Initial progress. Initial progress on the project was slow. As indicated above, the lack of detailed engineering designs on large civil works (that was rectified after the project was effective) was one of the reasons. However, the most important reason was the slow uptake of the mesqa improvement. Mesqa improvement works formed the largest component of the project, absorbing approximately 50 percent of the infrastructure budget. The designs for the mesqas and particularly the pumps and pump houses were critically reviewed during the implementation to reduce the overall costs of the mesqa-level subproject since these costs would be recovered from the individual farmers. This detailed design work caused delays. Delays also arose from acceptance of the design by a large majority (75 percent) of the farmers at a particular mesqa. Without farmers’ approval of proposed works, the implementing agency and the project could not proceed with their construction.
Political upheavals. The political upheavals of 2011–2013 were also one of the key factors affecting project implementation. The Egyptian revolution of 2011 took place across all of Egypt in January and the country entered a period of political uncertainty that remained high even after the presidential elections in early 2012, as Islamists clashed with non-Islamists over the direction of policy. In mid-2013, the army removed the president and soon after, declared a state of emergency and nighttime curfews. These three years severely affected project implementation because, among other things, the political uncertainty and the accompanying macroeconomic problems made the contractors very reluctant to proceed with works or bid for new contracts. The curfew also curtailed working hours because people had to complete all activities outside their house, including going to the stores for example, before nighttime.
PMU. On the positive side, the implementation was facilitated by a straightforward organizational design for project implementation. The project PMU was established in the MWRI offices in Cairo and was responsible for the integrated planning, financial management (FM) and budget control, procurement of goods and services, monitoring and coordination of project activities, and overall technical and progress reporting. The PMU had a coordinating, monitoring, evaluation, and problem solving role, while actual implementation of the structural works was delegated to the line departments within the MWRI. TA was provided by national and international consultants.
Procurement arrangements. The PMU was responsible for the procurement process, and after establishing acceptable procedures in discussions with the World Bank, there appeared to be few problems in the preparation, bidding, and contract award process in the latter stages of the project. Physical implementation of project works was designated to the technical units within the ministry who were then responsible for all activities related to the satisfactory completion of the project works. At the regional level, the RCUs were coordinating project implementation for Mit Yazid and Mahmoudia. These RCUs actually helped bring together irrigation and drainage sectors at the local level, which facilitated implementation of the project on the ground.
2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation, and Utilization
M&E design. The original M&E framework in the PAD 2005 was based on the overall project rationale and design and its underlying assumptions. In general, the framework was appropriate but key indicators had several shortcomings. First, the key indicators did not match the broad concepts, such as systems efficiencies, in the main text of the PAD with what was envisaged to be measured as shown in the annex. For some indicators, the design did not appreciate that a particular indicator, such as the value of land, could be influenced substantially by factors extraneous to the project. At least for two cases, the units of measurements chosen did not suit the PDO objective of ‘efficiency of irrigated agriculture water use’. Lastly, specifications of (intermediate and end) targets were not provided in the PAD and had to be developed later. Essentially, most of the design shortcomings were indeed rectified during implementation (see subsection on M&E utilization below).
M&E implementation. During the period of project effectiveness, the project had a strong progress monitoring system. The PMU relied on the regular provision of progress information from various implementing agencies involved, such as Irrigation Improvement Sector (IIS), Irrigation (IS), HEPS, Egyptian Public Authority for Drainage Projects (EPADP), and the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR). Earlier plans to facilitate and streamline progress monitoring by activating the ‘procurement’ and ‘project planning’ modules of the Lawson M3 software package, which was purchased in January 2007, was abandoned because the activated part of the software package covered only financial monitoring. Instead linked Excel sheets were used to generate monthly tabulated or graphic physical progress of the project. Based on this, monthly progress reports were prepared by the PMU and were used to adjust their overall planning of activities, adjust the financial forecast, and to take action with regard to poor performance of contractors, and so on. For financial monitoring, the project used the Lawson M3 software package, which allowed for entering the financial transactions into the system on a monthly basis. As a result, the PMU had a reliable filing system with easy access to the financial files and transactions. Financial monitoring reports were easily generated by the software, providing instant answers to queries.
