Counter Interpretation – the neg is entitled to counterplans that fiat governmental action besides the United States so long as they are grounded in the literature -
Info processing – key to test decision making between optimal actors – lets us better understand decision making
Policy analyst – looking at which country and how a plan should be carried out is a key question –
Limits – key to limit the topic down to affs with US key warrants – checks an infinite number of small affs especially for such a large topic
Neg flex and resolution basis to test the affirmatives burden – key to test the US key warrant to the resolution and test the aff from multiple angles
Aff side bias – the topic is inherently biased against the neg no good DAs or process counterplans
If anything reject arg not team
Debating from the international perspective is a critical part of learning and education
Best Delegate 11, Best Delegate, 3/15/11, Best Delegate is an organization that promotes learnings through international debate over the United Nations, “The Educational Benefits of Model UN,” http://bestdelegate.com/the-educational-benefits-of-model-un/, NN
No matter how many Model UN conferences I attend, I’m always a little amazed. These are students who could be hanging out at home, watching TV, or playing video games, and instead they want to put on a suit, work on a weekend, and develop solutions to the world’s most important problems. What makes them want to do MUN? And what makes Model UN worth teaching? Model UN motivates students to learn. On an emotional level, Model UN is a motivational experience. It’s fun to pretend being a world leader solving the world’s most important problems in 48 hours or less. Model UN activates students’ imagination and creativity – activities that students are naturally inclined to do. Students enjoy exploring new places, sharing common experiences with teammates and friends, and making new friends with smart and interesting students from other schools – which includes the best and the brightest from other countries. Students joke that “MUN is F-U-N,” but it’s true – that’s why it works so well. Students attend Model UN conferences because it’s fun – they just happen to learn something along the way. And when students have fun while learning, what they learn is more likely to stick. Model UN reinforces what students learn in the classroom. In the classroom, students learn from their teacher. At conferences, students learn from each other. The conference does not replace the classroom – the conference complements the classroom. Students have to internalize what they learn in class and deliver that information through speeches, caucusing, and resolutions. The role of the teacher in Model UN is to guide this “student-led” learning by ensuring information quality (e.g. proper research, position papers) and giving students the tools to teach one another (e.g. public speaking, resolution writing). Model UN teaches students about the world. In this era of globalization, learning about the world is more important than ever. No matter what field or profession students enter, they will interact with people from different countries and diverse backgrounds. Problems taking place halfway around the globe impact our lives, our country, and our communities. Students learn about the world as they prepare for Model UN conferences, represent countries other than their own, and present possible solutions to global problems in committee. Students also learn by meeting people from other countries and travel to places they’ve never been before. Model UN builds confidence and leadership skills. I know so many students who were so scared to speak at their first conference that went on to become active participants in committee and in the classroom. In his speech on “What Model UN Means to Me,” KFC shares his story of how he went from a scared high school delegate to Secretary-General of GCIMUN delivering the opening speech at the UN to over 3,000 people, including Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon: Students develop confidence and leadership skills through experience. Model UN conferences are opportunities to practice research, public speaking, teamwork, negotiation, and writing skills in a safe and structured environment. What many people don’t realize is that Model UN also teaches business skills – running a conference is like running a small business that involves finding “customers” (delegates), developing a “product” (the conference), and managing peers. It also serves as a fundraiser, with many high school conferences raising thousands of dollars at a time when schools are slashing budgets and cutting programs. Model UN helps students get into college. Model UN provides students with the learning and leadership experiences that admissions officers look for. The depth of these experiences serves as possible material for personal essays and interviews. Model UN is also an extensive network of alumni at top colleges.
