Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs
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- Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit
- Jurisdiction: California
Jurisdiction: All NLRB v. Noel Canning, No. 12-1281 (USSC, 6/26/14): http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-1281_bodg.pdf. Constangy Brooks & Smith law firm article at http://www.constangy.com/communications-524.html [enhanced lexis.com version]. Littler Mendelson law firm article at http://www.littler.com/workplace-policy-update/supreme-court-strikes-down-validity-nlrb-recess-appointments. Fisher Phillips law firm article at http://www.laborlawyers.com/supreme-court-strikes-down-nlrb-recess-appointments. Jackson Lewis law firm article at http://www.jacksonlewis.com/resources.php?NewsID=4888. Ford Harrison law firm article at http://www.fordharrison.com/. Franczek Radelet law firm article http://www.franczek.com/frontcenter-NLRB_Recess_Appointments-Unconstitutional.html. Phelps Dunbar law firm article at http://www.jacksonlewis.com/resources.php?NewsID=4888. The basic concept here is separation of powers among the three independent branches of the federal government. Three “recess appointments” made by President Obama were set aside as not having complied with the Recess Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution:
Ruling: There was no recess as defined by the Constitution at the time the President acted and consequently his attempted “recess appointments” were invalid. ADA: reasonable accommodation, challenged jury instruction, immune system – musculoskeletal system, judgment affirmed Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Scavetta v. Dillon Companies, Inc., No. 13-1311 (10th Cir., 6/27/14) [enhanced lexis.com version]; About the jury instruction: At the close of evidence, the district court held a jury instruction conference. The court proposed to instruct the jury as follows: “Ms. Scavetta has a disability if she has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more of her major life activities, such as performing manual tasks, walking, standing, or working.” Scavetta objected, insisting the instruction failed to reflect that major life activities can “include the operation of major bodily functions such as the immune system or musculoskeletal system.” The court overruled her objection, however, explaining that the instruction conformed to the evidence, which “had to do with performing manual tasks, walking, standing or working.” The court instructed the jury accordingly, and the jury returned a verdict for King Soopers. The appellate court affirmed the jury instruction as given because: Based on this testimony, the district court tailored the instruction to reflect that “Ms. Scavetta has a disability if she has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more of her major life activities, such as performing manual tasks, walking, standing, or working.” This instruction properly focused the jury’s attention on the evidence relating to limitations of Ms. Scavetta’s physical activities. See Dilley v. SuperValu, Inc., 296 F.3d 958, 965 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding no plain error where instruction focused jury’s attention on evidence of how impairment substantially limited plaintiff’s major life activity). Because there was no specific evidence that RA substantially limited the operation of Scavetta’s major bodily functions, the court correctly declined to reference major bodily functions in its instruction. ACA, RFRA, RLUIPA: Affordable Care Act, Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, contraceptive mandate, closely-held corporations – person, no compelling government interest – least restrictive means Jurisdiction: All Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (USSC, 6/31/14): http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/13-354_olp1.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinions.aspx?Term=13. Constangy Brooks & Smith law firm article at http://www.employmentandlaborinsider.com/affordable-care-act-2/breaking-supreme-court-5-4-finds-in-favor-of-hobby-lobby/. Fisher & Phillips law firm article at http://www.laborlawyers.com/supreme-court-rules-in-favor-of-religious-beliefs-of-business-owner. Ford Harrison law firm article at http://www.fordharrison.com/supreme-courts-contraceptive-decision-not-a-one-size-fits-all-religious-exemption-from-the-affordable-care-acts-requirements. Goldberg Segalla law firm article at http://www.goldbergsegalla.com/Impact%20of%20Hobby%20Lobby. Briefly, closely-held corporations, regardless of size, are protected by the RFRA from the requirement of the ACA to pay for contraceptive prescriptions. Study the full opinion and articles for guidance and legal opinions. Two other methods, less restrictive, are available to the administration. Court staff syllabus: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) prohibits the “Government [from] substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability” unless the Government “demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U. S. C. §§2000bb–1(a), (b). As amended by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), RFRA covers “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” §2000cc–5(7)(A). At issue here are regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA), which, as relevant here, requires specified employers’ group health plans to furnish “preventive care and screenings” for women without “any cost sharing requirements,”42 U. S. C. §300gg–13(a)(4). Congress did not specify what types of preventive care must be covered; it authorized the Health Resources and Services Administration, a component of HHS, to decide. Ibid. Nonexempt employers are generally required to provide coverage for the 20 contraceptive methods approved by the Food and Drug Administration, including the 4 that may have the effect of preventing an already fertilized egg from developing any further by inhibiting its attachment to the uterus. Religious employers, such as churches, are exempt from this contraceptive mandate. HHS has also effectively exempted religious nonprofit organizations with religious objections to providing coverage for contraceptive services. Under this accommodation, the insurance issuer must exclude contraceptive coverage from the employer’s plan and provide plan participants with separate payments for