All their disads are non-unique – a Privatization’s inevitable internationally
nc – at: regional econ – at: florida – private now
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- 1nc – at: regional econ – at: florida – won’t model Tracy 3/30
- 1nc – at: regional econ – link turn – wages Kimery 14
- 1nc – at: regional econ – link turn – tourism Nationalization is way better for tourism – they profit handsomely SCF 13
- 1nc – at: regional econ – link turn – monopoly Burton 7
- 1nc – at: regional econ – link turn – control Burton 7
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1nc – at: regional econ – at: florida – private now Privatization now Poole 14 – Searle Freedom Trust Transportation Fellow and Director of Transportation Policy Airport Policy and Security News #101” http://reason.org/news/show/airport-policy-security-news-101#c)//twemchen Two more airports have been approved to participate in TSA's Screening Partnership Program (SPP): Orlando-Sanford and Sarasota, both in Florida. When TSA screeners move out and a TSA-certified contractor moves in this fall, that will bring the total number of SPP airports to 20. Still studying the question is Orlando International, which is awaiting the results of a study it commissioned from McKinsey & Co. on ways to improve the air traveler experience at the airport. In 2012's FAA reauthorization law, Congress included requirements that TSA streamline the process under which airports can apply to participate in SPP. But at a July 29th hearing of the House Homeland Security transportation subcommittee, Chairman Richard Hudson (R, NC) expressed dismay at how TSA is implementing the law's provisions. And he had witnesses to back him up. The legislation requires TSA to approve all applications (consistent with the original 2001 legislation creating TSA and the opt-out provision) unless TSA can show that doing so would decrease security or increase costs. But TSA's revised process puts the burden of proof on the airport applicant to demonstrate those things. Moreover, the agency's latest cost comparison claims to show that there is only a difference of 0.2% between the cost of TSA and contractor screening. While the details of that cost analysis have not been made public, security companies point out that the TSA "cost" excludes various overhead items, in particular retirement benefits which are not included in TSA's budget because they are handled by the federal Office of Personnel Management. The claim of no cost savings is also belied by the empirical comparison of the cost of TSA screening at LAX and contract screening at SFO, carried out by staff researchers of the House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee in 2011. Those analysts applied the SFO contract cost model to the larger volume of screening at LAX and estimated that switching LAX to contract screening would reduce the annual cost at LAX from $90.7 million to $52 million, a 43% saving. 1nc – at: regional econ – at: florida – won’t model Tracy 3/30 – staff writer at the Orlando Sentinel (Dan Tracy, 3/30/15, “Orlando airport panel votes to keep TSA,” http://www.orlandosentinel.com/business/os-tsa-committee-meets-20150330-story.html)//twemchen The TSA could keep its job checking passengers for weapons and contraband at Orlando International Airport after a committee decided Monday that the agency shouldn't be replaced with privately hired security guards. But there are conditions: The Transportation Security Administration likely would have to meet a series of performance standards, including moving passengers quickly through security lines at the nation's 13th-busiest airport. "I think this is a good middle ground," said Dean Asher, a member of the Orlando International governing board who chaired the eight-person group. "It will be up for discussion at another time." That suggestion will be passed on to the full airport board, which is set to meet in mid-April. The seven-person board can accept, reject or modify the TSA proposal, though it likely will be given great weight. Jerry Henderson, who runs TSA in Orlando, said he is confident his agency can meet the benchmarks sets by the advisory committee, including getting passengers through security in an average time of six minutes during busy travel times, such as Christmas and Thanksgiving. "I don't foresee it being a problem," Henderson said. "We're committed to providing the most efficient service in the most courteous way." Asher's panel met off and on for more than two years. Several members visited airports across the country and Canada to see how private forces worked with the public. U.S. Rep. John Mica, R-Winter Park, initiated the push to privatize, arguing that the TSA he helped found after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks has become bloated with managers and too bureaucratic to function properly. His goal is to get TSA away from security lines in Orlando, as well as all airports in the country. He wants the agency to shrink and concentrate more on intelligence gathering. He