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MORAL APPLICATION TO EVALUATION



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MORAL APPLICATION TO EVALUATION

The application of this to moral evaluation is important, as Prichard continues in “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?”:


“Now it is easy to show that the doubt whether A is B, based on this speculative or general ground, could, if genuine, never be set at rest. For if, in order really to know that A is B, we must first know that we knew it, then really, to know that we knew it, we must first know that we knew that we knew it. But-what is more important-it is also easy to show that this doubt is not a genuine doubt but rests on a confusion the exposure of which removes the doubt. For when we say we doubt whether our previous condition was one of knowledge, what we mean, if we mean anything at all, is that we doubt whether our previous belief was true, a belief which we should express as the thinking that A is B. For in order to doubt whether our previous condition was one of knowledge, we have to think of it not as knowledge but as only belief, and our only question can be ‘was this belief true?”
“But as soon as we see that we are thinking of our previous condition as only one of belief, we see that what we are now doubting is not what we first said we were doubting, viz. whether a previous condition of knowledge was really knowledge. Hence, to remove the doubt, it is only necessary to appreciate the real nature of our consciousness apprehending, e.g. that 7 x 4 = 28, and thereby see that it was no mere condition of believing but a condition of knowing, and then to notice that in our subsequent doubt what we are really doubting is not whether this consciousness was really knowledge, but whether a consciousness of another kind, viz. a belief that 7 x 4 = 28, was true. We thereby see that though a doubt based on speculative grounds is possible, it is not a doubt concerning what we believed the doubt concerned, and that a doubt concerning this latter is impossible.”1
The most important applications are in the general philosophy of realism, which contends that things are what they are. Other applications are especially in the field of international relations, where the nature of the political system is unchanging. Realism would still maintain that in this system, only certain things are inherently good.


LINCOLN DOUGLAS DEBATE APPLICATIONS

The most effective means of using Prichard in a debate round would be as a counter-warrant to Kant or Berkeley, or to undermine claims to moral high ground. Inevitably, your opponent will claim that some action is warranted because it is based on a moral principle that must be upheld, be it “justice,” “truth,” or “fairness.” In order to question the interpretation of that principle and call into question what it means, a utilization of Prichard would be helpful.


In terms of Kant and Berkeley, Prichard serves as a warrant to the general realist mindset, something that is fundamentally contrary to the beliefs of commonly cited liberals. The application is useful in defining ideal state foreign policy, by following a Thucydian or Machiavellian system of politicking. That is, Prichard could be cited as proof that there exists a single set system of values when it comes to foreign policies, and thus that states should work towards promoting their own interests since other states will not agree to a cooperative effort, or will, at least, betray one if it does exist.
In terms of other applications, it seems especially useful to undermine the general claim by many debaters to the moral high ground. This can be achieved by using Prichard’s argument that moral theory in general is illegitimate, and thus that there is no effective means of proving one thing to hold moral superiority over another. Moral theory assumes that morality can be debated, or can have differing explanations by various philosophers. Prichard rejects this, and uses a set standard.
In addition, Prichard offers a unique avenue of criterion argumentation, because his theory requires the consideration of prima facie variables that many weighing mechanisms to not take into account. Prichard would be a perfect counter-warrant to a utilitarianism criterion, whether it’s Mill or Moore.
Prichard could also helpful in value and criterion argumentation in another way. His process of evaluating definitions opens the door to criticizing an opponent’s interpretation of a concept based on what it excludes.
That is to say, if in the context of a round an opponent claims that your argument does not fall within the realm of her value as defined. You could then argue that the exclusion of your argument or example constitutes a reason to reject your opponent’s definition. The evaluation, however, is applied to the process of defining instead of to the object being excluded.
Clearly, there exist a number of ways that Prichard would be useful in LD debate rounds, especially since his concepts are sufficiently non-unique to allow their application to a variety of issues.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

MacAdam, Jim. MORAL WRITINGS. Editor’s Introduction. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002.


Prichard, H.A. “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?” MORAL WRITINGS, Ed. Jim MacAdam.
New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002.
Prichard, H.A. “Duty and Interest” MORA LWRITINGS, Ed. Jim MacAdam. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002.
Prichard, H.A. “Green: Political Obligation” MORAL WRITINGS, Ed. Jim MacAdam. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002.
Prichard, H.A. “Kant’s Fundamental Principles of Metaphysic of Morals” MORAL WRITINGS , Ed. Jim

MacAdam. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002.


Prichard, H.A. KNOWLEDGE AND PERCEPTION: ESSAYS AND LECTURES. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1950.
Prichard, H.A. “Moral Obligation” MORAL WRITINGS, Ed. Jim MacAdam. New York: Oxford Univ. Press,

2002.
Prichard, H.A. “What is the Basis of Moral Obligation?” MORAL WRITINGS, Ed. Jim MacAdam.

New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002.
Sobel, J.H. GOOD AND GOLD: METAETHICS FROM G. E. MOORE THROUGH J. L. MACKIE-- A JUDGEMENTAL HISTORY. Univ. of Toronto, Feb 2003.



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