Resolved: The United States federal government shouldsubstantiallycurtailitsdomestic surveillance. Topic thoughts---
1. The resolution is short and contains only a couple key terms, but this is a highly complicated T topic with an exceptionally deep, complicated, and interactive debate about terminology. It is possible that few will try to push certain boundaries and so some controversies will be more relevant for academics than debaters, but it also may be one of the most engaging topics for those interested in T in some time.
2. The scope of “domestic” surveillance most likely refers to the target of action as a “U.S. Person” – a term of art for citizens and resident aliens. This draws upon statutory language and legal interpretation of FISA (The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978), a critical piece of legislation that shapes the context of the topic. It is also possible to define it as referring to the location of the surveillance activity.
3. “Surveillance” has a huge lit base, written primarily by scholars within the emerging field of “Surveillance Studies”. It is so broad that this file could not include all the great evidence available. I recommend that camps expand upon it and that students continue to research over the course of the year.
4. The strongest and most useful negative interpretation of “surveillance” is that it is information gathering with the intent to prevent something from occurring. This distinguishes “surveillance” from pure “information gathering” and requires the active purpose of suppressing behavior. This interpretation will be useful for excluding cases that restrict data collection for routine or bureaucratic purposes, or where there is not intent to use the data to surpress behavior (i.e. disaster warning, weather, environment, etc.).
5. “Curtail” is an interesting word and I am glad that the Topic Committee deviated from standard terms like “reduce”, but lacks a deep evidentiary base. Defining it as “restrict” for the purposes of limits is strong.
Director of Debate
Michigan State University
“Domestic” surveillance is defined by the target---the subject of surveillance must be U.S. persons
Donohue 6 – Laura K. Donohue, Fellow, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, “ANGLO-AMERICAN PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE”, Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, Spring, 96 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1059, Lexis
5. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
As the extent of the domestic surveillance operations emerged, Congress attempted to scale back the Executive's power while leaving some flexibility to address national security threats. n183 The legislature focused on the targets of surveillance, limiting a new law to foreign powers, and agents of foreign powers - which included groups "engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor." n184 Congress distinguished between U.S. and non-U.S. persons, creating tougher standards for the former. n185
n185. The former included citizens and resident aliens, as well incorporated entities and unincorporated associations with a substantial number of U.S. persons. Non-U.S. persons qualified as an "agent of a foreign power" by virtue of membership - e.g., if they were an officer or employee of a foreign power, or if they participated in an international terrorist organization. Id. 1801(i). U.S. persons had to engage knowingly in the collection of intelligence contrary to U.S. interests, the assumption of false identity for the benefit of a foreign power, and aiding or abetting others to the same. Id. 1801(b).
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") considered any "acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any wire or radio communication," as well as other means of surveillance, such as video, to fall under the new restrictions. n186 Central to the statute's understanding of surveillance was that, by definition, consent had not been given by the target. Otherwise, the individual would have a reasonable expectation of privacy and, under ordinary circumstances, the Fourth Amendment would require a warrant. n187
They curtail foreign, not domestic, surveillance---voting issue:
Limits---the explode the topic to include all foreign spying and espionage. There are hundreds of military and specific country Affs, each with distinct lit bases and advantages---makes in-depth preparation impossible
Precision---our interpretation is based on FISA, the gold standard for defining surveillance
Chiarella 97 – Major Louis A Chiarella, Chief, Administrative Law Office of the Staff Judge Advocate Fort Carson, Colorado and Major Michael A. Newton Professor, International and Operational Law Department The Judge Advocate General’s School, United States Army Charlottesville, Virginia, ““So Judge, How Do I Get That FISA Warrant?”: The Policy and Procedure for Conducting Electronic Surveillance”, THE ARMY LAWYER, October, http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/sojudge.pdf
What is the FISA?