International fiat is crucial to learning about other perspectives other than those of the USFG
Garcia 13, Ana Gil Garcia, nearest date given is 2013, Garcia is a professor of international relations at Northeastern University, “International best practices of higher education institutions: The good news!” http://www.academia.edu/2781211/International_best_practices_of_higher_education_institutions_The_good_news_, NN
The international experiences are among the most profound and defining influences on our sense of self and our view of the world. There are many ways for higher educationofficials to internationalize a campus. On the one hand, most faculties seek to acquirenew professional skills related to the management, leadership, development,implementation, on the other, delivering of international educational programs. Whenfaculty get involved in the planning of an international experience, there are numberlessof new professional skills in the field of international development and education thatwould help strengthen the international dimension in research, teaching and service;facilitate future development and design internationally oriented programs; help set uplinkages with schools and universities outside the U.S; assist on obtaining externalfunding needed for internationalizing an institution; train on recruitment strategies particularly for minorities; increase advising skills for international students; strengthennegotiation skills on institutional partnerships and exchange programs; prepare on facilitymanagement and budget for international affairs; and finally coach on how to disseminateknowledge of international resources to interested constituencies. Background Information After 9/11, the face of the internationalization of higher education institutions in the USAand the rest of the world was transformed. The joys of new learning and the acquisitionof new skills and knowledge on international affairs and exchanges became a slow anduncomfortable process. The federal regulations based on the safety and security on allliving aspects of the national territory demanded from all educational institutions drasticchanges in the way of conducting business with overseas institutions. Those stipulationsrequired the creation of new areas of learning, as for example utilization of masses of information, new regulations for obtaining visas, acquisition of interculturalcompetencies, attainment of innovative technical skills, proficiency on untraditionallanguages, reframing of conventional exchange programs, and adoption of new professional language among others. In order to comply with the Department of 1 Homeland Security, higher education institutions changed and restructured the facade of international offices. Many of them renamed the units in charge of internationaleducation and exchanges (i.e., Office of International Programs, The InternationalEducation Office, The Office of International Affairs, Center for International Studies,International Outreach, etc). Regardless of the name change, they preserved theinternationalization as the process of integrating an international/intercultural dimensioninto the teaching, research and service, fundamental university missions.For the purpose of this study, the term “International Program” is used. It isoperationalized as“the unit, department, and or division of a higher learning institutionthat deals with the management, leadership, development, implementation and deliveringof programs which meet international educational demand and standards as well asinternational aspirations of U.S faculty and students”. Based on the enforced federalchanges and the characteristics of institution which is classified as a Hispanic ServingInstitution, the researcher proposed a sabbatical plan related to the academicallyacceptable category of “acquiring new professional skills” with the solely purpose of becoming knowledgeable and skillful on the daily operations of international programdepartments that would help ensure that any minority institution is effectively competingon an international stage for the best students and faculty and for resources in support of internationalizing their academic programming, global partnerships, and any other initiatives on campus and around the world.The acquisition of new professional skills is broadly supported by many on the field of organizational development. For instance, Gary Benjamin (2006) mentions three reasonsorganizations are prepared to sacrifice time by endorsing the acquisition of new skills andknowledge: (1) keeping employees interested in the job, (2) having employees with skillsthat are up to date and (3) cutting back expenses and time on learning new skills than it isto train an employee replacement. In the global era, and in particular times of financialconstraints, educational institutions also seek radical methods of retaining andencouraging experienced faculty by providing innovative opportunities that would notonly ensure their enduring and long-term residency, but gaining different demonstratedskills. The schools of higher learning are attentive to new societal demands, changes indemographic, rapid technological advances and use them as indicators for faculty renewalof knowledge and skills. The literature revealed different approaches and strategies thatwould be used by an experienced faculty to learn fresh skills (Bachner, 1993; Benjamin,2006; Dwan, 2003; Stier, 2003): joining an academic team and learn from others; using personal time to study for on-the-job training, and using established relationships.
EU = Good CP
Learning about international organizations like the EU is key to education
European Commission 14, European Commission, February 2014, the European Commission is a section of the EU that focuses on education in world affairs, “Working with young people: the value of youth work in the European Union,” http://ec.europa.eu/youth/library/study/youth-work-report_en.pdf, NN
The history of providing youth work for young people varies depending on the Member State, but youth work is not a new concept in the EU and the landscape of youth work continues to evolve. Although youth work has greater recognition and visibility today in comparison to the past, there is still much to be done as there is a need to recognise youth work for the contribution and value it has in the lives of young people. In consideration of the fact that sources of data on youth work are currently scarce, this study strives to bring together existing evidence in order to facilitate the understanding and appreciation of youth work. It draws on literature in the area, a mapping of national contexts, consultation amongst stakeholders and an analysis of successful practice. The latter was conducted during the course of the study in order to gain a deeper understanding of youth work in the EU and the contribution that it makes for young people of the EU. The report highlights the diversity of youth work practice, the variety of actors involved, the observable trends in the sector, features of successful youth work and the range of outcomes associated with that success. Furthermore, it presents a comparative overview of the frameworks which support youth work at the national level across the EU. Whilst youth work practice will take place regardless of whether countries provide a policy framework of support for the sector or not, EU and national level policies and funding provisions have the potential to frame and shape the practice of youth work. These should be designed so as to further strengthen the capacity of the sector to provide meaningful activities for young people in their leisure time that lead to identifiable successful outcomes for youth in the EU.
