1ac heg Advantage Scenario 1 is Leadership
Government Wont Go to the moon
Download 1.32 Mb.
|
- Navigate this page:
- No co-op now the government and the private sector have different interests and goals Sadeh et al. 05
- Government needs to be leaner- thin out beuracracy key to support the private industry New York Times 04
- U.S. looks for innovation from the private sector to stop bureaucracy in their government programs- They don’t want another Apollo program New York Times 04
Government Wont Go to the moonGovernment space programs rely on a narrow technological and industrial base this is unsustainable for budgets Cleave & Pfaltzgraff et al.09- Dr. William R. Van Cleave Professor Emeritus Department of Defense and Strategic Studies Missouri State University Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The Fletcher School, Tufts University President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, “Report Independent Working Group on Missile Defense,the Space Relationship,& the Twenty-First Century”, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, p. 39-40 http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf Compounding the challenges from abroad is a weakening of the technological and industrial base on which American space power relies. Numerous reviews of U.S. space policy, programs, and budgets over the years have called for altering how space programs are budgeted and managed, changes in how space personnel are trained and the career paths available, and increased investment in research and technology. None of these concerns is new. Troubling signs of a weakening base for American space have been appar26ent for some time. The absence of a peer competitor and the sizeable lead in space capabilities from Cold War-era investments gave policy makers, the public, and even military leaders a false sense of security and reinforced the impression that U.S. leadership would go unchallenged with only minimal attention. Despite the national security importance of space, the United States has not put adequate resources into military space programs. Many of the approximately 100 U.S. national security satellites presently in orbit for military and surveillance operations are approaching obsolescence. Successor-generation models based on new and improved technologies frequently are delayed because they are over budget, behind schedule, and facing technical difficulties. The acquisition process for national security space programs is under severe strain, buffeted by excessive technical and schedule risk and unrealistic cost projections, leading the Defense Science Board to conclude that: “Government capabilities to lead and manage the acquisition process have seriously eroded.”27 The deleterious results of a broken acquisition system are apparent throughout the space sector. The Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS)-High and the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) are two cases in point. While both are key parts of the missile defense system to be deployed by the United States, they have had to be restructured because of large cost overruns, schedule delays, and technical problems. For example, SBIRS-High, which is replacing the Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites and will provide rapid early warning and ballistic missile trajectory data, is now projected to cost approximately $10 billion, well over twice the amount of earlier estimates.28 Cost increases in excess of 25 percent during the last quarter of FY 2005 forced the Pentagon to recertify the program in December 2005. For FY 2009, DoD requested $2.3 billion for the program, though the Air Force is currently exploring a potential alternative or early replacement for SBIRS-High called 3GIRS.29 No co-op now the government and the private sector have different interests and goals Sadeh et al. 05- Eligar Sadeh, David Livingston, Thomas Matula, Haym Benaroya, a Department of Space Studies, University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, ND 58202-9008, USA b Department of Space Studies, University of North Dakota, USA c School of Business, University of Houston-Victoria, USA d Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, Rutgers University, USA, Available online 13 October 2005, “Public–private models for lunar development and commerce”, Space Policy 21 (2005) 267–275 The government, whose motivation is to act in the public interest and create public value, undertakes the risk of R&D and formulates an appropriate legal regime that facilitates PPPs for lunar development. In recent years a number of firms has proposed commercial lunar ventures. One major barrier to commercial lunar missions is the inability of firms to raise the venture capital needed for implementation of business plans. Important factors related to this barrier are the lack of credible near-term revenue markets for commercial lunar activities, and political and legal uncertainties associated withcommer cial lunar ventures [1]. The private sector cannot be confident that it will get an acceptable ROI. This sector often looks to the government to share the technological and capital risks. Fig. 1 shows how this public–private relationship is possible. An important role for the government in the PPP equation is to reduce as many of the risks as possible. This can be accomplished through policy actions that make sure that governmental actions do not adversely affect the development of the private space industry, through a role for government in capital formation for developing space technology, or by offloading governmental activities in space to the private sector. These actions can reduce risk and enhance the possibilities of ROI for private entities that can then commercialize the technologies. An acceptable region for this commercialization exists when there is a favorable benefit-to-cost ratio implying that ROI is greater than risk. PPPs of this nature characterize how space commerce has evolved in other areas, such as telecommunications, commercial launchvehicles and remote sensing. This is likely to characterize PPPs directed at lunar development. The traditional approach of government contracting of R&D deals with risks inherent in the development of new and innovative technologies. This approach has been augmented with transfers of the technology for commercial use. The PPP equation implies that the government not only contracts for R&D and facilitates the transfer of the developed technologies, but also then addresses additional political, legal and market risks. The viability of PPPs depends upon the extent to which the government reduces all these risks for the private sector. For example, the successful commercialization of telecommunication satellites, space launchveh icles and remote sensing