Yemeni Report Explores Al-Qa'ida's 'New Strategy' in Southern Yemen
GMP20101006155001 Sanaa Al-Masdar Online in Arabic 03 Oct 10
["Exclusive" report by Umar al-Umqi entitled: "Al-Masdar Online Looks
Into Al-Qa'ida's New Strategy in Southern Yemen; Taking Control Over
Kawr Al-Awaliq Operating Under the Popular Army"]
Al-Masdar Online -- During the past 10 days, I have been going back
and forth between Hadramawt, Abyan, and Aden, which have in the past
decade embraced so-called Al-Qa'ida elements; when in fact those used
to be called the "Mujahidin of Afghanistan" over the last two decades
of the 20th Century.
During my visit, I was keen to search for the link which connects the
two generations with each other, and for the dreams that overtake
their feeble entity - dreams of becoming part of an army of 12,000
fighters.
In the following lines, Al-Masdar Online attempts to uncover
Al-Qa'ida's new strategy and the reasons which have driven its
elements to station themselves in Kawr al-Awaliq. The report opens
the door for discussion about what may be called "the three
constituents of the Al-Qa'ida Organization" and offers samples of
victims of the intelligence services... Here are the details.
Al-Qa'ida: Among the Followers of Bin Ladin, al-Qamash, and Obama
During the field visit, some raised profound questions about the
following points: All the leading members of the Al-Qa'ida
Organization in Yemen have been previously released from Guantanamo
Bay prison.
Members of the Al-Qa'ida Organization in Yemen have not killed any US citizens.
The US bases in the Gulf countries have never been targeted by
elements from the Al-Qa'ida Organization in the Arabian Peninsula
[AQAP].
Since its assassination of former AQAP leader Abu-Ali al-Harithi, the
US Air Force did not target or assassinate current AQAP leader Nasir
al-Wuhayshi after his release by the US authorities from Guantanamo
Bay prison.
After the release of Nasir al-Wuhayshi and the Saudi national Sa'id
al-Shahri from Guantanamo Bay prison, the two men managed to unify the
Al-Qa'ida Organization in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Al-Wuhayshi assumed
leadership of the organization, and Al-Shahri became his deputy.
What is the secret behind the Americans' silence over Al-Wuhayshi and
Al-Shahri and their excessive talk about cleric Anwar al-Awlaqi? And
why are the Americans promoting the idea that Al-Awlaqi is Al-Qa'ida's
leader?
On a different note, why did the Yemeni authorities release 175
members of the Al-Qa'ida Organization last year, 2009?
Why have the Yemeni intelligence apparatuses been arresting persons
not directly involved with Al-Qa'ida, only to release them later or
put them on trial where they would be acquitted -- whereas it turns a
blind eye to the real members of the Al-Qa'ida Organization?
Why have judicial sentences been limited to imprisoning Al-Qa'ida
members for two to three years only?
Why has Abu-Bakr Ja'yul - who is accused of bombing the British
Embassy in Sanaa and is sentenced to 15 years in prison and a
20-million-riyal fine - been released? Which side has paid out the
court fine to the British Embassy?
What is the reason behind all the setbacks and security failures --
such as when statements attributed to a security source reveal that
the security forces had carried out a preemptive operation which has
killed a number of Al-Qa'ida symbols; their names would be braggingly
listed and Al-Qa'ida would deny the reports days later? Above all, we
want to know whose charred bodies are those, or does the matter not
concern our security apparatuses?
Why would the Yemeni intelligence apparatuses not reveal the Al-Qa'ida
spies insinuated into their intelligence entities?
In short, we are looking at three Al-Qa'ida organizations; the first
follows Bin Ladin, the second Al-Qamash, and the last is led by Obama
and the CIA; the US intelligence.
Al-Qa'ida's Strategy in the South
After the declaration of unification of Yemen's two parts, I went with
my father on a visit to what used to be known back then as the
economic and commercial capital, Aden. On our way there, we stopped
at Al-Hawtah, capital of Lahj Governorate, to pray. I still remember
that day very well, because my father whispered in my ear, urging me
to read out a Hadith to the congregation of worshippers.
Moments later, many worshippers came to shake my hand, and they
gathered around me to hear me retell the "Actions Are Judged by
Intentions" Hadith. I was only 10 years old at that time, but I could
sense the enthusiasm that overwhelmed them!