AT: Perm Do Both (EU)
Perm do both fails – the United States and the EU working over implementation of the plan kills certainty and creates internal feuds that can’t be resolved
Still links to the net benefit – that’s a disad
No impact to ‘double solvency’ – that was sufficiency framing above – also can’t ‘shield the link’ to the net benefit – still triggers the link
Perm fails – the United States and European Union cannot cooperate over climate change
Antholis 09, William J. Antholis, 6/10/09, William Antholis is managing director of the Brookings Institution and a senior fellow in Governance Studies, “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: EU-U.S. Cooperation on Climate Change,” http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2009/06/10-climate-antholis, NN
When it comes to the international effort to address climate change, there is little doubt that a transatlantic bridge is needed. The question remains, however, to what end? I think that a quick review of the good, the bad, and the ugly of the current transatlantic relationship will show that, among other things, the old bridge has had structural flaws in how politics, political culture, and political systems in the U.S. and EU structured their negotiations with one another. That has contributed to how the sides have viewed the challenge, and viewed one another. As a result, a new bridge—that is, a new climate regime—is in order that takes into account those different political cultures and systems. Starting with the EU, it’s easy to start with the good. All students of institutions will tell you that a long-lasting institution requires a mission and a founder. With apologies to Al Gore, the EU’s moral mission and their founding spirit has been driving force in building a global climate regime. That was the case before Kyoto, and it certainly has been the case during the Bush Administration. This extends from establishing the soundness of climate science to showing the way in policy action. Importantly, Europe took on an ambitious policy target at Kyoto, and appears close to meeting that target. Why? One key factor in this success story is that the European political system allowed this to happen by empowering minority parties. In a parliamentary system, if a minority party such as the Greens captures 10% of the vote and then joins with a winning coalition, they will then make up 20% of the coalition’s votes. That will usually win them a cabinet position or two, and an ability to make a priority of their signature issue. This is exactly what happened in climate change, where Green parties throughout the continent—especially here in Germany, but also in the Low Countries, Scandinavia, and elsewhere—have prioritized this issue, coordinated amongst themselves and with other countries, and have scored major successes. In the United States, 10% of the vote would be a laughable also-ran. In Europe, 10% is a mandate to change the world. Political systems don’t account for all the difference between the United States and Europe. European private citizens, NGOs, and corporations also have moved the needle. These Europeans have not viewed climate change as a technological or an economic issue. They have viewed it as a matter of basic common sense morality, politics, economics and culture. So, that combination of political institutions and political culture has made the issue a priority across the continent, easy for the media and the general public to understand. Now, as someone with nearly fifteen years spent in Europe and with Europeans trying to build a global climate regime, I think all of us would recognize that there has been some bad. I would characterize that "bad" as a series of bad assumptions about how European diplomatic and institutional culture applies to global diplomatic culture and institutions. The first bad assumption Europeans often make is that other industrial countries would respond as quickly and as ambitiously to the same set of data. Perhaps European leaders assumed this because ambitious targets at Kyoto came relatively easy for Europe, thanks in part to early actions in Germany, France and the UK. While Europe’s big three took policy efforts in the 1980s and 1990s that reduced their greenhouse gases, these reductions were not made with the intention to fight climate change. They were done for an entirely different set of motives—the shutting of the inefficient East German economy, the effort to develop nuclear power in France, and Margaret Thatcher’s effort to shut down the coal mines. This pride in exogenous motives reinforced a second bad assumption: that Europe’s own post-war experience in inter-governmentalism could be applied globally. That is, since WWII, members of the EU have negotiated their integration with one another first, and then have legislated it later domestically. When Europe’s various national publics protested, the common refrain of the member-states was “the EU made me do it.” Indeed, European governments have come to treat the negotiations themselves as legislation. Needless to say, that approach to governance does not easily apply in other countries. In other words, Europe has a unique post-World War II view of “sovereignty-as-a-problem” that much of the rest of the world simply does not share. Sovereignty hawks still dominate, from Washington to Beijing to Delhi to Moscow to Mexico City. Finally, European diplomatic culture also has a different understanding of what it means to join a “binding” agreement, again based on this post-war experience. Rules in the European system are much like traffic speed limits: there is an expectation of some non-compliance. That is ok. Flexibility in international regimes is a good thing, so long as most states comply most of the time. Speed limits provide a good analogy. Having driven in from the Frankfurt airport yesterday at speeds of up to 190 km/hour in 120 km/hour zones, I can say that the European effort on climate is a much higher level of compliance. But that climate compliance is also not as strict as traffic enforcement in the small southern town where I live—Charlottesville, Virginia—where going five miles per hour over the speed limit will earn you a $100 ticket.
Independent EU action key to broader credibility gains
Ludlow ‘1 Peter Ludlow, founding director of the Center for European Policy Studies, “Wanted: A Global Partner,” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 3, Summer 2001, muse, NN
If the United States needs to work with the EU, it needs an effective EU with which to work. Jean-Marie Soutou, former secretary general of the Quai d'Orsay, rightly observed that "Europe tends to get the U.S. partner that it deserves." If the EU wants the United States to take it seriously, it must itself be serious. The record of achievement during the last 50 years is remarkable. Europe has been transformed. An enormous amount is yet to be done. If the EU looks to the United States to embrace multilateralism and global governance, it must itself assume a more significant global role, the details for which lie beyond the scope of this article. Although its role as the regional hegemonist obviously constitutes a large element of its claim to be treated as an important partner, the EU's credibility and therefore its powers of persuasion will suffer unless and until it makes a constructive and, where necessary, independent contribution to the development of the global system, in crisis management as much as trade and in creative diplomacy as well as aid. The lonely superpower needs global partners for it to heed the limits of superpowerdom and to appreciate the advantages of global governance. By raising its ambitions and reaching out on its own terms to other regional actors, the EU is arguably better placed than any other international player to facilitate the emergence of the United States that it and the world needs: a strong U.S. partner in a multilateral world order
EU key to fight U.S reluctance and galvanize international action against warming, they have the largest market, commitment to multilateralism, and leadership by example – means the perm fails
Parker ’10 [August 12 2010, Charles F Parker is a faculty member of the Department of Government at Uppsala University,
“Climate Change and the European Union's Leadership Moment: An Inconvenient Truth?” http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2010.02080.x/full]
The EU's goal, as it states in its own words, is nothing short of ‘[l]eading global action’ against climate change ‘to 2020 and beyond’ with the aim of limiting climate change to 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels (Council, 2007, pp. 10–11). The Union, in its quest to play a leading role in international climate protection, has provided high-profile support for the Kyoto Protocol and is now vigorously throwing its diplomatic weight behind the effort to successfully negotiate a comprehensive successor arrangement. In the late 1980s, the US began to disengage from international environmental governance and under George W. Bush's administration the US completely abdicated its leadership role, particularly in the area of climate change. The EU has stepped into this void and has attempted to shoulder the mantle of leadership. How exactly has the EU attempted to lead the global efforts to combat climate change? An examination of the EU's actions reveals that it has deployed all three modes of leadership in important ways, but it has primarily relied on directional leadership.In terms of structural leadership the EU – the world's largest market, largest exporter, most generous aid donor and largest foreign investor – is well endowed to offer economic, technological and diplomatic incentives. The EU's vast internal market underpins all Union action, provides it with a powerful bargaining chip and gives it an excellent potential to create and alter incentives. The ability to act as a gatekeeper for those who want access to the EU market and the ability to enforce EU standards on trading partners is an extremely valuable power resource. The sheer scale of the internal market also means that the EU can offer and take actions that will have a dramatic environmental impact. Despite these advantages, the EU has struggled to translate its material resources into influence. This difficulty can in part be attributed to the EU's unique characteristics – its