Iii: Diaspora, Remittances & Caribbean Development
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- Caribbean Migration and Diaspora to North America: 1890- 2001
- Country Profile: Canada
- Country Profile: The United States of America (USA)
- Global Cities, Global Plantations
III: Diaspora, Remittances & Caribbean DevelopmentUpdate-Implications for the Global South REFERENCES FORMAT
Reduce and focus to 8000-10,000 words ABSTRACT
CONVERSION TO ARTICLE vs CHAPTER INTRODUCTIONIt would be safe to argue that the role of geo-strategic pawn is a leitmotif of the international relations of the Caribbean region. Throughout a five hundred year evolution shaped by the "architectonic forces of conquest, slavery, sugar monoculture, colonialism, and racial and ethnic admixture" (Lewis, 1983: 3), Western European and later North American interests have competed for the use of the Caribbean as a stepping-stone to other objectives. In the words of Ragatz, Caribbean territories participated in the history of global political economy as "exploitation colonies...shaped by motives no higher than the desire to extract the greatest amount of wealth possible...in the shortest possible time..." (1971: 3). Decolonization appears to have done little to alter this state-of-affairs as mere political autonomy remains elusive even for the nominally independent states under consideration here (See Grosfoguel, 1998). This trajectory also means that the Caribbean provides an excellent case study for a historical analysis of the relationship between technology, capital mobility, labour, and multi-locational production. Caribbean Migration and Diaspora to North America: 1890- 2001In the period 1890 to 1914, the circum-Caribbean area would enter the sphere of influence of the United States of America (Petras, 1988: 127). Starting in 1898, the USA would enter militarily into the Caribbean Basin in the context of the Spanish-American War and seize control of Caribbean territories such as Cuba and Puerto Rico. Even in independent states such as Panama, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, the United States of America played a de facto colonial role during this period (Bulmer-Thomas, 2001: 6). This (neo-) colonial relationship leads to some extension of mobility across the frontier between the Plantation and Imperial Quasi-Colonial regions.1 During the first decade of the 20th century, US government agencies and multinational companies began to recruit labourers, usually male, from the Anglophone Caribbean to work on construction projects and plantation in Central America and beyond (Richardson, 1985: 105-107). When the construction of the Panama Canal ended in 19142 and crop disease forced production drawbacks on Central American plantations, these Caribbean labourers would move on to extractive and agricultural projects in South America and Cuba (Headley, 1996: 24). The northern industrial cities of the United States of America represented a viable but unstable option for migrant labour (Headley, 1996: 24). Patterson notes that by the start of the 20th century, more than 95,000 migrants had left the Caribbean for the United States, most of these Afro-Americans from Jamaica. Before a racist immigration regime restricted the flow, Caribbean migration to the US had risen to 290,000 people (Patterson, 1991: 500). A major effect of the 1914-1918 wars was a shift in focus in the United States towards internal migration from its southern states and colonies to its global cities. As Grosfoguel and Georas (2000: 103) relate, Afro-Americans from the southern United States and Puerto Ricans were now directly recruited by labour agents and the US Labor Department in to manufacturing industries and low-wage services in Northern cities such as New York City. The advent of Fordist transnational capitalism in the Caribbean was apparent by 1939 and the start of the second installment of the Anglo-German War (WWII). North American influence in the politics and especially the economics of the region had continued to expand into non-agricultural sectors such as bauxite and oil production, dominated by North American transnational firms such as ALCOA (Aluminum Company of America) and its Canadian offshoot, ALCAN, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, and Gulf Oil (Baptiste, 1996: 7). The influx of foreign capital may have had some causal relationship with international/intra-regional migration in this period, as workers flocked towards areas of higher wages and easier employment. The human toll of successive continental wars and the fact that many European states did not attract or accept large numbers of migrants during the 30-year war period were without doubt the major factors influencing the movement of migrant labour to the