


A-to Regional Coop = Impossible

( ) Regional Coop on maritime security is workable



Potgieter ‘12

Prof. TD (Thean) Potgieter is currently Chief Director Research and Innovation at PALAMA (Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy). His previous appointment was as Director of the Centre for Military Studies, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University. He is also the Secretary-General of the South African of Military History Commission and is the recipient of a number of academic and military awards. “Maritime security in the Indian Ocean: strategic setting and features” – Institute for Security Studies – PAPER 236 – AUGUST 2012 – http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper236.pdf


One of the objectives of the IONS is to encourage capacity-building. Though each sub-region has its own unique challenges, the capabilities required to deal with maritime security are often the same. The need to have a structure that addresses maritime security capacitybuilding and involves both regional and extra-regional countries is evident. Great potential exists for the international community and regional organisations to improve international cooperation, to strengthen security in the region, and to create a broad-based Indian Ocean security strategy that is acceptable to all. This is certainly a difficult undertaking. In the meantime, specifically in maritime security terms, the Indian Ocean has rough seas ahead.


Piracy Increasing – jeopardizes SLOC’s

( ) Piracy rising in the Indian Ocean – it jeopardizes SLOC’s



Potgieter ‘12

Prof. TD (Thean) Potgieter is currently Chief Director Research and Innovation at PALAMA (Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy). His previous appointment was as Director of the Centre for Military Studies, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University. He is also the Secretary-General of the South African of Military History Commission and is the recipient of a number of academic and military awards. “Maritime security in the Indian Ocean: strategic setting and features” – Institute for Security Studies – PAPER 236 – AUGUST 2012 – http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper236.pdf


Piracy in the Indian Ocean is not abatingquite the opposite. Two hundred and sixty six pirate attacks occurred in the first six months of 2011. Attacks ascribed to Somali pirates were up from 100 for the comparable period in 2010, but fewer vessels were hijacked (21 compared to 27) because of more effective anti-piracy measures.31 Indications are that piracy is now also growing in the South China Sea and in other parts of the Indian Ocean, such as Chittagong in Bangladesh where ships at anchor or approaching the anchorage are targeted specifically.32 As unhindered SLOCs across the Indian Ocean are of strategic importance to international shipping and the flow of energy shipments, great concern exists about the large number of attacks on oil and gas tankers. The capture of the MV Sirius Star on 15 November 2008 was significant because of the location of the attack 450 nautical miles south-east of Kenya, and the fact that it was carrying two million barrels of oil, worth $100 million, equal to a quarter of Saudi Arabia's daily output. It is believed that a captured Nigerian tug acted as the pirate mother ship. Although it was the biggest ship hijacked to date, the fully-loaded ship was low in the water and probably easy to board.3

Global Econ not resilient




( ) Global Econ not resilient – a shock could reverse growth.



UNECE ‘14

UNECE is the The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. “Global economy is improving, but remains vulnerable to new and old headwinds that could derail growth”– UNECE Report – Published:20 January 2014 – http://www.unece.org/index.php?id=34621


