I. A. Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Pacific Fleet
Captain Safford referred to OpNav secret dispatch 031855 which he said he prepared on December 3, and to a similar dispatch released by Admiral Wilkinson. He then said
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- to get a warning out to the Pacific Fleet McCollum emphasized both "wes. McCollum replied, We are doing everything we
- Captain Safford said that the unit in the Fourteenth Naval District did not have any material from which they could have gained this information through their own efforts. (p. 360)
- Exhibit 11 is the December 3 dispatch by CNO to CinCAF, CinCPac and others.
Captain Safford referred to OpNav secret dispatch 031855 which he said he prepared on December 3, and to a similar dispatch released by Admiral Wilkinson. He then said: "Before drafting my message, I called Commander McCollum on the telephone and asked him, "Are you people in Naval Intelligence doing anything to get a warning out to the Pacific Fleet?' McCollum emphasized both "we's'. McCollum replied, 'We are doing everything we can to get the news out to the Fleet.' In sending this information, I was overstepping the bounds as established by approved war plans and joint agreement between Naval Communications and Naval Intelligence, but I did it because I thought McCollum had been unable to get his message released. OpNav 031855 was addressed to CinCAF and Com 16 for action, but was routed to CinCPac and Com 14 for information. It was written in highly technical language and only one officer present at Pearl Harbor, the late Lieutenant H. M. Coleman, U. S. N., on CinCPac's Staff, could have explained its significance." (p.359‑360) Captain Safford said that the unit in the Fourteenth Naval District did not have any material from which they could have gained this information through their own efforts. (p. 360) 2. A dispatch from OPNAV to CincAF, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, ComSIXTEEN, for action: "Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong X Singapore X Batavia X Manila X Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important and confidential and secret documents" (Exhibit 20) Admiral Pye said that he saw the December 3 dispatch concerning the destruction of codes and discussed it with the Commander in Chief, that it seemed perfectly evident that such action could precede war by many days and it did not indicate immediate action. They were unaware of the source of this information and as it had appeared in the newspapers it probably did not mean as much as it would have meant had they known the source. Admiral Pye felt that at Oahu they were pretty much operating in the dark so far as the international situation was concerned. (p. 157) PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 521 Exhibit 11 is the December 3 dispatch by CNO to CinCAF, CinCPac and others. Concerning the code destruction messages, Admiral Turner said that it was impossible for him to understand how anyone could believe that because of the messages the war was coming in the Western Pacific and would not involve Oahu. He pointed out that both Washington and Manila had been included in the dispatch. Admiral McMorris said that the December 3rd dispatch concerning codes was the best indication, in his opinion, that the United States would be involved in war with Japan. He did not recall Admiral Kimmel's view. (p. 247) Admiral Anderson said that he had not precise knowledge but he thought that there had been a proper dissemination of information among the officers of the higher command. He saw the Commander in Chief at least weekly. Admiral Anderson did not think that he had seen nor had he been told about the October 16 dispatch. (p. 392). Admiral Anderson could not recall the November 24 dispatch or the November 30 dispatch to CinCAF with copy to CinCPac for information. He did remember having seen the war warning and believed that he had seen the December 3 dispatch. As a matter of interest, it may be noted that a sentence appearing at the end of this copy of the dispatch, which was released by T. S. Wilkinson, was stricken out in pencil. That sentence read: "From foregoing infer that Orange plans early action in Southeast Asia." On December 4 1941, OPNAV sent a dispatch (Exhibit 21) to NavStaGuam for action, and to CincAF; CincPac; ComFOURTEEN, and ComSIXTEEN for information stating: "Guam destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified mat matter except that essential for current purposes and special intelligence retaining minimum cryptographic channels necessary for essential communications with CincAF, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, ComSIXTEEN, and OpNav X Be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain X Report crypto channels retained" On December 6, 1941, a dispatch (Exhibit 22) bearing time‑date stamp 061743 was sent by OPNAV to CinCPac for action, and to CincAF for information. This stated: "In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific islands, you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency X Means of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence should of course be maintained until the last moment" Commander Kramer drafted Exhibit 66, the December 3rd dispatch concerning Japanese destruction of the "purple" machine. This was sent on the "Kopek" Channel, which was a channel for technical traffic between the Navy Department; Pearl Harbor and the Asiatic Station (page 971). It indicated, he said, a break in diplomatic relations. Exhibit 20, sent out by OPNAV on the same day as Exhibit 66, was the interpretive dispatch of Exhibit 66 (page 960). Admiral Noyes said that Exhibit 21 (dispatch to Guam of December 