North in the aftermath. While qualitative research conducted by the author indicates that Caribbean migration to North America (especially the United States of America) was already an important phenomenon by the turn of the 20th century, post-World War II reconstruction and industrial (re)development would feature a marked expansion of the trend of Caribbean labour migration to fill gendered posts in construction, agricultural and domestic work, as well as some high-level skilled service positions in Europe and North America. Between 1948 and 1968, almost 300,000 Jamaicans joined a colonial exodus that featured movements from European and North American colonies in Africa, Asia and the Americas. This number only accounts for those who migrated legally to Great Britain, the United States of America and Canada, as “tens of thousands more [chose] undocumented existence in the slums of Brooklyn and Brixton over life in Jamaica” (Headley, 1996: 24). This scene was repeating itself throughout the Caribbean region as declines in agriculture and construction in the post-war period as well as increased mechanisation exacerbated unemployment, making extra-regional migration an even more significant investment option for the Caribbean household. In the 1960s, as households in core states benefited from an explosion of disposable income, the export of services, especially mass tourism, became key elements of the regional economies of regions such as Caribbean and Hawaii. International (or extra-regional) migration, which had previously been a strong feature of the Anglophone Caribbean, became a generalised phenomenon. The influx of foreign capital could be cited as a factor in propelling extra-regional migration (as per Sassen), especially towards core states. A more plausible explanation in this period however, would include an analysis of relatively unrelated politico-economic crises as impetus for Cuban, Haitian, Surinamese, Guyanese, and Dominican migration to North America and Europe (See Bulmer-Thomas, 2001:11). Also key to the migration patterns of the period was the political economy of the Cold War. For example, the United States of America’s policy of allowing Caribbean immigration in the 1960s was motivated not only by changes in the techno-economic paradigm, but also by the sharpened competition with the Soviet state for influence3 at this juncture (Bach, 1999: 162-163). The relaxation of restrictions to Caribbean immigration policy was thus used strategically by the United States of America as a means to “support economic partnerships with regional allies and to protect clear spheres of influence….” (Bach, 1999: 162-163). Table 2: South-North Migration Flows from Latin America and the Caribbean: Average annual number of immigrants to selected developed regions, 1960 to 1989
Source: The Population Information Network (POPIN), United Nations Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. In 1965, therefore, as is nominally reflected in the increase in the average number of immigrants to the United States and Canada from Latin America and the Caribbean, the Hart-Cellar Immigration Reform Act reversed racist provisions imposed in 1952 by the USA government. These aggregate figures are complemented by estimates from researchers focussed on flows from the Anglophone Caribbean. For example, between 1960 and 1993, Patterson estimates that a total of 845,588 persons arrived in the USA from the Anglophone Caribbean (Patterson, 2000: 501). By the late 1970s, one can begin to discern elements of a secondary flow of migrants as the content of Caribbean migration flows had begun to involve family migration. By 1979, for example, 51% of the almost 20,000 (19,714) Jamaican migrants admitted to the USA in that year alone were follow-on family members of previous migrants (Niles, 1995: 209). Also important in the formation of the Caribbean North American Diaspora was the ‘lateral’ migration of Anglophone West Indians who, compelled by official and popular hostility in Great Britain, crossed the Atlantic again to the USA and Canada (Bonnett, 1990: 140). The decline of Soviet influence and the end of the Cold War weakened the strategic value of the USA’s relatively open immigration policy. As geopolitical paradigms shifted in various ways during the decade of the 1990s, migratory and diasporic processes in the Caribbean-North American sphere would also experience significant changes. By the late 1990’s, analysts such as Lilian Bobea could clearly point to the loss of the “privileged condition [the Caribbean region] involved vis-à-vis the United States” (Bobea, 1999: 119). Besides the reversal of economic incentives such as Law 936 in Puerto Rico, Bobea also pointed to the repeal of special immigration status for Cuban