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Implications For DebateLincoln-Douglas resolutions often begin with the words ‘When in conflict...” If Hegel is understood correctly, an application of dialectical reason can either prove or disprove such resolutions. If it can be shown that prioritizing one principle over another is a way to synthesize these opposing perspectives, then dialectical reason itself proves such resolutions true. Hegel’s view on the state, for example, is that governments exist to synthesize freedom and order. But since the state warrants absolute respect, it can be shown that order must, in this particular period of history, be prioritized above liberty. But it is just as easy to envision dialectical reason as the ultimate negation of conflict oriented resolutions. This negation occurs as a rejection of the antecedent of the resolution itself; a rejection of the possibility that the two principles may really be “in conflict.” This is because no two things are ever really in conflict from the point of view of that “bird’s eye” view of history. Such an approach will be most effectively executed if negatives can point out how the two ideas only seem to be in conflict, but are actually not. Again, freedom and order only seem to conflict if we ignore the possibility of their synthesis, responsibility, or whatever synthesis can be conceived of them. Such an approach would best end with an appeal to let the ideas continue to clash, rather than declaring a victor by saying that one should be prioritized over another. At that point, the negative answer to the resolution is: “When in conflict, let these principles remain in conflict.” The progressive nature of history allows one other possibility, which can be applied even to resolutions which do not presuppose conflict. Almost any affirmative (and most negatives) will say some particular state of affairs is undesirable. But a certain interpretation of Hegel argues that the problems which exist now are not “really” problems. They are simply manifestations of the way things should presently be, and if they are truly detrimental to the long view of historical progression, they will eventually change. This seems, for example, to be Hegel’s view of patriarchy (see evidence), which, according to feminists is the root of all evil, but according to Hegel, was (and perhaps still is) historically necessary. Hegel seems complicated, but his ideas are actually simple. Debaters wishing to use these ideas are well advised to read secondary commentary on his works alongside the original stuff, since his writing is at times cryptic and complex. But the principles are easily spotted, and many illustrations and applications of his ideas are found in others’ interpretations and commentaries. Although it will quickly be found that almost every “student” of Hegel has a different view of his work, no Hegelian would find those differences undesirable. After all, it will all eventually work itself out, and we’ll be part of the process. BibliographyHegel, G.W.F. PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). . AESTHETICS (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). . FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977). . ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959). . HEGEL: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS (New York: Harper and Row, 1974). . LOGIC (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967). . PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967). . HEGEL’S POLITICAL WRITINGS (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964). . INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY (Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing Company, 1988). . NATURAL LAW (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975). Elder, Crawford. APPROPRIATING HEGEL (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1980). Heidegger, Martin. HEGEL’S CONCEPT OF EXPERIENCE (New York: Harper and Row, 1989). Weiss, Frederick Gustav. BEYOND EPISTEMOLOGY: NEW STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974). THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HEGEL (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Rosen, Michael. HEGEL’S DIALECTIC AND ITS CRITICISM (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). Steinberger, Peter J. LOGIC AND POLITICS: HEGEL’S PEIL3SOPHY OF RIGHT (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988). PHILOSOPHICAL TRUTH IS DIALECTICAL1. THE DIALECTICAL PROCESS CAN SYNTHESIZE ALL CONTRADICTORY THINGS G.W.F. Hegel, German philosopher. “The Science of Logic,’ in Monroe C. Beardsley, THE EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHERS FROM DESCARTES TO NIETZSCHE, 1960, p. 636 It is in this dialectic (as here understood) and in the comprehension of the unity of opposites, or of the positive in the negative, that speculative knowledge consists. This is the most important aspect of the dialectic, but for thought that is as yet practiced and unfreeze, it is the most difficult. If thought is still in the process of cutting itself loose from concrete sense-perception and from syllogizing, it must first practice abstract thinking, and learn to hold fast concepts in their definiteness and to recognize by means of them. 2. DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN PHILOSOPHIES IS PART OF A LARGER SYNTHESIS G.W.F. Hegel, German philosopher. PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT, 1977, p. 2. These forms are not just distinguished from one another, they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of the whole. But he who rejects a philosophical system (i.e., the new philosopher) does not usually comprehend what he is doing in this way; and he who grasps the contradiction between them (i.e., the historian of philosophy) does not, as a general rule, know how to free it from its one-sidedness, or maintain its freedom by recognizing the reciprocally necessary moments that take shape as a conflict and seeming incompatibility. 3. TRUTH MUST BE CONSIDERED AS THE WHOLE RESULT INCLUDING CONTRADICTIONS G.W.F. Hegel, German philosopher. PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT, 1977, p. 11. The True is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only in the end is it what it truly is; and that precisely in this consists its nature, viz, to be actual, subject, the spontaneous becoming of itself. 4. GENUINE TRUTH TRANSCENDS THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN TRUE AND FALSE G.W.F. Hegel, German philosopher. PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT, 1977, p. 22. “True” and “false” belong among those determinate notions which are held to be inert and wholly separate essences, one here and one there, each standing fixed and in isolation from the other, with which it has nothing in common. Against this view it must be maintained that truth is not a minted coin that can be given and pocketed ready-made. 5. PHILOSOPHICAL TRUTH DOES NOT GIVE SIMPLE OR FACTUAL ANSWERS G.W.F. Hegel, German philosopher. PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT, 1977, p. 23. Dogmatism as a way of thinking, whether in ordinary knowing or in the study of philosophy, is nothing else but the opinion that the True consists in a proposition which is a fixed result, or which is immediately known. To such questions as, When was Caesar born?, or, How many feet were there in a stadium?, etc. a clear-cut answer ought to be given, just as it is definitely true that the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides of a right-angled triangle. But the nature of a so-called truth of that kind is different from the nature of philosophical truths. 6. NO TRUTH SHOULD BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED OR HELD TO BE COMPLETE G.W.F. Hegel, German philosopher. PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT, 1977, p. 41. The study of philosophy is as much hindered by the conceit that it will not argue, as it is by the argumentative approach. This conceit relies on truths which are taken for granted and to which it sees no need to re-examine; it just lays them down, and believes it is entitled to assert them, as well as to judge and pass sentence by appealing to them. In view of this, it is especially necessary that philosophizing should again be made a serious business.
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