said Monday that he will continue pushing privatization. "That system will ensure the very best security performance and efficiency, combined with the best use of public resources," Mica said in a written statement. Mica was opposed by Universal Orlando and Democratic U.S. Reps. Alan Grayson of Orlando and Corrine Brown of Jacksonville. They said TSA has done a good job and getting rid of the agency could harm the airport's reputation, particularly in the tourism community so important to the Metro Orlando economy. Grayson said the committee decision was "a victory for common sense. ...They have served us well and kept us safe." The TSA employs a 1,200-member force at Orlando International Airport and, on any given day, screens 50,000 travelers and 38,000 checked bags. Marketing surveys done by Valencia College at the request of TSA have consistently shown that more than 90 percent of the passengers contacted said they were satisfied with the work the guards are doing. Under the plan proposed Monday, the airport would hire another marketing company to ask travelers what they think about TSA. If the satisfaction rate falls below 85 percent, the contract could be switched to a private company. The committee plan envisions checking the wait times and customer-satisfaction rates every three months and giving TSA three reviews before deciding if it is meeting the benchmarks or deserves to be fired. Even if TSA stays on, the appraisals would continue quarterly, much as an employer goes over the performance of employees. TSA has started several programs since Asher's committee began meeting to speed the lines travelers face going through security. The average wait times ranged from five minutes to less than 10 when a survey was conducted for TSA in May 2014. In July 2013, the average wait during busy times was 26 minutes. Since 2013, TSA has been using dogs to sniff out contraband in large groups, which allows those travelers to skip taking off shoes, belts and jackets. TSA also has expanded its Precheck program, which moves qualified passengers to a quicker security line. 1nc – at: regional econ – link turn – wages Kimery 14 – Editor-in-Chief of Homeland (Anthony Kimery, 7/30/14, “TSA Employees Union Says Airport Security Privatization Jeopardizes Passenger Safety,” http://www.hstoday.us/channels/dhs/single-article-page/tsa-employees-union-says-airport-security-privatization-jeopardizes-passenger-safety/a6e8a0c966a32c626ff79febffed55b1.html)//twemchen “The flying public are not the only ones to lose when an airport is privatized,” AFGE said. “Airport security privatization means a significant cut in pay, benefits and career development opportunities for TSOs, weakening the salary base in fragile local economies. AFGE strongly supports the Contract Screener Reform and Accountability Act, a bill that would provide protection of TSO jobs and compensation if a security contractor is awarded the contract at their airport, and ensure security to the flying public through increased accountability.” Also testifying before the subcommittee, Jennifer Grover, acting director of Homeland Security and Justice at the Government Accountability Office (GAO), told the panel that, “Since GAO’s December 2012 report on the Screening Partnership Program, the Transportation Security Administration has developed guidance for airport operators applying to the SPP. In December 2012, GAO found that TSA had not provided guidance to airport operators on its SPP application and approval process, which had been revised to reflect statutory requirements.” 1nc – at: regional econ – link turn – tourism Nationalization is way better for tourism – they profit handsomely SCF 13 – Strategic Cultural Foundation Online Journal (SCF, 2/22/13, “Total Airport Nationalization Will Eliminate Travel Industry Thieves,” http://www.strategic-culture.org/pview/2013/02/22/airport-nationalization-will-eliminate-travel-industry-thieves.html)//twemchen Bolivian President Evo Morales recently nationalized his nation’s three main airports – La Paz, Cochabama, and Santa Cruz – taking control of the facilities from the firm Servicios de Aeropuertos Bolivianos (SABSA) that operated the airports on behalf of the Barcelona-based company Albertis. Morales proclaimed that the original privatization of the airports constituted «looting». Albertis demanded $90 million in compensation and threatened the Bolivian government with legal action. Spain’s neo-conservative and fascist Franco-rooted government immediately criticized Bolivia’s action as «unfriendly». Morales took a step that many Western governments should also take. As a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, a number of companies, many linked to Israelis, have concocted security schemes that have maximized profits for select individuals… Soon after 9/11, Americans and travelers from countries around the world were subjected to invasive searches and seizures of not weapons, but wine, liquor, shampoo, makeup, bottled water, and sanitary wipes. The U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA), a