refugees. In the post Cold War context, as the recruitment of skilled labour continues unabated, Caribbean nations had begun to demand attention in policymaking circles by dint of their poverty, political instability and the subsequent security threat of mass migration to richer states (Meissner, 1993:94). Country Profile: CanadaPrimarily a resource-based economy, Canada has spawned several multinationals specialising in the transnational extraction, elaboration and trade of mineral, petroleum, and agricultural products. Canada, like the United States of America, is also one of the world’s traditional countries of immigration. As Caribbean labour and skill migrants entered the Canadian political economy in the second-half of the 20th century, they found an economy that, due largely to the emergence and spread of multinational corporations, had been “integrated as the resource producing appendage of the North American economic system” (Clement, 1975: 101). Of equal note is the socio-political structure that attended the Canadian reality in this period. Confirming the finding of the seminal study by John Porter (1965), Clement observed that although by 1975, over a quarter (26.7%) of Canada’s population was made up of ethnic groups other than the two ‘charter’ groups, the English and French, these groups, with the exception of Jews, had “almost no representation in the economic elite….”(Clement, 1975: 237). Clement lends support to the New Economic Sociology School in noting that the persons from these ‘non-charter’ ethnic groups that had risen to high class positions had done so by transporting family businesses from elsewhere to Canada or else had come to Canada within the context of multinational corporations (Clement, 1975: 237-8). Canada in the 21st century promises to retain much of the features described by Porter and Clement. In 2000, for example, 25% of the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) 300 Index companies had a single shareholder with more than 50% of the outstanding votes, and another 40% featured at least one large shareholder with a voting stake of more than 20%. The vast majority of these closely-held companies are family-controlled (Yakabuski, 2001). Most Caribbean migrants used neither of these strategies in their entry to the Canadian society. Few, if any, migrants from the Caribbean could combine the education, connections and inheritance required to gain entry into the Canadian upper classes (Newman, 1975: 446). As Henry (1968) notes, the domestic scheme was initiated in 1955 by the Canadian government that used a quota of 280 female migrants from the English-speaking Caribbean to fill the need for domestic labour in the major cities of Canada (Henry, 1968: 83). These women were contracted for one-year domestic service and were awarded landed immigrant status (Christiansen, 1982: 67). Sponsored relatives of these persons, especially the last two would soon follow, if they did not accompany their relatives in the first move. Upward mobility was difficult for domestic service migrants as employers were reluctant to hire persons who had worked as domestics after their term ended (Henry, 1968: 88). The entrenchment of a large section of the Caribbean diaspora in the lower/working-class had begun. In the case of Canada, between 1950 and 1967, the other major categories of migrants were university students and professionals (clerical, professional, and managerial). The latter group accounted for over 40% of the West Indian immigrants to Canada in this period (Christiansen,1982: 67). This statistic is supported by 1969 Jamaican Economic Survey which indicated that of the approximately 20,000 Jamaicans who emigrated from the country up to 1969, 40% were in the professional categories (Jamaica Central Planning Unit, 1970: 48). By 1973, as Doug Collins notes in Immigration: The Destruction of English Canada, West Indies immigration was large enough (20,000) that Caribbean countries began to be listed separately, and both Jamaica and Trinidad/Tobago were in [sic] the leading source countries.” (Collins, 1979: 23). Mr. Collins may have been unaware, however, that Caribbean migration to Canada had roots in previous migration by Canadian human and financial capital. For example, it is worthy of note that Canada’s extraordinary appeal for Indo-Caribbean migrants was partly due to the involvement of the Canadian Presbyterian Church in the evangelisation and education of the Indian diaspora in Trinidad and Guyana (Baptiste, 1996: 36). Table 3: Canada: Stock of Foreign-Born Labour by Country of Birth  Source: OECD International Migration Outlook, OECD, 2006 edition
