File Title space weaponization good 2

Space mil assets more important to the US than other countries

Pre-emption Problem

As the world’s most extensive user of military Space resources and the most reliant on them, the United States would seem to have little incentive to initiate hostilities in Space. But as the likely military responder in a crisis rather than the aggressor, U.S. forces typically will be more vulnerable than their adversaries during the early stages of mobilization and deployment, and both information and information security will be precious. Hence, there will be immense pressure on U.S. decision-makers to deprive a potential adversary of Space-based information and communication capabilities before the latter can be used to target deploying U.S. and allied forces. Those pressures will increase in proportion to the expansion of potentially hostile non-U.S. Space capabilities.

Complicating matters is the likelihood that some of the capabilities used by an adversary very likely will be owned and operated by third parties such as multinational corporations, global private investment consortia, and nonbelligerent foreign governments. Attacking these assets would present legal and political problems not unlike those historically associated with naval blockades. Meanwhile, our own Space-based assets are likely to be increasingly vulnerable to damage or destruction by an enemy whose familiarity with the contested ground makes him less sensitive to a mutual degradation of Space-based capabilities.

Put differently, access to Space systems will be more valuable to the United States than to its adversaries in a future conflict. A general degradation of Space capabilities on both sides will be expected to benefit the adversary. That prospect will only intensify pressures on U.S. commanders to deprive an enemy of the ability to interfere with friendly Space systems.

Space mil key future military capabilities and success

A New American Way of War

Russell Weigley described a long-standing American way of war that was based on an essentially isolationist preference to allow issues beyond its borders to sort themselves out.1 Only when events spilled out of hand and threatened U.S. interests directly did America feel compelled to intervene. Only then did it mobilize for war. In the first half of the 20th century, however, this model had to be substantially refined. It was predicated on taking the fight to the enemy's shores, away from American soil, but only after other means of influence had failed and the military option was deemed the only one likely to succeed. And then, when America finally chose to bring force, it was overwhelming force. The country braced for long build-ups. American leaders made the public feel confident in its righteousness. Friendly casualties were to be limited to the extent practical, but damage to the enemy could be maximized. The strategy was suitable in an era when the U.S. homeland was safe from attack, when its industrial production ensured the stockpiling of vital supplies and innumerable armaments, and excess resources could be provided to friends and allies to do the fighting where prudent. In these conditions, America could afford to wait for problems to incubate and mature before reacting with colossal expenditure and terrible force. For the most part, this way of war was effective.

But then came the debacle in Vietnam, where U.S. forces arguably won every battle but lost the war, at home as well as in Southeast Asia. Television had come to war; rampant carnage was available for viewing in every American home. Indiscriminant area bombing was particularly horrific, and from that time forward U.S. leaders would not contemplate using such tactics except at desperate times, when the very survival of the state was at stake. In wars of lesser urgency, those characterized by international theorists as wars for less than the vital national interest, it would be incumbent on America to win the hearts and minds of not just the domestic audience, but of allies, potential allies, and erstwhile enemies as well. Overwhelming force on a broad scale would be ruled out in advance. Success would be achieved through the employment of high-tech means and weapons: by computers, satellites, and whole new classes of technological marvel. America's future wars would be less destructive. They would have far fewer casualties, both friendly and enemy. And they would be short.

That this transformation was well underway became evident in 1991, when U.S. forces defeated the world's fourth-largest military in just ten days of ground combat. The Gulf War witnessed the public and operational debut of unfathomably complicated battle equipment, sleek new aircraft employing stealth technology, and promising new missile interceptors. Arthur C. Clarke went so far as to dub Operation Desert Storm the world's first space war, as none of the accomplishments of America's new look military would have been possible without support from space.2 Twelve years later Operation Iraqi Freedom proved that the central role of space power could no longer be denied. America's military had made the transition from a space-supported to a fully space-enabled force, with astonishing results. [End Page 164] Indeed, the military successfully exercised most of its current space power functions, including space lift, command and control, rapid battle damage assessment, meteorological support, and timing and navigation techniques such as Blue Force tracking, which significantly reduced incidences of fratricide.

The tremendous growth in space reliance from Desert Storm to Iraqi Freedom is evident in the raw numbers. The use of operational satellite communications increased four-fold, despite being used to support a much smaller force (fewer than 200,000 personnel compared with more than 500,000). New operational concepts such as reach back (intelligence analysts in the United States sending information directly to frontline units) and reach forward (rear-deployed commanders able to direct battlefield operations in real time) reconfigured the tactical concept of war. The value of Predator and Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), completely reliant on satellite communications and navigation for their operation, was confirmed. Satellite support also allowed Special Forces units to range across Iraq in extremely disruptive independent operations, practically unfettered in their silent movements.