4th, directing the destruction of codes) was prepared by him and motivated by the growing feeling that war in the Pacific was imminent (page 1031). It was released by Admiral Ingersoll. Admiral Noyes said that Exhibit 22 (authorizing destruction of codes on outlying islands, dated December 6, 1941) was prepared by him and treated as priority dispatch, despite the lack of priority shown on its face (pages 1040, 1042). Admiral Stark testified that the code destruction message was sent to Guam because he felt that Guam was in the most danger; he did not similarly advise ComFOURTEEN because he did not think Hawaii was in as much danger as was Guam. (page 69). At this time, Admiral Stark testified, he believed that war was imminent. Of particular significance he felt, was the information relating the destruction of codes (pages 165‑6). We also knew that the Japanese consuls were advising the evacuation of Japanese nationals from Malay, the Philippines, Hawaii, the United States, etc. (page 157). Admiral Ingersoll stated that the dispatch concerning Japanese destruction of codes strengthened the "war warning" (page 835). Admiral Turner said that on Friday, December 5, 1941, there was a discussion between Admiral Stark, Admiral Ingersoll and himself concerning the general situation, and they all felt that all necessary orders had been issued to all echelons of command preparatory to war and that nothing further was necessary (page 522 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 1006). They did send some other messages about destruction of codes, both Japanese and our own (page 1007). Admiral Kimmel testified that he regarded the dispatches concerning Japanese destruction of codes as indicating that the Japanese were going to take steps to prevent the seizure of their codes upon the breaking off of diplomatic negotiations, and regarded the dispatch directing Guam to destroy classified matter as a general precautionary measure (page 327). He "presumed" that he received the December 6th dispatch prior to the attack (page 327). Admiral Smith testified that he saw the dispatches relating to the destruction of codes but that this meant little to him as CincPac was prepared to destroy codes (page 533). At this time, he said, war was inevitable (page 534).
Commander Rochefort, who was in charge of combat intelligence of the Fourteenth Naval District, stated that during this period the Japanese Consulate was burning or destroying various papers (page 474). Captain Layton said that the messages concerning Japanese code destruction meant to him only that the Japanese, were destroying a cipher machine; he knew "purple" designated it as a diplomatic code (pages 904‑5) and that the "purple" cipher was A high class cipher (page 908). On December 5, 1941, he said, they received word from the Naval Observer at Wellington that the Japanese were destroying codes. This was given to CincPac and was considered along with other information received at that time (page 906). At that time, they received messages from the British and from Washington Stating that highly secret and reliable information indicated a Japanese attack on the Kra Peninsula; this seemed to dovetail with the other information which they had (page 906). There was a discussion concerning the significance of the code destruction messages; they seemed to indicate to Layton that Japan was preparing for all eventualities. He presumed that when it was discussed by Admiral Kimmel with the War Plans Officer and others, it was a matter of discussion (page 906). Admiral McMorris said that he felt that Exhibit 20 (Japanese destroying codes) indicated strongly that there would be war with Japan. He did not recall whether this opinion was prevalent on CincPac's staff, but believed it was thought by CincPac that war was then extremely possible (page 895). It may be noted that although Admiral Kimmel stated that he had kept General Short informed, he did not personally direct that General Short be given the dispatches concerning codes destruction (Exhibits 20, 21, 22) and did not know whether they were given to him (page 327). The only action that Admiral Bloch recalled as a result of the December 3 dispatch concerning the destruction of codes was the security measures already prescribed, the additional inshore patrol in Honolulu, a warning that was given to the Destroyer captains, and his belief the Army was on a full alert. (p. 18) Admiral Bloch did not believe that the Army had been informed of these warning (code) messages. The messages, he said, 'were secret and they had been admonished to keep them secret to prevent alarming people, and one thing and another, Admiral Bloch's War Plans Officer would know about them. Admiral Bloch said that since General Short and he saw one another very frequently and Admiral Kimmel and he saw one another practically every day, it is hard to believe that anything of importance could take place or that anything could be received of even small importance that was not discussed because it is only fair to assume that they discussed everything. (p 18) General Short, he said, had an Army Colonel as a liaison officer in Admiral Bloch's office and Admiral Bloch had in the General's office a Lieutenant of the Naval Reserve as a liaison officer and these men were supposed to be kept informed. Admiral Bloch's liaison officer did not know of the dis‑ PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 523 patches that had been received because Admiral Bloch did not consider that it was proper to tell him; he was quite inexperienced. Nor was Admiral Bloch sure that the Army's liaison officer knew of the messages, but he said they were in close touch through these liaison officers and felt that they knew what was going