By the 1990s, almost 250,000 Caribbean natives had migrated to Canada (Premdas, 2000: 58). More precisely, in 1991, the Canadian census reported 269, 705 persons of Caribbean birth in Canada. This figure rose to 279, 405 in 1996 and 294, 050 in 2001. More than 90% of these are from Jamaica, Haiti, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago (Henry, 1994: 28). Haiti is the major source country for migrants to Quebec and accounts for most of the 69, 895 Caribbean migrants in that province (2001). In the 1990s, estimates of the Caribbean population in Canada, including the second-generation had been put at 455,000 (Henry, 1994 and Simmons and Plaza, 1991). Henry (1994:40) estimated the volume of illegal migration at between 10- 30,000. Table 4: Annual Immigrant Admissions- LAC to Canada, 1990-2002
Sources: OECD, Trends in International Migration SOPEMI 2003; United Nations, South-to-North International Migration, data in digital form. While adjustments have been made to survey methodologies in both Canada and the USA, a major shortcoming of North American surveys are their historical inability to disaggregate populations such as Indo-Caribbean, Euro-Caribbean or Sino-Caribbean groups from wider diasporic or racial groupings. As it cannot be assumed that most migrants from Caribbean countries describe themselves as Afro-Caribbean, these numbers can only be presented as approximations of the size of the Caribbean diasporic population. Figures presented in Table 4 also do not account for those persons from the Commonwealth Caribbean who migrated to Canada from the United Kingdom and would have been counted as British nationals. The difficulty of precise estimation is compounded by the possibility of double counting as legal and illegal migrants may move back and forth between Canada and the USA (see Grant, 2000). Country Profile: The United States of America (USA)About two-thirds of West Indians in the USA are from the Anglophone Caribbean, with Jamaicans accounting for 29% of the total. The second largest group is Haitian, comprising 19% of the total Caribbean populations followed by Hispanic-Caribbean (blacks) at 16% (Patterson, 2000: 502). Table 5: Annual Immigrant Admissions- LAC to United States, 1990-2002
Sources: OECD, Trends in International Migration SOPEMI 2003; United Nations, South-to-North International Migration (POP/1B/MIG/2001/1), data in digital form. Approximately 600,000 West Indian (Anglophone Caribbean) migrants had entered the USA by the 1990s (Premdas, 2000: 58). Of these, 343,000 are Jamaican by birth. In the same year, 435, 000 claimed immediate Jamaican ancestry (Headley, 1996: 24). In the same period, the USA has witnessed the arrival of over 1 million Cuban migrants, another 300,000 Haitians, 350,000 Dominicans, and almost 2 million Puerto Ricans (Premdas,1999: 58). Table 6: United States of America: Stock of Foreign-Born Labour by Country of Birth  Source: OECD International Migration Outlook, OECD, 2006 edition
As the so-called ‘second wave’ of Caribbean migrants entered the United States of America in the post-WWII period, the social situation was roughly similar to that of Canada. As Prewitt and Stone note, the attainment of elite status in the United States of America in this period was largely limited to those who were “born to wealth, acquire it fairly early in life, or at least have access to it.” (Prewitt and Stone, 1973: 136). While the composition of elite groups is largely ignored in the literature on the sociology of immigration, the study of wealth, class, and education in the post-WWII American economy is of particular interest given its implications for the Caribbean Diaspora and its second generation. As Moore and Alba observed in their 1982 empirical analysis of the economic elite in the USA, the ‘stream of recruitment’ into elite groups was very much concentrated on the families of business ownership. Participation in the business ownership and management classes, as well as educational attainment had a direct impact on the ability of families to enter elite groups (Moore and Alba, 1982: 56-57). It can be safely argued that at lower socio-economic levels, racial discrimination vastly complicates the route to comfortable living standards among Caribbean immigrants to the United States of America. Given the varying profile of Caribbean migrants from different territories, however, it is of little surprise that Caribbean migrants experience varying modes of incorporation. Household incomes reflect this disparity. Reports by the US Bureau of the Census in 1999 revealed that while Cuban households as of 1996 had a median annual income of just over $US27, 000, while Puerto Ricans at the same time had access to only $US19, 687 (Tharp, 2001: 133; www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hispanic/cps97/tabo1-1.txt). The importance of the Transnational Migration School is underlined