West Coast Publishing Surveillance 2015 november page
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- TSA/Airports AFF
- AT: Terror DA – Surveillance Fails
- Numerous attack methods inevitably overwhelm surveillance tactics
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TSA/Airports AFF 2 Airport Surveillance Aff – General 3 Aff Laundry List + AT: Terror DA 4 AT: Terror DA – Surveillance Fails 5 Body Scanners 6 Aff Laundry Lists 7 1st Amendment 9 4th Amendment 10 4th Amendment – AT: Border Search Exemption 12 4th Amendment – AT: Consent Doctrine 13 4th Amendment – AT: Older Case Law 14 4th Amendment – AT: Privacy Safeguards – Terror DA Double Bind 15 4th Amendment – AT: Terry Stops 16 Health 17 Racism + AT: Safeguards 18 AT: Terror DA – Link Turn 19 AT: Terror DA – Scanners Fail 20 Racial Profiling 23 Aff Laundry List 24 14th Amendment 25 Racism 26 Racism + AT: Crime/Terror DA – Link Turn 27 Treaties 28 AT: Terror DA – Link Turn 29 AT: Terror DA – Profiling Fails 30 Politcs TPP Disad AFF 33 *A2: UNIQUENESS* 34 TPP Won’t Pass 35 TPP is Inevitable – Opposition is Irrelevant 37 *A2: INTERNAL LINKS* 39 No Vote Anytime Soon 40 *A2: IMPACTS (TPP IS BAD)* 41 TPP Bad - General 42 TPP Bad – Economy / General 44 TPP Bad – Economy / Manufacturing 45 TPP Bad – Economy / Manufacturing 47 TPP Bad – Economy / Small Businesses 48 TPP Bad – Economy / No Free Trade 49 TPP Bad - Environment 50 TPP Bad - Environment 52 TPP Bad – Big Pharma 53 TPP Bad – China/India Economies 54 TPP Bad – Taiwan Conflict 55 TPP Bad – U.S. Hegemony / Leadership 56 TPP Bad – A2: Boosts US-China Relations 57 TPP Bad – China Containment / War 58 TSA/Airports Case Neg 59 AT: Aff Advantages 60 AT: 4th Amendment Adv – Airport Surveillance Doesn’t Violate 61 AT: 4th Amendment – Body Scanners 65 AT: 4th Amendment Adv – Luggage Sniffers 66 AT: 14th Amendment Adv – Profiling Doesn’t Violate 67 AT: Econ Adv – Body Scanners 68 AT: Health Adv – No MPX 69 AT: Health Adv – Backscatter – No MPX 70 AT: Health Adv – Millimeter Wave – No MPX 72 AT: Privacy/Civil Liberties Adv – TSA Solves 73 AT: Privacy Adv – AT: Body Scanners 74 AT: Privacy Adv – AT: Pat-Downs 76 AT: Profiling Bad Adv – General 77 AT: Profiling Bad Adv – Alt Causes 78 AT: Racism Adv – Body Scanners 79 AT: Racism Adv – Profiling – AT: Black Policing Parallels 80 CPs 81
1NC Secondary Search CP – Body Scanners 82 2NC Secondary Search CP – Solves Fourth Amendment 83 2NC Secondary Search CP – Solves Terror DA 84 1NC Lasers CP – Body Scanners 85 2NC Lasers CP – Solves 86 2NC Lasers CP – Solves 4th Amendment 87 2NC Lasers CP – Solves Terror DA + Privacy 88 DA Links 90 Terror DA Links – Body Scanners 91 Terror DA Links – Body Scanners – AT: Magnetometers 93 Terror DA Links – Body Scanners – AT: Pat-Downs 95 Terror DA Links – Profiling 96 Topicality 98 T – Profiling =/= Surveillance 99 Politcs TPP Disad NEG 100 * UNIQUENESS / INTERNAL LINKS* 101 Obama Political Capital Key / Every Drop 102 Obama Political Capital Key / Dems key 103 Obama Political Capital Key / GOP key 104 Obama Political Capital Key / Bipart 105 Obama Political Capital Key / Orrin Hatch 106 *IMPACTS* 108 TPP Good – Economy / Growth 109 TPP Good – Economy / Growth 111 TPP Good – Small Businesses / Rural America 112 TPP Good – Small Businesses / Rural America 114 TPP Good – Alternative is Protectionism / Depression 115 TPP Good – Alternative is Protectionism / No Heg 116 TPP Good – Boosts Free Trade 117 TPP Good – Boosts Japanese Economy 118 TPP Good – U.S. Leadership / Asia Pivot 119 TPP Good – Agriculture 120 TPP Good – Environment 121 TPP Good – A2: Big Pharma 122 *General Issues* 123 A2: “Anti-China” 124 A2: Chinese Hates 125 A2: Hurts Chinese Economy / Leadership 126 A2: TPP = Global Model 127 TSA/Airports AFFAirport Surveillance Aff – GeneralAff Laundry List + AT: Terror DAAirport surveillance exposes minority populations to racism and civil liberty violations, wastes millions of dollars and it’s counterproductive for preventing terror attacksYevgenia S. Kleiner, Articles Editor of the Boston College Third World Law Journal, 11-1-2010, “Racial Profiling in the Name of National Security: Protecting Minority Travlers' Civil Liberties in the Age of Terrorism,” http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=twlj The tragic events of September 11, 2001 introduced a fear of terrorism into Americans’ daily lives and inspired in many a suspicion of immigrants of Muslims and Middle Eastern descent.24 Compounding the