Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China



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2AC Solvency AT #2—Sanctions Fail

They say sanctions won’t work, but

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  1. Extend our evidence.

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It’s much better than their evidence because:

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(it’s newer) (the author is more qualified) (it has more facts)

(their evidence is not logical/contradicts itself) (history proves it to be true)

(their evidence has no facts) (Their author is biased) (it takes into account their argument)

( ) (their evidence supports our argument)

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and this reason matters because: ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________



  1. Reducing military aggression will bring North Korea to the negotiating table



Zhe, February 2016 [Sun, Sun Zhe is currently an adjunct senior research scholar and co-director of the China Initiative at School of International and Public Affairs of Columbia University, “What New Approach Should the U.S. and China Take to North Korea?”, February 10, https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/what-new-approach-should-us-and-china-take-north-korea]
North Korea’s continued bomb tests have apparently infuriated China, so why is Beijing still reluctant to react with harsh sanctions? China’s policy on North Korea reflects both its regional interests and global aspirations. There are two main aspects: first, China does not want to hurt or is not ready to abandon the traditional relationship and turn itself into an enemy of the DPRK. As a matter of fact, China has tried very hard to push a three- step dialogue, beginning with a consensus between the North and South, extending to a North Korea-U.S. dialogue, and then ending with a peaceful solution found in the Six Party Talks. China’s logic is that the DPRK will not give up its provocative acts unless it obtains a minimum security guarantee from the U.S. If all these positive steps cannot be achieved, then at least the head-on blow against the DPRK should not come from China directly. Secondly, any change of China’s North Korea policy should not be seen as a product of U.S.-China cooperation to put pressure on North Korea. Indeed, despite serious debates in China over whether North Korea is a strategic liability or an asset, many Chinese commentators are deeply concerned with military reactions by the U.S. and its allies in the region. The general perception that the U.S. spares no efforts to keep China, rather than North Korea, down is real among Chinese citizens and government officials. For instance, the U.S. overreacted by sending B-2s and B52s to participate in repeated military drills in the past. North Korea should be free of nuclear weapons but launching any regime-change strike against Pyongyang should not be the policy choice. Even a THAAD system in the region, in China’s view, might compose a bigger challenge to regional security than did North Korea’s latest launch. The contest of will between North Korea and international community will continue but it is necessary for the U.S. and China to better comprehend each other’s policy limits and fashion some joint actions to help avoid conflicts and confrontations that neither side wants on the Korean Peninsula. It will not be easy to do it, since the U.S. seems to lose “strategic patience” on China as well. Without China’s cooperation, will the U.S. mobilize its allies and take unilateral military actions such as a surgical strike against the DPRK? It’s highly unlikely at this time. The question left for us to consider then is this: If relations between China and the U.S. over the last two decades can generally be characterized as a mix of broad contact, substantial cooperation, deep competition, and occasional confrontation, can these two countries launch another round of dialogue on the Korean issue to find a way of turning black clouds into silver linings? Perhaps neither side is ready yet. But without these two countries working together, a “forced choice” strategy putting new pressure for North Korea will not work alone.

  1. Sanctions solve



Freeman, February 2016 [Carla, Executive Director of the Foreign Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), where she is concurrently Associate Director of the China Studies program and an Associate Research Professor, “What New Approach Should the U.S. and China Take to North Korea?”, February 10, https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/what-new-approach-should-us-and-china-take-north-korea]
The United States’ current policy toward North Korea is a reflection of frustration with past failures and fantasies born of misplaced hope. Frustration and exhaustion are the yield of years of fruitless negotiations with Pyongyang after the Bush Administration’s retrospectively disastrous trashing of Clinton’s efforts referred to by John Delury. Misplaced hope relates to this frustration and exhaustion and is reflected in the decision to let North Korea—China’s ally and territorial neighbor, after all—be China’s problem: the policy characterized as “strategic patience” of the Obama Administration. The assumption is that the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty mirrors U.S.-style alliance relationships. Misplaced hope weaves our secret dream that the North Korean state will collapse amid cries for democracy or that somehow “the real” western-educated Kim Jong-un will emerge and lead his country down a path of reform and opening despite the brutal evidence to the contrary. Kim Jong-un assumed the title of “marshal,” signaling the formal consolidation of his leadership after the country enshrined its nuclear status in its Constitution—making the threat of an existential threat to the regime from the U.S. and its allies existential. The Six Party Talks as a denuclearization process is among the growing stack of corpses of those executed for their failure to serve the interests of the state. It is clearer than ever before that neither change from within North Korea nor old modes of engaging the regime will achieve the US goal of denuclearization. For a brief moment, it seemed as if South Korea under President Park’s determined leadership could carve a new path toward peace and security on the peninsula by focusing on reunification, a trustpolitik in which through her good offices both China and the U.S. could also be engaged. However, in response to North Korea’s recent provocations, for the first time since the South Korea-North Korea joint industrial park at Kaesong was opened, Seoul unilaterally closed the symbolic facility. Since Park’s ambitious vision is stalled and neither China’s calls to get back to the Six Party table, nor American strategic patience or pleas to Beijing to get Pyongyang in line are working, what should the U.S. do? Sanctions offer a punitive response but not a strategy—they can help create conditions for negotiations or can contribute to but rarely cause internally-driven policy change on the part of the targeted state. One response beyond sanctions seems to be to move toward deploying THAAD, which has a defensive logic but is akin to putting a gated community in a crime-ridden neighborhood. It doesn’t solve the reasons the neighborhood is tough and it makes it harder to work with everyone outside the gates. The U.S. now finds itself in a position where it needs to be both bolder and even more patient, developing a strategy that will have to rest on several factors that the U.S. has so far found difficult to fully accept. First, the U.S. should see North Korea as operating from a position of pathological insecurity and attendant mistrust. Now, however, North Korea is also like the suicidal person on the roof but instead of a gun to the head it is armed with nuclear material—it is in command of the situation. Second, the U.S. should act from the understanding that for many reasons a surgical strike on North Korea’s nuclear facilities carries potential costs that are far too high to rationally entertain. Third, U.S. policy must proceed from the view that achieving the goal of denuclearization given the development of North Korea’s nuclear program is more difficult than ever. These factors add up to the conclusion that, unless we are so committed to waiting for Godot that we are willing to risk more threats to the security of ourselves and our allies, diplomacy is the only option. The U.S. must open bilateral talks with North Korea, while working intimately with South Korea and consulting with China, as well as other stakeholders in the region. Tighter, tougher sanctions and moving toward the deployment of greater strategic assets in the South can generate an environment more conducive to talks. With denuclearization as the goal, negotiations will assuredly be long and tortuous. They may enhance stability and help build trust, and perhaps even help to slow weapons development, but to have any chance of achieving greater outcomes will require putting something Pyongyang wants on the table.

