Prolif good – War


Exts – Yes Build Small Arsenals



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Exts – Yes Build Small Arsenals


Five reasons they’ll build small arsenals.

Seng, 1998

[Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, p.56-57]


Kenneth Waltz argues that leaders in all new nuclear states will build only small arsenals. His claim rests primarily on the assumption that all new nuclear states will believe they only need to threaten adversaries with the destruction of one or two cities to ensure stable deterrence, and that they subsequently will be reluctant to dedicate massive resources to building large nuclear arsenals.' My claim is less broad, and it concerns only stares in the developing world. I argue that conditions in the developing world are such that whether leaders think they need to be able to destroy only one city or believe they should have the capability to achieve complete societal destruction of an adversary, they very likely will judge that only very small nuclear arsenals are needed for the job. Moreover, because conditions are such that arsenal buildups will exact high economic, political and security costs on developing states, it is very unlikely they will build more weapons than they believe they need. What follows is an examination of the specific conditions on which these claims are based. There are five main reasons to expect small arsenals among nuclear states in the developing world. They include 1) the limited number of targets developing states will have to worry about, 2) fears concerning 'regional suicide' through nuclear fallout, 3) economic constraints related to nuclear production and military budgets, 4) the specific manner in which developing states reap political rewards and prestige from nuclear weapons development, and 5) the requirements of keeping nuclear arsenals opaque. These factors can carry a cumulative weight in developing state proliferators, which is to say that their cumulative effect may serve to constrain arsenal buildup when the individual effect of any one of them may not be sufficient. They also reinforce each other in important ways, meaning that if policymakers recognize the existence of one or some of the conditions they are likely to recognize most or all of them, and thus their cumulative weight is likely CO be felt. Not all the factors discussed here will apply to all proliferators and potential proliferators in the developing world; however, it is not necessary that they do. It is simply necessary that enough of the factors apply, or that one of them applies strongly enough, to generate the essential constraining effects. This is very likely to be the case in all developing world situations.

Only small arsenals – fallout fear.

Seng, 1998

[Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, p.71-72]



Among geographically close adversaries, fears concerning nuclear fallout definitely would eliminate the nuclear barrage tactics mentioned above. Barrage tactics would involve blanketing large sections of an enemy's territory with nuclear bombs. This bombing method might be used to generate greater levels of collateral destruction (especially in areas where population and industry are not concentrated) or as a counteroffensive measure in instances in which the exact location of an enemy's weapons are not known. I3 Either way, barrage tactics are likely to be a self-destructive. The large numbers of weapons employed in a nuclear barrage would generate extremely high levels of fallout. High levels of fallout are olso me concern if one is separated from the target state by a big ocean, but they are of great concern in one's enemy is right across the border. In any case, all nuclear explosions generate fallout; only its scope is uncertain, and a shift in wind could mean the difference between strategic victory and great loss of life within one's homeland. Fallout fears may not be enough to deter all nuclear attacks, but they would be a significant limiter on the scale of those attacks. Accordingly, the value of having large arsenals with many weapons is diminished.
Opacity requirements will keep new arsenals small.

Seng, 1998

[Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, p.56-57]



Limited nuclear proliferation in developing states involves both small arsenals and conditions of opacity. These characteristics function together to help provide the basis for limited means nuclear deterrence. They are also interrelated. The requirements of opacity generate pressure on emerging nuclear states to keep arsenals numerically small. Numerically small arsenals help facilitate opacity. Large arsenals are simply harder to hide. Opaque weapons must be stored secretly or somehow obscured in the field, and the more of them there are, the more difficult this will be. Also, the larger the arsenal, the harder it is for opaque nuclear states to maintain tight control of information about its existence and extent. Large arsenals will require greater numbers of people to maintain and supervise them, much moreso if weapons are actually deployed in the field. The larger the circle of officials and personnel 'in the know,' the more difficult it will be to contain information leaks and/or observations from outsiders. It is difficult to say at what point a developing state's arsenal would become too big to remain opaque; but it is safe to say that the bigger it is, the harder it is to obscure its existence. States that want to keep the existence of their weapons in question will want to keep numbers of weapons as small as possible. Of course, whether or not the requirements of keeping nuclear developments opaque constrain nuclear buildup will depend on how highly the emerging nuclear state values opacity. For several reasons, though, opacity is very useful. And so we turn to the next section and the next important question: why do developing states employ policies of opaque proliferation?
No incentive for large arsenals.

Seng, 1998

[Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, p.66-67]

In sum, developing state proliferators simply will not need anything beyond very small numbers of nuclear weapons. Urban concentrations in the developing world mean that large percentages of developing state populations can be devastated by targeting just a handful of cities with nuclear weapons; and the limited resources available for relief and rebuilding in developing states mean that each bomb dropped on those cities will do relatively more damage than bombs dropped on developed states. The diffusion of population outside key cities in many developing states means that the marginal value of dropping bombs beyond the number required for destroying key cities would be small, and the value of building up arsenals diminishes accordingly. Finally, due to likely asymmetries of interest, developing states will only need to threaten developed states with relatively limited damage in order to deter them effectively.

No adversaries = no large buildup


Seng, 1998

[Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, 67]


Developing states are not world powers. Their spheres of military concern are small and regionally bounded. The adversaries with which developing states are concerned will be their regional neighbors. Enemies will be right next door. or at least very close. This observation is important for two main reasons. First, it is rare that developing states face numerous enemy states. Their limited spheres of concern generally will restrict the potential number of conflictual relationships they might have. Only so many carp can Ht into a backyard pond. The fewer the adversaries a developing state has, the fewer number of targets it will have to worry about hitting. Whereas the former Soviet Union worried about targets in the United States, Britain. France, Germany. China and possibly Israel, Pakistan worries only about India. Some developing states have a couple major adversaries, and Israel has to worry about several . but as a general rule one can expect the geographically limited military concerns of developing states to act as a limiter on arsenal develoomentf



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