contraceptive services without imposing any cost-sharing requirements on the employer, its insurance plan, or its employee beneficiaries. In these cases, the owners of three closely held for-profit corporations have sincere Christian beliefs that life begins at conception and that it would violate their religion to facilitate access to contraceptive drugs or devices that operate after that point. In separate actions, they sued HHS and other federal officials and agencies (collectively HHS) under RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause, seeking to enjoin application of the contraceptive mandate insofar as it requires them to provide health coverage for the four objectionable contraceptives. In No. 13–356, the District Court denied the Hahns and their company—Conestoga Wood Specialties—a preliminary injunction. Affirming, the Third Circuit held that a for-profit corporation could not “engage in religious exercise” under RFRA or the First Amendment, and that the mandate imposed no requirements on the Hahns in their personal capacity. In No. 13–354, the Greens, their children, and their companies—Hobby Lobby Stores and Mardel—were also denied a preliminary injunction, but the Tenth Circuit reversed. It held that the Greens’ businesses are “persons” under RFRA, and that the corporations had established a likelihood of success on their RFRA claim because the contraceptive mandate substantially burdened their exercise of religion and HHS had not demonstrated a compelling interest in enforcing the mandate against them; in the alternative, the court held that HHS had not proved that the mandate was the “least restrictive means” of furthering a compelling governmental interest. Held: As applied to closely held corporations, the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violate RFRA. Union: collective bargaining, Harris v. Quinn, Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (PLRA), homecare – personal assistants (PA), state executive order Jurisdiction: All Harris et al. v. Quinn, Governor of Illinois, et al., No. 11–681 (USSC, 1/21/14): http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/11-681_j426.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. URL to Slip Opinions at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinions.aspx?Term=13. Ogletree Deakins law firm article at http://blog.ogletreedeakins.com/supreme-court-rejects-labors-mandatory-dues-collection-initiative-favor-workers-first-amendment-rights/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=supreme-court-rejects-labors-mandatory-dues-collection-initiative-favor-workers-first-amendment-rights. Fisher & Phillips law firm article at http://www.laborlawyers.com/supreme-court-strikes-down-mandatory-union-fair-share-deductions-for-public-sector-employees. Littler Mendelson law firm article at http://www.littler.com/workplace-policy-update/supreme-court-rules-against-public-sector-union-limited-decision. Goldberg Segalla law firm article at http://www.goldbergsegalla.com/Supreme%20Court%20Deals%20Blow%20to%20Public%20Sector%20Unions%20on%20Agency%20Fees. If a Rehabilitation Program PA does not want to join or support the union, then collecting an agency fee from a PA would violate the First Amendment. The PAs were determined not to be in an employment that qualified them as public sector employees.
Ogletree Deakins law firm article at http://www.ogletreedeakins.com/publications/2014-06-27/two-california-appellate-decisions-%E2%80%9Cdelegate%E2%80%9D-authority-courts-arbitrators#sthash.WnrTcfQK.dpuf. Litigation: FEHA, untimely objection, failure to exhaust administrative remedies Jurisdiction: California Kim v. Konad USA Distribution, No. G048443 (Cal.Ct.App.Dist4.Div3, 6/12/14)”
Comment: Most governments, federal and state, require an employee to submit such claims to an administrative agency that reviews and screens cases for their merits before allowing access to the judicial system. It’s a traffic control device. History: Only after the end of the trial did the employer first object to the employee’s failure to first submit the claim to the FEHA. Ruling: That would a futile endeavor because the case had been tried on the merits and screening at that time was thus irrelevant. Comment: This was not an issue of jurisdiction: Exhaustion of administrative remedies: This deals with whether an employee exhausts all necessary administrative procedural steps and remedies in order to qualify for access to the judicial system; that legal doctrine does not involve “the fundamental subject matter jurisdiction of the court.” Jurisdiction: This is the authority and power to decide a case and enter a binding judgment for or against the parties, which does involve “the fundamental subject matter jurisdiction of the court.” For example, a New Mexico Human Rights Act case could not be brought in a state other than New Mexico because that Act applies only in New Mexico and a court in another state other state would have no legal basis for trying it making a ruling. Independent Contractors: newspaper carriers, class action determination Jurisdiction: California Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., No. S206874 (CASC, 6/30/14):
Clarifies class action considerations. Supreme Court summary: Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc. (Antelope Valley) is the publisher of the Antelope Valley Press, a daily newspaper. To deliver the paper to its subscribers, Antelope Valley contracts with individual carriers. Four carriers, Maria Ayala, Josefina Briseño, Rosa Duran, and Osman Nuñez, contend Antelope Valley illegally treats them as independent contractors, rather than employees, and thereby deprives them of a host of wage and hour protections to which they are legally entitled. The merits of the complaint are not before us. The sole question is whether this case can proceed as a class action. The trial court concluded the case could not, holding that on the critical question whether Ayala and others were employees, plaintiffs had not shown common questions predominate; to determine employee status, in the trial court‘s view, would necessitate numerous unmanageable individual inquiries into the extent to which each carrier was afforded discretion in his or her work. The Court of Appeal disagreed in part, holding that the trial court had misunderstood the nature of the inquiries called for, and remanded for reconsideration of the class certification motion as to five of the complaint‘s claims. We affirm. Arbitration: Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), arbitration clause – enforceable, Jurisdiction: California Malone v. Superior Court, No. B253891 (Cal.Ct.App.Dist2.Div3., 6/17/14):