  1. Exchanging security assurances for strong economic sanctions resolves North Korean aggression



Kleine-Ahlbrandt, 2014 [Stephanie, joined the U.S. Institute of Peace as Director of the Asia-Pacific Program in August 2013. Previously, she set up and ran the Beijing office of the International Crisis Group for five years, engaging in research, analysis and promotion of policy prescriptions on the role of China in conflict areas around the world and its relations with neighboring countries. “U.S.-China Cooperation on North Korea: What are the Options?” June 9,
United States policy towards North Korea aims at achieving verifiable steps toward denuclearization -- which China says it wants, too. The U.S. believes that the best way to accomplish this is through targeted financial measures and conditional engagement. Beijing disagrees. It argues that Pyongyang needs security assurances and encouragement for economic reform, and that this might produce a willingness in the long term on Pyongyang’s part to revisit its nuclear weapons program. Meanwhile, Pyongyang’s nuclear stockpile continues to expand, missile delivery systems are being improved, the danger grows of spreading nuclear weapons technology, and the threat to U.S. allies increases. Clearly the U.S. tactic of trying to persuade China to come over to its approach isn’t having the desired effect. The idea that China can and will compel Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons cannot be the basis of sound U.S. policy. Following North Korea’s 3rd nuclear test [in February 2013], Western officials and analysts interpreted President Xi Jinping’s stronger emphasis on denuclearization as a sign of a policy shift and greater convergence between U.S. and Chinese national interests. But this shift in rhetoric did not translate into any measures to press North Korea to denuclearize or in any sense change Chinese priorities on the [Korean] Peninsula. While China does not want a nuclear North Korea, what it wants even less are scenarios such as war, the collapse of the regime, or a reunited Peninsula [that] allows a U.S. presence on [China’s] border . Even when Chinese analysts believe North Korea’s weapons buildup damages China’s strategic interests, they think that North Korea is simply trying to guarantee its security in the face of existential threats from the United States. In this regard, they cite examples such as Iraq, the NATO operation in Libya and now Ukraine as evidence that renunciation of weapons of mass destruction would only result in regime change. Beijing arguably maintains an interest in the survival of the North Korean regime for its own domestic legitimacy. At a time when President Xi is working to bolster his [Chinese Communist] Party’s standing through ambitious anti-corruption measures and a bold economic reform program, the last thing he needs is the failure or collapse of a communist regime next door. And these fears are [exacerbated] by the fact that the Chinese see the fall of Myanmar to western values as a country on China’s border that is now falling into the western camp. China sees the nuclear issue as just one component of its broader bilateral relationship with North Korea, which is based on a policy of sustaining the country to integrate it more fully into the international economy. Chinese officials see economic engagement as part of a long-term process that will ultimately change North Korea’s strategic calculations with regard to nuclear weapons. To be sure, there is not much affection left between China and North Korea. But Chinese mistrust of the U.S. remains the primary obstacle to meaningful U.S. cooperation on the Peninsula. When China looks at North Korea, it does so through a geopolitical strategic lens featuring U.S.-China competition at its core. Consensus amongst analysts in Beijing is that the U.S.-led bloc is using North Korea as a pretext to deepen its Asia rebalance, to strengthen regional alliances, move missile defense and military assets to the region and expand military exercises. As a result of this mismatch [of] strategic views between the U.S. and China, the very tools being used by both sides are arguably contradictory. Whereas Washington sees diplomatic isolation as essential, China sees diplomatic engagement and dialogue as necessary. Where Washington sees economic sanctions as the best way to deal with the Peninsula, China sees economic cooperation and support as the best way to move forward. And finally, where the U.S sees deterrence as important, China sees security assurances as necessary. So in this situation, what can actually be done? Well, there are no good options, only a series of trade-offs. The basic choice for U.S. policymakers is [among]: trying to change China’s perception of its self interest, which is highly unlikely; applying more pressure on China in return for its [reacting] more strongly to things like any new long-range missile launches or nuclear tests -- Beijing could agree, conceivably, to some new increment of punishment after any nuclear test, ballistic missile flight-test or space launch; or attempting to find a more collaborative approach that draws on China’s interest in engaging North Korea alongside continued U.S.-led multilateral pressure.


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