It is an enthusiasm that has led some to strap explosive belts around
their waists, while, in their eyes, others have become hypocrites and
persons of little faith for having refused to take the path of those
who dream of the Al-Hur al-Ayn [maidens of paradise.]
In front of a platform, a man in his seventies bows to his Creator
five times during the day and night. Although that group of young men
has itself brought about the anguish it appears to be going through,
he [the man in his seventies] still prays at the Abdallah Azzam mosque
in Al-Dakkah in Al-Ma'alla District in Aden Governorate.
Fathi's father considers those youngsters to be responsible for the
painful separation which he has been experiencing for 10 years -- ever
since his son left him to respond to the call for Jihad while his
peers stayed with their parents.
In the year 2001, Fathi headed for Afghanistan, where he received the
necessary training which enabled him to fight with the Mujahidin.
When the NATO coalition forces tightened the grip around the
Mujahidin, Fathi had to move to Indonesia. There, he married a girl
from the capital Jakarta. He had a baby boy whom he gave the name
Usamah.
He did not stay there for long. Soon, he quit selling "eggs" and
headed for Iraq. That was in April 2003.
Ever since, Fathi's father has been waiting for any news about his
only son -- and his grandson, about whom he knows nothing except that
he is living among 18 million people of the Indonesian capital,
Jakarta.
Fathi was not the first member of the "mujahidin," since scores of
them coming from the southern part [of Yemen] had preceded him to
Afghanistan. Those who had stayed alive could not go back to Yemen,
because of the brutal treatment that awaited them at the hands of the
pro-Moscow ruling party at the time, since the regime in the former
southern part of Yemen was correlated with the eastern camp.
After the unification, the mujahidin were able to return to their
homes, and when the summer 1994 war broke out, they got the chance to
take revenge. The term revenge appropriately describes the deal which
was struck between the veteran combatants and President Salih.
Tariq al-Fadli, Jamal al-Nahdi, Khalid Abd-al-Nabi, and Ali Zen
al-Abidin - who is nicknamed as Abu-Hasan al-Mihdar - are the most
important names of veteran mujahidin.
After the war, and following the victory of the so-called "legitimate
forces," a number of mujahidin settled in the city of Ja'ar, capital
of Khanfar District, the largest district in Abyan Governorate.
The euphoria of victory drove them to Islamize the city, according to
Nasir Ahmad. "We are Muslims," he said, with his eyes focused at the
mosque, which was built by the mujahidin on the ruins of the cinema
theater destroyed by the "youngsters." In a few days, the mujahidin
will have assumed control over the city. Nasir points to different
parts of his frail body: "They broke my bones and accused me of
drinking alcohol."
Some who spoke with Al-Masdar Online think that Abu-Hasan al-Mihdar
can be considered as a true mujahid. Despite being a religious
fanatic, he did not allow his militants to assault the local
residents.
"He had insight," said Alawi, a 25-year old man. He added: "He is the
shaykh of the mujahidin in Abyan, but the spies working for the United
States (the government) killed him."
It is known that Al-Mihdar had never met Usama Bin Ladin -- who
announced in February 1998 the formation of the international front
for fighting the Jews and Christians, Al-Qa'ida.
Prior to announcing the formation of the so-called Al-Qa'ida
Organization, Abu-Hasan al-Mihdar had set out to establish the
Aden-Abyan Islamic Army toward the end of 1997. However, a number of
his associates and others who had maintained relations and
communication with the intelligence apparatuses committed a lot of
acts of violence, culminating in the abduction of a number of foreign
tourists. The abduction aimed to pressure the government into
releasing a number of mujahidin it had had in its custody.
Intelligence personnel had sought to tarnish the reputation of
Al-Mihdar and his army, by pushing the mujahidin to persuade him that
their plans hold well. This led to arresting him, putting him on
trial, and sentencing him to death. The death penalty has not been
issued against Al-Qa'ida members ever since. Only prison sentences
have been issued against a few of them, whereas others are either
being released given amnesty or their escape from prison is being
facilitated.
Yemen, in the eyes of a few analysts, is considered as one of the few
countries that were able to contain "the mujahidin" returning from
Afghanistan. Despite having used these elements [the mujahidin] as a
card for eliminating its domestic foes, Yemen managed to contain them
by two means: The first is by physical liquidation and defanging them
and the other by integrating them into political and social life.
Al-Mihdar's case is an example of the first means, whereas Al-Fadli
and Jamal al-Nahdi provide an example of the second.