On 25 October 1978, President Carter signed the FISA into law. The explicit purpose of the FISA was to balance the protection of individual privacy with the needs of national security through the development of a regulatory framework for certain counterintelligence activities of the executive branch of the federal government.31 Many factors necessitated this express balancing act. First, the Supreme Court’s decision in Keith did not address the extent of the executive’s constitutional powers in the area of counterintelligence.32 Writing for the majority, Justice Powell explicitly stated that the opinion made no judgment on the scope of the President’s surveillance power with respect to the activities of foreign powers or their agents.33 Second, congressional hearings revealed that both the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had operated outside the law, in the name of intelligence collection.34 The Church Committee35 realized that counterintelligence was essential to the preservation of American civil liberties, and it recognized the need to collect intelligence and to establish appropriate limits on intrusive investigative techniques.36 Through the efforts of key officials from the DOJ and the Church Committee,37 the FISA became “the gold standard of legality in the world of counterintelligence.” 38
The FISA is a complex statute, with an elaborate structure and flexible procedures. 39 It is not, however, a comprehensive statute for all intelligence activities. The FISA regulates counterintelligence investigations;40 it does not extend to domestic security investigations. The FISA also regulates specific counterintelligence collection techniques—primarily “electronic surveillance,”41 but physical searches as well. Other intelligence collection techniques have separate statutory and regulatory provisions.42 Additionally, the FISA has no extraterritorial applicability;43 therefore, it does not regulate the use of electronic surveillance outside of the United States. Because of the limited application under the FISA, there are other statutory and regulatory sources which control other counterintelligence activities.
All electronic surveillance for counterintelligence purposes within the United States is subject to the requirements of the FISA. This does not mean, however, that prior judicial authorization is always required. The Attorney General may acquire foreign intelligence information for periods up to a year without a judicial order if the Attorney General certifies in writing under oath that:
(A) the electronic surveillance is solely directed at . . . communications used exclusively between or among foreign powers44. . . [or] technical intelligence, other than the spoken communications of individuals, from property or premises under the open and exclusive control of a foreign power . . .;
(B) there is no substantial likelihood that the surveillance will acquire the contents of any communication to which a United States person is a party; and (C) the proposed minimization procedures45 . . . meet [the statutory definition] of minimization procedures . . . . 46
Domestic surveillance targets U.S. persons
Freiwald 9 – Susan Freiwald, Professor, University of San Francisco School of Law, “ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AT THE VIRTUAL BORDER”, MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL, 1-14, http://www.olemiss.edu/depts/ncjrl/pdf/ljournal09Freiwald.pdf
That a member of the judiciary must be intimately involved in purely domestic surveillance for violations of domestic crimes and that the executive branch has discretion over purely foreign surveillance of foreign people in foreign places seems clear.22 But many, if not most, surveillance operations are neither purely domestic nor purely foreign, which substantially complicates the analysis. In fact, regulation of government surveillance of communications depends on so many factors that the rules Congress has formulated to handle them seem almost impenetrably complex.23
The pertinent statutory provisions may be found in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”).24 Those rules currently grant more discretion to executive branch monitors when (1) the purpose of the investigation is to gather foreign intelligence information rather than information pertaining to criminal offenses, (2) the target of the surveillance is located in a foreign country rather than in the United States, (3) the monitoring itself is conducted in a foreign place rather than in the United States, (4) the target is a foreign citizen rather than a U.S. citizen or a resident alien, (5) the U.S. Person targeted communicates with someone in a foreign country rather than here, (6) there is probable cause to believe that the U.S. Person targeted is an agent of a foreign power rather than there being no association between the target and a foreign power.25 Any one scenario involves some combination of the above pairings, which makes it even more difficult to determine the correct rule.
While the FISA scheme is a creature of Congress, it must conform to constitutional constraints.26 As Part II discusses, Fourth Amendment precedents require the judiciary to oversee executive branch surveillance of purely “domestic” surveillance.27 But the Fourth Amendment has much less, if anything, to say about executive branch conduct of purely “foreign” surveillance.28 One could defensibly arrange the scenarios along a spectrum from most “domestic,” and therefore protected by the Fourth Amendment, to most “foreign,” and therefore least protected.