M&E utilization. During the midterm review (MTR), pursuit of continuous flow4 in mesqa-level designs was quite correctly dropped. Shortly after the MTR, a revised framework was prepared combining existing elements and main targets defined in the arrangements for results monitoring with new indicators. It corrected some, but not all, of the problems in M&E design. For example, the indicators still failed to consider that most irrigation and drainage benefits come only after a number of years of improved irrigation/drainage services when farmers adjust their practices (and yield/productivity gains ensue). On the positive side, the new indicators were indeed made simpler and easy to measure, and more meaningful to the borrower and the World Bank. The changes included, adding to the original list of PDOs, indicators such as total area with improved irrigation and drainage services, number of beneficiaries, and number of established WUAs.
2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance
Overall, the project activities complied with all applicable World Bank policies. The project was classified as category B according to OP 4.01, as there were no associated significant, sensitive, diverse, unprecedented, or irreversible impacts. The triggered Safeguards Policies were OP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment) and OP 4.12 (Involuntary Resettlement) for the possible resettlement and economic losses attributed to the various planned activities the project.
Environmental safeguards. The client prepared an Environmental Assessment, which concluded that the net environmental impacts of the project are positive and that the direct negative impacts are generally temporary and minor. An Environmental Assessment and an Environmental Management Plan has been prepared to address both direct environmental impacts and external factors. The environmental mainstreaming component demonstrated how water quality could be improved through control of urban SWM and sewage treatment. Under this component, a feasibility study was undertaken for the preparation of the Integrated Sanitation and Sewerage Infrastructure Project in the same command areas, where rural sanitation investments were implemented, while other measures, including SWM and instream wetlands, have been transferred to the ongoing Enhanced Water Resources Management (EWRMP) GEF project. On the other hand, relatively higher-risk contracts, such as siphons5and canal bed dredging,6 were subject to site-specific Environmental and Social Impact Assessments /Environmental and Social Management Plans (ESMPs). The PMU has kept records showing the monitoring measures taken during implementation of the ESMPs.
Resettlement Action Plan (RAP). In light of the triggered OP 4.12 in March 2005, a provisional RAP was completed before project approval. During implementation, there was a scale-back and the need for land was significantly reduced. An update on the ESMP, including a Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF), was prepared and disclosed in 2010. The RPF was determined as the most appropriate choice of instrument because (a) the exact command areas for civil works were unknown and (b) the scope of the project and the magnitude of impacts were uncertain. Although the RPF indicated a possibility for preparing site-specific RAPs, no more RAPs were prepared during the course of the project. During implementation, the contractors worked carefully, selecting the timing of the civil works to minimize crop losses. After the works were completed, farmers had full use of their land without any restrictions or impacts on the land value (in fact, land value increased).
Compensation. During project implementation, lack of crop compensation for electrification contracts was identified, a joint World Bank/PMU team proactively conducted a series of field visits to the World Bank–funded investments in Kafr El Shiekh Governorate, between April and May 2016 to identify the project affected persons, assess crop damages, and pay compensation. Payment of all project affected persons was swiftly and successfully completed by end of May 2016. During this process, nonpayment for crop damages associated with SSD in Behira, because of lack of funds, was also identified, and extensive fieldwork was carried out to identify farmers and provide fair compensation.
FM. FM under the project included an externally hired FM consultant, in addition to three seconded accountants from the MWRI Finance Department. All of the employees in charge possessed the required skills and expertise to carry out their responsibilities. The project consistently maintained sound manual and automated accounting records. The quarterly report reviewed Interim Financial Reports and the annual audited Financial Statements were consistently received on time and were of acceptable quality.
Procurement. All procurement was carried out by the PMU. A total of 156 civil works contracts were awarded following standard World Bank procurement guidelines. In addition, 38 contracts were awarded for the supply of goods and services, the largest contract being for the supply of spare parts for drainage pumping units. There appeared to be minimal delays in the actual procurement process. Delays appear to be in identifying works and preparing detailed designs and technical issues for bid documents.