by Tharp’s observation that Caribbean migrants in the American middle class tend to be employees of others rather than owners and managers, and they have relatively little accumulated wealth, having to deal with the needs of poorer relatives. (Tharp, 2001: 174) Other studies have demonstrated that ‘poorer relatives’ may include those living in the country of origin, as Caribbean migrants remit as much as 15% of their annual income. Global Cities, Global Plantations?Geographical concentration and the dynamics of the global city are also important factors to note as the context of reception has a pronounced effect on the overall political economy of diaspora. Kotkin argues that “[e]ver since the Jews became the first fully transnational ethnic group, the natural home of global diasporas or tribes has been the cosmopolis or global city.” (Kotkin, 1993: 256) Such an argument overruns the fact that in the context of the Plantation, diasporas also move into industrial agricultural areas. However, Kotkin is quite correct in observing that the transport and communications infrastructure of the global city acts as a magnet for migrants seeking to establish themselves in a new economic space while remaining in contact with root communities. The Caribbean Diaspora is no exception. In Canada, as students, servants and professionals, most Caribbean migrants moved to the centres of commerce and education, in particular the axis cities of Toronto and Montreal. By 1975, however, Canadian economic gravity had begun to shift from traditional centres such as Montreal and Toronto towards its Pacific coast, as cities of Vancouver (British Columbia) and Calgary (Alberta) grew into greater economic and political prominence. (Newman, 1975: 448) This trend has continued into the present day. In 1994, Henry observed that seventy-four (74%) percent of Caribbean migrants were concentrated in the province of Ontario, particularly in the Golden Horseshoe of London, Toronto and Kingston. This concentration had fallen slightly to just over 68% in 2001, as significant growth has occurred in Quebec and the Western provinces of British Columbia and Alberta. In the USA, the Caribbean Diaspora ranks among the most highly concentrated ethnic populations in the United States of America. Overall, over 80% of the Caribbean Diaspora lives in the New England, Middle Atlantic, and South Atlantic regions. While persons of Caribbean descent comprise 6% of the total Black population in the USA, they are a major component of the population of the states of New Jersey, Massachusetts (one third of the state’s black population), and New York, where almost half of all blacks from the Caribbean live. In the state of New York, the USA Census Bureau projects population growth of the Afro-American population to 21.1%, with Latino population rising to 15.9% (Tharp, 2001: 8). In Florida, Caribbean people are the second largest group in Florida with 17% of the state’s population (Patterson, 2000: 502-503). The size of this group is likely to grow to almost 25% by 2020 with Cuban diasporic citizens alone comprising 17.2 percent of the projected total (Tharp, 2001: 8, 127). Caribbean Diasporas comprise a growing proportion of both of these groups as non-Caribbean African-Americans have tended towards moving out of the global cities to areas such as Atlanta, while by 1998, Puerto Ricans (46%) and Dominicans (15%) comprised 61% of New York’s Latino population (Tharp, 2001: 133). The experience of 20th century Caribbean migrants to North America was largely conditioned by the differential incorporation of ‘blacks’ or ‘non-whites’ in North American global cities.4 This theme of negative racial discrimination in the fields of education and employment would both inform the practice of diasporic identity and the dimensions of the Caribbean diasporic economy by geographical and professional location within the society. While the measurement of the degree of racism in various countries of destination is fairly difficult, arguments about discrimination in the workforce are put to rest by statistical evidence. In Canada, for example, visible minorities are paid 18% less than their counterparts across all levels of education (Henry, 1994: 118). Many Caribbean people have undertaken entrepreneurial ventures partially in response to the discrimination existent in the mainstream workforce. These businesses usually cater to the needs of their own community and operate mainly in the following sectors: -Food and Beverage: independent restaurants, hotel restaurants, fast-food outlets and groceries -Entertainment- records and music, booking and impresario services for live performers -Retail clothing (manufacturing African-style garments and specially designed T-shirts, tailoring and