Global economic growth should increase over the next two years with continuing signs of improvement, according to the United Nations World Economic Situation and Prospects 2014 (WESP) report, launched today. The global economy is expected to grow at a pace of 3.0 per cent in 2014 and 3.3 per cent in 2015, compared with an estimated growth of 2.1 per cent for 2013. The world economy experienced subdued growth for a second year in 2013, but some improvements in the last quarter have led to the UN’s more positive forecast. The euro area has finally ended a protracted recession. Growth in the United States strengthened somewhat. A few large emerging economies, including China and India, managed to backstop the deceleration they experienced in the past two years and veered upwards moderately. These factors point to increasing global growth. According to WESP, inflation will remain tame worldwide, but the employment situation will continue to be challenging. While growth in international trade flows is expected to pick up moderately to 4.7 per cent in 2014, the prices of most primary commodities are projected to be flat, although any unexpected supply-side shocks, including geo-political tensions, could push some of these prices higher. The report warns that international capital flows to emerging economies are expected to become more volatile. “Our forecast is made in the context of many uncertainties and risks coming from possible policy missteps as well as non-economic factors that could stymie growth,” said Shamshad Akhtar, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Economic Development. Developed economies In the United States, fiscal tightening and a series of political gridlocks over budgetary issues weighed heavily on growth; however, quantitative monetary easing boosted equity prices. The U.S. labour market and housing sector continued to recover. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the U.S. is expected to increase 2.5 per cent in 2014. Western Europe emerged from recession in 2013, but growth prospects remain weak, as fiscal austerity will continue and the unemployment rates remain elevated. GDP in Western Europe is expected to grow by 1.5 per cent in 2014. Growth in Japan has been boosted by a set of expansionary policy packages, but the effects of forthcoming structural reforms remain uncertain and an anticipated increase in Japan’s consumption tax rate is expected to curb growth. GDP is forecast to grow by 1.5 per cent in 2014. Developing countries and economies in transition Growth prospects among large developing countries and economies in transition are mixed. Growth in Brazil has been hampered by weak external demand, volatility in international capital flows and tightening monetary policy, but growth is expected to rebound to 3 per cent in 2014. A slowdown in China has been stabilized and growth is expected to maintain at a pace of about 7.5 per cent in the next few years. India experienced its lowest growth in two decades, along with large current account and government budget deficits plus high inflation, but growth is forecast to improve to above 5 per cent in 2014. In the Russian Federation growth weakened further in 2013, as industrial output and investment faltered, and is expected to recover modestly to 2.9 per cent in 2014. Among developing regions, growth prospects in Africa remain relatively robust. After an estimated growth of 4.0 per cent in 2013, GDP is projected to expand by 4.7 per cent in 2014. The report emphasized the dependence of Africa’s growth on investment in infrastructure, trade and investment ties with emerging economies, and improvements in economic governance and management. More detailed regional forecasts from WESP will be released in January 2014. Risks and uncertainties threaten global economy The report stressed that the risks associated with a possible bumpy exit from the quantitative easing programmes by the U.S Federal Reserve (Fed) threaten the global economy. As already seen somewhat during the summer of 2013, efforts by the Fed to pull out of quantitative easing programmes could lead to a surge in long-term interest rates in developed and developing countries. Tapering could also lead to a sell-off in global equity markets, a sharp decline of capital inflows to emerging economies and a spike in the risk premium for external financing in emerging economies. These first-round shocks in international financial markets could transmit quickly to developed and developing economies. The report warns that as the Fed is expected to taper and eventually unwind its quantitative easing programmes, emerging economies will face more external shocks. While economic fundamentals and the policy space in many emerging economies are better than when the Asian financial crisis erupted in 1997, emerging economies with large external imbalances remain particularly vulnerable. Other uncertainties and risks include the remaining fragility in the banking system and the real economy in the euro area and the continued political wrangling in the U.S. on the debt ceiling and the budget. Beyond the economic domain, geopolitical tensions in Western Asia and elsewhere remain serious risks. These and other risk factors, unfolding unexpectedly, could derail the world economy far beyond the report’s projections.


( ) Global econ not resilient – last financial crisis means reversals still possible.



Hawkins ‘14

(et al Adam Hawkins – and all of the authors of this paper – are from the International Finance and Development Division, the Australian Treasury. “Is the global financial safety net at a tipping point to fragmentation?” – April 9th – www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/.../01_Global_financial_safety_net.ashx)


As with any insurance, the ideal state of the world would be where the safety net is not needed at all. During the so called Great Moderation years, a sanguine view of the international monetary system, expressed by Rose (2006) for example, was that advanced economies with floating exchange rates and inflation targeting central banks had no need for a safety net. That rosy view has been laid to rest by the events of the past few years. The Global Financial Crisis and subsequent ongoing volatility in financial markets and capital movements has triggered a reassessment of the size and use of the safety net, and reignited debates about its role. This is very much a live debate, as continued volatility in financial markets around the world suggests that the global economy remains vulnerable to shocks. There have been arguments that the safety net should be expanded from its current insurance role to a more active role including intervening in markets to smooth volatility. Against this backdrop, it is timely to reassess the role, size and composition of the global financial safety net.

Econ Decline = war

Global economic decline causes nuclear war



Auslin ‘9

(Michael, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, and Desmond Lachman – Resident Fellow – American Enterprise Institute, “The Global Economy Unravels”, Forbes, 3-6, http://www.aei.org/article/100187)



What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang.

AT Econ Defense/Impact Boosters



( ) Economic decline risks global nuclear conflicts – studies confirm.



