Prolif good – War



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Prolif → BMD




Prolif causes BMD buildup


Cimbala 6 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Comparative Strategy, “Missile Defenses in a “Deuces Wild” Context: Proliferation, Terror and Deterrent Disorder,” vol. 25, issue 1, 1/1/2006, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Missile+Defenses+in+a+%22Deuces+Wild%22+Context%3A+Proliferation%2C+Terror+and+Deterrent+Disorder&rft.jtitle=Comparative+Strategy&rft.au=Stephen+J+Cimbala&rft.date=2006-02-01&rft.issn=0149-5933&rft.volume=25&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=1&rft.externalDBID=FCST&rft.externalDocID=1182855721 /mr)

Third, proliferation has all but pushed the NPT regime into receivership, and nuclear weapons spread in Asia has the potential to collapse into a tsunami of conflict spital. In this environment, the interest of regional states in theater or national missile defenses may grow: either in BMD provided by offshore protectors (America, Russia) or in home-grown varieties for the wealthier and larger states. Purpose-built missile defenses may help some states to avoid nuclear blackmail by powers inside or outside of their immediate region. However, missiie defenses without retaliatory forces will not deter a serious competitor or antagonist.

Prolif Bad – Environment




Prolif causes massive environmental destruction.


Christ and Zheutlin ‘1  (Michael, Ex. Dir. And Peter, Associate Prog. Dir. – International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Tikkun, “Stop Playing the Nuclear Game.” 16:3, May/June, Ebsco)

Even if nuclear weapons are never used in war, by accident, miscalculation, or in a terrorist attack, the legacy of radioactive and toxic contamination from the testing, production, and maintenance of nuclear arsenals over the last half-century presents intractable and costly long-term problems. Workers who were exposed to radiation and chemical hazards as they toiled in nuclear weapons plants and those living downwind of such sites continue to suffer disproportionate rates of work-related death and disease. Some nuclear weapons production sites, such as the Hanford Reservation in Washington state and Chelyabinsk in Russia, still pose potentially catastrophic health and environmental risks. Cleaning up contaminated soil and water and quarantining sites that cannot be cleaned--sites the government has called "national sacrifice zones"--will cost untold billions of dollars over hundreds--and perhaps thousands--of years. Holding onto existing nuclear arsenals, along with the proliferation of new ones, only compounds these enormous health, safety, and environmental problems.

Prolif Bad – Heg




Prolif destroys heg and diplomacy --

a. Proliferation affects each state differently. The largest determinant of whether proliferation is good or bad is an individual state’s power projection capabilities – this understanding of proliferation is comparatively better for policymakers.


Matthew Kroenig, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, assistant professor at Georgetown University, held academic fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California, research focuses on international security, nuclear proliferation, soft power, and terrorism, writes for Security StudiesForeign Affairs, Foreign Policy, received the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Award for Outstanding Achievement, 6/17/2008 (“Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation,” Matthew Kroenig, Accessed online at http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Kroenig_Beyond%20Optimism%20and%20Pessimism.pdf, Accessed on 7/22/2011)