Rather than viewing the Fourth Amendment as providing decreasing judicial oversight as the character of the electronic surveillance becomes increasingly foreign, however, one could instead view Fourth Amendment protection as being all or nothing. In other words, one could view the Fourth Amendment as providing strict regulation for purely domestic investigations and no regulation for purely foreign investigations because the latter are governed by executive branch discretion. Then one would view the rules for cases that fall in the middle as designed to determine whether to treat the investigation as domestic or foreign. Under this view, in cases that are neither clearly domestic nor clearly foreign, the judge’s role would be to review the executive’s decision to deprive the target of judicial oversight of the surveillance that the Fourth Amendment mandates. The executive makes such a determination when a target effectively acts in the interest of a foreign power; in such a case, the executive may be said to “exile” that target if she is a U.S. Person.29
In this analysis, the virtual border plays a key role. On this side of the virtual border, domestic targets enjoy extensive judicial review of executive branch surveillance, pursuant to the dictates of the Fourth Amendment.30 On the other side, foreign targets are subject to whatever electronic surveillance the executive branch chooses to conduct in the exercise of its foreign affair powers.31 Foreign targets have no right to complain about surveillance techniques in our courts, though they may of course raise their complaints in their own courts.32
That is not to say that judicial review over mixed domestic and foreign cases is not mandated by the Fourth Amendment, but rather that judicial oversight in these cases plays an additional role besides keeping electronic surveillance within permissible bounds. In addition, judges review the executive branch’s decision to exile and ensure that U.S. Persons are not deprived of their Fourth Amendment rights either by being exiled over the virtual border without sufficient cause, or by being swept up in the surveillance of exiled U.S. Persons and foreigners.33 The Fourth Amendment also calls for admitting foreign people inside our virtual border in some cases. For example, resident aliens and those with sufficient connections to this country who are targeted in ordinary criminal investigations benefit from the highest level of Fourth Amendment protection of their communications, even though they are not American citizens.34
By viewing the Fourth Amendment regulation of electronic surveillance as “on” for surveillance of people on the domestic side of the virtual border and “off” for those on the foreign side of the border, one can get a clearer view of how much is at stake in the “exiling decision.” With that in mind, one can appreciate the importance of judicial oversight of the executive’s decision to exile and can assess the rules governing that decision by how well they protect against improper exile.35 Again, while one may view judicial review in these cases as quasi-constitutional Fourth Amendment protection,36 one should also evaluate the judiciary’s performance of its responsibility to oversee the exiling decision.
As mentioned, FISA contains the rules that determine the amount of review provided by a judge over the exiling decision.37 As will be discussed in Part II, those rules permit the executive branch to use special procedures that accord meaningfully fewer rights to foreign targets.38 Foreign targets include those who are neither American citizens nor resident aliens (which together constitute “U.S. Persons”). But such targets also include those U.S. Persons who have effectively become foreigners through virtual exile. To exile a U.S. Person across the virtual border, high level executive branch officials must have probable cause to believe that the U.S. Person targeted for exile works as an “[a]gent of a foreign power,”39 and the officials must seek “foreign intelligence information”40 about that agent. If a reviewing judge approves the executive branch’s showing, agents may conduct surveillance of the exiled target without according her the full Fourth Amendment rights granted to domestic targets.4
“Domestic surveillance” is only against U.S. citizens---anything else is spying
Ross 12 – Jeffrey Ian Ross, Professor in the School of Criminal Justice, College of Public Affairs, and a Research Fellow of the Center for International and Comparative Law, and the Schaefer Center for Public Policy, at the University of Baltimore, An Introduction to Political Crime, p. 101
Domestic surveillance consists of a variety of information-gathering activities, conducted primarily by the states coercive agencies (that is, police, national security, and the military). These actions are carried out against citizens, foreigners, organizations (for example, businesses, political parties, etc.), and foreign governments. Such operations usually include opening mail, listening to telephone conversations (eavesdropping and wiretapping), reading electronic communications, and infiltrating groups (whether they are legal, illegal, or deviant).
Although a legitimate law enforcement/intelligence-gathering technique, surveillance is often considered unpalatable to the public in general and civil libertarians in particular. This is especially true when state agents break the law by conducting searches without warrants, collecting evidence that is beyond the scope of a warrant, or harassing and/or destabilizing their targets.1 These activities arc illegal (because the Constitution, statutes, regulations, and ordinances specify the conditions under which surveillance may be conducted), and they violate individual rights to privacy.
Not only should legitimate surveillance be distinguished from illegal domestic surveillance, but the latter practice should also be separated from espionage/spying.2 In short, spying/espionage, covered in chapter four, is conducted against a foreign government, its businesses, and/or its citizens, and illegal domestic surveillance takes place inside a specific individual’s country.