dressmaking) -Grooming (barbering, hairdressing and cosmetics) -Travel (usu. Travel agencies) (Henry, 1994: 113-114) -Insurance Services -Legal/Immigration Services -Specialty Goods -Money Transfer, Telecommunications and Shipping -Educational/Cultural Institutions -Real Estate Qualitative research by the author in Toronto and Montreal also revealed a continuation of Henry’s 1994 observation that ‘advanced professional services’ such as medical, legal and dental facilities are still in limited supply in the Caribbean community in major Canadian cities (Henry, 1994: 234). In 1978, Phillips commented that “[w]ithout access to substantial capital and a system of references and contacts which would help them break out of the circle of restrictions, failure is almost inevitable.” (quoted in Henry, 1994). Almost two decades later, Henry (1994:114) reports on the North American (Canada) and European (United Kingdom) situation, noting that one of the main difficulties of such enterprises is the “unwillingness of banks and lending institutions to offer credit to people of Caribbean origins.” The Caribbean community in North America has spawned several major formal organisations to improve access to physical and relational capital. For example, the Jamaican Canadian Association (JCA) used its position as a major ethnic broker to launch a Black-Canadian credit union organisation in 1993 (Henry, 1994: 114). Business associations and initiatives such as the BBPA (Black Businessmen and Professionals Association) of Canada, and the Brooklyn-based Caribbean-American Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Inc. (CACCI) and various publications of BlackPages have been instrumental also in the networking and development of Caribbean commercial enterprises. When the market for Caribbean products expands through demonstration effects and penetration of other ethnic markets, however, Caribbean diasporic firms are often unable to finance expansion to meet the demand (Henry, 1994: 114). While prepared foods have remained the domain of diasporic entrepreneurs, the development of ‘ethnic’ lines by major grocery chains has cut severely into the diasporic goods market that up to the mid-1980s was fairly secure. Start-ups in retail distribution have been minimal, as most existing enterprises have failed to expand beyond one outlet. While traditional community credit systems are still used in the Diaspora, these informal associations are not able to support entrepreneurial launch in their current state (Henry, 1994: 234-235). The characteristics of Caribbean Diasporas have emerged from the interplay of the structure and momentum of Caribbean and North American societies discussed above and the trio of geopolitical, techno-economic and demographic changes. As Goulbourne suggests, the influence of the Caribbean experience of poor diasporic linkages, especially among the Indian and African diasporas, may also influence the Caribbean Diasporas’ ability to mobilise their own diasporic linkages to supply capital and institutional support in order to influence the terms of their incorporation into the society of destination. In North America, while ethnic or colour differences may be mitigated to some extent by the umbrella of ‘non-white’ status, the Caribbean Diaspora has now become separated by socio-economic differences as “education, income and occupational achievement replace skin colour.” (Henry, 1994: 269-270). Even within national Diasporas, differences of class, immigration/citizenship status, gender, colour, religion present a significant challenge to internal consolidation. A major theme of this thesis is the impact of historical contexts on social and economic outcomes in the global economy. Perhaps Goulbourne’s most astute observation is that the position of the Afro-Caribbean migrant in North America and Europe varies little from his context of incorporation in the Caribbean. As Burgess and James-Gray’s study (1981) on Trinidadian migrants in New York City reveals, the educational and occupational mobility of Caribbean migrants to North America was influenced by the aspirations fostered by their education and work experience in the Caribbean (Burgess and James-Gray, 1981: 99). The Caribbean Diaspora in North America now features a clear division between an emerging underclass comprised of transmigrant guest workers, illegal immigrants, low-wage labourers and their offspring and a well-developed middle class comprised largely of professionals and students. Several migrants participate in agricultural work programmes, while others take their own initiative and work as domestic servants, clerical staff, salespersons and attendants, and non-unionised construction workers on a semi-permanent or part-time basis. A significant