Also, the intelligence apparatuses were able to attract many veteran
combatants such as Khalid Abd-al-Nabi -- preacher of the Friday prayer
at Hamzah mosque in the city of Ja'ar, who lives at his farm which
produces mango and papaya. It is said that the funds allocated to him
by Sanaa enabled him to own that farm and abandon the ideas of
Al-Qa'ida.
As to Abu-Hasan al-Mihdar, who was executed in 1999, his close friends
accepted condolences over his death from Al-Qa'ida leader Usama Bin
Ladin.
Although the two men had not met before, Bin Ladin did not want to
miss that chance and sought to pay tribute to him and his jihadist
acts. In order for Al-Qa'ida to attract Al-Mihdar's followers - and
subsequently get a foothold in the governorates of Abyan and Shabwah -
elements from the Al-Qa'ida Organization carried out a strike against
the US destroyer USS Cole off the coast of Aden in October 2000, under
the pretext of avenging the death of Al-Mihdar.
The Yemeni intelligence could not absorb and deal as should be with
the success of the Al-Qa'ida elements' operation against the USS Cole.
The Yemeni intelligence quickly used the operation to reap huge
amounts of money under the pretext of fighting terrorism -- which is
the tune it has mastered playing up until today.
Instead of capturing the Al-Qa'ida elements involved, the security
services arrested the veteran "mujahidin" and a number of their
supporters. They also brought charges against them, only to find out
that they had been barking up the wrong tree during their months-long
investigations.
Every once in a while, the Yemeni authorities used to announce that
they had concluded their investigation with detainees suspected of
involvement, and accordingly, express their intention to put them on
trial. However, the US authorities used to reject that and request
that the submission of their files to court be postponed - especially
after the CIA was able to ascertain the presence of a connection
between the attack against the destroyer USS Cole in Aden and the bomb
attacks against the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam.
The young Alawi believes that executing his shaykh, Al-Mihdar, created
a fertile ground for him and his "mujahidin" peers in Yemen to fight -
which culminated in targeting the USS Cole in Aden and the French oil
tanker Limburg, which was attacked in October 2002.
I am not sure how the two operations are related with respect to their
timing, but both took place in October two full years apart. The
first operation came in retaliation for Al-Mihdar's execution, whereas
the other came to avenge the assassination of Abu-Ali al-Harithi, who
was bombed by a US drone in November 2002 while wandering around in
Ma'rib desert.
Toward the end of 2002, the sides to the conflict (the Yemeni
intelligence, US intelligence, and the Al-Qa'ida Organization) started
to master the game.
Yemen fell victim to those three sides. The Yemeni intelligence, US
intelligence, and Al-Qa'ida took advantage of what may be described as
the zealous, unemployed youth to implement its agenda and plans. This
we shall explain in another section of this field file.
Nonetheless, those young men did not hesitate to respond to the calls
for entering heaven through [the use of] explosive belts!
Tora Bora or a Spark From Hell
Kawr al-Awlaq... A Dream for 12,000 Combatants
At the beginning of last March, I had the chance to visit the city of
Zinjibar, capital of Abyan Governorate, for the first time. That was
one day after the separatist flags had been removed.
Calm prevailed across the city, and there was no cause for concern
since the authority had been able to strike a deal with Shaykh Tariq
al-Fadli. Soon after, I managed quite easily to enter to the office
of Abyan's security chief Abd-al-Razzaq al-Maruni, and to conduct an
interview with him without prior appointment.
I went back to Abyan last week. In the morning of 18 September 2010,
I decided to visit Al-Maruni, who enjoys a special relation with
journalists unlike his fellow security chiefs.
At the external gate of the building - which is surrounded by high
walls - you see cement bricks, behind which are sandbags that had been
carefully placed [on top of each other] to serve as a protective wall
- "precautionary barricades." Behind those, a number of security men
stand with their fingers pressed against the rifles' triggers.
Fear gripped me. Those rifles usually hung over the men's shoulders,
but the security chaos across the governorate has forced those
soldiers to remain on alert -- just as motorcycle owners were forced
to quit driving their motorcycles after the ban issued by the local
and security authorities. The ban was issued because motorcycles can
[be used to] facilitate assassination operations, which have claimed
the lives of a number of soldiers and officers, as stated in the paper
posters placed on the walls, fences, and gates of public and private
facilities in Zinjibar.
Due to transportation difficulties, I accompanied a manager of one of
the executive offices. However, we had to stand at the exterior gate
of the security administration building for over 10 minutes.