The California Bank & Trust (CB&T) employee handbook for the period of July 2007 to November 2010 included a provision requiring binding arbitration of any “controversy or claim arising out of” Malone’s employment. It also stated: The arbitrator has exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, or enforceability of this binding arbitration agreement. ADA, Retaliation: failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted – 12(b)(6) – no causal connection alleged, dismissal affirmed Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Creamer v. Larned State Hospital, et al., No. 13-3333 (10th Cir., 7/1/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-3333.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Summary by the appellate court: Her pleadings, both in that [the district court] and on appeal, are almost incomprehensible. The district court noted the disconnect between her claim for unlawful discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and her allegations that Defendants had falsely imprisoned her and maintained false records about her. * * * ERISA: arbitration, litigation, long term disability benefits (LTD), pre-existing bi-polar disorder, back pain problems – not disabled, mental impairment benefits paid, dismissal affirmed Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Bigley v. Ciber, Inc. Long Term Disability Coverage, No. 13-1243 (10th Cir., 7/2/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-1243.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Appellant raided numerous points, some on the merits and others on litigation and procedural matters. Essentially, she did not have a provable case. From the appellate opinion: . . . . Plaintiff Linda Bigley appeals from the district court’s order upholding the denial of her application for long-term disability (LTD) benefits under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). * * * Ms. Bigley formerly worked for CIBER, Inc., which offered its employees the defendant LTD benefit plan (the Plan). Ms. Bigley stopped working on November 7, 2001, and filed an application for LTD benefits under the Plan in May 2002 based upon a pre-existing bi-polar disorder. The Plan began paying Ms. Bigley benefits based upon her mental illness, but those benefits could be paid only for two years under the terms of the Plan. She later sought continued benefits, however, asserting that she was independently disabled based on back impairments resulting from an accident in April 2001. On January 12, 2004, the Plan notified her that it was denying her claim for continued LTD benefits effective May 6, 2004, because she was not disabled by her back problems. The Plan paid her benefits from May 6, 2002, through May 5, 2004, based upon her mental impairment, but then discontinued paying benefits. . . . Two major concepts:
Jurisdiction: California Salas v. Sierra Chemical Co., No. S196568 (CASC, 6/26/14):
Supreme Court summary: Plaintiff sued his former employer under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA; Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.), alleging that defendant employer failed to reasonably accommodate his physical disability and refused to rehire him in retaliation for plaintiff’s having filed a workers’ compensation claim. Thereafter, defendant learned of information suggesting that plaintiff, to gain employment with defendant, had used another man’s Social Security number. The trial court denied defendant employer’s motion for summary judgment. When defendant sought a writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal, that court issued an alternative writ. In response, the trial court vacated its order-denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and it entered an order granting the motion. Plaintiff employee appealed from the ensuing judgment, which the Court of Appeal affirmed. It held that plaintiff’s action was barred by the doctrines of after-acquired evidence and unclean hands (based on information defendant acquired during discovery showing wrongdoing by plaintiff), and that here application of those doctrines was not precluded by Senate Bill No. 1818 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1818), enacted in 2002 (Stats. 2002, ch. 1071, pp. 6913-6915). That state law declares: “All protections, rights and remedies available under state law, except any reinstatement remedy prohibited by federal law, are available to all individuals regardless of immigration status who have applied for employment, or who are or who have been employed, in this state.” (Stats. 2002, ch. 1071, § 1, p. 6913, italics added.) After we granted plaintiff employee’s petition for review, we asked both parties for supplemental briefing on whether federal immigration law preempts California’s Senate Bill No. 1818, an issue the parties had not raised before. We conclude: (1) Senate Bill No. 1818, which extends state law employee protections and remedies to all workers “regardless of immigration status,” is not preempted by federal immigration law except to the extent it authorizes an award of lost pay damages for any period after the employer’s discovery of an employee’s ineligibility to work in the United States; and (2) contrary to the Court of Appeal’s holdings, the doctrines of after-acquired evidence and unclean hands are not complete defenses to a worker’s claims under California’s FEHA, although they do affect the availability of remedies. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the matter for further proceedings. Discrimination:
Evidence: What evidence is admissible in a case of adverse employment action? It’s what the employer knew at the time of the decision, not what it might have learned later that might have justified that action. As the court noted: The doctrine of after-acquired evidence refers to an employer’s discovery, after an allegedly wrongful termination of employment or refusal to hire, of information that would have justified a lawful termination or refusal to hire. Title VII: 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)
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