T- can’t Be qpq answers 4 t-have to Be Positive Incentives Answers 6
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ContentsT Answers 3 T- Can’t Be QPQ Answers 4 T—Have to Be Positive Incentives Answers 6 T--Diplomatic is Not Military Answers 7 T-Dialogue Answers 9 Disad Answers 11 China-Russia Relations Answers 12 Elections Answers 14 Japan Rearm Answers 17 Counterplans Answers 21 Peace Treaty Advantage Counterplan Answers 22 Kritik Answers 24 Cap K Answers 25 Neo-Liberalism K Answers 29 Orientalism K Answers 36 Securitization Kritik Answers 43 Whiteness K Answers 47 Whiteness Kritik Answers 48 Case Turn Answers 57 AT: North Korea Famine Turn 58 A2: Appeasement 59 A2: THAAD key to Assurances 60 A2: THAAD Forces Pressure 62 A2: Mutual Suspicion 63 T AnswersT- Can’t Be QPQ AnswersCounter-interp: Economic engagement can be conditional or unconditional.Kahler and Kastner 6 — Miles Kahler, Rohr Professor of Pacific International Relations at the school of International Relations and Pacific Studies and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California-San Diego, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University, and Scott L. Kastner, Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Maryland, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California-San Diego, 2006 (“Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait,” Journal of Peace Research, Volume 43, Number 5, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via SAGE Publications Online, p. 524-525) Economic engagement – a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and improve bilateral political relations – is a subject of growing interest in international relations. Most research on economic statecraft emphasizes coercive policies such as economic sanctions. This emphasis on negative forms of economic statecraft is not without justification: the use of economic sanctions is widespread and well documented, and several quantitative studies have shown that adversarial relations between countries tend to correspond to reduced, rather than enhanced, levels of trade (Gowa, 1994; Pollins, 1989). At the same time, however, relatively little is known about how often strategies of economic engagement are deployed: scholars disagree on this point, in part because no database cataloging instances of positive economic statecraft exists (Mastanduno, 2003). Beginning with the classic work of Hirschman (1945), most studies of economic engagement have been limited to the policies of great powers (Mastanduno, 1992; Davis, 1999; Skalnes, 2000; Papayoanou & Kastner, 1999/2000; Copeland, 1999/2000; Abdelal & Kirshner, 1999/2000). However, engagement policies adopted by South Korea and one other state examined in this study, Taiwan, demonstrate that engagement is not a strategy limited to the domain of great power politics and that it may be more widespread than previously recognized. We begin by developing a theoretical approach to strategies of economic engagement. Based on the existing literature, our framework distinguishes different forms of economic engagement and identifies the factors likely to facilitate or undermine the implementation of these strategies. We then evaluate our hypotheses by examining the use of economic engagement on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait. Because our conclusions are derived from a small number of cases, we are cautious in making claims that our findings can be generalized. The narratives that we provide and the conclusions that we draw from them may, however, spur further research on this interesting and important feature of security policy and international politics. Economic Engagement: Strategies and Expectations Scholars have usefully distinguished between two types of economic engagement: conditional policies that require an explicit quid pro quo on the part of the target country and policies that are unconditional.1 Conditional policies, sometimes labeled linkage or economic ‘carrots’, are the inverse of economic sanctions. Instead of threatening a target country with economic loss (sanction) in the absence of policy change, conditional engagement policies promise increased economic benefits in return for desired policy change. Drezner (1999/2000) has proposed several plausible predictions regarding the employment of conditional [end page 524] strategies and the conditions of their success. He argues that the successful use of economic engagement is most likely between democracies (because democracies are better able to make credible commitments than non-democracies), within the context of international regimes (because regimes reduce the transactions costs of market exchange), and, among adversaries, only after coercive threats are first used. The success of a conditional engagement strategy should also be contingent on a state’s influence over domestic firms. If those firms find market-based transactions with the target state unappealing, a government pursuing a conditional strategy must convince them to deal with the target when desired change occurs. On the other hand, if domestic firms have strong economic incentives to conduct economic transactions with the target state, a successful conditional strategy must prevent them from pursuing their economic exchange in the absence of the desired change in a target state’s behavior. In this regard, democracies may have a harder time pursuing a conditional strategy: in a democratic setting, firms are likely to be openly critical of politicians who try to restrict their commercial activities and will