Evolution and History of Airfield Seizure Theory

Chapter 2

Evolution and History of Airfield Seizure Theory

18.23 "Against a power of this kind it will not do to have merely a weak naval armament, but we shall want also a large land army to sail with us, if we are to do anything worthy of our ambition, and are not to be shut out from the country by a numerous cavalry… We must therefore start from home with a competent force, seeing that we are going to sail far from our country, and upon an expedition not like any which you may undertaken… we are cutting ourselves off, and going to a land entirely strange,”¹

In 415 the Athenians sent out a great fleet, and in 414 besieged Syracuse, the main Greek city in Sicily. The campaign proved to be a disaster for the Athenians and the beginning of the end for their empire.

Fast forward to an America that up until World War I had fought most all of its wars on the continent of North America. For two centuries the United States enjoyed near isolation behind two broad oceans. The country's participation in World War I against the Central Powers was the first major break with these traditional isolationist policies. The United States fought in World War I as an associate power, not as an ally. Despite President Woodrow Wilson's leadership, the Senate rejected the Versailles treaty ending that war, and the United States never became a member of the League of Nations, only to continue its isolationist stance.² Even after a world war, America attempted to return to an isolationist country.

The year 1940 marked the first turning point for US isolationists. German military triumphs in Europe and the Battle of Britain forced widespread American reconsideration of its relation to the war, now raging in Europe. Many worried that if Germany and Italy triumphed in Europe and Africa, and Japan triumphed in East Asia, the Western Hemisphere would be the next target. Even if America withstood assaults, its democracy, freedom, and economy could be traumatized in the "fortress America" it might have to maintain to guard its security. Given that frightening worst-case scenario, the majority, by the autumn of 1940, believed it important to ensure the defeat of the Axis, even at the risk of war. The ultimate turning point, from isolationist to global power, proved to be the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor Hawaii, December 1941.

As America emerged from isolation in World War II, force projection became increasingly important. In Europe the projection was less of a challenge, as US forces were able to secure lodgment in North Africa and England. In the Pacific the Allies witnessed the birth of airfield seizure, an entire campaign based on acquiring new lodgment after new lodgment.

Thousands of miles separated the United States from ultimate victory in the Pacific during World War II. Lt. Col. James H. “Jimmy” Doolittle led the famous raid on the Japanese home islands early in the war, but spanning the vast oceans with concentrated air power proved a daunting task. American naval and ground forces had to secure bases in China and wrest far-flung islands from the tenacious grip of the Japanese. From these bases, the US Army Air Forces (AAF) launched specially-designed, very long range bombers against the home islands. The strategic bombing campaign, climaxed by the destruction of enemy cities with conventional and atomic bombs, helped force Japan to surrender and spared the United States a bloody invasion. The US air offensive against Japan is the central story of the Pacific war, a drama of island hopping, airfield seizures and the truest sense of joint operations.³ Much of the WWII Pacific experience in airfield seizure is very pertinent to today’s expeditionary Air Force.

A RAND corporation study, by Alan Vick notes that there is broad range of objectives to be gained from attacking an air base. These range on a scale from simple harassment of the enemy and its operations to the focus of this paper, capturing an airfield for US operations. Vick further divides the capture of an airfield into two categories, the seizure of an airfield as an airhead or support base and the capture of an airfield for offensive air operations or a forward operating location (FOL).⁴

The capture of an airfield for offensive air operations, where attacking air forces sought to capture enemy bases to perform their own offensive air operations, was limited to World War II until recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.⁵ There were 23 FOL operations found in WWII, and, in many of these, the attackers were able to mount offensive air operations within hours or days after ground forces had secured the airfield. These operations were much akin to today’s conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Ground forces captured the airfields so that their own air force could occupy the base and conduct offensive air operations from the airfield, extending the reach of the attacker’s air force.⁶

Fighting in the Pacific theater of WWII was noted for its jointness. In particular, the campaign plans of both sides were largely determined by the need to capture and defend air bases.⁷ As such, joint operations were launched to capture enemy airfields. Subsequent air operations from these new bases extended the offensive range of airpower, allowing for new naval and ground operations that, in turn, seized new airfields.