Ferguson ‘9

(Niall, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University, “The Axis of Upheaval,” Foreign Policy, February 16th, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/02/16/the_axis_of_upheaval)


The Bush years have of course revealed the perils of drawing facile parallels between the challenges of the present day and the great catastrophes of the 20th century. Nevertheless, there is reason to fear that the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression could have comparable consequences for the international system. For more than a decade, I pondered the question of why the 20th century was characterized by so much brutal upheaval. I pored over primary and secondary literature. I wrote more than 800 pages on the subject. And ultimately I concluded, in The War of the World, that three factors made the location and timing of lethal organized violence more or less predictable in the last century. The first factor was ethnic disintegration: Violence was worst in areas of mounting ethnic tension. The second factor was economic volatility: The greater the magnitude of economic shocks, the more likely conflict was. And the third factor was empires in decline: When structures of imperial rule crumbled, battles for political power were most bloody. In at least one of the world’s regions—the greater Middle East—two of these three factors have been present for some time: Ethnic conflict has been rife there for decades, and following the difficulties and disappointments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States already seems likely to begin winding down its quasi-imperial presence in the region. It likely still will. Now the third variable, economic volatility, has returned with a vengeance. U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke’s “Great Moderation”—the supposed decline of economic volatility that he hailed in a 2004 lecture—has been obliterated by a financial chain reaction, beginning in the U.S. subprime mortgage market, spreading through the banking system, reaching into the “shadow” system of credit based on securitization, and now triggering collapses in asset prices and economic activity around the world. After nearly a decade of unprecedented growth, the global economy will almost certainly sputter along in 2009, though probably not as much as it did in the early 1930s, because governments worldwide are frantically trying to repress this new depression. But no matter how low interest rates go or how high deficits rise, there will be a substantial increase in unemployment in most economies this year and a painful decline in incomes. Such economic pain nearly always has geopolitical consequences. Indeed, we can already see the first symptoms of the coming upheaval. In the essays that follow, Jeffrey Gettleman describes Somalia’s endless anarchy, Arkady Ostrovsky analyzes Russia’s new brand of aggression, and Sam Quinones explores Mexico’s drug-war-fueled misery. These, however, are just three case studies out of a possible nine or more. In Gaza, Israel has engaged in a bloody effort to weaken Hamas. But whatever was achieved militarily must be set against the damage Israel did to its international image by killing innocent civilians that Hamas fighters use as human shields. Perhaps more importantly, social and economic conditions in Gaza, which were already bad enough, are now abysmal. This situation is hardly likely to strengthen the forces of moderation among Palestinians. Worst of all, events in Gaza have fanned the flames of Islamist radicalism throughout the region—not least in Egypt. From Cairo to Riyadh, governments will now think twice before committing themselves to any new Middle East peace initiative. Iran, meanwhile, continues to support both Hamas and its Shiite counterpart in Lebanon, Hezbollah, and to pursue an alleged nuclear weapons program that Israelis legitimately see as a threat to their very existence. No one can say for sure what will happen next within Tehran’s complex political system, but it is likely that the radical faction around President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will be strengthened by the Israeli onslaught in Gaza. Economically, however, Iran is in a hole that will only deepen as oil prices fall further. Strategically, the country risks disaster by proceeding with its nuclear program, because even a purely Israeli air offensive would be hugely disruptive. All this risk ought to point in the direction of conciliation, even accommodation, with the United States. But with presidential elections in June, Ahmadinejad has little incentive to be moderate. On Iran’s eastern border, in Afghanistan, upheaval remains the disorder of the day. Fresh from the success of the “surge” in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus, the new head of U.S. Central Command, is now grappling with the much more difficult problem of pacifying Afghanistan. The task is made especially difficult by the anarchy that prevails in neighboring Pakistan. India, meanwhile, accuses some in Pakistan of having had a hand in the Mumbai terrorist attacks of last November, spurring yet another South Asian war scare. Remember: The sabers they are rattling have nuclear tips. The democratic governments in Kabul and Islamabad are two of the weakest anywhere. Among the biggest risks the world faces this year is that one or both will break down amid escalating violence. Once again, the economic crisis is playing a crucial role. Pakistan’s small but politically powerful middle class has been slammed by the collapse of the country’s stock market. Meanwhile, a rising proportion of the country’s huge population of young men are staring unemployment in the face. It is not a recipe for political stability. This club is anything but exclusive. Candidate members include Indonesia, Thailand, and Turkey, where there are already signs that the economic crisis is exacerbating domestic political conflicts. And let us not forget the plague of piracy in Somalia, the renewed civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the continuing violence in Sudan’s Darfur region, and the heart of darkness that is Zimbabwe under President Robert Mugabe. The axis of upheaval has many members. And it’s a fairly safe bet that the roster will grow even longer this year. The problem is that, as in the 1930s, most countries are looking inward, grappling with the domestic consequences of the economic crisis and paying little attention to the wider world crisis. This is true even of the United States, which is now so preoccupied with its own economic problems that countering global upheaval looks like an expensive luxury. With the U.S. rate of GDP growth set to contract between 2 and 3 percentage points this year, and with the official unemployment rate likely to approach 10 percent, all attention in Washington will remain focused on a nearly $1 trillion stimulus package. Caution has been thrown to the wind by both the Federal Reserve and the Treasury. The projected deficit for 2009 is already soaring above the trillion-dollar mark, more than 8 percent of GDP. Few commentators are asking what all this means for U.S. foreign policy. The answer is obvious: The resources available for policing the world are certain to be reduced for the foreseeable future. That will be especially true if foreign investors start demanding higher yields on the bonds they buy from the United States or simply begin dumping dollars in exchange for other currencies. Economic volatility, plus ethnic disintegration, plus an empire in decline: That combination is about the most lethal in geopolitics. We now have all three. The age of upheaval starts now