portion of the Caribbean diasporic population in North America can be characterised as the permanently settled working poor. This group usually comprises newly arrived migrants, or those who have arrived in the countries prior to the tightening of immigration requirements. This group is limited in its access to capital, and often has little or no equity in the country of destination. Indeed, discourses of race within the Diaspora have become intertwined with concepts of wealth, nationality and legality/citizenship. Internal attempts to unite across socio-economic barriers have been largely unsuccessful, especially given the galvanisation of a Caribbean diasporic underclass in North American society (Henry, 1994: 270). The image of involvement of the Caribbean immigrant underclass in illegal economic activities has served to widen the class schism in the Diaspora. The emergence of ethno-racial boundaries across the Caribbean Diaspora complicates the relationship between various elements of the Diaspora and may reduce overall capacity for a coherent response to emerging global economic and social trends. The Caribbean of the early 21st century remains a collection of societies geared primarily towards the production and export of staples and the importation, assembly, distribution, and consumption of branded products from the North. The analysis of the economic outcomes such as migration and diaspora in the Caribbean can provide valid insights into the historical and contemporary economies of the rest of the South, in particular the plantation states of the United States of America and of Brazil, and parts of Tropical Asia such as the Philippines that have had similar historical experiences of plantation economics. However, the salience of the Caribbean case study transcends the historical plantation. The value of the Caribbean as case study also resides in its challenge to the theorist's understanding of the concept of territory and the position of social networks in political economy. The fundamental imbalance between the nature and levels of Caribbean production and consumption has created severe balance-of-trade difficulties in many countries and compounded natural phases of decline with the structural incapacity to retain earned foreign exchange. This historical imbalance has served to create a series of global economic networks based on family and kinship relationships, alumni and religious associations, and increasingly, virtual communities. In its own meso-level form of globalisation, which I term ‘transeconomisation’, these diasporic networks extend the society and economy of the Caribbean into major metropolitan cities of more powerful states.5 Over the past decade, egged on in the search for options for growth and development by multilateral interests, Caribbean states have signalled the importance of relations with overseas nationals. Recent studies on diasporic relationships confirm that Diasporas do provide their home country or region with a market for indigenous products and services (e.g. food, beverages, and entertainment services), as well as a potential source of human capital, social and commercial networks, financial and investment capital, ideas, information and technology (see Pessar, 1996; Greenidge and Jean-Baptiste, 2005; Brinkerhoff, 2008). As a result, in one of the subtle paradoxes of contemporary international relations is the consideration of Diaspora, previously considered the ultimate signal of underdevelopment, as a mechanism for state development, not only in terms of the outcomes of migrants and the possibilities of returns of financial flows or human capital, but in the creation of economies based on transnational relationships, transactions, and networks. The central element of this turn towards diaspora-State relations in the Caribbean, remittances, demonstrates the complexity and fissures generated by the juxtaposition of organic household strategies and state-based development policy. Directory: file -> fetch fetch -> 11 th Lit Semester 1 Final Study Guide!!! fetch -> Industrial Revolution Inventors fetch -> Analysis for Galveston Hurricane of 1900 fetch -> The Illuminators (Team 2) 1900 Galveston Hurricane Cycle a team Assignment fetch -> Team csi-utb ruth Reyes Jose Ferrer fetch -> Galveston Hurricane of 1900 Cycle a-teacher as a Problem Solver fetch -> Is Climate Change Starting a New Dust Bowl? Cycle A fetch -> What makes a storm a hurricane fetch -> The 1950s were the "Happy Days" because it was a time of economic prosperity, technology development, new entertainment, new fashion and family growth. The 1950s was a great time fetch -> Sputnik and The Dawn of the Space Age Download 186.21 Kb. Share with your friends:
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