But the paramount effect of space-enabled warfare was in the area of combat efficiency. Space assets allowed all-weather, day-night precision munitions to provide the bulk of America's striking power. Attacks from standoff platforms, including Vietnam-era B-52s, allowed maximum target devastation with extraordinarily low casualty rates and collateral damage. In Desert Storm, only 8 percent of munitions used were precision-guided, none of which were GPS-capable. By Iraqi Freedom, nearly 70 percent were precision-guided, more than half from GPS satellites.3 In Desert Storm, fewer than 5 percent of aircraft were GPS-equipped. By Iraqi Freedom, all were. During Desert Storm, GPS proved so valuable to the army that it procured and rushed into theater more than 4,500 commercial receivers to augment the meager 800 military-band ones it could deploy from stockpiles, an average of one per company (about 200 personnel). By Iraqi Freedom, each army squad (6–10 soldiers) had at least one military GPS receiver.

Given the demonstrated utility of and reliance upon military assets in space, there is no question the United States must guarantee space access if it is to be successful in future conflicts. Its military has stepped well over the threshold of a new way of war. It is simply not possible to go back to the violently spasmodic mode of combat typical of pre-space interventions. The United States is now highly discriminating in the projection of violence, and parsimonious in the intended breadth of its destruction. For the positive process of transformation to continue, however, space weapons must enter the combat inventory of the United States.[End Page 165]

Space mil increases military capacity—not perceived as aggressive

To be sure, America will maintain the capacity to influence decisions and events beyond its borders, with military force if necessary. The operational deployment of space weapons would increase that capacity by providing for nearly instantaneous force projection worldwide. This force would be precise, unstoppable and deadly. At the same time, the United States would forgo some of its ability to intervene directly in other states because the necessary budget tradeoffs would diminish its capacity to do so. Space weapons offer no advantage if the opponent is not dispersed broadly around the globe. Against massed and regionally concentrated forces, conventional weaponry is far more efficient. As such, transformation of the American military assures that the intentions of current and future leaders will have but a minor role to play in international affairs. The need to limit collateral damage, the requirement for precision to allay the low volume of fire, and the tremendous cost of space weapons will guarantee they are used only for high-value, time-sensitive targets. An opposing state's calculation of survival no longer would depend on interpreting whether or not the United States desires to be a good neighbor. Without sovereignty at risk, fear of a space-dominant American military will subside. The United States will maintain its position of hegemony as well as its security, and the world will not be threatened by the specter of a future American empire.

Controlling space key to military operations

Tucker 8 – Dennis P. Tucker, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, commander of the 336th Recruiting Squadron at Moody Air Force Base, June 2008, “PRESERVING UNITED STATES DOMINANCE: THE BENEFITS OF WEAPONIZING THE HIGH GROUND,” School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q_mod.../display.aspx?...

Space Controllers

Space controllers are common in the military space community. These individuals favor development of space weapons because the military is heavily dependent on space capabilities. Similar to Lupton’s control school, Mueller’s space controllers subscribe to the view that space is becoming essential to terrestrial military operations and control of space is essential to success. Therefore adversaries will look to attack US space systems to take that advantage away. In addition, other space faring adversaries will look to control space in order to support their own terrestrial forces with communication, targeting, navigation, and other functions. Space controllers believe space weapons are needed to defend their own satellites and to attack enemy satellites. “In addition, as the relevant technologies improve, space-to-Earth weapons will become a potent military instrument.”13

Like space racers, space controllers are not particularly concerned with the political costs associated with fielding space weapons. Their view is that weaponization is inevitable, and it does not make sense to become reliant on space systems and then not protect them. Unlike space racers, however, space controllers do not agree that the United States can afford to wait until there is an urgent and pressing space threat before fielding space weapons. The key for criterion for deciding to weaponize space “will not be a comparison of potential US space weapon capabilities with those of rival states, but a comparison of future US military capabilities with and without space weapons.”14 The bottom line for space controllers is that the United States should weaponize space as soon it appears that it will be useful to do so.15

Controlling space key to future military operations and protecting space assets

Tucker 8 – Dennis P. Tucker, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, commander of the 336th Recruiting Squadron at Moody Air Force Base, June 2008, “PRESERVING UNITED STATES DOMINANCE: THE BENEFITS OF WEAPONIZING THE HIGH GROUND,” School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q_mod.../display.aspx?...

