***Private Sector***
Government space programs rely on a narrow technological and industrial base this is unsustainable for budgets
Cleave & Pfaltzgraff et al.09- Dr. William R. Van Cleave Professor Emeritus Department of Defense and Strategic Studies Missouri State University Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The Fletcher School, Tufts University President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, “Report Independent Working Group on Missile Defense,the Space Relationship,& the Twenty-First Century”, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, p. 39-40 http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf
Compounding the challenges from abroad is a weakening of the technological and industrial base on which American space power relies. Numerous reviews of U.S. space policy, programs, and budgets over the years have called for altering how space programs are budgeted and managed, changes in how space personnel are trained and the career paths available, and increased investment in research and technology. None of these concerns is new. Troubling signs of a weakening base for American space have been appar26ent for some time. The absence of a peer competitor and the sizeable lead in space capabilities from Cold War-era investments gave policy makers, the public, and even military leaders a false sense of security and reinforced the impression that U.S. leadership would go unchallenged with only minimal attention. Despite the national security importance of space, the United States has not put adequate resources into military space programs. Many of the approximately 100 U.S. national security satellites presently in orbit for military and surveillance operations are approaching obsolescence. Successor-generation models based on new and improved technologies frequently are delayed because they are over budget, behind schedule, and facing technical difficulties. The acquisition process for national security space programs is under severe strain, buffeted by excessive technical and schedule risk and unrealistic cost projections, leading the Defense Science Board to conclude that: “Government capabilities to lead and manage the acquisition process have seriously eroded.”27 The deleterious results of a broken acquisition system are apparent throughout the space sector. The Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS)-High and the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) are two cases in point. While both are key parts of the missile defense system to be deployed by the United States, they have had to be restructured because of large cost overruns, schedule delays, and technical problems. For example, SBIRS-High, which is replacing the Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites and will provide rapid early warning and ballistic missile trajectory data, is now projected to cost approximately $10 billion, well over twice the amount of earlier estimates.28 Cost increases in excess of 25 percent during the last quarter of FY 2005 forced the Pentagon to recertify the program in December 2005. For FY 2009, DoD requested $2.3 billion for the program, though the Air Force is currently exploring a potential alternative or early replacement for SBIRS-High called 3GIRS.29
No talented workers in the government space programs now. Mismanagement private sector will increase the scope and intensity of programs drawing a wider research base.
Cleave & Pfaltzgraff et al.09- Dr. William R. Van Cleave Professor Emeritus Department of Defense and Strategic Studies Missouri State University Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The Fletcher School, Tufts University President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, “Report Independent Working Group on Missile Defense,the Space Relationship,& the Twenty-First Century”, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, p. 39-40 http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf
The Rumsfeld Space Commission warned that the United States was not developing the military space cadre needed in the years ahead; a conclusion subsequently reinforced by the Walker and Allard Commissions.35 The aging aerospace workforce, bleak prospects for the growth of the space market, and uncertain career paths for military personnel have drained talented workers, scientists, engineers, and managers from the space sector. Additionally, the Allard Commission highlights the limitations of the current system of managing military space programs. In summary, the ability to threaten the United States in space will only grow in the years ahead. Small nations, as well as groups or even individuals, are increasingly able to acquire technologies and knowledge that could disrupt or destroy space systems and ground facilities. The United States could be surprised by the speed with which such capabilities are acquired by its enemies and by the rate in which its own capabilities decline. Such adversaries, especially if they are rogue states or terrorist groups, are unlikely to be bound by international agreements or global norms against the weaponization of space. Commercial Activity in Space Space has become an essential part of daily life. This includes satellites that transmit television images, provide weather forecasting data, emergency response, the infrastructure for the internet, the mapping of the Earth’s surface, and global positioning information. Space technologies are transforming the process by which we conduct business and undertake research. The net result is greater productivity with important implications for economic growth, prosperity, and innovation. Access to space-based assets is essential for a broad range of private-sector activities, which will increase both in scope and intensity as a result of the emergence of technologies including smaller satellites and cheaper boosters, miniaturization, and greater economies of scale. The space infrastructure originally established with government funding has furnished the basis for both military and commercial applications. In the years ahead, the commercial sector is likely to provide innovative impetus that spills over into the military arena. By the mid-1990s, global commercial revenues from space resulting from the rapid expansion of consumer services such as telecommunications and television were greater than the aggregate of government spending on space. In 2007 alone, spending on commercial space infrastructure, infrastructure support industries, and commercial satellite services (including direct-to-home television and GPS) totaled approximately $174 billion, accounting for nearly 70 percent of total global space spending. Alongside increased November 2002, http://www.aia-aerospace.org/pdf/commission_report2.pdf; and Amy Butler, “Panel Wants Massive Milspace Reshuffling,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, August 14, 2008, (as of November 12, 2008).commercial spending on space, government space budgets have accounted for a steadily decreasing percentage of global space spending. In the past two years alone, the governmental share of global space spending has slipped by 8 percentage points, from 39 percent of global space spending in 2005 to 31 percent in 2007. Over the same period of time, aggregate government spending on space actually increased by $8.25 billion. The fact that government’s share of space spending decreased 8 points in spite of a 12 percent boost in spending further underscores the impressive growth of the commercial space sector.36 This means that governments will have less control over access to such services as high-resolution imagery of the Earth’s surface, which can be used for civilian or for military purposes. Growing commercialization of space will make such access more widely available as commercial investment in space technologies increases relative to that of governments.
