1ac heg Advantage Scenario 1 is Leadership



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Solvency


Plan allows for commercial development of space

Dolman 10- Everett Dolman, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force's School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, September 2010, “The Case for Weapons in Space: A Geopolitical Assessment” APSA Annual Meeting, pg 30

Moreover, if the United States were willing to deploy and use a military space force that maintained effective control of space, and did so in a way that was perceived as tough, non-arbitrary, and efficient, such an action would serve to discourage competing states from fielding opposing systems. It could also set the stage for a new space regime, one that encourages space commerce and development. Should the United States use its advantage to police the heavens and allow unhindered peaceful use of space by any and all nations for economic and scientific development, over time its control of LEO could be viewed as a global public good. In much the same way the British maintained control of the high seas in the nineteenth century, enforcing international norms of innocent passage and property rights, and against slavery, the US could prepare outer space for a long-overdue burst of economic expansion.


Space Missile Defense key to colonization- space missile defense satellites can be used to research celestial bodies

German Press Agency 96- German newspaper, December 3, 1996, “Ice on moon increases chance of colonization”, pg. Lexis

The apparent discovery of ice on the lunar south pole increases the chance that man might one day colonize Earth's moon and use it as a refuelling base for space flights, U.S. scientists said Tuesday. That startling prospect comes with news that the moon, once thought to be completely without water, has at least one small frozen lake hidden deep inside a crater, according to data recorded by a U.S. spacecraft. The discovery was made by Clementine, a 226-kilogram craft with sophisticated radar equipment developed during the now abandoned space-based "Star Wars" anti-ballistic missile defence system championed in the 1980s by President Ronald Reagan, Air Force Colonel Pedro Ruston said at the Pentagon. The spacecraft was launched in January 1994 in a joint endeavour by the Defense Department, the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and NASA, the U.S. space agency, to test the equipment, but scientists quickly decided in-mission to turn its multi-spectrum radar antenna on lunar craters at both ends of the orb. Ruston, head of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, told reporters the "experiment of opportunity" hit pay dirt when it found ice in the moon's South Pole-Aitken basin.
Boost phase is better laundry list

Aubin and Streland 2k- Dr. Stephen P. Aubin and Major Arnold Streland, phd. Director strategy execution at Raytheon and Col Arnold H. Streland, Commander, TSAT Space Group, MILSATCOM Systems Wing, Space and Missile Systems Center, October 2000 , “The Space-Based Laser Integrated Flight Experiment: Global Missile Defense in the Boost Phase”, Team SBL-IFX, http://www.wslfweb.org/docs/SBLWP.pdf