support candidates who do not place such demands on them. Our first hypothesis (H1), therefore, is that conditional engagement strategies will be less likely to succeed if the initiating state is a democracy, especially when underlying economic incentives to trade with or invest in the target state are strong.2 Unconditional engagement strategies are more passive than conditional variants in that they do not include a specific quid pro quo. Rather, countries deploy economic links with an adversary in the hopes that economic interdependence itself will, over time, change the target’s foreign policy behavior and yield a reduced threat of military conflict. How increased economic integration at the bilateral level might produce an improved bilateral political environment is not obvious. While most empirical studies on the subject find that increased economic ties tend to be associated with a reduced likelihood of military violence, no consensus explanation exists (e.g. Russett & Oneal, 2001; Oneal & Russett, 1999; for less sanguine results, see Barbieri, 1996). At a minimum, state leaders might seek to exploit two causal pathways by pursuing a policy of unconditional engagement: economic interdependence can act as a constraint on the foreign policy behavior of the target state, and economic interdependence can act as a transforming agent that reshapes the goals of the target state. We meet the counter-interpretation because we are a quid pro quo.They overlimit—they prevent AFF’s that require a positive change from China which limits out South China Sea AFF’s, the Pakistan AFF, the Taiwan AFF etc.Their interpretation isn’t exclusive: their evidence says unconditional engagement is topical, but not that a quid pro quo isn’tReasonability: Good is good enough on Topicality.Functional limits: have to have a solvency advocate for your quid pro quo.We’re educational: we cause education on North Korea who is arguably the most dangerous country on the planet.T—Have to Be Positive Incentives Answers(--) We meet because we are engaging with China and cooperating with them, which is positive.(--) We meet because we are getting rid of THAAD which is positive.(--) Sanctions include positive incentivesInternational Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences 1 – “Sanctions in Political Science”, http://www.krivda.net/books/-international_encyclopedia_of_the_social_and_behavioral_sciences_10_-_sanctions_in_political_science_41 A sanction is an action by one actor (A) intended to affect the behavior of another actor (B) by enhancing or reducing the values available to B. Influence attempts by A using actual or threatened punishments of B are instances of negative sanctions. Influence attempts by A using actual or promised rewards to B are instances of positive sanctions. Not all influence attempts involve sanctions. Actor A may influence actor B by reason, example, or the provision of information without the use of sanctions. (--) Reasonability: Good is good enough on topicality.T--Diplomatic is Not Military Answers(--) Counter-interpretation: Diplomatic relations refers to the diplomatic intercourse between nations.U.S. LEGAL DICTIONARY, 2014. Retrieved Apr. 25, 2016 from http://definitions.uslegal.com/d/diplomatic-relations/. Diplomatic relations refers to the customary diplomatic intercourse between nations. It involves permanent contact and communication between sovereign countries. As a part of the diplomatic relations two countries send diplomats to work in each other’s country and to deal with each other formally. (--) The plan meets the counter-interpretation: it negotiates an agreement with China to not deploy THAAD.(--) We meet: The plan is diplomatic engagement:Zhu Feng, 2016 (Executive Director of China Center for Collaborative Studies of the South China Sea at Nanjing University) What New Approach Should the U.S. and China Take to North Korea? Feb. 9, 2016. Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/what-new-approach-should-us-and-china-take-north-korea When China and the U.S. decide together to adopt such a big stick, the international community should simultaneously take tougher sanctions more seriously. Washington needs to lower the threshold of diplomatic engagement, and even promise security guarantees to the Pyongyang regime as North Korea simply agrees to suspend the development of the nation’s nuclear capability. Smothering North Korea for its nuclear capability seems the only workable alternative. China and the United States should not line up to meet North Korea’s exorbitant demands, and instead should jointly make clear that keeping nuclear weapons would be deadly costly. (--) And we meet economic engagement: Selling military equipment is “economic” --- this is a reasonable distinction that excludes weapons useBaldwin 85 – David A., Professor of World Order Studies and Political Science at Colombia, Economic Statecraft, p. 31 There are, as always, borderline cases that are hard to classify. For example, should the sale or gift of military hardware be considered as economic or military statecraft? In general, the relevant distinction is between firing (or threatening to fire) weapons and selling (or promising to sell) them. Insofar as a market price for such items exists, these transactions could reasonably be labeled economic statecraft. A plausible case could also be made for classifying them as military since some items, e.g. nuclear bombs, may have no "going market price." Also, since providing weapons is so closely related to military statecraft, some might want to treat it as such. Depending on the particular research interest at hand, one might decide to classify them either way. The existence of such borderline cases, however, does not do serious harm to the value of this concept of economic statecraft for most purposes. (--) Their evidence says that diplomatic engagement is not the use of force or the sending of troops to solve a problem—but we negotiate the agreement, so we are topical.