Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China


NC/1NR AT #1—China Taiwan War Now



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2NC/1NR AT #1—China Taiwan War Now



They say China Taiwan war coming now, but

[GIVE :05 SUMMARY OF OPPONENT’S SINGLE ARGUMENT]



  1. Extend our Krepinevich evidence.

[PUT IN YOUR AUTHOR’S NAME]

It’s much better than their Schreer evidence because: [PUT IN THEIR AUTHOR’S NAME]

[CIRCLE ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS]:

(it’s newer) (the author is more qualified) (it has more facts)

(their evidence is not logical/contradicts itself) (history proves it to be true)

(their evidence has no facts) (Their author is biased) (it takes into account their argument)

(It’s predictive/talks about the future) (their evidence supports our argument)

[WRITE IN YOUR OWN!]


[EXPLAIN HOW YOUR OPTION IS TRUE BELOW]

Our evidence talks about the future of the US, China, and Taiwan relationship, especially in terms of the military. It says that the US will “based 60% of its troops by 2020”. Also, our evidence assumes that there will be disagreements, but military strength will check China and assure Taiwan.
[EXPLAIN WHY YOUR OPTION MATTERS BELOW]

This matters because: the status quo is safe now. If we do not do the plan, then now war will erupt killing millions.

  1. China-Taiwan relations high now



Brookings Institution, 2010 [International affairs journal, “China’s Growing Strength, Taiwan's Diminishing Options”, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2010/11/china-taiwan-wang]
The Taiwan Strait, often considered one of the most dangerous flashpoints in international politics, appears stable at present. The last crisis took place some fifteen years ago in 1995-96, when China launched missiles which landed off Taiwan's coast in an attempt to intimidate politicians and voters and sway the island’s presidential election. Cross-strait relations have improved significantly since President Ma Ying-jeou took office in 2008. The two sides have signed a series of agreements on direct flights, financial cooperation, crime fighting, tourism promotion, and reduction of trade barriers. People-to-people contacts have intensified and economic links have strengthened. Beijing ceased to actively oppose Taiwan’s participation in some international organizations that do not require statehood for membership, such as the World Health Assembly. The infamous “checkbook diplomacy” in which each side tried to outbid the other in stealing diplomatic partners has been put on hold, replaced by a tacit “diplomatic truce.” In Beijing, the Hu Jintao leadership has shown remarkable skill in dealing with Taiwan. Hu and other Chinese officials seemed to realize that the hardball tactics and harsh rhetoric of the past had driven Taiwan further away from China. To remedy this, they embarked upon a “hearts and minds” strategy aiming to win over Taiwan's voters. The focus of this new strategy was on preventing Taiwan from drifting toward independence. Beijing muted the unpopular “one country, two systems” formula for unification and avoided reminding Taiwan that the use of force to deter independence or compel unification was still an option. To bring the island closer, Chinese leaders promised the benefits of closer economic, cultural, educational, and other ties for the Taiwanese people. For instance, Beijing opened the mainland market to agricultural products from southern Taiwan, an area traditionally unfriendly toward China; mainland universities meted out preferential treatment to Taiwanese students; academic scholars from both sides regularly held joint conferences; Taiwanese businesses received low-cost loans for investing on the mainland; daily direct cross-Strait flights helped revitalize Taiwan’s ailing airline industry and airports; and the influx of mainland tourists provided tangible gains to Taiwan's domestic economy.

  1. US military presence contains China and North Korea



Hao, April 2016 [Su, director of the Center for Strategic and Peace studies, China Foreign Affairs University, and president of Beijing Geopolitical Strategy and Development Association, “Six-Party Talks most rational choice to solve Pyongyang nuclear conundrum”, April 4, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/977138.shtml]
It's true that conditions and timing to restart the talks are still immature. The planned US deployment of the THAAD missile defense system despite firm opposition from China and Russia further complicates the North Korean nuclear conundrum. Washington has its own strategic calculations. Taking North Korea's provocations including nuclear tests and satellite launch as pretexts, Washington is aimed at strengthening its military presence on the Korean Peninsula and consolidating its military alliances in Northeast Asia. The US is advancing its "rebalancing to the Asia Pacific" strategy with the explicit strategic purposes of forming a military system combining defensive and offensive operations in the West Pacific region, especially in East Asia. Despite being a US military ally, South Korea hasn't been fully integrated into this potential system. Therefore, Washington needs to sustain Seoul's reliance on the US by manipulating external pressures and draw the country into its military system. Due to China's opposition, the US and South Korea had misgivings about openly discussing the deployment of the THAAD system in the past. But now, North Korea's nuclear activities offer them an excuse, creating conditions for the US to advance its military deployment in Northeast Asia. North Korea's recent acts are ostensibly directed against the US; however, they to some extent tally with the US military strategic demands, helping the US get the effects it wants. The US wants to maintain its dominant position in the Asia-Pacific region, which poses great challenges to China and Russia. The nuclear ambitions of Pyongyang directly threaten the security of the two countries. Yet a graver challenge is that the US is taking the chance to constitute a pan-Pacific military system and build strategic superiority to press Russia and China.

  1. Military containment is working



Chanlett-Avery, Rinehart, and Nikitin, January 2016 [Emma, Coordinator Specialist in Asian Affairs, Ian, Analyst in Asian Affairs, Mary Beth D. Specialist in Nonproliferation, Congressional Research Service Report, “North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation”, January 15, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41259.pdf]
The United States, Japan, and (to a lesser extent) South Korea have deployed ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems to protect their territory and military forces from the threat of North Korean attacks. During the 2009 and 2012 North Korean long-range missile tests, U.S. and allied forces reportedly made ready and available a number of BMD systems, in addition to the intelligence gathering capabilities sent into the region. Japan deployed Patriot interceptor batteries around Tokyo and on its southwestern islands, in the event of an errant missile or debris headed toward Japanese territory.57 Aegis BMD ships deployed to the area as well. In response to the heightened tensions in spring 2013, the U.S. military accelerated deployment of a ground-based Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) BMD system to Guam, two years ahead of schedule. As part of the efforts by the United States and its allies to change China’s strategic thinking about North Korea, the BMD deployments may have an impact. Chinese media made the Patriot deployments a major part of their coverage of the April 2012 launch.58 A subtext to those reports was that North Korea’s actions are feeding military developments in Asia that are not in China’s interests. Many observers, particularly in the United States and Japan, argue that continued North Korean ballistic missile development increases the need to bolster regional BMD capabilities and cooperation. For more information, see CRS Report R43116, Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition, by Ian E. Rinehart, Steven A. Hildreth, and Susan V. Lawrence.



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