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BIBLIOGRAPHY

AYN RAND LETTER, THE. Volumes 1-4, 1971-1976. New Milford: Second Renaissance, 1990.


Branden, Barbara. THE PASSION OF AYN RAND: A BIOGRAPHY. New York: Doubleday, 1986.
Branden, Nathaniel. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-ESTEEM: A NEW CONCEPT OF MAN’S PSYCHOLOGICAL NATURE. New York: Bantam, 1969.
Branden, Nathaniel. JUDGMENT DAY: MY YEARS WITH AYN RAND. Houghton Mifflin, 1989.
Collier, James Lincoln. THE RISE OF SELFISHNESS IN AMERICA. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
Den Uyl, Douglas J., and Douglas B. Rasmussen, eds. THE PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT OF AYN RAND. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984.
Ellis, Albert. IS OBJECTIVISM A RELIGION? New York: Institute for Rational Living, 1968.
Erickson, Peter. THE STANCE OF ATLAS: AN EXAMINATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF AYN RAND. Portland: Herakles Press, 1997.
Gladstein, Mimi Reisel. THE AYN RAND COMPANION. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984.
Greenberg, Sid. AYN RAND AND ALIENATION: THE PLATONIC IDEALISM OF THE OBJECTIVIST ETHICS. San Francisco: Sid Greenberg, 1977.
Mayhew, Robert, ed. AYN RAND’S MARGINALIA. New Milford: Second Renaissance, 1995.
Merrill, Ronald E. THE IDEAS OF AYN RAND. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1991.
Peikoff, Leonard. THE OMINOUS PARALLELS: THE END OF FREEDOM IN AMERICA. New York: New American University, 1882.
Peikoff, Leonard. OBJECTIVISM: THE PHILOSOPHY OF AYN RAND. New York: Dutton, 1991.
Rand, Ayn. FOR THE NEW INTELLECTUAL. New York: Random House, 1961.
Rand, Ayn. THE NEW LEFT: THE ANTI-INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION. Revised 2nd edition. New York: Signet, 1963.
Rand, Ayn and Nathaniel Branden. THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS. New York: New American Library, 1964.
Robbins, John W. ANSWER TO AYN RAND. Washington D.C.: Mount Vernon Publishing, 1974.
Walker, Jeff. THE AYN RAND CULT. Chicago: Open Court, 1999.
A special thank you to Jeff Walker for answering questions related to the writing of this article.

OBJECTIVIST REASON IS FLAWED AND DANGEROUS

1. OBJECTIVIST CLAIMS TO REASON ARE AS DANGEROUS AS THE FRENCH REVOLUTION’S

John W. Robbins, Ph.D in political philosophy at Johns Hopkins University, ANSWER TO AYN RAND, 1974, p.4

Humanism is the heart of the ideological underpinnings of both the French Revolution and of Objectivism, and there is reason to fear that the practical results of the latter will be similar to those of the former, if no coherent criticism is made of Objectivism. It is ironical that the greatest danger to human beings is humanist thought. The main presupposition of all humanist thought is the autonomy of reason, that is, all humanist philosophers claim that their philosophies are independent of religious presuppositions.' This claim is quite explicit in Rand, for throughout her work, she draws a hard and fast line between "reason" and faith," maintaining that her philosophy, and hers alone is based upon "reason," ("Reason is the faculty that perceives, identifies, and integrates the material provided by his senses.")" while all others (with the possible exception of Aristotle to the degree that he agrees with Rand) are based upon "faith." ("Faith is the commitment of one's consciousness to beliefs, for which one has no sensory evidence or rational proof.")" Objectivism is the only rational philosophy; all others are irrational. Indeed, "rational philosophy" is redundant: only philosophy can be rational; if a system of thought is not based upon and governed by "reason" it is irrational, mystical and religious. It follows logically from this that the label philosophy may be assigned only to Objectivism, while all other systems are religious, i.e., mystical.


2. OBJECTIVISM IS AS DOGMATIC AS THE HUMANISTS IT ATTACKS

John W. Robbins, Ph.D in political philosophy at Johns Hopkins University, ANSWER TO AYN RAND, 1974, p.7