I realized that it was no longer easy to access this security
facility, for even the government official whom I was accompanying was
required to obtain an approval over the phone so the soldier would
allow him to cross a distance of up to 700 meters to reach the
security chief's office.
The security administration building is located in a bystreet, and the
Political Security Organization [PSO] department headquarters is
situated on the city's main street. However, the PSO has closed the
street and placed cement bricks over it to prevent transportation
vehicles from moving along its building's fences, as a precautionary
measure.
There, I met a young man, who had recently joined Al-Qa'ida.
Bakr is 22 years old. His educational failure is attributed to his
Islamic Education teacher, who used to treat him rudely when Bakr was
in first secondary grade.
The young man used to have memorization difficulties, and the teacher
was very good at punishing him. "He drove me away," said Bakr loudly.
Bakr justifies his joining the Al-Qa'ida fighters by citing the
Prophet, may God bless him and grant him peace: "There will be 12,000
who set out from Aden-Abyan [in Yemen] to bring victory to [the
religion of] God and His messenger. They are the best of people from
my time until theirs."
Bakr told me good news about the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army, and I
listened along as a he quoted verses from the Holy Koran and Sunni
Hadiths about the virtues of Jihad and the rewards of martyrdom.
He recited those verses and Hadiths by heart. When I asked [how he
was able to do so], he answered: "Vim led me to memorize all these
texts... and my longing for paradise has made the task easier."
That prophecy has driven the Al-Qa'ida elements to station themselves
in Kawr al-Awaliq.
The Kawr al-Awaliq area is characterized by a chain of high and
connected mountains situated in the western and southern parts of
Shabwah Governorate and in the eastern and northern parts of Abyan
Governorate.
Al-Awaliq [tribe] -- to which cleric Anwar al-Awlaqi belongs, and
whose assassination by the US intelligence over suspected affiliation
to Al-Qa'ida has been reportedly approved by US President Barack Obama
-- is considered to be among the most rugged areas in Yemen.
The heroes of the 14 October revolution had previously taken refuge in
those mountains during their quest for liberating the occupied South
from Britain.
The British occupier may have recognized how important this area is to
us Muslims, since the Aden-Abyan army is going to come out of it.
This is why the British occupier - since the beginning of the
twentieth century - was keen to fragment and divide Kawr al-Awaliq
into the lower al-Awaliq, Abyan, and the upper Al-Awaliq, Shabwah.
The Al-Iklil [the Crown; an encyclopedia containing genealogical,
topographical, and historical information about South Arabia] states
that the Al-Awaliq tribes are historically related to the Yemeni
historic leader Sayf Bin-dhi-Yazan. Hence, many members of the
Al-Awaliq believe themselves to be the sole heirs of the Dhi-Yazan
Himyariyah tribe in the whole of Yemen.
The Al-Awaliq members also believe that the Aden-Abyan army will come
out from their descendents.
In praise of his tribe, Al-Awaliq's poet says:
[Start of a poem:]
The verses praise the gallantry of the Al-Awaliq tribe members in
their support of the mujahidin against their enemies. The verses
describe the Al-Awaliq tribe as a "spark from hell."
[End of the poem.]
The Al-Qa'ida Organization recognizes the significance of the area of
Kawr al-Awaliq. Some parts of Kawr al-Awaliq, such as "Al-Mahfad" in
Abyan and "Al-Sa'id- Mayfa'ah" in Shabwah, have witnessed fierce
clashes between Al-Qa'ida elements and security forces during the past
few months.
After a quick read through the writings of Al-Qa'ida's key preacher
Abu-Mus'ab al-Suri - in which he refers to "the Yemeni people's
responsibility toward the Muslims' sanctities and resources" and
mentions 10 reasons that assert Yemen's importance for Al-Qa'ida - we
conclude that Al-Qa'ida is currently seeking to take control over Kawr
al-Awaliq, which extends from the coasts of the Arabian Sea in the
South to the deserts of the Empty Quarter in the North. This is in
accordance with Al-Qa'ida's new strategy, which is based on
establishing direct contact with the dignitaries of the areas in which
its elements are stationed -- and the aim of which is to revive the
concept of popular Jihad. This would enable Al-Qa'ida to isolate the
security and military units, which would in turn be unwilling to get
involved in conflicts and confrontations with the tribes' members.
If Al-Qa'ida succeeds in accomplishing this, then the appropriate
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