( ) Decline magnifies the severity of other conflicts – WWII proves


Miller 8 – G. Robert M. Miller, journalist for Digital Journal, 10-25, 2008, “Guns vs. Shovels – The Central Question Behind Our Next Economy,” online: http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/261595
But before we look at the modern ‘Guns versus Butter’ model
, it first has to be noted that this phrase was
originally popularized
in a time where securing economic prosperity was a primary concern in
nearly every nation
. More importantly, when
these nations did experience economic collapse
, nearly all of them chose Guns
. There is no question that Nazi aggression spawned World War II
, however, what was happening in Europe became a world war for
a purpose as central to the heart of the capitalist as was the instantaneous end of the holocaust to the heart of the compassionate; economic prosperity
. Simply said, big wars are big money
; and to
truly break from the
embrace of the Great Depression, a big commitment to the economy was necessary
. And due to the leadership that guided the balance between ‘Guns and Butter’ in the US through World War II, the economy was considerably improved; this was true for many western nations.

( ) Economic decline cause nuclear war.


Liutenant Colonel Bearden -2K (Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army, 2000, The Unnecessary Energy Crisis: How We Can Solve It, 2000, http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Big- Medicine/message/642)
Bluntly, we foresee these factors - and others { } not covered - converging to a catastrophic collapse of the world economy in about eight years. As the collapse of the Western economies nears, one may expect catastrophic stress on the 160 developing nations as the developed nations are forced to dramatically curtail orders. International Strategic Threat Aspects History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China - whose long range nuclear missiles can reach the United States - attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is his side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all, is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs, with a great percent of the WMD arsenals being unleashed . The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.

Yes, Diversionary war




( ) Economic decline causes war – studies prove



Royal ‘10

(Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)


Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent stales. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level. Pollins (20081 advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 19SJ) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fcaron. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately. Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states arc likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Mom berg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write. The linkage, between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict lends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other (Hlomhen? & Hess. 2(102. p. X9> Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blombcrg. Hess. & Wee ra pan a, 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DcRoucn (1995), and Blombcrg. Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force arc at least indirecti) correlated. Gelpi (1997). Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that Ihe tendency towards diversionary tactics arc greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked lo an increase in the use of force. In summary, rcccni economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict al systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

( ) Crisis makes diversionary theory true – states will start wars to head off domestic discontent – and use force to settle old disputes with rivals


Rothkopf 9 – David Rothkopf, Visiting Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3-11, 2009, “Security and the Financial Crisis,” Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee, CQ Congressional Testimony, lexis
--Destabilizing Bilateral or Regional Effects of the Crisis: The weakening of states can produce instability that spills across borders or can produce social pressures that increase migration and create associated tensions along borders. The rise of opposition groups can create an opportunity for like-minded neighbors to support their activities and thus cause rifts and potential conflicts to spread. Political and economic weakness in nations can be seen by opportunistic neighbors
(some wishing to produce distractions from their own crises) as an invitation to intervene
in their neighbors politics or even to step in and take control of neighboring territories or
to seek to use force to resolve in their favor long-simmering disputes. In the same vein, old animosities may be inflamed by the crisis either because they produce tensions that play into the origins of old rivalries or because political leaders seek to play on those rivalries to produce a distraction from their inability to manage the economic crisis. Need may enhance tensions and produce conflicts over shared or disputed resources. A desire to preserve national resources, jobs, or capital may produce reactive economic, border or other policies that can increase tension with neighbors. This can include both trade and capital markets protectionism (in traditional and new forms see below), closed or more tightly monitored borders, more disputes on cross-border issues and thus both an increase in tensions and a decreased ability to effectively cooperate with neighbors on issues of common concern.



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