In her philosophy of Objectivism, Rand is compelled to insist upon the autonomy of "reason," i.e., its independence of religious ideas, more vigorously than any other contemporary or recent philosopher. She has even requested that the term "reason" be engraved on her tombstone." Other philosophers have been influenced or overwhelmed by the depth psychologies, by radical historicism, or by existentialism and have questioned the traditional certitudes of secular thought, including the presupposition of theoretical autonomy. Prior to this modern skepticism, this dogma of autonomy was accepted uncritically, and it has been Rand's goal to reaffirm the autonomy of "reason" ". . . as the ultimate judge in matters of truth and falsehood" " on pain of skepticism. Rand is the modern champion of "reason" against the modern philosophical skeptics. But "reason" is simply a cue word that has been used by all varieties of humanists since the world began. Its derivatives, "reasonable," "unreasonable," "rational" and "irrational" are the necessary verbiage of all socialist legal systems, which are established to eliminate "unreasonable risks" to citizens or establish "reasonable standards" for their behavior. The word "reason" is a great empty vessel into which any and all meanings may be and have been poured; without it or its equivalent it is inconceivable that humanist thought and society could exist." Her position, and the position of all secular thinkers, is made problematic, not only by modern skepticism, but also by the lack of one definite meaning for the word "reason." As Dooyeweerd points out, “the traditional dogmatic view of philosophical thought . . . implies that the ultimate starting point of philosophy should be found in this thought itself. But due to the lack of a univocal sense, the pretended autonomy cannot guarantee a common basis to the different philosophical trends. On the contrary, it appears again and again that this dogma impedes a real contact between philosophical schools and trends that prove to differ in their deepest, supra-theoretical presuppositions.”

OBJECTIVISM CANNOT LEGITIMIZE POLITICAL ACTIONS

1. RAND'S PHILOSOPHY LEADS TO SKEPTICISM, HEDONISM, AND ANARCHY

John W. Robbins, Ph.D in political philosophy at Johns Hopkins University, ANSWER TO AYN RAND, 1974, p. np

Her epistemology, sensation plus abstraction, leads only to skepticism, not to knowledge. Chapter two is a digest of the many ambiguities and difficulties in Rand's epistemological theory which concludes with Branden's admission that even though all the evidence might point to a specific conclusion, one can never be sure. This, of course, is skepticism. Rand's ethics, being founded on an amoral choice, not on the "facts of reality," result in hedonism. Then her entire ethical edifice collapses because she has built it on a non-existent bridge across Hume's gap. Her politics, deriving from her theory of the sovereign individual, leads straightway to anarchism, not to a society or state, but to a "voluntary association of men acting only in their individual self-interest."


2. OBJECTIVISM IS ONLY AN UNMITIGATED HEDONISM

John W. Robbins, Ph.D in political philosophy at Johns Hopkins University, ANSWER TO AYN RAND, 1974, p.97

If, then, pleasure and pain are trustworthy guides to morality, we have here a formulation of unmitigated hedonism. Infallible guides to right and wrong courses of action are not to be disobeyed, particularly when such infallible guides are the unique source of moral knowledge. Whatever would overrule these infallible guides—pleasure and pain—must be suspect, for on what basis, aside from sense experience, are contrary judgments to be made? Identification of the good with pleasure and of the evil with pain is properly called hedonism. Rand writes that, “Sensations are an automatic response, an automatic form of knowledge, which a consciousness can neither seek nor evade. An organism that possesses only the faculty of sensation is guided by the pleasure-pain mechanism of its body, that is: by an automatic knowledge and an automatic code of values."
3. OBJECTIVISM IS CONTRADICTORY ON WHY GOVERNMENT IS NECESSARY

John W. Robbins, Ph.D in political philosophy at Johns Hopkins University, ANSWER TO AYN RAND, 1974, p.123

Our first question must be, if government be the right of self-defense externalized and objectified, why should men "delegate" their prior rights to the state? Unlike Plato and Aristotle, who taught that the state is prior to man, the individual, Rand teaches that man, the individual, is prior to the state. The priority may not be temporal, but it is logical and moral. Why, then, should individuals surrender their rights to an "objective" agency? The answer given by Rand appears to be: because men are evil. “Such, in essence, is the proper purpose of a government, to make social existence possible to men, by protecting the benefits and com- bating the evils which men can cause to one another.” Lest the argument be misunderstood, the question is not whether some (or all) men commit specific evil actions, for Rand is quite willing to admit that some men do and thereby deserve to be called evil men. The question is whether or not all men are ethically evil by nature, whether or not there is a one hundred percent chance of a man doing evil at some time. It is this idea of Original Sin that Rand castigates as "this monstrous absurdity." "° For Rand, as for the Enlightenment thinkers. Nature is normative: "To hold man's nature as his sin is, a mockery of nature." " It must be concluded then that Rand believes man to be naturally good, or at least morally neutral. Now these two beliefs, namely that government is necessary, and that man is naturally neutral or good are in conflict. The conflict erupts into view in Rand's essay: "Conservatism: an Obituary." Rand attacks the view that government is necessary because man is depraved: “This argument runs as follows: since men are weak, fallible, non-omniscient and innately depraved, no man may be entrusted with the responsibility of being a dictator and of ruling everybody else; therefore, a free society is the proper way of life for imperfect creatures. Please grasp fully the implications of this argument: since men are depraved, they are not good enough for a dictatorship; freedom is all that they deserve; if they were perfect, they would be worthy of a totalitarian state.” As the author has pointed out before,'''" the argument is persuasive only because Rand juxtaposes two contradictory concepts: perfect man and totalitarian state. This is a variant of the fallacy of the stolen concept: "totalitarian state" presupposes evil men. The argument is forceful only because Rand contradicts herself.



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