Space Control

Twenty-first century joint operations are critically dependent on space capabilities, and this dependence will continue to grow in the future. America’s ability to achieve victory in future conflict rests heavily on its ability to gain and maintain space superiority. Space control operations are designed to achieve this space superiority, ensuring access to and freedom of action in, from, and through space while denying the same to the adversary. The threat to space is real, and it is a contested medium. It is long past time to treat space like a combat medium, to use passive and active defense capabilities to protect space assets from hostile attack, and be prepared to use offensive capabilities to take away an opponent’s hostile use of space when required. These are, in fact, missions previously assigned to the nation’s military and reiterated when President Bush, in his 2006 national space policy, stated:

The United States considers space capabilities—including the ground and space segments and supporting links—vital to its national interests. Consistent with this policy, the United States will: preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space; dissuade or deter others from either impeding on those rights or developing capabilities intended to do so; take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to US national interests.29

President Bush’s aligns well with current military doctrine with regards to space control. Joint Publication 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, defines space control as “combat, combat support, and combat service support operations to ensure freedom of action in space for the United States and its allies and, when directed, deny an adversary freedom of action in space. The space control mission area includes: surveillance of space; protection of US and friendly space systems; prevention of an adversary’s ability to use space systems and services for purposes hostile to US national security interests; negation of space systems and services used for purposes hostile to US national security interests; and directly supporting battle management, command, control, communications, and intelligence”30 For its part, Air Force doctrine accepts the mission of counterspace activities to achieve space control. According to AFDD 2-2, Space Operations, counterspace operations are defined as “Operations to attain and maintain a desired degree of space superiority by allowing friendly forces to exploit space capabilities while denying an adversaries ability to do the same”31 The Air Force further divides counterspace operations into offensive and defensive operations, both of which are dependent on robust space situational awareness.

Defensive Counterspace (DCS) operations “provide the means to deter and defend against attacks and to continue operations by limiting the effectiveness of hostile action against US space assets and forces. DCS operations include deterrence of attacks against our space system, defense of our space systems as they come under attack, and where necessary, recovery of our space forces and assets.”32 The defense portion of the DCS definition is broken down into attack detection and characterization, passive and active measures. DCS operations may target an adversary’s counterspace capability to ensure access to space capabilities and freedom of action in space. Examples include destruction of adversary GPS or satellite communication jammers, intercept of enemy antisatellite weapons, system hardening, jam-resistance, and satellite maneuver.

Adversaries recognize they cannot battle the United States force-on-force, so they are seeking to ways to attack asymmetrically. This plays right into “China’s indigenous military traditions, which emphasize ‘stealth, deception, and indirect approaches to warfare—and the opportunities offered by emerging technologies—which permit effective asymmetric strategies focuses on attacking an adversaries weaknesses rather than its strengths.’”33 China and other countries have come to the realization that:

The advanced military might of the United States depends inordinately on a complex, exposed network of command, control, communications, and computer-based systems that provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and these systems operate synergistically in and through the medium of space. These space-based capabilities enable American forces to detect and identify different kinds of targets, exchange vast and diverse military relevant information and data streams, and contribute to the success of combat operations by providing everything from meteorological assessment to navigation and guidance to different platforms and weapon systems to early warning and situational 34 awareness.

The bottom line is that America’s adversaries have figured out that its space-based capabilities are its Achilles heel. US policy makers must provide for the military means to defend these space assets against a variety of threats. No longer can the United States take the high ground for granted, in the next war it is very clear that its space advantage will be challenged. In the words of Senator Joseph Lieberman, “space…has become an inseparable and vital part of our personal and daily lives. The implications for security are critical. Our dependence on space, will change warfare itself just as the rise of sea borne trade centuries ago expanded warfare from the land to the seas….We are rapidly creating new ‘sea lanes’—space and cyberspace lanes—that can be attacked and that must in turn be defended.”35