There are a number of advantages to intercepting an aggressor’s missile in the boost phase. The first is that the missile is most vulnerable during its launch. There is a large infrared signature, thanks to the burning fuel; the missile maintains a slowly changing attitude, making it easier to track; and the rocket body is relatively fragile and under great aerodynamic stress. Additionally, because the warhead has not separated from the launcher, there is a relatively large lethal-hit area when attempting to destroy the missile. The boost phase also occurs before any decoys or countermeasures can be initiated by an aggressor. One of the greatest challenges for hit-to-kill kinetic interceptors attempting to destroy warheads in the midcourse or descent phases is the ability to distinguish between the warheads and the decoys. In the descent phase, advanced warheads may also maneuver and be less predictable in terms of their flight paths. The combination of using directed energy intercept in the boost phase and kinetic intercept in the midcourse and terminal phases would increase the likelihood of successfully defeating countermeasures aimed at thwarting missile defense systems. In fact, countermeasures, like deploying decoys and maneuvering outside of the projected target track, which may be effective against kinetic interceptors, are ineffective against directed energy attack during boost phase. Likewise, countermeasures that are aimed at reducing the effectiveness of directed energy systems, like hardening of missiles to prevent laser penetration and fast burn to shorten the boost phase, are ineffective against mid-course and terminal phase kinetic interceptors. Another key advantage and potential deterrent to a would-be aggressor is the fact that ballistic missiles destroyed early in the boost phase usually explode and fall over the aggressor’s own territory, forcing the aggressor to confront the risk of nuclear, chemical or biological debris. The greatest challenge of boost phase intercept is the speed required to catch an aggressor’s missile in the first few minutes of flight. Although the United States has the capability to detect missile launches very early in flight, the speed limitations of interceptor missiles being developed make it unlikely that they could destroy the aggressor missile before its launcher burns out. This challenge, however, can be overcome by using directed energy, which moves at the speed of light ­ 186,000 miles per second (or 300,000 kilometers per second). To illustrate this advantage, consider the speed of the ground-based interceptor being developed for National Missile Defense, which is in the vicinity of 7 kilometers per second. (This is faster than today’s theater interceptors under development, which were capped at 5.5 kilometers per second in the September 1997 Agreed Statement to the ABM Treaty of 1972.) Even if the interceptor were positioned close enough to achieve intercept, it is a very challenging task and not nearly as efficient as directed energy, which travels about 43,000 times faster than the most capable groundbased interceptors. Given its speed, directed energy should be seen as complementing the critical role kinetic interceptors play in the mid-course and terminal phases of a missile attack. Both the Airborne Laser, which is being developed to address short- and medium-range theater ballistic missiles, and the Space-Based Laser, which is being designed to counter ICBMs deep in the aggressor’s 4 territory, can detect and intercept missiles almost instantaneously. Each works by acquiring the infrared signature of the boosting missile, tracking its course with a low-power laser, and then focusing a high-power laser on the body of the boosting missile. The heat of the laser weakens the missile’s skin, and the internal pressures and supersonic aerodynamic flight stresses cause it to explode.
Feasibility card+ missile defense causes development of other lasers

Aubin and Streland 2k- Dr. Stephen P. Aubin and Major Arnold Streland, phd. Director strategy execution at Raytheon and Col Arnold H. Streland, Commander, TSAT Space Group, MILSATCOM Systems Wing, Space and Missile Systems Center, October 2000 , “The Space-Based Laser Integrated Flight Experiment: Global Missile Defense in the Boost Phase”, Team SBL-IFX, http://www.wslfweb.org/docs/SBLWP.pdf

In June 2000, the Tactical High Energy Laser, or THEL, successfully shot down a Katyusha rocket at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. On several occasions in August and September, THEL managed another feat by engaging and destroying two-missile salvos of Katyusha rockets. To date, THEL has negated a total of 13 Katyusha rockets. Although THEL is being designed for tactical use by the U.S. Army and the Israeli Army, its success demonstrates how far directed energy research and development have progressed in recent years. The SBL-IFX program builds on more than twenty years of research and investment by the nation in the development of directed energy weapon systems, technologies and related facilities. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency initiated the SBL program in 1977. It was later transferred to the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) in 1984. In May 1997, a Memorandum of Agreement was signed transferring execution of the SBL-IFX from the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, SDIO’s successor, to the Air Force. Over the years, the members of Team SBL-IFX have played central roles in several directed energy programs that have advanced the nation’s understanding of a space-based laser missile defense option, including Zenith Star, Mid-InfraRed Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL), Alpha, the Airborne Laser (ABL), the Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL), the High Energy Laser Systems Test Facility (HELSTF), and the Alpha-LAMP Integration (ALI) program. This heritage of success provides the foundation for a successful Space-Based Laser Integrated Flight Experiment ­ a critical step toward providing the nation and its allies with a global, boost-phase defense against the evolving threat of ballistic missiles.