2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase
Success of the post-completion operation/next phase will depend largely on the WUAs. As each mesqa was fully completed and operational with electric power supply and electric pumping units, and the mesqa handed over to the WUA, the beneficiaries took full responsibility for O&M. This allowed the project to move steadily and smoothly into the operational phase, one operational WUA at a time. The involvement of the farmers at all stages of the development of the mesqa contracts including the design layout and location has ensured that the community has a strong sense of ownership of the system, and this should also ensure its overall sustainability. In some cases, the farmers were prepared to take over their systems with only diesel units installed. To redress their situation, since January 2016, the MWRI has allocated EGP 162 million from the counterpart funding to complete all ongoing contracts. Lastly, the MWRI is expected to maintain the availability of water through the main and branch canals.
3. Assessment of Outcomes
3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation
Relevance of objectives. The relevance of the project objective is rated High.
The above rating is based on three observations. First, the project explicitly included drainage in the objective and addressed issues of rising water table, for example. This made the project objective highly relevant not only in terms of agricultural production/poverty alleviation but also in terms of general well-being that include prevention of contamination from waterlogging/flooding that used to happen for the beneficiaries regularly7. Second, elements other than drainage in the project objective, such as management of irrigation, continue to be very relevant in the country context. Of course, even without the project the beneficiaries would be using irrigation but its management, with distinct roles for the public sector and the beneficiaries, needed to be addressed in the context of diminishing water supply and climate change. Furthermore, given the country condition, it is also well understood that because the main livelihood of the population in the Nile delta is agriculture, improvements in the link between irrigation and agriculture such as improvements in the reliability and equity of water supply are very relevant. Contribution to employment and reduction in rural poverty are elements of this relevance. The project objective specifically addressed ‘increase the efficiency8 of irrigated agriculture water use and services’, which made it quite consistent with the World Bank Group CPF (FY2015–19) for Egypt Objective 2.4: Enhanced access to improved agriculture and irrigation services. Egypt’s 2009 Sustainable Agricultural Development Strategy Towards 2030,on page 21, puts its number one objective as enhancing water use efficiency in irrigated agriculture and which the project’s PDO addressed.
Relevance of design/implementation. The relevance of the project design/implementation objective is rated Substantial.
The project design/implementation used essentially a two-pronged approach where in terms of organization, the design/implementation focused on the development of the WUAs at the tertiary level (that is, one level above the individual farmer) with some development of other institutions, such as water boards and so on, above the WUAs. To have cohesion at the WUAs, the design/implementation focused on the equity aspect (for example, availability of water at the head and tail end) as well as on costs (for example, cost of electricity/gasoline). The design to address the equity aspect locally while addressing broad water issues through the state’s institutions, the MWRI in particular, was powerful. It did not have the usual trade-offs of winners and losers or efficiency and equity. Similarly, the benefit of having 40–50 diesel pumps replaced by a single electricity powered unit not only brought down costs but also had a substantial positive effect in terms of greenhouse gases.
The other prong focused on the investments that went into rehabilitation and improvement of the irrigation and drainage facilities in the project area at various levels starting at the main canals, moving through branch canals, into tertiary (mesqa) and quaternary (marwa/farm level) systems. Combining the two prongs, the design/implementation had half the investment for the tertiary systems matching the development of WUAs, where the MWRI came with support that coordinated its various directorates.
These investments aimed to increase the efficiency of water usage through improvement in the management of both irrigation and drainage and led to better water distribution, particularly for tail end users, which was reflected in the PDO. The components were well aligned with the PDO. In general, the Results Framework was appropriate but there were minor shortcomings in indicators that were rectified during implementation. In terms of process, the project empowered water users for participation in the planning and implementation and reduced the fragmentation that existed within the MWRI. Lastly, with water users assuming greater responsibility for O&M through their WUAs, the project built upon indications that users are willing to share the costs, if services are reliable. Such sharing of costs/responsibility is expected to lead to greater sustainability of the infrastructure modernization and improved management of the irrigation and drainage systems.