on. He said that it was indicated that there were some things which they were not correctly informed about. (p. 18) Neither General Short nor his Chief of Staff recalled having seen these messages prior to the attack (pages 255, 486). XXVIII. THE "MORI" CONVERSATION; JAPANESE BURNING PAPERS General Short testified that about December 5th or 6th, he received intelligence reports to the effect that the Japanese Consulate was burning papers. Admiral Bloch said that after the receipt of information to the effect that the Japanese were burning papers, he didn't know whether or not that was something that was really filled with meaning; he believed that so long as there were negotiations going on in Washington, there was a possibility of the period of waiting being extended; he had a very definite feeling that we were going to have war sometime in the future but just how far in the future he was unable to predict. (p. 17) Lt. Stephenson discussed in some detail the Mori telephone conversation intercepted on December 6, 1941 and stated his conclusion that he believed it unlikely that this was a calculated transmission of information from Honolulu to Japan. On December 6th, he received a report of a long telephone conversation between a person named "Mori" and someone in Japan, in which references were made to the weather, ships at Pearl Harbor, and the local attitude toward the Japanese (page 233). The Mori conversation was as follows: (Exhibit 39) IC (J) Hello, is this Mori? (H) Hello, this is Mori. (J) I am sorry to have troubled you. Thank you very much. (H) Not at all. (J) I received your telegram and was able to grasp the essential points. I would like to have your impressions on the conditions you are observing at present. Are airplanes flying daily? (H) Yes, lots of them fly around. (J) Are they large planes? (H) Yes, they are quite big. (J) Are they flying from morning till night? (H) Well, not to that extent, but last week they were quite active in the air. (J) I hear there are many sailors there, is that right? (H) There aren't so many now. There were more in the beginning part of this ear and the ending part of last year. (J) Is that so? (H) I do not know why this is so, but appears that there are very few sailors here at present. (J) Are any Japanese people there holding meetings to discuss US‑Japanese negotiations being conducted presently? (H) No, not particularly. The minds of the Japanese here appear calmer than expected. They are getting along harmoniously. (J) Don't the American community look with suspicion on the Japanese? (H) Well, we hardly notice any of them looking on us with suspicion. This fact is rather unexpected. We are not hated despised. The soldiers here and we get along very well. All races are living in harmony. It appears that the people who come here change to feel like the rest of the people here. There are some who say odd things, but these are limited to newcomers from the mainland, and after staying here, from three to six months, they too begin to think and feel like the rest of the people in the islands. (J) That's fine. (H) Yes, it's fine, but we feel a bit amazed. 524 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK (J) Has there been any increase in . . ? . . of late? That is, as a result of the current tense situation. (H) There is nothing which stands out, but the city is enjoying a war building boom. (J) What do you mean by enjoying a war building boom? (H) Well, a boom in many fields. Although there is no munitions industry here engaged in by the army, civilian workers are building houses for the army personnel. Most of the work here is directed towards building houses of various sorts. There are not enough carpenters, electricians and plumbers. Students at the High School and University have quit school and are working on these jobs, regardless of the fact that they are unskilled in this work. (J) Are there many big factories there? (H) No, there are no factories, but a lot of small buildings of various kinds are being constructed. (J) Is that so? (H) It is said that the population of Honolulu has doubled that of last year. (J) How large is the population? (H) The population increase is due to the present influx of Army and Navy personnel and workers from the mainland. (J) What is the population? (H) About 200,000 to 240,000. Formerly there were about 150,000 people. (J) What about night time? (H) There seem to be precautionary measures taken. (J) What about searchlights? (H) Well, not much to talk about. (J) Do they put searchlights on when planes fly about at night? (H) No. (J) What about the Honolulu newspapers? (H) The comments by the papers are pretty bad. They are opposite to the atmosphere pervading the city. I don't know whether the newspaper is supposed to lead the community or not, but they carry headlines pertaining to Japan daily. The main articles concern the U.S.-Japanese conferences. (J) What kind of impression did Mr. Kurusu make in Hawaii? (H) A very good one. Mr. Kurusu understands the American mind, and he was very adept at answering queries of the press. (J) Are there any Japanese people there who are planning to evacuate Hawaii? (H) There are almost none wishing to do that. (J) What is the climate there now? (H) These last few days have been very cold with occasional rainfall, a phenomena very rare in Hawaii. Today, the wind is blowing very strongly a very unusual climate. (J) Is that so? (H) Here is something interesting. Litvinoff, the Russian ambassador to the United States, arrived here yesterday. I believe he enplaned for the mainland today. He made no statements on any problems. (J) Did he make any statements concerning the US‑Japan question? (H) No. Not only did he not say anything regarding the US‑Japan