Foundation Briefs Advanced Level September/October Brief Resolved



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Statistics from Sports Institutions are Inaccurate


Why the Pro Team’s Statistics are Imbalanced and Inaccurate AMS

DeMause, Neil. “Why Do Mayors Love Sports Stadiums?” July 27, 2011. The Nation. http://www.thenation.com/article/162400/why-do-mayors-love-sports-stadiums

For politicians eager to embrace sports deals, it’s easy to find consulting firms willing to produce glowing “economic impact studies”—even though sports economists nearly unanimously dismiss them as hogwash. For example: Economic Research Associates told the city of Arlington, Texas, that spending $325 million on a new stadium for billionaire oil baron Jerry Jones’s Dallas Cowboys would generate $238 million a year in economic activity. Critics immediately pointed out that this merely totaled up all spending that would take place in and around the stadium. Hidden deep in the report was the more meaningful estimate that Arlington would see just $1.8 million a year in new tax revenues while spending $20 million a year on stadium subsidies.

Jeanette Mott Oxford, who was an antisubsidy activist before being elected a Missouri state representative, says it’s easy for her colleagues to be distracted with flashy claims. “Unfortunately, it doesn’t appear that elected officials are much into evidence-based decision-making,” she explains. “Folks believe the threat that jobs will be lost, that somehow the team will move. Then there’s the civic pride element around the status of having a team. I think that too often, those motivate people no matter what the evidence says.”


Capital Costs Funded by Taxpayers AMS

Easterbrook, Gregg. “How the NFL Fleeces Taxpayers.” September 18, 2013. The Atlantic. http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/10/how-the-nfl-fleeces-taxpayers/309448/%20Y2K

Judith Grant Long, a Harvard University professor of urban planning, calculates that league-wide, 70 percent of the capital cost of NFL stadiums has been provided by taxpayers, not NFL owners. Many cities, counties, and states also pay the stadiums’ ongoing costs, by providing power, sewer services, other infrastructure, and stadium improvements. When ongoing costs are added, Long’s research finds, the Buffalo Bills, Cincinnati Bengals, Cleveland Browns, Houston Texans, Indianapolis Colts, Jacksonville Jaguars, Kansas City Chiefs, New Orleans Saints, San Diego Chargers, St. Louis Rams, Tampa Bay Buccaneers, and Tennessee Titans have turned a profit on stadium subsidies alone—receiving more money from the public than they needed to build their facilities. Long’s estimates show that just three NFL franchises—the New England Patriots, New York Giants, and New York Jets—have paid three-quarters or more of their stadium capital costs.
The Math Does Not Add Up AMS

DeMause, Neil. “Why Do Mayors Love Sports Stadiums?” July 27, 2011. The Nation. http://www.thenation.com/article/162400/why-do-mayors-love-sports-stadiums

It’s a story that could have been told in almost any American city over the past two decades. Owners of teams in the “big four” sports leagues—the NFL, MLB, NBA and NHL—have reaped nearly $20 billion in taxpayer subsidies for new homes since 1990. And for just as long, fans, urban planners and economists have argued that building facilities for private sports teams is a massive waste of public money. As University of Chicago economist Allen Sanderson memorably put it, “If you want to inject money into the local economy, it would be better to drop it from a helicopter than invest it in a new ballpark.”

Studies demonstrating pro sports stadiums’ slight economic impact go back to 1984, the year Lake Forest College economist Robert Baade examined thirty cities that had recently constructed new facilities. His finding: in twenty-seven of them, there had been no measurable economic impact; in the other three, economic activity appeared to have decreased. Dozens of economists have replicated Baade’s findings, and revealed similar results for what the sports industry calls “mega-events”: Olympics, Super Bowls, NCAA tournaments and the like. (In one study of six Super Bowls, University of South Florida economist Phil Porter found “no measurable impact on spending,” which he attributed to the “crowding out” effect of nonfootball tourists steering clear of town during game week.)

