Implementation completion and results report
Download 1.43 Mb.
|
- Navigate this page:
- 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating
- 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts
- 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome
- 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance
- 5.2 Borrower Performance
- 6. Lessons Learned
3.3 EfficiencyRating: Modest The project efficiency suffered mainly from the higher cost of mesqa rehabilitation compared with the appraisal estimate and from the two-year delay in implementation during the political upheavals. During project appraisal, the target cost for mesqa rehabilitation was set at US$1,200 per feddan, with an upper limit of US$1,450 per feddan. With 85,000 feddans improved for an overall cost of US$112.24 million, including the branch canals, the cost for improvement came to US$1,320 per feddan, 10 percent above the appraisal estimate. Similarly, for SSD, the cost was estimated at US$450 per feddan for 124,000 feddans. Instead, the project completed 94,715 feddans at a cost of US$528 per feddan, 17 percent above the appraisal estimate. While there were some initial delays before the loan became effective, it was a period when there was no financial outlays made from the project and consequently, the impact on the project efficiency was minimal. However, once the project started to incur costs and there were delays in implementation, for example, during the political upheavals in 2011 and 2012, benefits from the project got delayed after substantial expenditure9 had been incurred. While no calculation has been attempted, based upon the one-sided impact on the benefits getting postponed while substantial expenditures have been incurred, the impact of the delays from the political upheavals in the middle of the implementation period can be assumed to have a more substantial impact on the project efficiency. The appraisal’s economic analysis assessed the economic soundness of the project based on the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and Net Present Value (NPV), both of which had been calculated from projected incremental costs and benefits to society as a whole, using the with- and without-project approach. Yields were expected to grow gradually during five years, increasing from 4 percent to 25 percent depending on the crop, improvements financed, and the location. The project was expected to have an ERR of 20.5 percent. The NPV, at a discount rate of 12 percent (representing the opportunity cost of capital), was estimated at EGP 847 million (about US$141 million equivalent). The financial analysis at farm level estimated that farmers’ incremental income would allow not only for the cost recovery of investments but also for a significant increase in family income in the range of 12 percent to 26 percent. After debt service, family benefits were expected to increase by 12 percent to 26 percent after the fifth year, depending on the farm size. Therefore, the project was expected to contribute toward alleviating poverty in project areas. This is confirmed by the significant increase in the value of land and rental costs in the newly improved areas as compared with similar neighboring unimproved areas10. The economic analysis is based on the results obtained at completion at the crop/activity level, preparation of representative farm models, the type of improvements financed, and the areas benefited by each type. Based on the assumptions described in Annex 3, the project ERR is recalculated at 12.2 percent (instead of the 20.5 percent estimated at appraisal) 11. The NPV at a discount rate of 6 percent (representing the marginal utility of consumption of the project beneficiary)12 is estimated at EGP 1,350 million (about US$153 million equivalent). Using the same discount rate as for the analysis at appraisal of 12 percent, the NPV would still be positive at EGP 27.56 million, or about US$3.13 million equivalent. 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome RatingRating: Moderately Satisfactory The overall outcome rating for the project is Moderately Satisfactory because it is rated High on relevance of objectives, Substantial on relevance of design/implementation and achievement of its objectives, and Modest on efficiency. 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development Poverty impact. More than 70 percent of the farmers in the project area have landholdings of less than 3 feddans, with some 38 percent having holdings of less than 1 feddan. Consequently, the significant reduction in irrigation costs from EGP 300 per m3 per crop to EGP 150 per m3 per crop, the increase in yield of main crops by 15 percent, and improvement in equity in water availability from project design/implementation at the mesqa will have a significant effect in the reduction of poverty in the project areas. Gender. Although not targeted specifically by project interventions, significant numbers of female are expected to benefit. In addition, during administration of TA, it was found that although their land ownership could be limited, the women were very much involved in water management. Female farmers are heavily engaged in agriculture particularly during sowing, harvest, and postharvest work. It is estimated that 20 percent (over 90,000) of the water users, who were provided with new/improved irrigation and/or drainage, were female. Adaptation to climate change. The project activities will enhance adaptation to climate change in irrigation water management through the improvement in the