dangerous environment of racism these fears engender is what Jeffrey Goldberg, an acclaimed Israeli-American journalist, calls American “security theater.”25 Goldberg argues that airport security in America is a sham, entirely incapable of dealing with a myriad of security vulnerabilities, and accuses the security system of being able to catch only the most careless and “stupid” of terrorists.26 If Goldberg is right, his argument lends support to the idea that existing security programs can be only partially successful because they assume that terrorists will wage future attacks using the same methods they used in the past.27 If true, this theory would mean that the U.S. government is wasting millions of dollars on security equipment that is either obsolete or more likely to be put to use on an unsuspecting minority traveler than against a real terrorist.28 Some authorities on the subject go so far as to argue that the United States would be better served if airport security was returned to pre-September 11 levels and the remaining funds allocated for intelligence, investigations and emergency response.29 Until then, airlines continue to run the risk of conducting the most in-depth security checks on those who fit a certain ethnic or racial category—a method that succeeds primarily in embarrassing and delaying travelers of certain ‘inconvenient’ backgrounds while trampling on their civil rights.30 AT: Terror DA – Surveillance FailsDeterrence-based security measures fail – multiple warrantsInternational Bulletin of Political Psychology (IBPP), 11-5-2003, “Motivation and Aviation as a Terrorism Target,” http://security.pr.erau.edu/read.php?kind=html&article_volume=15&article_issue=10&article_title=Motivation%20and%20Aviation%20as%20a%20Terrorism%20Target Can terrorist motivation to target aviation be significantly minimized? For example, could there be a combination of aviation security programs that would deter or attenuate the probability of such attacks? If terrorists believe that security programs have a high enough degree of effectiveness, either in preventing an operation from beginning or in resolving it to the disadvantage of the terrorist operator once it begins, one might argue that some sort of normative reason, rationality, and logic would lead terrorists to stop terrorism altogether or at least to take their operations elsewhere. However, there are at least three problems with this analysis. The first is that normative reason, rationality, and logic may not characterize certain aspiring and actual terrorists. The second is that a subgroup of terrorists characterized by a psychological nexus that could be labeled as sensation seeking (cf. Aluja et al., 2003) might actually be more likely to engage in terrorism as the threat to the success of their operation increased. The third is that it is quite difficult to identify what specific social action and assumed consequence combined as an aviation security program may be perceived or serve as positive reinforcement, negative reinforcement, punishment or omission training (the four main classes of conditioning paradigms) by terrorists considering terrorist action. Numerous attack methods inevitably overwhelm surveillance tacticsInternational Bulletin of Political Psychology (IBPP), 11-5-2003, “Motivation and Aviation as a Terrorism Target,” http://security.pr.erau.edu/read.php?kind=html&article_volume=15&article_issue=10&article_title=Motivation%20and%20Aviation%20as%20a%20Terrorism%20Target Another problem in attenuating terrorist motivation to attack aviation is the class of varied operations that can be chosen—from harming people on the ground or in the air, to destroying aircraft and other aviation materiel on the ground or in the air, to using aircraft and other aviation materiel as weapons. Such variety can quickly overwhelm intelligence resources and their integration into aviation security and force security authorities into flying blind through fielding security programs based on a risk analysis that really is a vulnerability analysis without adequate threat analysis. Directory: documents documents -> Concept stage documents -> Concept stage documents -> The great global switch-off documents -> Nonprofit grant application documents -> The Truth about the Rwandan Genocide documents -> Annual InStructional unit plan documents -> Chaos equipment included Download 449.23 Kb. Share with your friends:
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