domestic U.S. internal travel control agency cobbled together and placed under the aegis of the Gestapo-like Department of Homeland Security, began issuing nonsensical travel restrictions on what airline passengers could bring on to an airplane. However, these restrictions had little to do with security and everything to do with maximizing after-security screening retail store and kiosk profits for firms that had a close relationship with Bush administration Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, the son of Israeli Zionists: Rabbi Gershon Baruch Chertoff, a Talmudic scholar, and Livia Eisen Chertoff, El Al’s first stewardess who reportedly doubled as a Mossad agent. Several airlines used restrictive airline security controls to maximize their own profits. Passengers were strictly limited to carry-on bag size and in many cases, were forced to check in their smaller bags, leaving their valuables susceptible to theft from baggage handlers previously cleared as low security risks by Israeli-owned airport security firms. Passengers with prohibited items were also forced to pay extra fees for checked in baggage. Key to Israeli profiteering on airline security was the Christmas Eve 2009 incident aboard Northwest Flight 253, in which a Nigerian man attempted to ignite his underpants after he was cleared for boarding without a passport at Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam, the security for which is handled by Israeli-owned ICTS International N.V., a firm based in the Netherlands that was founded by members of Israel’s Shin Bet security service and El Al officials. Chertoff, who parleyed his job as Homeland Security Secretary to shill for Rapiscan Systems, the full body scanning system that images passengers’ genitalia and stores the pictures, immediately went on major U.S. television news networks calling for the use of Rapiscan technology to ensure that passengers did not have bombs placed in their underwear or even inside bodily orifices. ICTS is believed to have allowed certain airline terrorist attacks to take place in order to maximize profits for Israeli firms and Jewish-owned businesses in other countries, including the United States. An ICTS subsidiary, Huntleigh USA, was partially responsible for security at Boston’s Logan Airport in September 11, 2001, the day American Airlines Flight 11 took off and later plowed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center. The firm was also responsible for security at Charles de Gaulle airport in Paris when, in December 2001, «Al Qaeda» shoe bomber Richard Reid failed to detonate his explosive-laden sneakers on board American Airlines Flight 93 from Paris to Miami. That incident required passengers to remove their shoes and undergo further intrusive searches. In 2006, British police were said to have uncovered a plot, one that appeared to be more a product of Hollywood screen writers than actual terrorists, to blow up ten transatlantic flights from the United Kingdom to the United States and Canada using bombs in shampoo containers and soft drink bottles. Immediately, passengers were banned from carrying liquids and gels on planes. However, as security standards were relaxed, passengers could buy such items in the airport after they cleared security. Alternately, passengers could place 3.4 ounce or less containers of liquid or gel in a 1 quart clear plastic bag, with one bag per passenger (the 3-1-1 rule). One airport, Fargo, North Dakota, began charging $2 for a single plastic bag. In the United States, supply of goods to post-security screening airport shops, kiosks, and concession stands is handled by ARAMARK Corporation, owned by Philadelphia-based Eretz Israel native and arch-Zionist and Republican Joseph Neubauer, and which saw $11 billion in sales in 2007. ARAMARK is a major «centralized third party logistics provider». Chertoff and Neubauer rubbed shoulders at Jewish events in Philadelphia while Chertoff served as on the bench of the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Philadelphia from 2003 to 2005. Neubauer is a leading member of Jewish high society in Philadelphia and a founder of the Neubauer Family Fellowships that trains future generations of rabbis. Previously, Chertoff ran the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice from 2001 to 2003 and became Homeland Security Secretary in 2005. Chertoff was confirmed by the Senate in a 98-0 vote. Not one senator dared to challenge the secretary hand-picked by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) to maximize profits for Israeli security firms and Jewish-owned airport services firms in the United States. Chertoff had the strong backing of Israel’s most trusted U.S. Senate servants: Philadelphia’s own Arlen Specter, Connecticut’s Joseph Lieberman, and New York’s Charles Schumer. It was Specter and Lieberman’s bill that created the Department of Homeland Security. Chertoff used his position to make a fortune for his Jewish and Israeli business friends. When lighters were banned on