hydraulic infrastructure. The replacement of open mesqas (from which farmers push water with diesel pumps individually) with underground piped mesqas served by communally managed electrical pumps, resulted in a reduction in the use of diesel and also a reduction of the emissions of the greenhouse gas CO2. The replacement of individual diesel pumps resulted in a decrease of 80.62 kg of CO2 per feddan per year. With a total farm area of 92,085 feddan of improved mesqa area from SSD systems, it amounts to a reduction of over 7.4 million kg of CO2 per year. This is expected to go up further when all diesel pumps are replaced by electric pumps. (b) Institutional Development Achievements Project activities have strengthened and enhanced the institutional capacity for more efficient operation and management of the water resources with 3 IWRIGDs established at Beheira, Gharbia, and Kafr El Sheik and 9 DWBs established in the project area, with 22 IWMDs. All these are aimed at resolving the concerns of a fragmented water service delivery. Further institution development focused on the farmers with the establishment of 308 BCWUAs and 2,070 WUAs at the mesqa level. 4. Assessment of Risk to Development OutcomeRating: Moderate The risk to the development objectives is considered to be Moderate. The project has provided good quality and more efficient small pumping stations, and has strengthened the decentralized irrigation service delivery. The WUAs established for the mesqas have incentives to ensure that the systems continue to operate successfully because each farmer depends on the efficient and equitable distribution of the available water resources. The risk to the sustainability of the mesqa infrastructure is negligible, and the farmers should continue to benefit from the reduced irrigation costs brought about by the project. The Government is committed through annual budgetary allocations to operating and maintaining the irrigation and drainage infrastructure as they are critical for the survival of agriculture. Cost recovery. Law 213 of 1994 provides for recovery of mesqa improvement costs from the landowners benefiting from such investments.13. The costs of pump sets are repaid within three years, while repayment of the cost of civil works takes place over 20 years. Costs are repaid without interest. Collection of the instalments is the responsibility of the Land Tax Authority (LTA). After deduction of fees for the LTA and IIS, the amount collected is paid into a revolving fund which is intended to be used for further mesqa improvement. Until 2013, arrangements to start the cost recovery were delayed while a decision was being awaited as to whether the costs of electrification should also be included. During summer 2013, a formal decision was made by the MWRI in conjunction with the Ministry of Finance that the costs of the electricity networks should be taken into account for the cost recovery, with repayments to be made over 15 years. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower PerformanceBank Performance(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Satisfactory The rating is based on the following strengths: (a) a clear analysis of the alternatives including a review of lessons learned from earlier projects that led to emphasizing improvement of management of irrigation and drainage to increase the efficiency of irrigated agriculture water use and services and (b) the identification of the need for improvements both in the institutional arrangements, where multiple agencies provided services, and infrastructure to improve the equity, timeliness of water supplies, and costs to farmers. The World Bank was possibly overoptimistic about overall readiness and preparedness to launch the project. For example, detailed studies of the canal systems were needed before critical major civil works contracts could be awarded but were unavailable at entry. This might have increased the implementation period. However, this activity was not in the ‘critical path’ because mesqa-level work was being carried out in parallel and consumed more time than what was required for the detailed studies. The seven-year project was indeed delayed by two years but it was mainly due to political upheavals during 2011–2013. Similarly, better estimates of costs of the mesqa-level work might have been obtained through sampling the needs at different locations, instead of from one pilot, at appraisal. Again, this increase in cost was modest, of the order of 15 percent, and more detailed sampling would have increased project preparation costs. Contrasting the above shortcomings, of course, are how the World Bank preparation team had correctly identified the problem/issues and set the stage for the implementation effort to persevere in the right direction. The preparation effort set the stage for a two-pronged effort that would lead to organizational changes at the MWRI as well as set the structure to carry out systematic mesqa- and marwa-level design efforts at over 1,500 locations, addressing, among other things, piping open canals in a concerted manner under the MWRI. Even the apparently long period between approval and effectiveness was actually well utilized. When this project was approved, projects in Egypt were regularly held up at the legislative body and delay of a year or so was the norm. This project was reviewed twice at the legislative body and consequently, much of the period between approval and effectiveness required the attention of the World Bank staff to address the queries at the legislative body that included obtaining legal opinions, which indeed was accomplished. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Satisfactory The World Bank supervised the project regularly throughout the implementation period. Early supervision rectified the lack of detailed engineering designs on large civil works but found the uptake of the mesqa improvement more challenging. Delays arose because of the slow pace of social mobilization of beneficiaries. The slow pace at the mesqa level were not only due to getting a large majority (75 percent) to agree to the plan at over 1,000 locations but also because mesqa improvement costs have to be recovered from the individual farmers14. The World Bank supervision played an important role to have these mesqa-level designs critically reviewed and keep the overall costs of the project within control. In addition, throughout the lifetime of the project, the World Bank task team was proactive and helped the Government restructure the project so that implementation could catch up with the original schedule after political upheavals (for example, by increasing the percentage of expenditures to be financed by the World Bank), and when that became infeasible, extend the closing date. The number of supervision missions undertaken was sufficient and the skills mix was good. Aide memoires were regularly prepared and transmitted, which alerted the Government and the World Bank management to problems with project implementation and suggested remedies on time. Lastly, although the MTR was particularly delayed in terms of elapsed time since project launch (five years), it was appropriate in terms of proportion of project expenditure before the MTR. Because of the participatory process and the slow uptake of the mesqa improvement indicated above as well as the 2011 political upheaval, the project had spent a little less than 30 percent of the US$303 million of the project funds (as indicated in the PAD), when the MTR was undertaken. The need for sufficient investment with enough evidence on implementation precluded an earlier MTR. (c) Justification for Rating of Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory Overall Bank performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory, reflecting the Moderately Satisfactory rating for both World Bank performance in ensuring quality at entry and for quality of supervision. 5.2 Borrower Performance(a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory The rating is based on the following: ownership that included providing counterpart funding more or less as planned and senior officials availing themselves to the World Bank missions without fail. The authorities supported implementation arrangement, including appointment of key staff, and initiated restructuring requests as and when required. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory The responsibilities for actual implementation of the various civil works contracts was assigned to the HEPS, IIS, IS, and EPADP. Although each of these agencies performed satisfactorily during the latter period of the loan, there was slow progress during the first years of the project, maybe because of the steep learning curve of coordination at various levels. Progress accelerated in the last four years as all contracts were awarded, and the departments could focus on contract management, ensuring that the works were completed on schedule. During this time, the departments also became more proactive, prepared to terminate underperforming contractors and appoint new contractors to complete the works. The PMU was established following a formal Government Decree and functioned satisfactorily throughout the project period. The PMU had the important task of monitoring and coordinating the activities and performance of the other agencies. The PMU regulated the procurement activities on the project and was responsible for the financial aspects including making disbursements for all project activities and making appropriate withdrawal from the World Bank. Compliance with safeguards requirements on the electrical contracts with land and crop compensation was only resolved during the final stages of the project. This issue, had it been identified sooner, could have helped earlier completion on the electrical contracts with better results on operationalization of WUAs. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory Overall borrower performance is rated as Moderately Satisfactory, reflecting Moderately Satisfactory rating for both the Government and the implementing agency performance. 6. Lessons LearnedThe main lessons learned from implementation of the project are as follows: Design projects more realistically by limiting outcomes to project’s direct influence. In the IIIMP, some assumptions were made during project preparation, such as environmental mainstreaming and continuous flow, which were conceptual in nature and found to be infeasible during implementation. During implementation, arriving at a more realistic project design rested on separating what was within the project’s direct influence from broader benefits outside its influence. For example, outside project’s influence included environmental mainstreaming because it was not part of the mandate of the MWRI. Outside project’s influence also included items which were incentive incompatible. For example, continuous flow required farmers to participate/monitor without substantial benefits accruing to that particular farmer. The lesson learned is that limiting outcomes to project’s direct influence make project