Meanwhile, numerous cities are littered with “downtown catalysts” that have failed to catalyze, from the St. Louis “Ballpark Village,” which was left a muddy vacant lot for years after the neighboring ballpark opened, to the Newark hockey arena sited in the midst of a wasteland of half-shuttered stores.

Flaws in Economic Studies Exposed AMS

Zimbalist, Andrew and Noll, Roger. “Sports, Jobs, & Taxes.” Brookings Institution. 1997. http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/1997/06/summer-taxes-noll

Unfortunately, these arguments contain bad economic reasoning that leads to overstatement of the benefits of stadiums. Economic growth takes place when a community's resources—people, capital investments, and natural resources like land—become more productive. Increased productivity can arise in two ways: from economically beneficial specialization by the community for the purpose of trading with other regions or from local value added that is higher than other uses of local workers, land, and investments. Building a stadium is good for the local economy only if a stadium is the most productive way to make capital investments and use its workers.

In our forthcoming Brookings book, Sports, Jobs, and Taxes, we and 15 collaborators examine the local economic development argument from all angles: case studies of the effect of specific facilities, as well as comparisons among cities and even neighborhoods that have and have not sunk hundreds of millions of dollars into sports development. In every case, the conclusions are the same. A new sports facility has an extremely small (perhaps even negative) effect on overall economic activity and employment. No recent facility appears to have earned anything approaching a reasonable return on investment. No recent facility has been self-financing in terms of its impact on net tax revenues. Regardless of whether the unit of analysis is a local neighborhood, a city, or an entire metropolitan area, the economic benefits of sports facilities are de minimus.

As noted, a stadium can spur economic growth if sports is a significant export industry—that is, if it attracts outsiders to buy the local product and if it results in the sale of certain rights (broadcasting, product licensing) to national firms. But, in reality, sports has little effect on regional net exports.

Sports facilities attract neither tourists nor new industry. Probably the most successful export facility is Oriole Park, where about a third of the crowd at every game comes from outside the Baltimore area. (Baltimore's baseball exports are enhanced because it is 40 miles from the nation's capital, which has no major league baseball team.) Even so, the net gain to Baltimore's economy in terms of new jobs and incremental tax revenues is only about $3 million a year—not much of a return on a $200 million investment.

Sports teams do collect substantial revenues from national licensing and broadcasting, but these must be balanced against funds leaving the area. Most professional athletes do not live where they play, so their income is not spent locally. Moreover, players make inflated salaries for only a few years, so they have high savings, which they invest in national firms. Finally, though a new stadium increases attendance, ticket revenues are shared in both baseball and football, so that part of the revenue gain goes to other cities. On balance, these factors are largely offsetting, leaving little or no net local export gain to a community.

One promotional study estimated that the local annual economic impact of the Denver Broncos was nearly $120 million; another estimated that the combined annual economic benefit of Cincinnati's Bengals and Reds was $245 million. Such promotional studies overstate the economic impact of a facility because they confuse gross and net economic effects. Most spending inside a stadium is a substitute for other local recreational spending, such as movies and restaurants. Similarly, most tax collections inside a stadium are substitutes: as other entertainment businesses decline, tax collections from them fall.

Promotional studies also fail to take into account differences between sports and other industries in income distribution. Most sports revenue goes to a relatively few players, managers, coaches, and executives who earn extremely high salaries—all well above the earnings of people who work in the industries that are substitutes for sports. Most stadium employees work part time at very low wages and earn a small fraction of team revenues. Thus, substituting spending on sports for other recreational spending concentrates income, reduces the total number of jobs, and replaces full-time jobs with low-wage, part-time jobs.

This analysis by the Brookings Institution not only points out the economic problems with public subsidies for sports, but explains the flaws in studies done to demonstrate the economic benefit of these studies. Use this card to explain the economic problems with expecting large scale impact from sports subsidies and discount statistics from Pro teams.

