Their prolif good turns assume a Soviet and American influence – they don’t apply to Asia
Cimbala 5 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Comparative Strategy, “Nuclear Prolifeartion in Asia and Missile Defense,” vol. 24, issue 4, 10/1/ 2005, http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=ba28c7bd-0ee6-4c79-ad0b-b188b88681eb%40sessionmgr114&vid=2&hid=1232F13518040500341809&rft.externalDBID=FSMS&rft.externalDocID=976978281 /mr)
This author disputes the argument that “more is better” when it comes to nuclear weapons spread. But he acknowledges that the “more is better” school has some arguments that require serious discussion. On the evidence, nuclear weapons do make leaders more cautious about getting into wars and about employing weapons of mass destruction against their enemies, once having been engaged in war. But during the Cold War and even during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the international system was constrained by the existence of American and (declining) Soviet international influence and their overbearing nuclear arsenals. A future nuclear arms race in Asia will take place in a very different political, and military, context.
Cimbala 6 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Defense & Security Analysis, “Strategic Reassurance in a Proliferation-Permissive World: American and Russian Options,” vol. 22, issue 3, 9/2006, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Strategic+Reassurance+in+a+Proliferation-Permissive+orld%3A+American+and+Russian+Options&rft.jtitle=Defense+%26+Security+Analysis&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen+J&rft.date=2006-09-01&rft.issn=1475-1798&rft.volume=22&rft.issue=3&rft.spage=221&rft.epage=239&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080%2F14751790600933830&rft.externalDBID=n%2Fa&rft.externalDocID=10_1080_14751790600933830 /mr)
The spread of nuclear weapons into parts ofthe Middle East with strategic reach into Asia complicates further the issues of deterrence and crisis stability. The case of Iran, under diplomatic pressure from the US and the European Union to reverse its course toward the development of nuclear weapons, has all the earmarks of a potential crisis.* Israel is a de facto nuclear weapons state, and an Iranian nuclear deterrent once deployed will factor into the diplomatic and military calculations of leaders in Riyadh, Cairo, Amman and Damascus. In addition, an Iranian nuclear deterrent poses problems for US military commitments to Iraq and Afghanistan. First, Iran may use its nuclear weapons for diplomatic coercion against US and allied supporters of the governments in Kabul and in Baghdad. Second, more than a trivial number of deployed nuclear weapons gives Iran an "access denial" strategy of its own against military intervention from outside the region.
Middle East Prolif Bad – General
Middle East prolif causes destabilizing arms races, escalation, and nuclear terrorism.
IHT ‘6 (Noah Feldman, “Nuclear holocaust: A risk too big even for martyrs?” 10-27, http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/10/27/news/bombforweb.php)
Adding the nuclear ingredient to this volatile mix will certainly produce an arms race. If Iran is going to get the bomb, its neighbors will have no choice but to keep up. North Korea, now protected by its own bomb, has threatened proliferation - and in the Middle East it would find a number of willing buyers. Small principalities with huge U.S. Air Force bases, like Qatar, might choose to rely on an American protective umbrella. But Saudi Arabia, which has always seen Iran as a threatening competitor, will not be willing to place its nuclear security entirely in American hands. Once the Saudis are in the hunt, Egypt will need nuclear weapons to keep it from becoming irrelevant to the regional power balance - and sure enough, last month Gamal Mubarak, President Mubarak's son and Egypt's heir apparent, very publicly announced that Egypt should pursue a nuclear program. Given the increasing instability of the Middle East, nuclear proliferation there is more worrisome than almost anywhere else on earth. As nuclear technology spreads, terrorists will enjoy increasing odds of getting their hands on nuclear weapons. States - including North Korea - might sell bombs or give them to favored proxy allies, the way Iran gave Hezbollah medium-range rockets that Hezbollah used this summer during its war with Israel. Bombing through an intermediary has its advantages: deniability is, after all, the name of the game for a government trying to avoid nuclear retaliation. Proliferation could also happen in other ways. Imagine a succession crisis in which the Saudi government fragments and control over nuclear weapons, should the Saudis have acquired them, falls into the hands of Saudi elites who are sympathetic to Osama bin Laden, or at least to his ideas. Or Al Qaeda itself could purchase ready-made bombs, a feat technically much less difficult than designing nuclear weapons from scratch. So far, there are few nuclear powers from whom such bombs can be directly bought: as of today, only nine nations in the world belong to the nuclear club. But as more countries get the bomb, tracing the seller will become harder and harder, and the incentive to make a sale will increase.