design more realistic. Be ready for implementation with priority contracts ready to be tendered. Both the World Bank and the Government should be more realistic in assessing the time required to launch such a complex project. Before loan award a more rigorous assessment of the readiness of each of the separate agencies was needed, with the Steering Committee established to ensure coordination and establish priorities for the overall implementation process. The lesson learned is that selected priority contracts should be ready to tender soon after Board presentation. Irrigation management and infrastructure improvements must go hand in hand. Project experience has demonstrated that irrigation improvement is not merely a matter of adding measurement and control structures but also requires a mindset change: irrigation services for farmers and existing institutional arrangements must be systematically analyzed and redefined. The lesson learned is that project design in irrigation management has to be based on a combination of infrastructure improvement and management solutions (for example, improvements in monitoring, planning, institutional capacity, and operation). Beneficiaries’ participation enhance benefits. The project interventions provide a better service for farmers in water deliveries and improved controls, and during implementation nearly 120,000 person months of employment was created. In addition, the project is expected to generate employment for O&M and for incremental labor as a result of increased agricultural intensification. The lesson learned is that creating WUAs not only benefits the design, improving both the objectives of equity and efficiency of water usage, but also brings valuable additional employment opportunities both during construction and beyond in these communities. Procurement of civil works and contract management could be improved with larger procurement packages. With smaller procurement packages, sometimes 4–6 fully qualified contractors were unavailable to bid for such a package. The smaller packages did not appeal to the best-quality contractors. Usually, in these very specialized works, the best-quality contractors develop a pool of smaller contractors through subcontracting and monitoring them. Instead, the Project Implementation Unit often had to undertake close monitoring of the smaller contractors, thereby increasing project monitoring costs. The lesson learned is that a project with very specialized works needs to be packaged in larger procurement packages that would maintain the high standards for contractors for all packages and where capacity of smaller local contractors would take place through subcontracting. The Project Implementation Unit would then have to monitor fewer and more reliable contractors, bringing down project costs. Transparency and accountability are core elements of performance management and service delivery. During project implementation, accountability and governance were strengthened on the side of the service providers, the MWRI, and the Ministry of Electricity as well as for the recipients (farmers) of the service. The lesson learned is that to overcome problems of poor maintenance and inadequate service delivery in irrigation, it is important to have a clear agreement between the MWRI, the Ministry of Electricity, WUAs, and farmers about respective roles and responsibilities, proper financing arrangements, and transparency and accountability in monitoring the agreement. Sustainability beyond maintenance of works may require legal changes. Resource constraints imply that success of the post-completion operation/next phase, as indicated in section 2.5, will depend largely on the WUAs. The involvement of the farmers at all stages of the development of the mesqa contracts, including the design layout and location, has ensured that the community has a strong sense of ownership of the system, and this should also ensure its overall sustainability. In addition, the MWRI is expected to maintain the availability of water through the main and branch canals. Notwithstanding the above, sustainability beyond maintenance of works has not been fully addressed. The lesson learned is that when the implementing agencies are all project-oriented and once the works are completed, there is no support for the farmers in terms of specialist training to use the water well. In theory, agricultural extension is available but that institution tends to focus on crop and livestock production, not on the particular skills needed to operate an irrigation system efficiently. To have that level of sustainability, more institution building is needed where BCWUAs and DWBs have legal powers and users have a greater stake in the management, operation, and maintenance of the infrastructure. Directory: curated curated -> Concept stage curated -> Concept stage curated -> Republic of Côte d'Ivoire Urbanization Review curated -> Report No: aus11011 Central America curated -> Report No. 94474-pk fiscal Disaster Risk Assessment Options for Consideration curated -> Environmental and Social Management Framework for the Costa Rica Telecommunications Sector Modernization Project curated -> Environment Impact Assessment For Jiangxi Shangrao Sanqingshan Airport Beijing Guohuantiandi Environmental Technology Development Center. Ltd. Oct. 2012 Content curated -> Growth through Innovation An Industrial Strategy for Shanghai By Shahid Yusuf Kaoru Nabeshima April 22nd, 2009 curated -> Report No: 70178. People's Republic of China Download 1.43 Mb. Share with your friends:
|