3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives
Rating: Substantial
The project improved the management of irrigation and drainage by the borrower’s MWRI in the project area by (a) mainstreaming a program that encouraged user participation at the tertiary (mesqa) and secondary (branch canal) levels and (b) leveraging user preferences at the mesqa level to integrate various parts of the MWRI to coordinate their programs on irrigation, drainage, and pump-related engineering services. The project also attempted to coordinate beyond the MWRI to include the services of the MALR, Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs, and other ministries, but with modest success, maybe because of the challenge of such inter-ministerial coordination.
The results in terms of increase in efficiency of irrigated agriculture water use (as per the PDO) are most visible at the mesqa level, with the availability of water at the head and tail end at 75 percent level and water table stabilization, and to some extent, also at the marwa level in terms of water productivity increases and substantial cost reductions. The water productivity result is expected to reach their target as farmers adjust their practices to reflect the reliability of water supply. These improvements materialized from the project:
Main canals. A total of 27 contracts were completed, of which 13 on Mahmoudia main canal and 14 on Meet Yazid and Zawia main canals, that included, among other things, rehabilitation of major structures including locks, cross-regulators, and bridges, installation of bored and sheet pile bank protection works, reprofiling and stabilizing embankments with stone pitching and internal drains, construction of reinforced concrete sections to replace unstable sections of the main canal, seepage control works, and the replacement of syphons.
Branch canals. A total of 43 branch canals were rehabilitated with upgrading of 445km of canals with 38 completed contracts with works including bank stabilization, new road and foot bridges, repair or replacement of cross-regulators, improved mesqa offtakes, construction of boxed culverts through residential areas, and construction of some lined sections. Contracts were also awarded to install ultrasonic flow measurement systems in the main and branch canals.
Rehabilitation and new construction of SSD. A total of 97,982 feddans were covered under contract, of which 92,085 feddans were completed, with some new construction, with 10 contracts.
Activities for mesqa WUAs and irrigation improvement. Preparation of designs and tender documents for 85,347 feddans of mesqa improvement.
Marwa development covering 24,546 feddans (completed).
Similarly, some improvements in costs are expected as more mesqas are connected to electric pumps. However, they may still have higher total costs (from higher labor costs) because they are unwilling to invest in cost savings, for example, from a change in farming practice that would be supported by the reliable water availability because of various reasons such as unemployment of family members.
The increase in efficiency indicated above came from 476,662 water users, where beneficiary farmers reporting improved access to water and drainage services was 91 percent (almost double the target). The large coverage results also demonstrate in another way how the project improved borrower’s management of irrigation and drainage in the project area.
Substantial achievement was also made in institutional development and on farm management in the project area:
Three Integrated Water Resources and Irrigation General Directorates (IWRIGDs) were established in Beheira, Gharbia, and Kafr El Sheikh.
A total of 22 IWMDs were established.
A total of 308 Branch Canal Water Users Associations (BCWUAs) were established.
Nine District Water Boards (DWBs) were established.
At the mesqa level, 1,162 WUAs were operationalized, which required a large majority (75 percent) of the beneficiaries in the mesqa to agree to the proposed design specific to that mesqa and agree to bear mesqa improvement costs as required under the law.
The WUAs operationalization effort fell short of the target (1,530 WUAs), partly because of problems with electrification. The shortcoming was partly redressed by establishing 2,070 WUAs that exceeded considerably the target (also 1,530). These were established but were not fully operational; WUAs continue to use individual pumps and do not benefit from electricity-related operational cost reduction.
Lastly, the project assisted the borrower in improving the management of irrigation and drainage organizationally by having other donors work together toward the same PDO. The project was supported by two other agencies: KfW provided an initial loan of EUR 38,800,000 and in addition a grant of EUR 2 million for TA for consultancy services, and this was subsequently increased by a further EUR 25 million; and the Netherlands Government Ministry for development Cooperation provided a grant budget of EUR 14,900,000 which was allocated specifically to the various components of the project and focused on training and awareness programs. The Netherlands Grant was extended by three months, to compensate for the suspension during the political unrest, and closed in early 2014. The KfW support has a closing date of December 31, 2016.