status as an intergovernmental actor and the challenges this presents for truly acting as a Union – and highlights how its leadership efforts are enabled and constrained by its complex agency-structure dynamics. As others have demonstrated, the EU's leadership impact has not been commensurate with its structural power (Elgström, 2007). Nonetheless, it was the EU's ability to leverage its structural leadership that played an integral role in its successful mission to salvage the Kyoto Protocol. In 2001 President Bush attempted to scuttle the Kyoto Protocol by announcing that the US was withdrawing from further involvement with it. The EU responded to Bush's gambit by taking on the mission to save the Protocol. In the face of US hostility and opposition, the EU successfully rounded up enough followers for the Protocol to enter into force. It was the EU's support for Russian WTO membership that was the final carrot that induced Russia to ratify the Protocol, which paved the way for Kyoto to enter into force (Vogler, 2005). An EU–Russian energy deal that would nearly double the price of Russian natural gas by 2010 was also a vital sweetener. As President Putin noted at the time: ‘The European Union has made concessions on some points during the negotiations on the WTO. This will inevitably have an impact on our positive attitude to the Kyoto process. We will speed up Russia's movement towards ratifying the Kyoto Protocol’.1 In the run-up to the 2009 Copenhagen conference, the EU once again displayed a willingness to exercise its structural leadership. On the inducement side, it promised funding to developing countries for actions to mitigate and adapt to climate change if a satisfactory post-2012 agreement was reached (Council, 2008b, pp. 6–7). Conversely, the spectre of imposing border tax adjustments on goods from countries with less stringent climate regulations has been raised by the French as well as Commission President Barroso (BBC News, 2008a). The Union's power resources also play a role in the second and historically most important leadership mode: directional leadership or leading by example. The EU, drawing on its capacity and potential to act, has attempted to demonstrate its commitment to fighting climate change by adopting a number of binding measures to reduce its emissions without corresponding reductions in other countries. The EU has also taken unilateral action by making the first move in putting future commitments on the table and putting into place policy instruments, such as the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). Under the Kyoto Protocol, the 38 industrialized countries are required to reduce their emissions by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels by 2012. The EU-15 agreed to an even larger target, committing to a collective GHG emissions reduction of 8 per cent. Prior to the start of serious international negotiations for the post-2012 arrangements the Union took autonomous action to drastically reduce its emissions. At its 2007 spring summit the EU launched its 20-20-20 by 2020 plan (Council of the European Union, 2007, pp. 10–23). The EU committed to reduce its emissions by at least 20 per cent by 2020 and it dangled the carrot of increasing that cut up to 30 per cent if a satisfactory global agreement was reached. The EU also committed to increasing its share of renewable energy to 20 per cent and improving its energy efficiency by 20 per cent by 2020. In January 2008 the Commission released a blueprint for implementing and achieving these goals. Elevenmonths later the work carried out under the co-decision procedure produced a first-reading agreement on an energy and climate package. The EU has also developed and, in 2005, launched the EU-ETS. This established the world's largest company-level market for trading CO2 emissions.The EU, which sees itself as the world leader in this emerging market wants the EU-ETS to serve as the ‘pillar of a global carbon trading network’ (Commission, 2007, p. 2). It further envisions a future framework that enables comparable emission trading arrangements in different regions to be linked together. The EU, which sees the ETS as a vital tool for developed countries to reach GHG reductions in a cost-effective manner, believes the efficacy of the ETS will be further enhanced by the revisions enacted by the 2008 climate package. The revised ETS directive, which will apply from 2013 to 2020, brings new industries into the ETS, covers two additional GHGs, reduces the Community-wide quantity of allowances issued each year, introduces full auctioning from 2013 in the power sector and will phase in auctioning for the manufacturing sector (with exceptions for sectors at risk of ‘carbon leakage’). The EU's promotion of the revised ETS as a model that is ‘fit to go global’ and serve as the ‘nucleus’ for building a global carbon market (Commission, 2008) provides a good example of how the EU's directional leadership dovetails with its policy entrepreneurship activities. Although the idea for emissions trading was originally a US idea initially resisted by the Europeans, the EU has now fully embraced the concept and repackaged it as its own. In fact, the