Strict limits on “domestic” are vital to meaningful debate about the topic---our interpretation is already sufficiently broad because there are many forms of intelligence gathering about U.S. persons---expanding the topic more wrecks it
Small 8 – Matthew L. Small, United States Air Force Academy, “His Eyes are Watching You: Domestic Surveillance, Civil Liberties and Executive Power during Times of National Crisis”, cspc.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/Fellows2008/Small.pdf
Before one can make any sort of assessment of domestic surveillance policies, it is first necessary to narrow the scope of the term “domestic surveillance.” Domestic surveillance is a subset of intelligence gathering. Intelligence, as it is to be understood in this context, is “information that meets the stated or understood needs of policy makers and has been collected, processed and narrowed to meet those needs” (Lowenthal 2006, 2). In essence, domestic surveillance is a means to an end; the end being intelligence. The intelligence community best understands domestic surveillance as the acquisition of nonpublic information concerning United States persons (Executive Order 12333 (3.4) (i)). With this definition domestic surveillance remains an overly broad concept. This paper’s analysis, in terms of President Bush’s policies, focuses on electronic surveillance; specifically, wiretapping phone lines and obtaining caller information from phone companies. Section f of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 defines electronic surveillance as:
[T]he acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be received by a particular, known United States person who is in the United States, if the contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that United States person, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes;
Adhering to the above definition allows for a focused analysis of one part of President Bush’s domestic surveillance policy as its implementation relates to the executive’s ability to abridge certain civil liberties. However, since electronic surveillance did not become an issue of public concern until the 1920s, there would seem to be a problem with the proposed analysis.
“Domestic surveillance” refers to targets that are within the U.S.---this is the most accurate and historically grounded interpretation and vital to precise topic education
Wainstein 7 – Kenneth L. Wainstein, Assistant Attorney General for National Security on FISA Modernization at the Georgetown University Law Center’s National Security Center, Prepared Remarks at the Department of Justice, 9-10, http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007/September/07_nsd_699.html
This conference is a great idea. It gives us an opportunity to share thoughts about where our surveillance authorities should be -- how the powers should be defined and where the lines should be drawn. And the line I’d like to talk about today is the line between domestic surveillance and overseas surveillance – how the law should distinguish between those two areas of surveillance and how much each area should be subject to judicial review.
There is no question that we should have to get court orders when we want to collect domestic communications or target individuals within the U.S. The question for today is whether we should have to do so when we are targeting surveillance against a person who is outside the United States, where constitutional and privacy protections do not apply.
And, this is not a discussion with only legal or theoretical implications. There are very practical, operational implications here-- implications that will dictate whether we have sufficient coverage overseas or only narrow coverage of our foreign adversaries; whether we can move nimbly and quickly among overseas coverages, or whether we have to go through a resource-consuming court approval process before we go up on one of our adversaries.
In considering this issue, it’s useful to look back at the history and the evolution of our surveillance laws. And, when you do that you see that this is a recurring theme. There have been a number of major turning points in the law along the way, and at each of these turning points, we’ve seen the repetition and reinforcement of this fundamental distinction between foreign and domestic surveillance -- a distinction that finds its origins in the Constitutional balancing between executive authority to take efforts to protect the nation against external threats and the judiciary’s authority to protect privacy interests.
You can see this consistent theme as you go back through the evolution of the law. The first turning point in the development of our surveillance law came in the 1960s. In 1967, the Supreme Court held that telephone conversations were protected by the Fourth Amendment. The next year, Congress responded to the Court’s decision by passing the wiretap statute that established a procedure by which the government had to secure a court-issued warrant before wiretapping the subject of a criminal investigation.
While both the Supreme Court decision and the ensuing legislation were clear on the need for a warrant requirement when the government was wiretapping a person in the United States for purposes of a criminal investigation, both the Court and Congress were very careful to carve out surveillances for national security purposes. They made it clear that domestic surveillance for evidence in a criminal case was covered by the warrant requirement, but that national security surveillance involving foreign threats was not.
The next turning point came a decade later, when Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which imposed a court review mechanism for electronic surveillance designed to collect foreign intelligence information. We came to this juncture after it was disclosed in the Church and Pike Hearings that the government had abused its flexibility in the area of national security investigations to investigate domestic persons who had no connection to a foreign power. After those disclosures, Congress and the country were understandably looking for a way to ensure that the executive branch could no longer invade their privacy under the guise of protecting against foreign threats. The result was legislation that subjected our foreign intelligence surveillances to court review.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) was passed in 1978, and it created a regime of court approval for national security surveillances. However, once again, Congress reinforced the distinction between domestic and foreign surveillance. Congress designed a judicial review process that would apply primarily to surveillance activities within the United States where privacy interests are the most pronounced and not to overseas surveillance where privacy interests are minimal or non-existent. Congress gave effect to this careful balancing through its definition of the statutory term “electronic surveillance,” the term that identifies those government activities that fall within the scope of the statute and, by implication, those that fall outside it. Congress established this dichotomy by defining “electronic surveillance” by reference to the manner of the communication under surveillance -- by distinguishing between “wire” communications -- which included most of the local and domestic traffic in 1978 -- and “radio” communications -- which included most of the transoceanic traffic in that era.
