Gdi 2010 Energy Reform Politics da



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I/L – PC Key



Political Capital can only help – increases make legislation more likely – not the other way around

Lee 5 [Andrew, The Rose Institute of State & Local Government – Claremont McKenna College – Presented at the Georgia Political Science Association 2005 Conference http://a-s.clayton.edu/trachtenberg/2005%20Proceedings%20Lee.pdf]

Congressional Anticipation The last alternative explanation proposes that Congress drafts favorable legislation in response to the president’s increase in political capital. In contrast to the investment explanation, where the president uses veto threats differently depending on his capital and the legislation stays constant, this theory suggests that Congress changes its actions. The president’s use of the veto is constant, but Congress changes its legislation depending on the president’s approval rating. In recent years, the majority leadership in the House has aggressively used its power to control the agenda. If a measure seems likely to divide the majority party or face a presidential veto, then it will probably not reach a House floor vote in the first place (Simendinger 2003). When the president’s approval ratings increase, the Congress anticipates a stronger veto threat. This anticipation creates favorable legislation rather than unfavorable legislation that will trigger a veto. Therefore, when the president’s political capital is at its highest, the presidential veto will be least likely. In the current 109th Congress, however, there were signs of strain between the White House and the House Republican Leadership, possibly caused by the president’s decrease in political capital (“Bush Vows Stem Cell Veto” 2005).


Political Capital determines the agenda – above anything else

Light 99 [Paul C., Senior Fellow at the Center for Public Service

the President’s Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton”, 3rd Edition p. 34] KLS

In chapter 2, I will consider just how capital affects the basic parameters of the domestic agenda. Though the internal resources are important contributors to timing and size, capital remains the cirtical factor. That conclusion will become essential in understanding the domestic agenda. Whatever the President’s personal expertise, character, or skills, capital is the most important resource. In the past, presidential scholars have focused on individual factors in discussing White House decisions, personality being the dominant factor. Yet, given low levels in presidential capital, even the most positive and most active executive could make little impact. A president can be skilled, charming, charismatic, a veritable legislative wizard, but if he does not have the basic congressional strength, his domestic agenda will be severely restricted – capital affects both the number and the content of the President’s priorities. Thus, it is capital that determines whether the President will have the opportunity to offer a detailed domestic program, whether he will be restricted to a series of limited initiatives and vetoes. Capital sets the basic parameters of the agenda, determining the size of the agenda and guiding the criteria for choice. Regardless of the President’s personality, capital is the central force behind the domestic agenda.
High political capital makes legislation more likely – fear and cooperation

Lee 5 [Andrew, The Rose Institute of State & Local Government – Claremont McKenna College – Presented at the Georgia Political Science Association, 2005 Conference, http://a-s.clayton.edu/trachtenberg/2005%20Proceedings%20Lee.pdf]

No single alternative theory can entirely explain the use of veto threats under President Bush’s first term. For example, the president would not be able to invest political capital without having the opportunity of increased legislation created by the legislative cycle. It is more likely that a combination of these factors produced the data in the first Bush administration. During periods of high legislative activity, the Congress, divided during the 107th Congress, anticipated more credible veto threats due to high political capital. Congress constructed legislation that was favorable to the president, and the president invested his political capital by decreasing his veto threats and opposition to legislation. Congress creates legislation that is more favorable to the president, and the president supports Congress in order to invest his political capital. Ultimately, this means that Congress and the president are inadvertently working to create agreeable legislation during times of high political capital. Conversely, when political capital decreases, the president gradually increases his opposition language.




I/L – AT: PC Key



Political capital is not key to the agenda

Lindberg  4 [Todd,  Editor of Policy Review Magazine, Research Fellow at the Hoover Institute, The Washington Times, December 7.  Pg. A21, Lexis]

Striking it is, then, that Mr. Bush came in for only half of the metaphor: He believes he possesses political capital, but rather than invest it, he proposes to spend it.I think this innovation may be an improvement. It removes the implicit expectation of an automatic return on the use of political capital. Because in reality, one may spend one's political capital and lose it - specifically, if things don't turn out the way you hope, namely, in glorious victory.

I/L – AT: PC Finite


Political Capital spills over between issues – 107th congress proves

Lee 5 [Andrew, The Rose Institute of State & Local Government – Claremont McKenna College – Presented at the Georgia Political Science Association 2005 Conference http://a-s.clayton.edu/trachtenberg/2005%20Proceedings%20Lee.pdf]

The idea of investing political capital also supports the notion that the chief executive specializes in foreign and defense policy. The president may increase his domestic capital by cooperating on domestic legislation and then spend it implementing foreign policies. In executing foreign policy, the president will not issue SAPs on his own foreign policy. For example, if the president signs a treaty, Congress may or may not ratify it, but there is no opportunity for veto. Therefore, the president’s use of foreign policy is a spend maneuver, whereas his domestic policy is an invest maneuver. The 107th Congress, during which the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq began, supports this theory. President Bush may have spent his political capital towards executing those wars and attempted to invest his capital by cooperating on domestic legislation.


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