question he also did not mention anything pertaining to the Russo‑German war. It appears he was ordered by his government not to make any statement. (J) Well, that means he was very different from Mr. Kurusu. (H) Yes. (J) What kind of impression did Litvinoff make? (H) A very good one here. He impressed the people as being very quiet and a gentleman. (J) Did he stop at the same hotel as Mr. Kurusu? (H) Yes, at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel overnight. He has already enplaned for the mainland. (J) Do you know anything about the United States fleet? (H) No, I don't know anything about the fleet. Since we try to avoid talking about such matters, we do not know much about the fleet. At any rate, the fleet here seems small. I don't know whether all of the fleet has done this, but it seems that the fleet has left here. (J) Is that so? What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present? (H) Presently, the flowers in bloom are fewest out of the whole year. However, the hibiscus and the poinsettia are in bloom now. *(J) does not seem to know about poinsettias. He admits he doesn't know. (J) Do you feel any inconvenience there due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods? PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 525 (H) Yes, we feel the inconvenience very much. There are no Japanese soy, and many other foodstuffs which come from Japan. Although there are enough foodstuffs (Japanese) left in stock to last until February of next year, at any rate it is a big inconvenience. (J) What do you lack most? (H) I believe the soy is what everyone is worried about most. Since the freeze order is in force, the merchants who have been dealing in Japanese goods are having a hard time. (J) Thanks very much. (H) By the way, here is something interesting about Hawaii. Liquor sells very fast due to the boom here. The United States, which twenty years ago went under prohibition, is today flooded by liquor. British and French liquors are also being sold. The Japanese merchants, whose business came to a standstill due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods, engage in, liquor manufacture. The rice from the United States is used in brewing Japanese sake here, and the sake is exported back to the mainland. *(H) explains that the Japanese sake brewed in Honolulu is called "Takara‑Masamuno"; that a person named Takagishi was the technical expert in charge of the brewing; that said Takagishi is a son‑in‑law of Grand Chamberlain Hyakutake, being married to the latter's daughter; and that said Takagishi returned recently to Japan on the Taiyo Maru. He adds that Japanese here and the Americans also drink sake. He informs (J) that Japanese chrysanthemums are in full bloom here, and that there are no herring‑roe for this year's New Year's celebration. (J) How many first generation Japanese are there in Hawaii according to last surveys made? (H) About fifty thousand. (J) How about the second generation Japanese? (H) About 120,000 or 180,000. (J) How many out of this number of second generation Japanese are in the United States Army? (H) There aren't so many; up to the present. About 1,500 have entered the army, and the majority of those who have been drafted into the army are Japanese. (J) Any first generation Japanese in the Army? (H) No. They do not draft any first generation Japanese. (J) Is that right, that there are 1,500 in the army? (H) Yes, that is true up to the present, but may increase since more will be inducted in January. (J) Thank you very much. (H) Not at all. I'm sorry I couldn't be of much use. (J) Oh no, that was fine. Best regards to your wife. (H) Wait a moment please? (J) Thank you. (J) Off phone. XXIX. THE LIKELIHOOD OF A JAPANESE ATTACK AT HAWAII AS ESTIMATED WASHINGTON DECEMBER 6, 1941 A. NAVY ESTIMATES Admiral Stark testified that as of December 6, 1941, he considered that a United States and Japanese war was imminent and that there was a strong probability that Japan would strike. He thought that the Philippines and Guam were the most likely targets, of United States territory. He considered that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was possible but, he said, he thought that there was a good chance that any attack there would be detected in time to intercept it or to reduce its effectiveness (pages 73, 165) However, he had no information indicating that such an attack on Pearl Harbor was probable (pages 105 792). Generally speaking, he said, he and his advisors did not expect a raid on Hawaii (page 798). Captain Wellborn said that there were various individuals in the Navy Department who felt that an attack on Pearl Harbor was probable‑such as Admiral Turner, and there were others who felt that it was less probable, although possible, such as Admirals Ingersoll and Stark. Admiral Turner, on the other hand, testified that he had expected a landing in Southeast Asia, attacks on the Philippines and some form of attack on Hawaii 525 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK (page 1002). He had thought that an aerial torpedo attack in Pearl Harbor was not only possible (page 997) but that it was a probability, and he was not surprised when it was made (page 1021). Directory: pha pha -> Security Education Narrative Database Patterns of Professional Education pha -> Northern health centers, inc pha -> Pharmacy Section II pha -> Pprd east Programme Final Conference and 3rd Steering Committee Meeting Brussels, 13 June 2014 pha -> Correct Answer c chlorothiazide D pha -> Document Number: V1/C/alc2/7 Submission by: United States, Government pha -> When to submit to the dna database pha -> Gordon L. Amidon Download 1.58 Mb. Share with your friends:
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