The plan breaks down the wisdom that missile defense tech is doomed
Pinkerton 01- James K., frequent columnist for fox news fellow at the New America foundation in Washington D.C. Former Columnist for Newsday He worked in the White House domestic policy offices of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush and in the 1980, 1984, 1988 and 1992 presidential campaigns. In 2008 he served as a senior adviser to the Mike Huckabee for President Campaign, July 16, 2001, “Missile Defense Spinoffs from Outer Space”, http://www.newamerica.net/node/6152
Which is unfortunate, because the unfashionable science they champion has a way of proving itself. In the last few years it's become the conventional wisdom in Washington that missile defense technology is doomed, because, in the popular cliche, "You can't hit a bullet with a bullet." Well, the Pentagon did just that on Saturday night. A projectile, the so-called "kill vehicle," hit a dummy warhead when both were traveling at 4.5 miles per second. Not bad. And while missile defense has a long way to go, the test is a distant early warning to the establishment that the idea might work. As for the astronomers who have been reaping the huge benefits of SDI/NMD, they are not obligated to support missile defense as a form of gratitude for the technogoodies they have received. But as a group, speaking louder than the articulate but lonely voice of Jastrow, astronomers might speak up just a bit. After all, if missile defense technology is good enough for them to use in their stargazing, it might just be good enough to use in defending America.
Specifically redoing brilliant pebbles incentivizes the development of new technologies
Cleave & Pfaltzgraff et al.09- Dr. William R. Van Cleave Professor Emeritus Department of Defense and Strategic Studies Missouri State University Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The Fletcher School, Tufts University President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, “Report Independent Working Group on Missile Defense,the Space Relationship,& the Twenty-First Century”, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, p. 39-40 http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf
The Lunar Landing Program began in May 1961 with Kennedy’s daring declaration before a joint session of Congress to land a man on the moon before the end of the decade. With the possible exception of the Manhattan Project, technology had never been so brutally challenged. The world’s first satellite, Sputnik, launched in 1957 and visible to nearly every backyard in America, had flashed a warning that awakened the nation to its vulnerabilities to the Soviet race into space and its nuclear ICBM development efforts. By 1961 competition with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) had become vital to U.S. geopolitical interests.In April, Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin pulled ahead as the first to orbit the Earth. In May, astronaut Alan Shepard followed with the first U.S. suborbital flight, which was wildly celebrated by the American public. Kennedy took heed and responded three weeks later with his challenge, a stunningly bold move to put the nation ahead in space via the moon. Thus, the political dynamics were in place to drive technology toward a maximum outcome, i.e., taking a supportive role by letting technology determine the outcome. The now two-year-old National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) took the charge with straight-line logic: how to get from here to there and back as efficiently and safely as possible. To achieve this, the Mercury missions were given new challenges, with Gemini following to pioneer new achievements as the bridge to the Apollo moon program. Each phase contributed synergistically to the other components also being worked on, so that the sum of the whole (the lunar landing mission) at any given time was greater than its parts. Spacecraft designs begat new spacecraft designs; guidance systems begat new guidance systems; living one day in space begat 14 days; and on and on into a myriad of thousands of components of human intellect and endeavor, and materiel designs and functions that were all pointed to one declared mission. There were tragic deaths, other dangerous moments, and discouraging failures along the way. There were also hundreds of useful spin-offs that helped to give the United States its commanding lead in technology. But the mission point was never lost and scores of heroes abounded, as on July 20, 1969 – eight years after Kennedy’s challenge – the Eagle landed at Tranquility Base. Of singular significance to this discussion is that throughout the Lunar Landing Program, each component and phase had its own place in the continuity and integrity of the overall mission. Remove one component and the entire mission would fail. Therefore, the program could not be arbitrarily cut in half or more in a Solomon-like gesture and still be expected to succeed. The significance is that the same applied to Brilliant Pebbles; it was cut and it died.2
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