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John Rawls Political Philosopher



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John Rawls

Political Philosopher

John Rawls, a philosophy professor at Harvard University, interest surrounds the issue of justice as Fairness. Rawls early work assumes a “well-ordered society,” one that is stable, relatively homogenous in its basic moral beliefs and in which there is broad agreement about what constitutes the good life. However, in modern democratic society a plurality of incompatible and irreconcilable doctrines--religious, philosophical, and moral--coexist within the framework of democratic institutions. In an attempt to explain Rawls’ theory, this essay will examine his notions of: (1) society, (2) “Justice as Fairness,” (3) political power and action, (4) values, and (5) application to debate


Indeed, free institutions themselves encourage this plurality of doctrines as the normal outgrowth of freedom over time. Recognizing institutions as a permanent condition of democracy, Rawls asks how can a stable and just society of free and equal citizens live in concord when deeply divided by reasonable though incompatible doctrines? His answer is based on a redefinition of a “well-ordered society.” It is no longer a society united in its basic moral beliefs, but in its political conception of justice, and this justice is the focus of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. That is, to say that a society is well-ordered conveys three things: first it is a society in which everyone accepts and knows that everyone else accepts, the very same principles of justice, and second, its basic structure--that is, its main political and social institutions and how they fit together as one system of cooperation--is publicly known, or with good reason believed to satisfy these principles. Finally, its citizens have a normally effective sense of justice and so they generally comply with society’s basic institutions, which they regard as just. In such a society the publicly recognized conception of justice establishes a shared point of view from which citizens’

claim on society can be judged.


As an answer to contemporary views of justice, justice as fairness is now presented as an example of such political conception; that it can be the focus of an overlapping consensus means that, understood as a political conception, it can be endorsed by the main religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines that endure over time in a well-ordered society. Such an overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines, Rawls believes represents the most likely basis of social unity available in a constitutional democratic regime. Were it achieved, it would extend and complete the movement of thought that began three centuries ago with the gradual if reluctant acceptance of the principle of toleration. This process would end with the full acceptance and understanding of modern liberties. In sum, Rawls argues that the evaluation of values of liberty and equality have long been controversial. Rawls contends that the aim of justice as fairness is to resolve the controversy in which the fair terms of cooperation are agreed upon by citizens so conceived.
In presenting a theory of justice Rawls has tried to bring together into one coherent view the ideas expressed throughout his writings. Rawls assumes that a diversity of reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines found in democratic societies is a permanent feature of the public culture and not a mere historical condition soon to pass away. Granted all this we ask: When may citizens by their vote properly exercise their coercive political power over one another when fundamental questions are at stake? To this question political liberalism replies: Our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance to our constitution. Rawls argues that the constitution provides citizens with reasonable and justifiable principles that guide our action. The reliance on the constitution and other documents, Rawls labels, as the liberal principle of legitimacy. Rawls’ notion of legitimacy is that public reasoning and value should be found in common sense and the methods of science.
Rawls contends that there are two kinds of political values. The first are the values of political justice. These values fall under the principles of justice for the basic structure: the values of equal political and civil liberty; equality of opportunity; the values of social equality and economic reciprocity; and let us add also values of the common good as well as the various necessary conditions for all these values. Second, are the values of public reason. These values fall under the guidelines for public inquiry, which make the inquiry free and public. Also included here are such political virtues as reasonableness and a readiness to honor the moral duty of civility, which as virtues of citizens help to make possible reasoned public discussion of political questions.

The integration of Rawls’ theory into academic debate can take a number of forms. Initially, any debate that focuses around the value of justice, liberty or fairness should invite a discussion of Rawls. In addition, the debater could use Rawls to justify the value of justice and provide the criteria of fairness to evaluate the value. In addition, Rawls has much to say about political practice insofar as justice is concerned. For example, the debater could use Rawls’ work on civil disobedience, or moral authority to respond to a number of value claims.


Bibliography

Brian M. Barry. THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE PRINCIPAL DOCTRINES IN A THEORY OF JUSTICE BY JOHN RAWLS. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973.


Kenneth Baynes. THE NORMATIVE GROUNDS OF SOCIAL CRITICISM: KANT, RAWLS AND HABERMAS. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992.
H. Gene Blocker, & Elizabeth H. Smith, ed. JOHN RAWLS’S THEORY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1980.
Norman E. Bowie. “Some Comments on Rawls’ Theory of Justice. SOCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 6 (1980): 65-74.
J. Angelo Corlett, ed. EQUALITY AND LIBERTY. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991. Norman Daniels, ed. READING RAWLS: CRITICAL STUDIES ON RAWLS’ A THEORY OF JUSTICE. New York: Basic Books, 1975.
David Gauthier. “Justice and Natural Endowment Toward a Critique of Rawls’ Ideological Framework.”

SOCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 6(1980): 3-26.


Vimt Haksar. “Rawls’ Theory of Justice.” ANALYSIS 32 (1972): 149-153.
R. M. Hare. “Critical Study: Rawls’ Theory of Justice--Il.” PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 23 (1973):

241-252.
John C. Harsanyi. “Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls’s Theory.” AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 69(1975): 594-606.


Chandran Kukatlias. RAWLS: A THEORY OF JUSTICE AND ITS CRITICS. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990.
Rex Martin. RAWLS AND RIGHTS. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1985.
Stephen Mulhall. LIBERALS AND COMMUNITARIANS. Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Kai Nielsen & Roger A. Shiner, ed. NEW ESSAYS ON CONTRACT THEORY. Guelph, Ont.: Canadian Association for Publishing in Philosophy, 1977.
Thomas Winfried Menko Pogge. REALIZING RAWLS. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989.
John Rawls. POLITICAL LIBERALISM. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
John Rawls. A THEORY OF JUSTICE. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971.
David Lewis Schaefer. JUSTICE OR TYRANNY?: A CRITIQUE OF JOHN RAWLS’S A THEORY OF JUSTICE. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1979.
John P. Sterba. “Justice as Desert.” SOCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 6 (1980): 101-116.
Michael Teitelman. “The Limits of Individualism.” JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 69 (1975):545-556.


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