Threats to US space systems abound, and the United States needs to be prepared to detect and defeat those threats. In 2001, Donald Rumsfeld’s Space Commission concluded that “the U.S. Government should vigorously pursue the capabilities called for in the National Space Policy to ensure that the President will have the option to deploy weapons in space to deter threats to and, if necessary, defend against attacks on U.S. interests”36 The commission also reported “that the U.S. is not…well prepared to handle the range of potential threats to its space systems.”37 This conclusion was based on the threat report prepared for the commission by Tom Wilson, which listed the following threats against space-based systems: Non-directed nuclear ASATs, interceptor ASAT weapons (direct ascent ASATs, short-duration orbital ASATs, long-duration orbital interceptors (farsats, nearsats, space mines, fragmentation or pellet rings, space-to-space missiles, microsatellites)), stand off weapons (laser ASATs, radio frequency ASAT, high-power laser and microwave weapons, particle-beam ASATs), and electronic attack on communication, data, and command links.38 From this lengthy list of threats, some already fielded, some in various phases of research and development, it is evident that the United States cannot assume freedom of operation in space without adequate defensive capabilities and weapons.

Over the last five years America’s potential adversaries have developed numerous advances in counterspace technology. Several states have the capability to send high-altitude nuclear detonations (HAND) into low-Earth orbit and have outwardly expressed the need to counter adversary space capabilities. Many more could reach highly populated orbits with simple medium-range ballistic missiles and detonate a payload that would leave a dangerous debris cloud. Russia has the largest offensive counterspace capability, and is known to possess direct ascent ASAT means, HAND weapons fielded around Moscow, and a variety of non-kinetic laser systems and satellite jammers. As previously noted, China has recently demonstrated a laser ASAT capability and a direct ascent ASAT capability. These are the most developed potential adversarial capabilities in space, but are by no means the only or even most likely threats.

Space is the new war medium—controlling it key to military success

Tucker 8 – Dennis P. Tucker, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, commander of the 336th Recruiting Squadron at Moody Air Force Base, June 2008, “PRESERVING UNITED STATES DOMINANCE: THE BENEFITS OF WEAPONIZING THE HIGH GROUND,” School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q_mod.../display.aspx?...

The medium of air became a medium of warfare during World War I. Airpower was used in all four primary mission areas of force application, force enhancement, control, and support, and led to World War I being called the first air war. “As World War I provided the efficacy of airpower as a valuable tool for future conflict, the Gulf War seems to have proved the efficacy of space power as a viable arm of future military operations.”88 However, in the first space war, space forces were only operative in space support and force enhancement, and were not equipped to perform the missions of space control and space force application. Today, these two mission areas still lack resources and political support.

Adversaries have evaluated America’s advantageous utilization of space from 1991 forward, and have plans to negate that advantage. With the current demonstrated threat to US space systems, the two mission areas of space control and space force application need to be fully embraced. No longer can the United States get by with unenforceable (and endlessly debated) legal protections or passive defenses such as shielding and hardening. Space is a medium of warfare, and the high-ground must be defended and must be utilized to defend the United States, its allies, and its interests.

US military depends on space assets

Dolman and Cooper 11 – Everett C. Dolman, Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Henry F. Cooper, Jr., Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, Department of Defense, March 7, 2011, “Toward a Theory of Space Power, Chapter 19: Increasing the Military Uses of Space,” http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/space-Ch19.pdf

America's reliance on space is so extensive that a widespread loss of space capabilities would prove disastrous for both its military security and its civilian welfare. The Armed Forces would be obliged to hunker down in a defensive crouch awaiting withdrawal from dozens of no-longer-tenable foreign deployments. America's economy, and along with it the rest of the world's, would collapse.

For these reasons, the Air Force is charged with protecting space capabilities from harm and ensuring reliable space operations for the foreseeable future. As a martial organization, the Air Force looks to military means to achieve these assigned ends—as well it should. The military means it seeks include the ability to apply force in, through, and from space, as well as enabling and enhancing terrestrially based forces. Is this not self-evident?

Consider for a moment that the Navy has a similar charge: to ensure freedom of access to international waters and, when directed in times of conflict, to ensure that other states cannot operate there. Now imagine how the Navy might achieve these objectives if it were denied the use of weapons, to include shore-based weapons or those owned by other Services. What if it were further denied the capacity or legal power to research, develop, or test weapons? How effective could it be? Such restrictions would be absurd, of course. And yet this scenario is almost perfectly parallel with the conundrum facing the Air Force in space.

In this chapter, we make the case that opposition to increasing the militarization and weaponization of space is a misapplied legacy of the Cold War and that dramatic policy shifts are necessary to free the scientific, academic, and military communities to develop and deploy an optimum array of space capabilities, including weapons in space, eventually under the control of a U.S. Space Force.

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