This power-based theory provides a better account of the differential effects of nuclear proliferation than alternative explanations based on political relationships or nuclear possession. Whether nuclear weapons spread to friends or foes influences the nature and the degree of the proliferation threat, but I will show that a state’s political relationship with the new nuclear-weapon state is less important than a state’s power-projection capability in determining whether nuclear proliferation will advantage or disadvantage a state’s security. Further, I demonstrate that the threat that a state faces as nuclear weapons spread does not depend on whether the state itself possesses nuclear weapons. By moving beyond optimism and pessimism to consider the differential effects of nuclear proliferation at the unit level, this article makes a number of contributions to our theoretical understanding of nuclear proliferation. First, understanding the effects of nuclear proliferation on states, the units that compose the international system, is important in its own right. Second, the debate about the consequences of nuclear proliferation at the systemic level could be informed through a better understanding of the unit-level effects of nuclear proliferation, because unit-level effects may aggregate to influence systemic outcomes. Third, this article demonstrates that nuclear proliferation has differential effects. Sagan argues that the spread of nuclear weapons is bad, Waltz argues that it is good, and this article sets out the argument that it depends: the spread of nuclear weapons is bad for power-projecting states and can be good for non-power-projecting states. This novel approach promises to reinvigorate the scholarly study of the consequences of nuclear proliferation by establishing a research agenda on the differential effects of nuclear proliferation. Further studies could identify and examine the factors, other than power projection, that shape the degree to which states will be threatened by the spread of nuclear weapons. Fourth, explaining the differential effects of nuclear proliferation is the first step in developing a theory to explain variation in state responses to nuclear proliferation in other states. Empirically, we see that states respond very differently to the prospect of nuclear proliferation in other states. At one extreme, states are willing to use military force to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. At the other extreme, states provide sensitive nuclear assistance to help additional states acquire nuclear weapons. Without a better understanding of the conditions under which nuclear proliferation will positively or negatively influence the security environments of different types of states, we cannot begin to explain why states support or oppose the spread of nuclear weapons in particular cases. If the argument of this article is correct, a state’s ability to project power over a particular state should be an important factor that determines whether, and the degree to which, a state will oppose nuclear proliferation to that state. Finally, the unit-level focus of this research is well-suited to meet the demands of nuclear nonproliferation policymakers. Government officials do not make policy with the primary aim of contributing to the stability of the international system; rather, they pursue policies that will promote the interests of their own state.6 This article explains the nature of the threat that nuclear proliferation poses to different types of states, helping intelligence analysts and policymakers better understand the effects of nuclear proliferation on their own security environment and how other key states may respond to important nuclear proliferation issues.


b. Proliferation hurts power-projecting states like the US while strengthening our enemies – proliferation hurts hegemony by decreasing our ability to leverage coercive diplomacy


Matthew Kroenig, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, assistant professor at Georgetown University, held academic fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California, research focuses on international security, nuclear proliferation, soft power, and terrorism, writes for Security StudiesForeign Affairs, Foreign Policy, received the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Award for Outstanding Achievement, 6/17/2008 (“Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation,” Matthew Kroenig, Accessed online at http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Kroenig_Beyond%20Optimism%20and%20Pessimism.pdf, Accessed on 7/22/2011)

To contribute to our understanding of the consequences of the spread of nuclear weapons, this article proposes a theory of nuclear proliferation that examines the effects of nuclear proliferation at the unit level. I argue that nuclear proliferation threatens some states more than others and that the threat posed by nuclear proliferation depends on a state’s ability to project military power. States that have the ability to project military power over a particular target state, states that I call “power-projecting states,” incur many costs and accrue few benefits when that target state acquires nuclear weapons.5 I claim that these states are threatened by nuclear proliferation largely because the spread of nuclear weapons constrains their conventional military freedom of action. Of course, there are other potential negative consequences of nuclear proliferation, including the low-probability, high-consequence threat of nuclear war. I argue, however, that leaders in power-projecting states are primarily concerned that nuclear proliferation will: deter them from using military intervention to secure their interests, reduce the effectiveness of their coercive diplomacy, trigger regional instability that could engulf them in conflict, weaken the integrity of their alliance structures, dissipate their strategic attention, and set off further nuclear proliferation within their spheres of influence. On the other hand, states that lack the ability to project military power over a target state, states that I call “non-power-projecting states,” incur fewer strategic costs and have the potential to accrue strategic benefits when that target state acquires nuclear weapons. Because they lack the advantages afforded by a viable military option, the spread of nuclear weapons does not further undermine their strategic position. Their relative weakness precludes them from: using military intervention to secure their interests, using military coercion as a tool of diplomacy, intervening in regional crises, extending security guarantees as a means to cement their alliance structures, needing to monitor new nuclear states, or needing to worry about further nuclear proliferation beyond their limited spheres of influence. Non-power-projecting states may incur other costs as nuclear weapons spread, but the strategic costs of nuclear proliferation enumerated above are concentrated on power-projecting states. For these reasons, non-power-projecting states are, on average, less threatened by nuclear proliferation. Moreover, the spread of nuclear weapons can, in certain circumstances, actually improve the strategic environment of non-powerprojecting states, even if they lack nuclear weapons themselves, because the spread of nuclear weapons constrains other, more powerful states. Indeed, I will show that non-power-projecting states can even promote the spread of nuclear weapons as a way to impose strategic costs on more powerful states, shifting the international balance of power in their favor.




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