Space assets need to be used for high priority objectives- Bin Laden

Logston 03- John M. Logsdon is Director of the Space Policy Institute of George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs in Washington, DC. “REFLECTIONS ON SPACE AS A VITAL NATIONAL INTEREST” p. 18 http://www2.gwu.edu/~spi/assets/docs/space_as_a_national_interest.pdf

What then can substitute for an international challenge to create the U.S. “space imperative” that seems needed to shake the sector out of its current lethargy? The best candidate is a clear demonstration, most likely in the national security sector, of the contribution of space assets to a high priority U.S. interest or objective. What if, for example, the use of space capabilities led to the capture of Osama bin Laden, the location of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, or the interdiction of a terrorist action against U.S. interests? Such a success could add credibility to the argument that increased priority for space would have great benefits to the nation, and could catalyze the kind of changes suggested above. If this were to happen, the United States could indeed make space capabilities a corner of its national power.
new scientific R&D, technology needs to be better rather than broader

Paarlbarg, 04- Robert L. Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College and Associate at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. He received his B.A. in government from Carleton College in Minnesota and his Ph.D. in government from Harvard. He has served as visiting professor of government at Harvard, as a legislative aide in the U.S. Senate, and as an officer in the U.S. Naval Intelligence Command., Summer 2004, “Knowledge as Power Science, Military Dominance, and U.S. Security”, International Security, Volume 29, Number 1, Summer 2004, pp. 122-151 (Article), pg. 122-123

Can the United States maintain its global lead in science, the new key to its recently unparalleled military dominance? U.S. scientific prowess has become the deep foundation of U.S. military hegemony. U.S. weapons systems currently dominate the conventional battlefield because they incorporate powerful technologies available only from scientiªcally dominant U.S. weapons laboratories. Yet under conditions of globalization, scientiªc and technical (S&T) knowledge is now spreading more quickly and more widely, suggesting that hegemony in this area might be difªcult for any one country to maintain. Is the scientiªc hegemony that lies beneath U.S. weapons dominance strong and durable, or only weak and temporary? Military primacy today comes from weapons quality, not quantity. Each U.S. military service has dominating weapons not found in the arsenals of other states. The U.S. Air Force will soon have ªve different kinds of stealth aircraft in its arsenal, while no other state has even one. U.S. airborne targeting capabilities, built around global positioning system (GPS) satellites, joint surveillance and target radars, and unmanned aerial vehicles are dominating and unique.1 On land, the U.S. Army has 9,000 M1 Abrams tanks, each with a ªre-control system so accurate it can ªnd and destroy a distant enemy tank usually with a single shot. At sea, the U.S. Navy now deploys Seawolf nuclear submarines, the fastest, quietest, and most heavily armed undersea vessels ever built, plus nine supercarrier battle groups, each carrying scores of aircraft capable of delivering repeated precision strikes hundreds of miles inland. No other navy has even one supercarrier group Such weapons are costly to build, and the large relative size of the U.S. economy (22 percent of world gross domestic product [GDP]) plus the even larger U.S. share of global military spending (43 percent of the world total in 2002, at market exchange rates) have been key to the development and deployment of these forces. Yet economic dominance and spending dominance would not sufªce without knowledge dominance. It is a strong and rapidly growing S&T capacity that has allowed the United States to move far ahead of would-be competitors by deploying new weapons systems with unmatched scienceintensive capabilities. It was in the middle of the twentieth century that the global arms race more fundamentally became a science race. Prior to World War II, military research and development (R&D) spending absorbed on average less than 1 percent of total major power military expenditures. By the 1980s, the R&D share of major power military spending had increased to 11–13 percent.3 It was precisely during this period, as science became a more important part of military might, that the United States emerged as the clear global leader in science. During World War II, the military might of the United States had come more from its industrial capacity (America could build more) than from its scientiªc capacity (Europe, especially Germany and the United Kingdom, could still invent more). As that war came to an end, however, a fortuitous migration of European scientists to the United States plus wartime research investments such as the Manhattan Project gave the United States the scientiªc as well as the industrial lead.
co-op now on corporate satellites with the government the private sector will need to play a larger role in the future

Defense Daily 3-31- “Satellite Industry Companies Create Alliance Favoring Hosted Payloads” Vol. 249 No. 61 http://www.defensedaily.com/publications/dd/Satellite-Industry-Companies-Create-Alliance-Favoring-Hosted-Payloads_13099.html