aircraft and confiscated by TSA personnel, ARAMARK-serviced kiosks and shops at destination airports stood ready to sell lighters to tobacco-starved passengers but at a hefty price. TSA security screeners ban drinks, food, and wine but all of these are available at secured airport concourses owned by ARAMARK and other firms with ties to Israel. In the wake of 9/11, post-security concession space rose to 70 percent of all airport retail space. Because of TSA security rules and long screening lines, passenger dwell times decreased in pre-security areas and increased in post-security sections of airports. Retailers quickly moved to take advantage of «captured» passengers. Travelers who are visiting family and friends and want to bring along a gift are particularly susceptible to the greedy airport merchants who charge far beyond street prices. Banned from outside of airports are jams and jellies, wine, liquor, beer, salsa, sauces, maple syrup, soups, and juices. Passengers, of course, are free to buy such items, if they are available, after clearing security, from retailers that make a huge profit. Many of these are associated with ARAMARK. TSA changes its permissible list so often, passengers simply decide to travel with the very least in the way of items they are not sure will be allowed through security. Ready to make a killing from the passengers are the stores and kiosks that have no problem getting their goods and wares through security systems overseen by TSA and Israeli-connected airport security firms. Starbucks Coffee is ubiquitous in post-screening airport concourses. One reason may be the fact that the firm’s CEO, Howard Schultz, received the 50th Anniversary Tribute Award from the Jerusalem Fund of Aish Ha-Torah for «playing a key role in promoting a close alliance between the United States and Israel». In other words, American and other travelers are being robbed in the interest of security for maximized profits by a select few elite billionaires. The scam is likely the most costly in the history of the United States, if not the entire world. At least one world leader, President Morales, has figured out the scam and is fighting back. 1nc – at: regional econ – link turn – monopoly Burton 7 – J.D. Candidate 2008, SMU Dedman School of Law (Casey Burton, Summer 2007, “An analysis of the proposed privatization of Chicago’s Midway airport,” 72 J. Air L. & Com. 597, Lexis)//twemchen The main argument in opposition to airport privatization is that while there can realistically be competition in air travel among the airlines, most cities have only one commercial airport, and thus a natural monopoly frequently arises. 132 The main thrust of the argument on monopolistic behavior is that airports will restrict quantity in order to set rates higher than the efficient rate, and thereby reap monopolistic profits. Because of this potential for airport ownership and control to result in monopolistic behavior, many commentators, even those generally [*618] in favor of privatization, state that in most situations, such assets "must be regulated or even operated by the public sector." 133 The question, therefore, is whether privatization of an airport will result in a monopoly-type arrangement, and if so, what can be done to remedy the situation. 134 Most commentators would agree that in isolated cities with a single air carrier airport, the privatization would most likely result in a monopoly; however, most airline passengers are located in an area where they could drive a distance of fifty to seventy-five miles to another airport if the flight prices from the nearest airport were too high. 135 Further, in cities such as Chicago, New York, Los Angeles, and other large metropolitan areas, the people of the city have a choice between two or more airports with commercial service. 136 With two or more airports, it can hardly be argued that a single privatized airport will exercise monopolistic power, as it will be kept in check by the presumably lower prices at the nearby government-owned airport. Further, economic theory would suggest that people with the best skills in managing and marketing, which the airport should be seeking to hire, would seek employment where they can earn the highest wage, which is not usually government employment. 137 Thus, while the private airports in Europe would have access to the best employees, potential employees at American airports would have a greater incentive to use their skills in another, more lucrative, career. 138 This result means skilled workers will not be working at American airports, thereby reducing the benefits to the American citizens engaged in air travel. Another argument relating to monopolistic behavior comes from Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize winning economist and Clinton appointee to the Council of Economic Advisors. 139 He argued that, in the wake of the British terrorist plot to blow up an aircraft in August of 2006, privately owned and operated airports such as Heathrow fare worse in the aftermath of such a crisis because there is little incentive to provide extra staff to handle the increased security in the weeks after such an attack. 