ETS has become a political pet that the EU has aggressively implemented and promoted. The EU's directional leadership in this area has already had an impact as the positive and negative lessons of the EU-ETS have been studied by emission trading initiatives being set up in the US and other countries. By taking the lead in committing to sharp unilateral GHG reductions, adopting an aggressive climate and energy plan, with binding targets for renewable energies and launching the EU-ETS, the EU is attempting to spotlight that building a low-carbon economy is compatible with energy security, economic growth and competitiveness. Finally, it is the Union's view that by taking action itself, demonstrating the utility of that action and by promising to take even more aggressive action in the future, it can credibly ask others to act as well. The hoped for demonstration effects from leading by example are also linked to idea-based leadership. The Union has been an active policy entrepreneur for climate protection. It worked hard to make its voice heard on problem definition, agenda setting, goal setting and promoting policy solutions regarding the climate threat. The Union has embraced the scientific conclusions from the IPCC; already in 1996 the European Council endorsed the goal that global warming must be limited to no more than 2 degrees Celsius above the pre-industrial level. In addition to defining the nature of the problem, the EU has conducted its own analysis and put forward its own proposals for what must be done (Council, 2008a). According to the EU Commission's analysis, GHG emissions must be stabilized by 2020 and then reduced to 50 per cent of 1990 levels by 2050 if the world is to avert a 2 degrees temperature rise. The Union has also laid out its vision for meeting these goals and how the burden should be shared among the developed and developing countries. The Union argues that the developed countries must shoulder the lion's share of the burden over the coming decades. The Union has called for the EU and other developed countries to enter into a new international agreement requiring collective emission cuts of at least 30 per cent below the 1990 level by 2020. According to the EU, the developed countries should aim for cuts of 60 to 80 per cent by 2050 (Council of the European Union, 2007, p. 12). The Union wants these goals and commitments to be enshrined in a post-2012 international agreement containing binding rules with well-developed monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. The Union also has a timeline in mind and it attempted to get the international community to accept a 2009 deadline for a new agreement. This review of the Union's climate leadership actions and climate protection goals has revealed that the EU has laid out an extensive leadership agenda for itself. It has also demonstrated that the Union's own actions are an integral part of these plans. The EU aspires to show leadership by ‘setting a convincing example’ and demonstrating that actions to reduce GHG emissions are ‘economically and technologically feasible’, which raises the issue of performance
Science leadership is a zero sum game, EU and U.S compete over patents, skills, and International tech market share
Shelton ’04[ Febrauary 2004, Duane Shelton leads small business startups that provide research and administrative services to the Federal Government. His own research is on scientometrics and science policy, “The US-EU Race for Leadership of Science and Technology:Qualitative and Quantitative Indicators” http://itri2.org/s/USEU/paper.pdf]
Table I summarizes the most important output qualitative indicators, including the sources and dates of the data. Each row will be discussed in turn. The indicator that shows the most dramatic shift from the U.S. to the EU is the number of technical publications in the world's leading journals (Row 1). As late as 1991, the U.S. led in 17 of 20 fields of science as measured by its success in placing its papers in the some 2500 of the world's leading journals in the ISI database. The EU then led only in three fields, but by 2001 their positions had reversed. The EU now leads in 1 fields, while the U.S. leads in only seven. (The Asia Pacific Region leads in one field.) Extrapolations of trends (and addition of ten more EU countries) predict that the EU will take the lead away from the U.S. in at least three more fields by 2004. An analysis of the causes of this sharp decline in the U.S. position was made in (NSB, 2001, pp 5-39), but the conclusion was, "The reasons for this development remain unknown." On the other hand, the U.S. led the EU as a whole in relative impacts (Row 2). These normalized citation counts are a rough measure of the quality of technical papers. Compared to others, U.S. researchers have an extraordinary propensity to cite mostly papers from their own country, which may distort this measure substantially. Even so, some individual EU members led the U.S. in up to eight of 20 technical fields in the ISI database. Incidentally, non-member Switzerland has led the world in relative impacts since the early 1980s. Inventions are mainly patented in the home country of the inventors, which