There are several noteworthy FOL operations, both Allied and Axis, from World War II. Among them are the Japanese attack on Wake Island and Japanese landings at Singora and Patani, Thailand, and Kota Bharu, Malaya. Japan secured two Thai airbases and three RAF fields and subsequently defeated the British in Malaya, on February 15, 1941. The Japanese also captured the RAF airfield at Palembang, Sumatra, in Feb 1942.⁸ The Japanese attack on Midway Island in 1942 was a failed attempt at airfield seizure—a battle that could have and did change the tide of the war.⁹ Notable allied efforts include the British assault on the Vichy French airfield at Souk-el-Arba, Algeria, in Nov 1942¹⁰ and the US landings on Tinian, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and Ie Shima in 1944 and 1945.¹¹ The above are a few operations in an entire campaign bent on the seizure of airfields in order to attack and counter-attack the enemy.

The Soviet and American Cold War, following World War II, stifled such operations on a grand scale. Although airfield seizures did occur in several conflicts, such operations were limited. The Korean War witnessed the United States rapidly opening air bases as land was seized from the North. Operation Chromite or Inchon is an excellent historical example of the strategic importance of airfield seizure. The objectives of Operation Chromite were multifaceted: neutralize the fortified Wolmi Island, which controlled access to Inchon Harbor; land and capture Inchon, 25 miles west of Seoul; seize Kimpo Airfield just south of Seoul; and, finally, capture the city of Seoul.¹² On September 24, just days after the invasion, Kimpo airfield opened for 24-hour operations. Cargo aircraft brought much needed supplies in and air evacuated the wounded and sick back to hospitals in Japan. Nine C-119 transports emergency airdropped ammunition and rations to the front line troops as they pushed north out of the Inchon area. Eight C-54s landed at the newly captured airfield at Suwon on September 24, to bring in some 65 tons of ammunition and rations. The Combat Cargo Command lifted the 187^th Airborne Regiment into Kimpo on the 25^th to guard the offensive’s flank as the troops moved forward.¹³

As previously mentioned, from the end of Korea until the 1980s, the two superpowers had somewhat stabilized the global environment, and the United States faced the USSR along stagnated lines. The static “Iron Curtain” over Europe allowed for the building of forward bases and the deployment of permanently stationed troops in the theater of conflict. The ability and requirement to seize bases significantly decreased in strategic importance. The operations were relegated to a small force of special operations experts.

These infrequent operations included Operation Eagle Claw, the failed rescue attempt of American hostages held in Iran. Eagle Claw planned on the seizure of Manzariyeh Air Base in Iran. This putative lodgment would have allowed for C-141 Starlifter transports to fly the hostages and rescue teams out of the country.¹⁴

Operation Urgent Fury, the rescue of American students in Grenada, required the seizure of Salinas and Pearls airports.¹⁵ During Operation Just Cause, US Rangers captured Rio Hato and Tocuman airfields in Panama, for insertion of forces to remove dictator Manuel Noriega.¹⁶ All of the above operations differ from those of WWII, in that the objective of these seizures was never to sustain forces. The operations were a “bolt out of the blue,” a surprise special operation effort for temporary effects.¹⁷

In essence, the Cold War was the driving factor in diminishing the US military’s need for airfield seizure and the requirement to open bases. Europe and the Pacific were fertile ground, littered with bases to support troops in combat with the USSR. If World War III were to occur, a nuclear exchange would end the war quickly. If nuclear weapons were not used, the conventional battle between the United States and USSR was a battle of forces already deployed in Europe fought from fixed bases with follow on forces deploying to forward NATO airfields and ports. These forces and forward bases were a requirement of the Cold War and very much part of deterrence.

Following the Cold War, America and its allies faced what President George H.W. Bush called a “New World Order.” Ironically, the President presented the speech on 11 September 1990, and eleven years later his son, President George W. Bush, would face a completely different world.

A new world order -- can emerge: a new era -- freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony. A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor. Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we've known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak.¹⁹
Instead, the “New World Order” ushered in a new realm of conflict. America was forced to change from a Cold War force that was deployed forward to a force that was in garrison and home, based in the United States with the ability to deploy rapidly. The US approach to combat in Desert Storm was based on Cold War thought. The United States led Coalition built up forces in the Persian Gulf at allied bases and was afforded the time to meet the Iraqis with overwhelming force.

Conflicts in Somalia and Rwanda stimulated discussion amongst US strategists regarding the notion of airbase opening. There was a need for more, open airfields in austere places located in areas at the very limit of the United States’ logistical reach. US military strategy increasingly stressed force projection and the important role of air mobility forces. The pre-9/11 airbase opening sequence proved a good start in thought, but a leaner military structure required the USAF to develop doctrine for the optimum use of forces. The United States no longer enjoyed a large number of airlifters and tankers flying to fixed bases. In order to strengthen and grow this budding expeditionary culture, new strategies would have to emerge.