140 [*619] Instead, he argues that the airports tell people to get to the airport earlier, thus increasing the cost to those arriving early by forcing them to wait in long lines and foregoing other opportunities. 141 He argues that because Heathrow operates as a monopoly, there is no incentive for them to change practices. 142 These arguments, however, do not apply to American privatization. First, as mentioned, the FAA and TSA will still be in charge of all security operations at a privatized commercial airport. 143 Further, these types of long lines are present in the United States when there is a terrorist situation, even when the government is handling security. And finally, in the United States, if there was a difference in security measures from Midway to O'Hare, people would simply go to O'Hare, as it would still remain under government control; unlike the London airports which are all owned by BAA, there would presumably be different ownership of the major cities' airports in the United States. If a monopoly did result, the government could always regulate the airport as it does with many other public utilities. This was the response of the British government when they privatized the London airports, where the British government used their earlier experience in regulating the privatized British Telecom and British Gas to regulate the potential monopoly of the newly created and privately held BAA. 144 In fact, if American airports want to continue to receive federal grants, they must comply with the FAA's definition of fair and reasonable pricing. 145 Other checks on the potential monopolistic practices of airports include antitrust laws, such that if an airport were charging discriminatory prices or engaged in other prohibited behavior, the federal government could step in and prohibit these unwanted practices. 146 1nc – at: regional econ – link turn – control Burton 7 – J.D. Candidate 2008, SMU Dedman School of Law (Casey Burton, Summer 2007, “An analysis of the proposed privatization of Chicago’s Midway airport,” 72 J. Air L. & Com. 597, Lexis)//twemchen Another smaller concern is that because the government no longer has direct day-to-day control, or perhaps no ownership stake altogether, the government will no longer have a say in the [*620] airport's actions. 147 No matter what type of privatization occurs, the government will not lose as much control as advertised because they still have the power to regulate the airport in substantial ways, such as putting a limit on fee charges, imposing safety rules, and maintaining ultimate authority over other important criteria such as noise or pollution. 148 For example, in the Midway privatization, the FAA and TSA standards will continue to apply, and all screening will still be performed by TSA personnel. 149 Further, in a lease of an airport, the government will hold the residual interest in the property, and therefore will have rights commensurate with that position and the rights secured by the contract with the private lessee. ***NEXT GEN 1nc – at: next gen – link turn – congestion Barowski 10 – J.D. Candidate at Pepperdine University (Justin T. Barkowski, 2010, “Managing Air Traffic Congestion Through the Next Generation Air Transportation System: Satellite-Based Technology, Trajectories, and - Privatization?,” 37 Pepp. L. Rev. 247, Lexis)//twemchen President Barack Obama's Secretary of Transportation, Ray LaHood, has taken a firm stance against any market-based mechanisms for slot allocations with the complete opposite approach: "If you're really trying to cut down congestion, then eliminate the slots. But the idea of then going back and re-auctioning them doesn't make any sense." 331 LaHood believes the key to fixing congestion is "obviously" NextGen. 332 Examining the historical context properly puts this perspective in clearer view. 333 First, when Congress tried to phase out the HDR in 2001, this measure created obvious problems at Chicago's O'Hare Airport, making it the worst in on-time performance immediately after its demise. 334 As addressed before, focusing solely on NextGen without measures to effectively distribute limited airport resources would be disastrous. 335 But the irony of LaHood's sole focus on [*318] NextGen derives from the JPDO's Integrated Plan, which suggests that in areas where "infrastructure expansion cannot be accomplished," airports will need to utilize "market-based mechanisms such as peak period pricing" to allocate slots in order to "ease congestion." 336 LaHood's attempt to escape demand management policies and focus on NextGen is circular. History shows that eliminating slots for short-term alleviation will lead to disastrous results and does not provide the proper cure for implementing a more agile airport environment. 337 Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 1.61 Mb. Share with your friends:
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