(--) They overlimit: They limit out cases about the South China Sea, the East China Sea, North Korea, and all of China’s disputes.(--) We don’t hurt ground—we link to all disads about improving US-Chinese relations.(--) Reasonability: good is good enough on Topicality. (--) Our interpretation is more educational: we allow education on North Korea, currently the most dangerous nation on the planet. T-Dialogue Answers(--) We meet: we negotiate an agreement with China.(--) Counter-interpretation: Diplomatic relations refers to the diplomatic intercourse between nations.U.S. LEGAL DICTIONARY, 2014. Retrieved Apr. 25, 2016 from http://definitions.uslegal.com/d/diplomatic-relations/. Diplomatic relations refers to the customary diplomatic intercourse between nations. It involves permanent contact and communication between sovereign countries. As a part of the diplomatic relations two countries send diplomats to work in each other’s country and to deal with each other formally. (--) The plan meets the counter-interpretation: it negotiates an agreement with China to not deploy THAAD.(--) We meet: The plan is diplomatic engagement:Zhu Feng, 2016 (Executive Director of China Center for Collaborative Studies of the South China Sea at Nanjing University) What New Approach Should the U.S. and China Take to North Korea? Feb. 9, 2016. Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/what-new-approach-should-us-and-china-take-north-korea When China and the U.S. decide together to adopt such a big stick, the international community should simultaneously take tougher sanctions more seriously. Washington needs to lower the threshold of diplomatic engagement, and even promise security guarantees to the Pyongyang regime as North Korea simply agrees to suspend the development of the nation’s nuclear capability. Smothering North Korea for its nuclear capability seems the only workable alternative. China and the United States should not line up to meet North Korea’s exorbitant demands, and instead should jointly make clear that keeping nuclear weapons would be deadly costly. (--) And we meet economic engagement: Selling military equipment is “economic” --- this is a reasonable distinction that excludes weapons useBaldwin 85 – David A., Professor of World Order Studies and Political Science at Colombia, Economic Statecraft, p. 31 There are, as always, borderline cases that are hard to classify. For example, should the sale or gift of military hardware be considered as economic or military statecraft? In general, the relevant distinction is between firing (or threatening to fire) weapons and selling (or promising to sell) them. Insofar as a market price for such items exists, these transactions could reasonably be labeled economic statecraft. A plausible case could also be made for classifying them as military since some items, e.g. nuclear bombs, may have no "going market price." Also, since providing weapons is so closely related to military statecraft, some might want to treat it as such. Depending on the particular research interest at hand, one might decide to classify them either way. The existence of such borderline cases, however, does not do serious harm to the value of this concept of economic statecraft for most purposes. (--) “Economic engagement” doesn’t require formal governmental dialogueHaass 00 – Richard N. Haass, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, “Engaging Problem Countries”, Brookings Policy Brief, No. 61, June, http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/18245/1/Engaging%20Problem%20Countries.pdf?1 Engagement as a policy is not merely the antithesis of isolation. Rather, it involves the use of economic, political, or cultural incentives to influence problem countries to alter their behavior in one or more realms. Such a strategy can take a variety of forms. Conditional engagement is a government-to-government affair in which the United States offers inducements to a target regime in exchange for specified changes in behavior. This was the approach favored in 1994 when the United States and North Korea entered into a framework agreement under which Pyongyang pledged to curtail its nuclear weapons development in exchange for shipments of fuel, construction of a new generation of nuclear power-generating reactors, and a degree of diplomatic normalization. In contrast, unconditional engagement is less contractual, with incentives being extended without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Unconditional engagement makes the most sense in promoting civil society in hopes of creating an environment more conducive to reform. (--) We meet because their Resnick card says that we have to influence the political behavior which we are doing.(--) The neg is over limiting which is bad for debate because the neg would win every time because they know exactly what the aff is going to say.(--) Ground: we link to all disads that have to do with relations or economics.(--) Reasonability: good is good enough.Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 315.21 Kb. Share with your friends:
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