A further examination of economic impact studies DAT

Wilhelm, Sarah. “Public Funding of Sports Stadiums.” Center for Public Policy and Administration. University of Utah. 30 April 2008. Web. http://cppa.utah.edu/_documents/publications/finance-tax/sports-stadiums.pdf
Several flaws in the franchise consultant analysis have been identified. Not all analyses have all the mentioned flaws, but most have at least one that leads to the overestimating of the impact of sports stadiums.

• Author biases. Economic consulting firms hired by franchises obviously have an incentive to find positive results. Academics may have bias as well, although there is no reason to assume that all academics would be biased against stadium construction. Yet all of their findings have been that stadiums do not create economic growth.

• Method. Franchise consultants create estimates based on assumptions about projected future economic activity for one metro area. Academic economists are analyzing past economic activity. Academic studies look at multiple metropolitan areas and analyze economic activity controlling for other factors that will likely affect economic growth.

• Ignoring the substitution effect. Franchise consultants often anticipate spending that would happen in and around the new stadium without taking into account spending that may be reduced in other recreational activities as fans divert their spending. Assuming families have relatively fixed entertainment budgets that they split among many activities, increased spending at a new stadium will mean decreased spending at other entertainment facilities (movies, amusement parks, museums, etc.). Thus, we can expect little economic growth from local families redistributing their entertainment budgets. Some economic growth can come from those outside the metro area choosing to spend their money at the sports stadium rather than spending near their home.

Ignoring visit motivation. Franchise consultants count every dollar spent by out-of-town fans as dollars brought in by the stadium. However, many out-of-town fans attend games, but would have visited the metro area without the stadium. Many attend games while being in town for a conference, a wedding, to see an art exhibit, etc. Their spending on hotels, restaurants, etc. should not be included in stadium benefits if the motive for their trip was not the stadium.

• Overstating the multiplier. Franchise consultants have used multipliers to estimate economic benefits such as job creation as high as 2.5. That is, one job created by the stadium directly leads to 2.5 jobs being created indirectly. Academic studies have found that a more reasonable multiplier would be 1.25. The lower multiplier is justified because a large portion of spending goes to purchase goods produced outside the metro area and the athletes typically live outside the metro area (at least during the off season).

• Focusing on gross rather than net jobs. Jobs lost are often not included in the analysis done by franchise consultants. While the new stadium may employ 1000 people, if the old stadium employed 900, net jobs increased 100.

• Overstating the importance of the stadium in the local economy. Sports stadiums positive impacts are often small relative to the economy of a metro area. In fact a sports franchise has about the same scale of economic effect as a large grocery store. A civic leader in Sacramento claimed, “The Raiders coming to Sacramento would be an event the magnitude of the Gold Rush.” During the Gold Rush 300,000 people moved to California in the six years following the 1848 discovery of gold in Sacramento. The Raiders would have played 8 home games a year there. Many find it surprising that a sports stadium does not generate more economic development however; sports franchises are really small businesses. The Jazz generates about $10 million dollars - that is 0.029 percent of the Salt Lake economy which generated $33.6 billion dollars in personal income in 2005.21 Real Salt Lake will generate create 175 jobs or 0.027 percent of jobs in a metropolitan area that has 625,800 nonfarm employees.



This topic is rare, in that economists are nearly unanimous in their negative findings toward sports stadium subsidies. With that in mind, this card offers the most empirical look at why any economic impact study (which present the preponderance of evidence for the use of public funds for stadiums) is unreliable. Statistics can’t be used to prove a point if their methodology is suspect and their numbers are meaningless, as is nearly the case with pro-subsidy economic impact studies.