Seven satellite industry companies yesterday said they have agreed to form an industry alliance to increase awareness of the benefits of hosted government payloads on commercial satellites. The Hosted Payload Alliance (HPA) will serve as a bridge between government and private industry to foster open communication between potential users and providers of hosted payload capabilities, the companies said in a statement. HPA Steering Committee members are Boeing [ BA], Intelsat General Corp., Iridium Communications Inc. [IRDM], Lockheed Martin [LMT], Orbital Sciences Corp. [ORB], SES WORLD SKIES U.S. Government Solutions [SESG], and Space Systems/Loral [LORL]. The companies expect to be joined by other satellite operators, satellite manufacturers and system integrators in a broad-based organization aimed at increasing awareness of hosted payloads to provide the government with timely and cost-effective space-based capabilities. "We believe there is a need for industry and government to work together to facilitate hosted payloads," said Don Thoma, chairman of the HPA Steering Committee. "An important goal of this group is to act as a source of subject- matter expertise to educate stakeholders in the public and private sectors on the numerous opportunities for hosted payloads on commercial launch spacecraft." Lance Lord, retired Air Force general and former commander of Air Force Space Command, said: "The time is right for the formation of the Hosted Payload Alliance. "The 2010 U.S. National Space Policy calls for public-private partnerships with the commercial satellite industry to fill potential gaps, specifically citing hosted payloads, which the public sector might not have the resources to provide. The policy statement also encourages federal departments and agencies to seek out nontraditional arrangements to leverage commercial capabilities. As government funding for important space-based sensor programs continues to be cut or postponed, private industry will be called upon to play an important role in providing affordable and timely capabilities to meet those mission needs." Lord said wider use of hosted payloads on commercial satellites can provide a timely and cost-effective pathway to space for a diverse range of missions. Applications include communications, Earth observation, remote sensing, research and development, space situational awareness and forecasting electromagnetic solar storms in space. The HPA Steering Committee met to draft a charter and establish goals during the Satellite 2011 conference in Washington, D.C. The group will hold its first organizational meeting in conjunction with the 2011 National Space Symposium in Colorado Springs, Colo., on April 11.
Hickman, 99- John Hickman, Ph. D. Associate Professor of Government Department of Government and International Relations Berry College, November 1999, “The Political Economy of Very Large Space Projects” JOURNAL OF EVOLUTION AND TECHNOLOGY, Volume 4, November 1999

Attempting to persuade investors to risk enough capital to finance the construction of a very large space development project would run up against the same capitalization problems now faced by entrepreneurs seeking capital for ordinary space development projects such as launching communication satellites. Investors and lenders seek to maximize economic returns from capital while avoiding risk. The cost of capital is higher for riskier investments. Persuading investors and lenders to part with their capital requires making credible promises that they will receive better returns than they would have received from making alternative investments during the same time period commensurate with risk. While investors often accept higher levels of risk than do lenders, they do so in the expectation of even better returns. Ordinary space development projects confront not only the risks that their businesses might not make money and that the technology might fail to work as projected, but also that they might not attract enough investment because the necessary capital investment is too “chunky.” In other words, the “up−front” capital investment necessary to proceed with even an ordinary space development project tends to be relatively large and to take a relatively long time period before generating cash flows or profits (Simonoff 1997: 73−74; U.S. Department of Commerce 1990: 55−60; McLucas 1991). It is important for the subsequent discussion that the reader note that many investors typically understand the phrase “long time period” to mean “5 years” (Marshall and Bansal 1992: 99−100).

Plan solves lack of capital

Hickman, 99- John Hickman, Ph. D. Associate Professor of Government Department of Government and International Relations Berry College, November 1999, “The Political Economy of Very Large Space Projects” JOURNAL OF EVOLUTION AND TECHNOLOGY, Volume 4, November 1999

