United states military academy learning from Lightning

Methodology

In order to test this hypothesis and its two subcomponents it was necessary to closely examine the official expression of German doctrine during this period, Truppenfürhrung. ¹³ In addition to official doctrine, this paper’s analysis took advantage of doctrinal writings by personalities involved in the campaign such as Guderian’s Achtung- Panzer!, written in 1937. The structure of the German Army and its personnel management system also presents evidence of practices that fostered tighter unit cohesion and organizational trust. After examining the German expression of doctrine and the structure of the German Army, a detailed review of the German invasion of France and the Low Countries in 1940 presents evidence of German doctrine in action. This step serves as a check to ensure that the German Army practiced what it demanded on paper and that its personnel management system had the desired effect.

The method of comparing the doctrine of the German Army with its conduct on campaign was chosen precisely because it establishes the most direct link between the historical case in question and the organizational and doctrinal factors that form the core of the hypothesis. Naturally, it is nearly impossible to determine if a given action that is in agreement with doctrine was done out a conscious application of doctrinal principles or simply in accordance with them. However, if a pattern of actions in line with doctrine should emerge in the course of examining the campaign in France, it is fair to say that doctrine exerted an influence on the course of events. Also, if evidence of the qualities sought in the German personnel management system presents itself in a consistent manner, it is safe to say that those practices also had a strong hand in the outcome of the campaign. In short, if evidence of a strong doctrinal and organizational influence can be found in the course of an examination of the German invasion, this would demonstrate that these factors were primary contributors to success of Fall Gelb and the overall excellence of the Wehrmacht.

Literature Review

The explanation most widely accepted in German military circles in 1940 was that the victories of the Panzergruppe in France were the product of much organizational experimentation and theoretical work that occurred during the interwar period.²¹ The application of Strosstruppen , or storm trooper, tactics to armor formations is one of the most important intellectual developments of the period.²² The of James S. Corum treats this period in detail and explores the work German General Hans von Seeckt in exploring the use of technology to revive operational principles buried under the mud of Flanders in WWI. Guderian’s writings, in both Achtung- Panzer! and Panzer Leader are represent clear evidence of German theoretical work on armor centric combined arms warfare well ahead of such thought in the militaries of the other principal combatants.²³ Also, the fact that Germany’s Panzer divisions, large armor centric combined arms formations first formed in 1935, were unique in the militaries of the world until the eve of the war supports this line of reasoning.²⁴ The various Panzer Corps and the Panzergruppe employed by the Germans during Fall Gelb were operational experiments without precedent and without parallel until the 1942.²⁵

In many ways, German doctrinal superiority extended to the fundamental issues of the nature of war and command principles. In what may be a direct result of their experiences in World War I, the western allies and the Wehrmacht developed strikingly different outlooks on these issues. German doctrine stressed a strictly Clausewitzian view of warfare. ²⁶ This firm grounding in Clausewitz resulted in a doctrine that stressed the difficulties posed by uncertainty and friction. This image of war had several profound consequences. The German Army developed doctrine stressing decentralized command using mission type orders. The Allies relied on a modernized version of the tightly controlled methods of command that had typified operations on the Western Front.²⁷ This reliance on firm control, combined with an “engineering approach” to war would leave the Allies soundly outpaced in the face of more fluid German command principles.²⁸

Another explanation of German excellence finds its source in the way German Army created and maintained its combat formations. Structure of the German Army in World War II, from recruitment through replacement sought to instill in its combat formations a sense of trust and unit cohesion.²⁹ Because of a well thought out method of personnel management that was first and foremost oriented towards generating fighting power, the Germans experienced the unit cohesion their doctrine demanded.

Some literature on the topic takes issue with the underlying assumption that the Wehrmacht enjoyed any sort of qualitative advantage over its principal opponents in World War II. A recent addition to this line of argumentation is Keith Bonn’s When the Odds Were Even: The Vosges Mountains Campaign, October 1944- January 1945. This book’s premise is that in a situation where the German Army and American Army faced each other with roughly similar numbers of men, artillery and armor, the result was an American victory. Bonne’s argument, in its general outline, is typical of this school of thought denying that the Wehrmacht possessed a qualitative edge. A number of issues exist with the accuracy of Bonne’s analysis. One, his appraisal of the comparative quality of the American Army and the German Army in a single campaign is inherently anecdotal. This is very problematic in so much as Bonn’s findings are contrary to those findings arrived at by other scholars who examined a broader range of cases.³⁰ Additionally, Bonne’s decision to focus on the immediate situation of the American and German armies in the Vosges Mountains campaign draws an artificially narrow boundary around the comparison. In choosing a single campaign in the late stages of the war, Bonne excludes several key factors from meaningful consideration. Among those factors are the marked inferiority of the Luftwaffe in this late stage of the war, German supply shortages, the scarcity of reserves, and the fact that the training available to German replacements in this late stage of the war was not representative of the training practices the German Army maintained in most circumstances.

As demonstrated above, the topic of the excellence of the German Army in World War II has received much examination. Where this study looks to add something novel to the existing body of literature is in demonstrating the instrumentality of German doctrine and institutions to their success during Fall Gelb. This study will also add to the existing by determining what lessons of the invasion of France and the Low Countries are applicable to the U.S. Army today. By systematically establishing the principle causes of German success in Fall Gelb and comparing the conduct of the German Army in that campaign with the conduct of the American Army in major combat operations in operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom, this study will offer policy recommendations aimed at increasing the fighting effectiveness of America’s combat formations, and putting it in a better position to face the strategic and resource challenges of the future.