Based on the communications reality of that time, that dichotomy more or less accomplished the Congressional purpose, as it distinguished between domestic communications that generally fell within FISA and foreign international communications that generally did not.
But, that finely-balanced distinction has eroded with the dramatic changes in communications technology in the 29 years since FISA was enacted. In that time, we’ve seen the migration of the majority of international communications from satellite transmission (which qualified as “radio” communications under the statute) over to fiber-optic cable (which is “wire” under the statute); and, as a result, we’ve seen the tipping of that careful balance in the FISA statute. As the technology evolved further and further away from the paradigm established in the statute, we had to subject more and more of our overseas collections to review by the FISA Court.
So we had a situation where, on one hand, we have this technological change making it more difficult for us to surveil overseas threats. And on the other, we have the backdrop of an increasing national security threat from international terrorism -- from terrorists who had hit us hard on 9/11; who were bent on inflicting catastrophic damage to us and our allies; who were taking full advantage of modern modes of communication to organize and command their international network of terrorist operatives; and who have continued to show resiliency and a determination about their work -- as reflected quite clearly in the disruption last week of a large-scale terrorist plot in Germany, and also as reflected in the recently-issued National Intelligence Estimate.
And it is the combination of these two historical trends -- the changing technology that handicapped our efforts to surveil our adversaries and the increasing threat posed by those adversaries -- that produced the turning point we came to this year.
And, this is the turning point that Congress addressed last month when they passed the Protect America Act. The legislation was very straight-forward but very effective. In short, it returned FISA to its original focus on domestic surveillance. And it did that by making it clear that -- regardless of the type of communication being surveilled or the location where the surveillance takes place -- FISA does not apply when the surveillance is targeting persons outside the United States. It does apply – and we have to get a court order – when the communications are domestic or when we target someone in the U.S. But, when the target is truly foreign, when we’re targeting someone in another country, we don’t need to go through the FISA Court.
This is true, even if communications are intercepted domestically
Lewis 7 – James Lewis, Senior Fellow and Director of Technology Policy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Domestic Surveillance, FISA, and Terrorism”, 11-7, http://csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071107_lewis.pdf
Q4: What is the distinction between foreign and domestic communications?
A4: The distinction between foreign and domestic communications was a linchpin of the 1978 act, but unfortunately, technology has eroded that distinction. FISA was careful to carve out intelligence collection of radio signals (an NSA mission) from court oversight. As telecommunications moved from satellites (a radio signal) to fiber optic cables (which the law defined as a wire and subject to the court), more foreign intelligence activities became subject to FISA than were originally intended. The Protect America Act helped to fix this problem by making clear that FISA does not apply when foreign persons outside of the United States are under surveillance, even if the communication passes through (and is intercepted) domestically. FISA should be drafted to be technologically neutral and to carefully clarify that protections apply to citizens and residents of the United States, not communications that are just passing through.
Clear distinctions between foreign and domestic surveillance are impossible because of modern communication networks
Lee 13 – Timothy B. Lee, Senior Editor at Vox, “The NSA Is Trying To Have It Both Ways On Its Domestic Spying Programs”, Washington Post, 12-22, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/22/the-nsa-is-trying-to-have-it-both-ways-on-its-domestic-spying-programs/
Traditionally, domestic surveillance powers were held by law enforcement agencies, not the NSA. And the existence of the spying powers were not secret. Everyone knows that the FBI and local police departments have the power to compel telecommunications companies to disclose their customers' communications. But first they must get a warrant, supported by probable cause, from a judge. That oversight gives Americans confidence that domestic surveillance powers won't be abused.
Things are very different when the U.S. government spies on people overseas. Obviously, U.S. intelligence agencies don't generally have the power to compel foreign telecommunications companies to cooperate with surveillance efforts. So instead of a formal legal process, they traditionally have used covert means—bribing insiders, installing bugs, tapping undersea cables, hacking into foreign networks—to intercept foreign communications. For these methods to work, the government must keep secret not only the specific surveillance targets, but the fact that the surveillance program exists at all. If the program's existence is revealed, the foreign government is likely to shut it down.