A regional combatant commander requires his forces to flow into the theater in a timely manner to where they are needed, so that they can quickly prepare for employment. The linear battlefield made this a challenge; today’s non-linear battlefield makes it even more difficult. New units in theater make vulnerable targets for the enemy. The airfield, be it an FOL or support base, can be vulnerable and a bottleneck. Because of its critical importance for force insertion and sustainment, it is a likely center of gravity. A competent enemy would likely attack this lucrative target. No longer can air mobility alone open bases as we saw in the pre 9-11 world. Today, forces must be integrated.

CONOPS Theory

Today the US Department of Defense is transforming itself as directed by the Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld: “We need rapidly deployable, fully integrated forces, capable of reaching distant theaters quickly and working with our air and sea forces to strike adversaries swiftly, successfully and devastating effect.”²⁰ Although all branches are attempting this transformation, the Army and Marine Corps long ago developed forcible entry capability. Joint Publication (JP) 3-18: Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations, states Army airborne and air assault forces are primary forces in such operations. Such forces cannot project themselves on a global scale and require the USAF in order to seize airfields. RAND’s 2000 study, Lightning Over Water, notes that airborne and air assault assets lack “survivability and killing power for future . . . contingencies . . . they need to have much greater survivability and lethality to operate effectively.”²¹ This survivability and lethality is enhanced by the USAF in the form of airlift, counter air, CAS, tactical air reconnaissance, air interdiction, special air warfare operations, electronic warfare, and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD).²² The Global Strike CONOPS²³ is one tool to offer responsive airpower options, but the integration with Air Mobility is an absolute must.

Air Mobility

This forcible entry option, of either airborne or air assault, requires a delivery method. The preferred method for delivery of these forces is via the USAF’s air mobility forces. Without the robust capability of the USAF, the airborne unit is a rider without a horse, but with an effective and timely USAF response, the employment of seizure forces can be carried out with the maximum probability of success.²⁴ JP 3-18 states “Air mobility forces are a national resource and air mobility operations represent a rapid means to project and sustain power across the globe in support of vital, important and humanitarian US national interests.”²⁵ Rapid global mobility is “the backbone for sustained combat operations.”²⁶

Air mobility is a system of systems that combines airlift, air refueling, and air mobility support assets, processes and procedures into an integrated whole. Airlift and air refueling can operate independently of one another, but neither can operate without air mobility support.²⁷

Current forcible entry forces, airborne and air assault, lack survivability and lethality, especially in a high threat environment.²⁸ The Air Force’s Global Strike CONOPS package of aircraft can establish air dominance, but troops on the ground are usually required to occupy terrain and secure lodgment. The solution is an integrated force using airborne forces, the Air Forces Global Strike CONOPS and the Global Mobility CONOPS (GM CONOPS).

Lodgment and the GM CONOPS

A contingency mission requires a secure base of operations at which combat power can be introduced, projected from, and sustained in order to conduct joint operations. Seizure of an airfield is one means of securing such a base. Such operations can be conducted over ground, via air or by sea. Once the field is attacked, it must be secured, defended and subsequent air and/or ground operations must ensue.

The projection and employment of United States forces has almost inevitably required the establishment of bases near the area of operations.²⁹ The Global Mobility CONOPS is the designated element, designed to facilitate the projection and employment of US forces. The Global Mobility CONOPS consists of five force modules (FMs) that comprise the whole. One is the “Open the Airbase FM” that first employs the Base Assessment Team. The second is the “Command and Control FM.” Next is the “Establish the Airbase FM.” The latter brings sufficient forces to the base to achieve initial operating capability. The fourth is the “Generate the Mission FM.” Finally, the Global Mobility Task Force includes the “Operate the Airbase FM,” which contains forces needed to achieve a base’s full operating capability.³⁰



Figure 4: Building Blocks of Air Base Opening. Sourced from AMC/A35 Airbase Opening Operational Concept, Version 8.2, 18 Dec 2003
The concept of engaging in GM CONOPS operations in a hostile environment requires direct and detailed coordination and integration between the GM CONOPS planners and airfield seizure forces. Airfield seizure forces usually consist of special operations forces (SOF) or conventional Army (USA) or Marine Corps (USMC), and Air Force forces. Of these, the USAF “open the airbase” FM is imperative.

Conclusion

History shows the strategic importance of airfield seizure. The following three chapters will examine such operations in context. Case studies start with German operations in Norway, continue with the Soviet concept of airfield seizure and its effects in Afghanistan, and conclude with the US operation in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). These case studies are offered as reflection prior to further addressing the USAF’s concept for airbase openings in the wake of OIF and OEF. Finally, future organization, training requirements and doctrine are amplified as recommendations for future operations.