Economic impact studies entirely ignore opportunity costs DAT



Zaretsky, Adam M. “Should Cities Pay for Sports Facilities?” The Regional Economist. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. April 2001. Web. https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re/articles/?id=468

Another glaring omission from these economic impact studies is the value of the next-best investment alternative—what economists call the opportunity cost. "There's no such thing as a free lunch" is a favorite economist expression because it sums up exactly what opportunity cost means: When making a choice, something always has to be given up. The value of the "losing" choice must be considered when making the decision and when calculating the value, or return, of the "winning" choice. In other words, when a city chooses to use taxpayer dollars to finance a sports stadium, the city's leaders must consider not only what the alternative uses of those funds could be—such as schools, police, roads, etc.—but they must also figure what return the city would receive from these other ventures. Then, the return from the city's next-best alternative (for example, schools) must be subtracted from the total return of the "winning" choice to arrive at the "actual" return of the stadium investment. This adjusted calculation, though, is almost always missing from sports stadium impact studies. Why? Because in just about every case, the adjusted calculation would show that the next-best alternative was actually the better alternative.



The net cost of a stadium for a sports team thus ends up negative. If a stadium is robbing its neighborhood of better alternatives (e.g. schools, theatres), it’s doing harm on balance.

Small markets vastly oversell themselves to justify excessive funding of local teams DAT



Crompton, John L. “Economic Impact Analysis of Sports Facilities and Events: Eleven Sources of Misapplication.” Journal of Sport Management. Texas A&M University. 1995. Web. http://agrilifecdn.tamu.edu/cromptonrpts/files/2011/06/Full-Text100.pdf

Changes in geographical boundaries of the area of impact are likely to lead to changes in multiplier size, because the magnitude of a multiplier depends on the structure of the host community. That is, the degree to which businesses at which visitors spend their money proceed to trade with other businesses within the defined area, rather than with enterprises outside the defined geographical area. It is generally assumed that a smaller community tends not to have the sectorial interdependencies that facilitate retention of monies spent during the first round of expenditures. Hence, much of the expenditure would be respent outside the local region leading to a low local economic multiplier. Conventional wisdom posits that the larger is the defined area's economic base, then the larger is likely to be the value added from the original expenditures, and the smaller is the leakage that is likely to occur.

Almost all professional sports franchises are located in major metropolitan areas. Hence, revenues the franchises receive from out-of-town visitors and other external sources such as television, tend to stay in the local area. For example, Schaffer and Davidson (1984, p. 15) concluded that about 70% of expenditures by the Atlanta Falcons were made locally. They reported that 79 percent of the players and staff of the team live here all year; 39 of 58 players and 46 of 50 staff members live in Atlanta. Most field personnel are local residents, printing is local, the team uses Atlanta banks as well as an Atlanta based airline, and the team is locally owned.

Thus, much of the visitors' revenues received by the Falcons is respent inside the local region leading to a relatively high economic multiplier.



There has been a tendency for aspirants in inherently small market areas seeking a new professional franchise to expand the definitions of their traditional market area in order to strengthen their case with existing team owners and with city officials and residents who will be expected to subsidize the franchise. For example, promoters of Charlotte's NFL bid transformed the city of 396,000 into a region of 9.7 million people, despite the Charlotte metropolitan area having only 1.2 million residents. They counted everyone within 150 miles of Charlotte as a potential fan in order to persuade team owners that their market could generate the desired threshold of revenue, and residents that substantial economic impact would be forthcoming (American Demographics, 1992). In fact, studies have consistently shown that at least 70% of fans are likely to come from the immediate metropolitan area (Crompton, 1984; Schaffer & Davidson, 1975,1984).

The smaller a market for a sports team, the more likely that any revenue generated by the market will eventually escape, leading to smaller gains. By artificially inflating their own value, small markets wind up placing themselves under a burden which they cannot meet. This, then, is the real impact shown by the above card: the outlay of a public subsidy for a professional sports team is inherently unsustainable for small markets, and the manipulation of accounting figures to make the market seem sustainable simply sets local communities up to bear a burden too large for them.



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