That secrecy meant that American foreign intelligence-gathering operations have not had the checks and balances that applied to domestic law enforcement surveillance. But Americans were protected by the rule that American foreign intelligence agencies were only supposed to operate overseas.
But now the Internet has made a hash of the tidy distinction between foreign and domestic surveillance. Today, citizens of France, Brazil and Nigeria routinely use Facebook, Gmail, and other American online services to communicate. Americans make calls with Skype. And much Internet traffic between two foreign countries often passes through the United States.
Eitherwholly or one-end communications are “domestic”
Dickerson 15 – Julie Dickerson, JD Candidate at Harvard Law School, “Meaningful Transparency: The Missing Numbers the NSA and FISC Should Reveal”, Harvard Law School National Security Journal, 2-17, http://harvardnsj.org/2015/02/meaningful-transparency-the-missing-numbers-the-nsa-and-fisc-should-reveal/
There are two types of domestic communications: wholly domestic (sent to and from a U.S. citizen) and one-end domestic (communications to, from, or concerning a U.S. citizen). Upstream acquisitions inadvertently sweep in tens of thousands, up to 56,000 wholly domestic communications (0.248% of all communications collected under § 702 upstream authorities). However, the number of one-end domestic communications remains unknown. The multiple categories – all Internet communications, communications collected under § 702, communications collected under the § 702 upstream program, and wholly domestic or one-end communications – combined with the mix of percentages and absolute numbers of both total data traffic and total communications can be difficult to keep straight. A simple chart placing the 56,000 wholly domestic communications (small black box below), in its greater context of all communications collected under the § 702 upstream program (the white box below) and all internet communications (big black box below), would demonstrates the NSA’s low margin of error.
1Of or relating to the running of a home or to family relations:
1.1chiefly British Of or for use in the home rather than in an industrial or office environment:
1.2(Of a person) fond of family life and running a home:
she was not at all domestic
1.3(Of an animal) tame and kept by humans:
2Existing or occurring inside a particular country; not foreign or international:
the current state of US domestic affairs
“Domestic” refers to activity in the 50 states and DC
Energy Dictionary 7 – “domestic”, 11-3http://www.photius.com/energy/glossaryd.html#domest
Domestic: See United States.
United States: The 50 States and the District of Columbia. Note: The United States has varying degrees of jurisdiction over a number of territories and other political entities outside the 50 States and the District of Columbia, including Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, Johnston Atoll, Midway Islands, Wake Island, and the Northern Mariana Islands. EIA data programs may include data from some or all of these areas in U.S. totals. For these programs, data products will contain notes explaining the extent of geographic coverage included under the term "United States."
“Domestic surveillance” must collect information from within the United States
Sladick 12 – Kelli Sladick, Blogger at the Tenth Amendment Center, “Battlefield USA: The Drones are Coming”, Tenth Amendment Center, 12-10, http://blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2012/12/battlefield-usa-the-drones-are-coming/
In a US leaked document, “Airforce Instruction 14-104”, on domestic surveillance is permitted on US citizens. It defines domestic surveillance as, “any imagery collected by satellite (national or commercial) and airborne platforms that cover the land areas of the 50 United States, the District of Columbia, and the territories and possessions of the US, to a 12 nautical mile seaward limit of these land areas.” In the leaked document, legal uses include: natural disasters, force protection, counter-terrorism, security vulnerabilities, environmental studies, navigation, and exercises.
They allow Affs that reduce surveillance internationally because data of U.S. citizens are stored in servers overseas
Tracy 15 – Sam Tracy, “NSA WHISTLEBLOWER JOHN TYE EXPLAINS EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333”, Digital Fourth, 3-18, http://warrantless.org/2015/03/tye-12333/
It’s been widely reported that the NSA, under the constitutionally suspect authority of Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, collects all Americans’ phone metadata. Congress has not yet passed any reforms to this law, but there have been many proposals for changes and the national debate is still raging. Yet Americans’ data is also being collected under a different program that’s entirely hidden from public oversight, and that was authorized under the Reagan-era Executive Order 12333.
That’s the topic of a TEDx-Charlottesville talk by whistleblower John Napier Tye, entitled “Why I spoke out against the NSA.” Tye objected to NSA surveillance while working in the US State Department. He explains that EO 12333 governs data collected overseas, as opposed to domestic surveillance which is authorized by statute. However, because Americans’ emails and other communications are stored in servers all over the globe, the distinction between domestic and international surveillance is much less salient than when the order was originally given by President Reagan in 1981.