Afghanistan wave 4
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Aid Pakistan CounterplanPakistan cooperation is key to solve insurgency Massoud, 10 – part of the Afghan resistance, (7/30/10, Yahya, Foreign Policy “Afghans can win this war,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/07/30/afghans_can_win_this_war?page=0,2) To reverse the Taliban's gains, the international community and the Afghan government must recognize that, in addition to following basic tenets of counterinsurgency doctrine, there are a number of unique aspects of Helmand and Kandahar that will affect the potential success or failure of their mission. Most importantly, controlling the Pakistani border, which abuts long sections of Kandahar and Helmand, must be a top priority for international forces. The interlinking network of insurgent groups, from Mullah Omar's Quetta Shura to the forces led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani, sponsor attacks within Afghanistan and also play an important role linking al Qaeda to the Taliban. Diminishing their capabilities is a precondition for success in Afghanistan. Striking a crucial blow against the insurgents can only take place with the cooperation of the Pakistani government. The international community must pressure Pakistan to deploy enough force on its side of the border to stop further cross-border movement of insurgents. Our sad experience over the last nine years has demonstrated how the Taliban used the undefended border with Pakistan to strike the Afghan people and international forces. Some pessimists have argued that securing the frontier with Pakistan is impossible, due to the mountainous terrain and vast 2,430-kilometer border. They cite the failures of the Soviet Army and previous Afghan governments, which were unable to exercise effective control of the region. Iran cooperation counterplanIran supports US withdrawal Leverett 10-CEO of the political risk consultancy STRATEGA (7/6/10, Hilary Mann Leverett, “AfPak Behind the Lines: Iran in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/07/06/afpak_behind_the_lines_iran_in_afghanistan_and_pakistan) But, if Tehran perceives Washington as hostile to its interests -- which, unfortunately, is currently the case, given the Obama administration's drive to impose sanctions and continued use of covert operations to undermine the Islamic Republic -- then Iranian policymakers will regard the United States, along with America's Pakistani and Saudi allies, as part of the complex of anti-Iranian external players that Iran needs to balance against in Afghanistan. In this context, Iran has a strong interest in preventing U.S. troops in Afghanistan from being used to attack Iran directly, used as covert operatives to undermine the Iranian government, or used to strengthen Iran's regional rivals. 2. What is Iran's likely reaction to the expected U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan, scheduled to begin in July 2011? How might Iran react if the Taliban's influence across Afghanistan grew, particularly in Herat and other border provinces? In contrast to the United States, which seems at least to be looking for a viable exit strategy from Afghanistan, there is no exit strategy for Iran. Iran publicly calls for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, partly because U.S. forces there could be used against Iran. But Tehran also calls for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan because Iranian policymakers believe that the extended U.S. presence there is seen by much of the population as an occupation and that it is this occupation which is fueling an increasingly fierce cycle of violence and instability. From Tehran's perspective, this cycle of violence and instability empowers Iran's Afghan adversaries, principally the Taliban, and their external backers, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, both of which are regional rivals to the Islamic Republic. For an Iranian standpoint, the most constructive American strategy would have been for the United States to begin a gradual but steady withdrawal of troops a few years ago when that could have helped shape a political settlement based on power sharing among all of Afghanistan's major constituencies. From an Iranian perspective, such a settlement could have included the Pashtun, though, at least at the time, not necessarily the Taliban, and would have given Iran's Afghan allies -- who, at the time, were also America's allies -- the upper hand. Today, Iran is concerned that, as America belatedly positions itself to begin withdrawing forces from Afghanistan next year, the Obama administration still has no coherent strategy regarding President Karzai's drive for a political deal -- a deal which, because of mistakes made by Washington, must now include the Taliban and its chief external backers, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. In the political and security vacuum that is today's Afghanistan, Karzai's effort to engage the Taliban is generating deep unease among Iran's allies in Afghanistan's Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara communities. Already, the leadership of these non-Pashtun communities -- who also dominate the upper echelons of the Afghan military -- are organizing to resist, by force, any serious attempt at power-sharing between Karzai's government and the Taliban. If the Taliban's political influence across Afghanistan continues to grow -- particularly in an environment conditioned by what Tehran sees as America's strategic and tactical incompetence -- Iran will support its Afghan allies as they "push back" against a resurgent Taliban. Iran cooperation counterplanIran is key to Afghanistan stabilization--- US cooperation is key Leverett 10-CEO of the political risk consultancy STRATEGA (7/6/10, Hilary Mann Leverett, “AfPak Behind the Lines: Iran in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/07/06/afpak_behind_the_lines_iran_in_afghanistan_and_pakistan) 4. How would the ‘grand bargain' between the U.S. and Iran affect stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan? Post-conflict stabilization in Afghanistan requires recognizing and working with the integral connections between Afghanistan's internal balance of power and the broader balance of power among major states in the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia. And that means cooperation with Iran is essential to stabilizing Afghanistan and, by extension, Pakistan. Following 9/11, Iran worked with the United States on the short-term project of overthrowing the Taliban -- but with the long-term goal of prompting Washington to reconsider its hostile posture toward the Islamic Republic. In effect, the Iranians hoped that cooperation with the United States would facilitate a U.S.-Iranian "grand bargain" -- but this approach did not work, largely because of American resistance to a broader opening to Iran. Under current circumstances, Iran would need to be persuaded to cooperate once again with the United States in Afghanistan -- persuaded, in particular, that power-sharing could be done in a manner that addressed Tehran's longstanding concerns about the Taliban, the regional balance of power, and U.S. intentions toward the Islamic Republic. This cannot be done while Washington is pursuing sanctions against Iran -- however feckless they may be -- and offering progressively less veiled support for regime change in Tehran. Today, cooperation with Iran on post-conflict stabilization in Afghanistan has to be embedded in a broader strategic understanding between the United States and the Islamic Republic -- what my husband, Flynt Leverett, and I have described as a U.S.-Iranian "grand bargain". So, in other words, a U.S.-Iranian grand bargain has become essential to avoiding something close to strategic failure in Afghanistan. The Islamic Republic will, as I described, continue supporting its longstanding Afghan allies in resisting a Taliban onslaught backed by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. But, in the absence of a broader strategic understanding, those efforts will be seen, in Washington, and elsewhere, as undermining whatever political arrangements the Karzai government has reached with the Taliban. And that will fuel a regional proxy conflict with Afghanistan as the main battlefield, and with the United States drawn increasingly into supporting Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. That is a position the United States has been in before. We should not want to go there again. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. 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