Gulf War Air Power Survey

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none. However, the MARWIN and TPS-68 systems were not deployed until January 1991 and the BOS was used as back-up equipment.^¹²⁷⁵

The maintenance concept for UAWS required broken systems to be returned to Germany for repairs. The system had few maintenance problems and sufficient spares were brought to support the system. QRCT and Goldwing on the other hand experienced many hard disk failures.^¹²⁷⁶ Both the Air Force and the Army purchased additional cartridges, but the new hard drives did not arrive in country before the war ended. In addition, software defects caused the systems to reject garbled message traffic and to prevent polling of the nodes by the network control station. Other problems included the slowness of the system in handling data transfer, insufficient power (12 watts), and difficulty in finding usable frequencies.^¹²⁷⁷
The Air Force had no in-country maintenance capability, but the Army deployed two communications maintenance detachments to support their Goldwings. The Air Force obtained an agreement with the Army to repair their QRCTs also. However, maintenance procedures required both Army and Air Force customers to bring their equipment to the maintenance shops for repairs. While this procedure worked well for the Army, CENTAF units found it difficult because the shops were located near Army units while they themselves were spread across the theater. As the Army began to move its forces closer to the Iraqi border in January 1991, the maintenance detachment moved with them, thus making it even more difficult for Air Force weather teams to locate them.^¹²⁷⁸

Appendix G

Operations Desert Shield/

Desert Storm Ground Rules
The following information should not be reported because its publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives:
(1)  For U.S. or Coalition units, specific numerical information on troop strength, aircraft, weapons systems, on-hand equipment, or supplies (e.g., artillery, tanks, radars, missiles, trucks, water), including amounts of ammunition or fuel moved by or on hand in support and combat units. Unit size may be described in general terms such as “company-size,” “multibattalion,” “multidivision,” “naval task force,” and “carrier battle group.” Number or amount of equipment and supplies may be described in general terms such as “large,” “small,” or “many.”
(2)  Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations, or strikes, including postponed or cancelled operations.
(3)  Information, photography, and imagery that would reveal the specific location of military forces or show the level of security at military installations or encampments. Locations may be described as follows: all Navy embark stories may identify the ship upon which embarked as a dateline and will state that the report is coming from the “Persian Gulf,” “Red Sea,” or “North Arabian Sea.” Stories written in Saudi Arabia may be datelined “Eastern Saudi Arabia,” “Near the Kuwaiti border,” etc. For specific countries outside Saudi Arabia, stories will state that the report is coming from the Persian Gulf region unless that country has acknowledged its participation.
(4) Rules of engagement details.
(5)  Information on intelligence-collection activities, including targets, methods, and results.

(6)  During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop movements, tactical deployment, and disposition that would jeopardize operational security or lives. This would include unit designations, names of operations, and size of friendly forces involved, until released by CENTCOM.
(7)  Identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than as land- or carrier-based.
(8)  Information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence- collection, or security measures.
(9)  Specific identifying information on missing or downed aircraft or ships while search and rescue operations are planned or underway.
(10)  Special operations forces' methods, unique equipment, or tactics.
(11)  Specific operating methods and tactics (e.g., air angles of attack or speeds, or naval tactics and evasive maneuvers). General terms such as “low” or “fast” may be used.
(12)  Information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used against U.S. forces, such as details of major battle damage or major personnel losses of specific U.S. or Coalition units, until that information no longer provides tactical advantage to the enemy and is, therefore, released by CENTCOM. Damage and casualties may be described as “light,” “moderate,” or “heavy.”

Appendix H

Public Affairs Chain of Command
Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm

Appendix I

Guidelines for News Media
14 Jan 91
News media personnel must carry and support any personal and professional gear they take with them, including protective cases for professional equipment, batteries, cables, converters, etc.
Night OperationsRestrictions in exposing light will be followed. The only approved source of light is a flashlight with a red lens. No visible light source, including flash or television lights, will be used when operating with forces at night unless specifically approved by the on-scene commander.
Because of host-nation requirements, you must stay with your public affairs escort while on Saudi bases. At other U.S. tactical or field locations and encampments, a public affairs escort may be required because of security, safety, and mission requirements as determined by the host commander.
Casualty information, because of concern of the notification of the next of kin, is extremely sensitive. By executive directive, next of kin of all military fatalities must be notified in person by a uniformed member of the appropriate service. There have been instances in which the next of kin have first learned of the death or wounding of a loved one through the news media. The problem is particularly difficult for visual media. Casualty photographs showing a recognizable face, name tag, or other identifying feature or item should not be used before the next of kin have been notified. The anguish that sudden recognition at home can cause far outweighs the news value of the photograph, film, or videotape. News coverage of casualties in medical centers will be in strict compliance with the instructions of doctors and medical officials.
To the extent that individuals in the news media seek access to the U.S. area of operation, the following rule applies: Prior to or upon commencement of hostilities, media pools will be established to provide initial combat coverage of U.S. forces. U.S. news media personnel present in Saudi Arabia will be given the opportunity to join CENTCOM media pools, providing they agree to pool their products. News media personnel who are not members of the official CENTCOM media pools will not be permitted into forward areas. Reporters are strongly discouraged from attempting to link up on their own with combat units. U.S. commanders will maintain extremely tight security throughout the operational area and will exclude from the area of operations all unauthorized individuals.
For news media personnel participating in designated CENTCOM Media Pools:
(1)  Upon registering with the JIB, news media should contact their respective pool coordinator for an explanation of pool operations.
(2)  In the event of hostilities, pool products will be the subject to review before release to determine if they contain sensitive information about military plans, capabilities, operations, or vulnerabilities (see attached ground rules) that would jeopardize the outcome of an operation or the safety of U.S. or coalition forces. Material will be examined solely for its conformance to the attached ground rules, not for its potential to express criticism or cause embarrassment. The public affairs escort officer on scene will review pool reports, discuss ground rule problems with the reporter, and in the limited circumstances when no agreement can be reached with a reporter about disputed materials, immediately send the disputed materials to JIB Dhahran for review by the JIB Director and the appropriate news media representative. If no agreement can be reached, the issue will be immediately forwarded to OASD(PA) for review with the appropriate bureau chief. The ultimate decision on publication will be made by the originating reporter's news organization.
(3)  Correspondents may not carry a personal weapon.