provides a "home court advantage" that makes it difficult to use this key output measure to compare the position of countries. Triadic patents (Row 3) are inventions that are patented in all three locations: the U.S., EU, and Japan, thus reducing the home country bias for patenting, among these three anyway. The U.S. has only a small lead over the EU in this indicator. In recent years it has increased this lead slightly, but it would not take much for the EU to take the lead. Policies that merely encourage researchers to file more patent applications could make the difference. While the total number of working scientists and engineers is an input resource to the R&D process, the production of new scientific personnel can be considered to be an output of the scientific establishment, particularly PhDs. In any event the EU has a clear lead in production of scientific human resources (Rows 4 and 5), and will strengthen this lead with the addition of new countries like the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Nobel prizes are the gold standard of quality in scientific achievement in the fields where they are given. In 2001 the Japanese set a goal for increasing the number of their laureates by 30 over the next 50 years, which would require a huge R&D investment to achieve. The U.S. has dominated this indicator over the last 50 years (Row 6). However, brain drain exaggerates this leadership somewhat. The career path of many Nobelists starts with a European education and early research there, but by the time the award is made, they are working in a U.S. lab or have retired in the U.S. For example if Table I counted the countries of origin instead, the U.S. totals would go down by six, and the EU total would go up by five -- in just the last three years of data. If the EU were to reverse its brain drain by encouraging a few scientific superstars to move to the south of France for their senior years, they could probably increase their count of Nobel prizes at very little cost. Braun and colleagues (2003) have recently examined various ways of tabulating the counts. For example for the whole 20th Century (1901-2001), the countries of the EU would lead the U.S., even counting nationality by residence at award time. Selling innovative products in the international market place is one bottom line of the innovation process. High technology market share is a particularly relevant indicator of the overall success of a country's S&T policies, although there are many other factors involved. Row 7 lists the international market share in five sectors. The U.S. leads in four of them and the EU in one (pharmaceuticals). The trend curves show the EU gaining in one more sector (aerospace), but the most dramatic phenomenon is the sharp loss of Japanese market share in all five sectors. In 2002 U.S. international trade in high technology products ran a deficit ($17.5 billion) for the first time ever. Overall international trade is often used as an indicator of a nation's business and technological prowess in competing in the marketplace. (Row 8.) By this measure the U.S. is leading the world, but in the enormous and increasing size of its trade deficit. The U.S. deficit in goods and services in 2002 was $435 billion, greater than the total GDP of all but a fewnations. The EU has a positive surplus greater than that of Japan, which is thought to be an export powerhouse. It also has an $82 billion trade surplus with the U.S. Space does not permit trend graphs of all these indicators, but a couple of the more interesting ones are included here. Fig. 1 shows the percent share of papers published in the world's leading journals as compiled by ISI (2002). The surge of the EU is quite remarkable, while the decline in U.S. "market share" of these slots in refereed journals is puzzling. Fig. 2 shows the EU well ahead of the U. S. in production of PhDs in science and engineering, and again we see the U.S. declining. Other trend graphs are posted at http://itri2.org/s/USEU/. In some cases the U.S. leads, but EU position in output indicators is strong and getting stronger. III. Qualitative Indicators Qualitative assessments also raise questions about whether the U.S. or EU leads in S&T. While relatively few fields have been analyzed by this comprehensive, but expensive approach, expert review of the main competitors frequently finds European centers of excellence that equal or lead the best work in the U.S. Two U.S. So who is leading the world in S&T: the U.S. or the EU? While no single nation rivals the U.S. for the lead, it is becoming clear that the European Union as a whole is mounting a serious challenge. It has set strategic leadership goals and has committed itself to substantial funding increases to meet those goals. The 15-nation EU already leads the US in important metrics, and the EU's addition of ten more countries in 2004 will strengthen its position. As the EU becomes more tightly integrated into a European Research Area, it will be more reasonable to compare its overall performance to that of the U.S. And that performance is likely to lead that of the U.S. by any reasonable composite of measures, unless U.S. policies toward science change.