The fundamental problem in opening any contemporary frontier, whether geographic or technological, is not lack of imagination or will, but lack of capital to finance initial construction which makes the subsequent and typically more profitable economic development possible. Solving this fundamental problem involves using one or more forms of direct or indirect government intervention in the capital market. When space development enthusiasts describe how permanent human communities might be established in space, they often draw analogies to the European colonization of the Americas and to the “winning” of the western frontiers of the United States and Canada, analogies which are often given a very contemporary libertarian spin. Complex historical processes are offered up as examples of the triumph of individualism and private enterprise. The unspun truth about European colonization in the Americas, and in Asia and Africa, is that the state played a central role in all colonial enterprises. European colonies often emerged out of trading ventures organized as joint stock companies chartered by the colonizing state and in which the crown invested both its prestige and its capital. Colonial territory was conquered and defended by soldiers and sailors paid either by the colonizing state or the local colonial state. Plantations and mines were often directly owned by the local colonial state. Trading monopolies and tax privileges granted by the colonizing state to the local colonial state were used to attract capital investment. Indeed, conceptual distinctions between public and private economic activity which seem so clear today were much less clear in the heyday of colonialism. The unspun truth about the “winning” of the western frontiers of the United States and Canada make for even poorer libertarian dramas. Notwithstanding all the hardy pioneers in their covered wagons, the western frontier of the United States was really “won” by the U.S. Army and the construction of the railroads which were capitalized by enormous Federal land grants.[5] Similarly, the western frontier of Canada was “won” by cash grants, subsidies, loans, and the guarantee of bond issues by the Canadian government to finance the construction of the railroads. A better historical analogy for establishing permanent human communities in space is actually provided by one of the greatest civil engineering project of this century−−the construction of the Panama Canal. As would be true with any very large space development project, constructing the Panama Canal required that tough new engineering and science problems had to be overcome in an unforgiving environment, a labor force had to be imported and supported, and sufficient capital had to be invested despite the fact that private investors could not or would not provide the financing necessary to complete the task. After twenty years of failed efforts by private French firms to dig a canal across the isthmus of Panama and the failure of a private American firm to dig a canal through Nicaragua, it was the United States government that successfully completed the construction of the Panama Canal.[6] Financing by the United States government and management by U.S. Army engineers succeeded where the private sector failed. Engineering problems more difficult than those which were encountered in constructing the Suez Canal were solved, yellow fever and malaria were effectively controlled, a new sovereign nation−state was created, and world commerce was facilitated.[7] Not bad for government work. Very large space development projects should be understood as massive public works projects constructed to provide the environmental and economic requirements for permanent human settlement beyond Earth. If these new human settlements are to attract and keep the kind of people needed, then they will have to be livable communities. Making them livable will provide plenty of scope for private firms to profit from the provision of goods and services. But private firms will not do the heavy lifting necessary to finance the construction of the very large space project within which and around which such a livable community may grow.
Need private investment for the moon Investors encouraged by US development of technologies

Schmitt 3- Harrison H. Schmitt has a doctorate in geology from Harvard University in 1964, former astronaut, November 6, 2003, “Testimony of Hon. Harrison H. Schmitt: Senate Hearing on "Lunar Exploration"”, http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=10924

Most important for a new NASA or a new agency would be the guarantee of a sustained political (financial) commitment to see the job through and to not turn back once a deep space operational capability exists once again or accidents happen. At this point in history, we cannot count on the Government for such a sustained commitment. This includes not under-funding the effort - a huge problem still plaguing the Space Shuttle, the International Space Station, and other current and past programs. That is why I have been looking to a more predictable commitment from investors who have been given a credible business plan and a return on investment commensurable with the risk. Attaining a level of sustaining operations for a core business in fusion power and lunar resources requires about 10-15 years and $10-15 billion of private investment capital as well as the successful interim marketing and profitable sales related to a variety of applied fusion technologies. The time required from start-up to the delivery of the first 100 kg years supply to the first operating 1000 megawatt fusion power plant on Earth will be a function of the rate at which capital is available, but probably no less than 10 years. This schedule also depends to some degree on the U.S. Government being actively supportive in matters involving taxes, regulations, and international law but no more so than is expected for other commercial endeavors. If the U.S. Government also provided an internal environment for research and development of important technologies, investors would be encouraged as well. As you are aware, the precursor to NASA, the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA), provided similar assistance and antitrust protection to aeronautics industry research during most of the 20th Century.


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