Appendix J

Historical Comparison of War Correspondence
	War	Comments	Reporters
	Civil War	• Initially no attempt to censor.	Five hundred reporters covered the War in the North.
	 McClellan's attempt to rely on “Gentleman's agreement” with press didn't work.	A smaller number covered the Confederacy.
	• Censorship of telegraph imposed 2 February 1862.	No accurate accounting of reporters because no accreditation system and documentation exists.
	 No “prepublication” control of mails or private couriers.
	• Historians concluded that government lacked an “incisive and intelligible news policy.”
WW 1	• British and French banned correspondents from the front for an entire year.	British accredited six journalists initially to its headquarters.
	 Only under pressure from the press and American entry into the war did they relent and accredit reporters to headquarters and the field.	Thirty-eight reporters were accredited to General Pershing's American Expeditionary Force in 1917-1918.
	 The British practice was to assign quarters, a car, driver, and “escort/censor” to each accredited journalist.	Hundreds of unaccredited journalists, freelancers, “visitors” were to follow.
WW II	• Office of Censorship created by President in 1941.	Four hundred sixty-one reporters and photographers from Allied press and radio accredited to SHAEF for D-Day (including 180 Americans).
	 Published a “Code of Wartime Practices” with full cooperation of the press that codified kinds of information could not be published without official authorization.	Walter Cronkite of UP assigned to Supreme HQ-Air, along with eight other U.S. news persons.
	 Established a clearance procedure in U.S. for official authorization of information for domestic publication.	Only 27 U.S. newsmen went ashore with elements of all Allied armies, others came later (only six on Omaha Beach where pivotal battle of invasion took place).
	• Military retained full authority to censor all dispatches from overseas theaters of war.	Estimates that throughout the war a total of some 2,250 American journalists covered the conflict all over the world.
	 Censorship in the field and again at the headquarters where dispatches were cleared.
	• First photos of U.S. war dead killed in battle weren't published at home until 1943.
	• By Normandy, U.S. two years of experience with press covering military operations in North Africa and Sicily.
	• Newsmen were accedited to HQ (Supreme HQ or various echelons of land, air, or naval contingents).
	• Newsmen wore uniforms, assimilated rank of Captain in U.S. Army, were subject to the Articles of War.
	• First news of Normandy invasion came from London, not from the beaches...communication system set up for correspondents broke down, was out for 28-hours.
Korean War	• MacArthur experimented first with “voluntary censorship.”	Five newsmen accompanied first U.S. troops sent to reinforce South Korea (later joined by 70 others after three days).
	 Under “voluntary” rules, there were almost daily security/rules violations.	Eventually 270 reporters (American and foreign, accredited to Tokyo HQ to cover Korea).
	 Rate of disclosures alarmed members of Congress who called on press and radio to stop disclosures, to no avail.	Fewer than one-quarter were ever at the front at any given time.
	• At request of reporters, MacArthur imposed WW II-like field and headquarters censorship in December 1950.
Dominican Republic		Twenty-two journalists accompanied the April 1965 deployment of U.S. forces.
Vietnam War	• No censorship imposed (political reasons, practicality cited).	Number of correspondents accredited increased as U.S. troops commitments increased.
	• U.S. Mission in Saigon provided “dedicated spaces” for newsmen on in-country transport.	In 1960, fewer than half a dozen fulltime correspondents.
	• Set up major “press camps” in each of Vietnam's three outlying regions with direct telephone communication and daily flights to/from Saigon.	In 1964, 40 U.S. and foreign correspondents.
	• Helicopters occasionally assigned exclusively to transport reporters to units in the field.	In 1965, 400 plus (MACV's daily briefings regularly attended by 130 correspondents).
	 Newsmen often “hitchhiked” on helicopters and aircraft.	In 1966, 419 news media accredited from 22 nations (179 American including support).
	• Action unpredictable, never any assurance of contact with enemy.	In 1968, 637 (at height of Tet); 1969 - 467; 1970 - 392; 1971 - 355; 1972 - 295; 1974 - 35.
Grenada	• No censorship.	At D⁺48 hours, one pool of 15 reporters taken to island.
	• No ground rules.	At D⁺72 hours, pool of 24 reporters.
	• No regular briefings.	At D+96 hours, pool of 47 reporters.
	• As one journalist described the situation there: “no briefings, no press releases, no nothing.”	At D+120 hours, day five of operation, 182 transported and pool restrictions lifted.
	• No media plan in place with deployment of troops.	Total of 370 journalists on Barbados waiting to cover the war (estimates have gone as high as 700).
	• Public Affairs Officers deployed to Barbados after war well under way (press already there).
Panama		Fifty to 100 resident journalists in country at time of invasion.
		DOD Media (14 plus two technicians, three escorts).
		Day Two, 300 media.
		Total of 855 media accredited/processed through SOUTHCOM Media Center.
Persian Gulf War	• Pool coverage of combat.	No Western press in Saudi Arabia.
	• Security Review of pool reports “at the source.”	At start of air campaign, 1,200 reporters (130 reporters in pools with units).
	 Ground rule violations only.	A start of ground campaign, 1,500 reporters (192 reporters in pools with units).
	 No “editorial” changes.	Pools dissolve when events outpace pools.
	 Final decision to print story up to editor or bureau chief.
	• Military escort required.

Index

1 Jomini, Antoine H. The Art of War (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Publishing Co., 1958).

2 ²Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 1 Dec 1989.

3 This schema is also consistent with proposed joint logistics doctrine. Joint Test Pub 4-0, Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations, Jun 1990, p I-1. The “test” publication promulgates the proposed doctrine.

4 Clayton H. Snedeker, Operation Desert Shield  Desert Storm: Also, The Vernon J. Kondra Notes, 24 Aug - 31 May 1991, Apr 1992, p 2.

5 As an example: Ltr, Col Ralph J. Templin, 363 TFW(P)/DCM to AF/LEY/LEYM, subj: The war from an F-16 maintenance perspective, nd.

6 Tactical Air Command, Desert Shield Desert Storm Logistics Data (Langley AFB, VA: TAC/LGP, Sep 1991), pp A-9 and A-10.

7 MAC History, Appendix 7.

8 Lt Col Bill Ewing and Lt John Walker,

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