1 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, translated by Richard Crawley, Abridged Edition prepared by Ian Johnston, (Malaspina University-College, BC), The 6^th Book, Chapter XVIII, on-line, Internet, 4 February 2004, available from http://www.mala.bc.ca/~johnstoi/thucydides/thucydides_4.htm.

2 Wayne S. Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932-1945 (1983); John Milton Cooper, Jr., The Vanity of Power: American Isolationism and the First World War, 1914-1917 (1969); Ralph Stone, The Irreconcilables: The Fight against the League of Nations (1970). On-line, Internet, 5 February 2004, Available from:

http://college.hmco.com/history/readerscomp/rcah/html/ah_046200_isolationism.htm.

3 Daniel L. Haulman, The US Army Air Forces in World War II, Hitting Home, The Air Offensive Against Japan, Air Force History and Museums Program, 1999 on-line, Internet, 5 February 2004, Available from: www.usaaf.net/ww2/hittinghome/ 5 Feb 04

4 Alan Vick, Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest, A History of Ground Attacks on Air Bases, Project Air Force, (Santa Monica, Calif. RAND Publishing, 1995), 11-12.

5 Vick, 13.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Nick Tucker, Air Warfare and Air Base Defense, (Washington DC; Office of Air Force History, 1988), 101.

9 US aircraft discovered the Japanese fleet and sank four carriers, turning back the invasion force before it could land. RAND analyst David Shlapak has observed that this may be the most significant airfield attack in history. The resulting battle, and the destruction of the Japanese attack force, was a turning point in the war. Noted in Vick, 13.

10Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol II, (Chicago IL, University of Chicago Press, 1949), 81.

11 Vick, 13.

12 50^th Anniversary of the Korean War, Fact Sheet: Official Public Access Web Site for Department of Defense, on-line, Internet, 6 February 2004, available from: http://korea50.army.mil/history/factsheets/chromite.shtml.

13 Larry Davis, “Combat Cargo Command” from Air War Over Korea: A Pictorial Record, (Houston Tex: Squadron/Signal Pub, 1982), 161.

14 Jim Greeley, “Desert One: A mission of hope turned tragic. A case of what could've been,” Airman Magazine, on-line, Internet, 10 February 2004, available from http://www.af.mil/news/airman/0401/hostage.html.

15 Mark Adkin, Urgent Fury; The Battle for Grenada, (Lexington Mass, Lexington Books, 1989), 200-214.

^ Malcom McConnell, Just Cause; The Real Story of America’s High-Tech Invasion of Panama, (New York, St Martins Press, 199)1, 73,99.

16 Ibid.

17

18 Sourced from Colonel Ehrhard, PhD, USAF, briefing to SAASS, 17 May 2004

19 President George Herbert Walker Bush's address to a joint session of Congress and the nation, on-line, Internet, 10 February 2004, available from, http://www.sweetliberty.org/issues/war/bushsr.htm .

20 Donald Rumsfield, US Secretary of Defense, Speech at National Defense University, 2002

21 Lightning Over Water: Sharpening America’s Light Forces for Rapid Reaction Missions, RAND, on-line, Internet, 2 February 2004, available from: http://www.rand.org/publications/RB/RB3022/ 2 Feb 04.

22 US Army Field Manual 90-26, (Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington DC1990), on-line, Internet, 4 February 2004, Available at: http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/90-26/Ch1.htm#p6.

23 The Global Strike Task Force (GSTF) will be the US Air Force’s contribution to the nation’s kick-down-the-door force. GSTF will rapidly establish air dominance and subsequently guarantee that joint aerospace, land, and sea forces will enjoy freedom from attack and freedom to attack. GSTF will be a rapid-reaction force employed within the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) construct and timeline while maintaining interoperability with joint, coalition, and allied assets. -- Jumper, John, USAF Chief of Staff, 2001

24 Randolph C.White, Jr., The Airborne Forces of the United States; Cornerstone of Force Projection, US (master’s thesis, Naval War College, Newport RI), 5 February 1999, 7.

25 JCS Pub 3-18 Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations (D). April 1994, vii.

26 Air Force Doctrine Document, 2-6, Air Mobility Operations, 25 June 1999, 1, on-line, Internet, 2 February 2004, available at: http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/dd/afdd2-6/afdd2-6.pdf.

27 Ibid.

28 RAND, Lightning Over Water

29 Airbase Opening Operational Concept, Headquarters Air Mobility Command,A35, Version 8.2, 18 Dec 2003, 1

30 Ibid, 2-3

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