satellites in the USA became possible because the government not only contracted for the R&D of these technologies, for its civil and military space use, but then also facilitated the transfer of these technologies to the private sector, established policies and laws that provided a licensing and regulatory regime, and promoted the development of markets that could sustain these areas of space commercialization [2]. Concomitantly, a failure to address the non-technical risks can lead to failure of PPP initiatives. This is no better illustrated in the space commercial sector then by the failure of the Earth Observation Satellite Company (EOSAT) during the 1980s. In the EOSAT case, legal, financial and market risks were not adequately considered [3]. EOSAT was established as a result of congressional legislation and was formulated as a PPP, where the federal government transferred remote sensing satellite technology (i.e., the Land Remote Sensing Satellite System or Landsat) to EOSAT. The government mandate for EOSAT was to commercialize Landsat data and to generate profits from the sale of that data. Technology transfer did not in this case foster the success of EOSAT. Even though the government provided EOSAT withope rational subsidies, these subsidies were insufficient, and there was an inadequate legal regime in place and a lack of financial mechanisms to encourage the development of a market for Landsat data. The lessons of EOSAT show that PPP viability rests on the extent to which market barriers, such as a lack of proven markets, to commercial lunar ventures can be overcome. The US Congress Commercial Space Act 1998 addresses this barrier by calling for NASA and other US federal agencies and scientific researchers to acquire space science and Earthscienc e data from commercial providers [4]. Early market products from lunar missions will probably comprise information, experimental data and samples. The logical market for these products is the scientific community. The scientific community currently has no way of purchasing these products, being dependent on NASA missions for gathering such data. A viable scientific market created through a federal grant program to fund the purchases by university and non-profit research groups of data and samples from commercial lunar ventures is one plausible option. It is important that the government foster an ‘anchor’ market for science data. A government sponsored purchase grant program provides suchan anchor tenant market for commercial lunar ventures by allowing existing lunar researchers to purchase products from the commercial sector. This allows the private sector to establisha market and achieve revenue streams necessary for implementation of business plans. Government needs to be leaner- thin out beuracracy key to support the private industry New York Times 04- WARREN E. LEARY and JOHN SCHWARTZ staff writers, June 14 “NASA Is Urged To Widen Role For Businesses” Section A; Column 5; National Desk; Pg. 1, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/15/us/nasa-is-urged-to-widen-role-for-businesses.html NASA needs to thin out its bureaucracy and turn over many tasks to private industry if the agency is to carry out President Bush's new vision to explore the Moon and Mars, a presidential commission has concluded. The panel, the President's Commission on Moon, Mars and Beyond, which spent months considering how to reach goals outlined by Mr. Bush in a January speech, said the venture would require huge changes within NASA and steady commitment from government. ''The commission unanimously endorses this ambitious yet thoroughly achievable goal of space exploration,'' the panel said in a report to be issued Wednesday. ''Our journey will require the government to embrace fundamental changes in its management and organization.'' The panel also recommended restoring an advocate for space programs at the White House by creating a Space Exploration Steering Council. A similar council existed under the first President Bush but disbanded with his administration. Details of the report were first disclosed by Space.com, an Internet site specializing in space issues; a summary of the report was obtained by The New York Times. It said NASA should make itself a leaner organization that concentrates on research and developing space technology that is not readily available. Any technology or services useful to the space program that are available from private industry should be contracted out, it said. The agency should encourage private industry ''to assume the primary role of providing services to NASA,'' the report said -- leaving it to industry to launch most payloads into low orbit around the Earth, for instance. ''In NASA decisions, the preferred choice for operational activities must be competitively awarded contracts with private and nonprofit organizations,'' it said. ''NASA's role must be limited to only those areas where there is irrefutable demonstration that only government can perform the proposed activity.'' Increased commercialization is crucial, the panel said, ''to attainment of exploration objectives within reasonable schedules and affordable costs.'' U.S. looks for innovation from the private sector to stop bureaucracy in their government programs- They don’t want another Apollo program New York Times 04- WARREN E. LEARY and JOHN SCHWARTZ staff writers, June 14 “NASA Is Urged To Widen Role For Businesses” Section A; Column 5; National Desk; Pg. 1, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/15/us/nasa-is-urged-to-widen-role-for-businesses.html The NASA administrator, Sean O'Keefe, has repeatedly suggested that NASA should get out of the business of doing things in low Earth orbit and should be focusing its financing and goals instead on exploration beyond the home planet. Mr. O'Keefe said last week that the agency would take the commission's work seriously and expected to adopt many of its recommendations. NASA is already studying a reorganization, which according to draft documents would combine several departments within the agency and reduce the size of its bureaucracy. Howard E. McCurdy, a space expert at American University, said that at first blush, the commission might seem to be endorsing what had been happening to a great extent at NASA, with contractors already doing a good deal of the work at the agency. Within the space shuttle program, Professor McCurdy said, the main contractor, United Space Alliance, and other companies ''don't sit in the front room at mission control, but they do just about everything else.'' Still, if the space program was restructured as the commission suggests, NASA would be looking to entrepreneurs for more innovation and creativity as well, he said. And that, he said, would mean an utterly transformed space agency. ''It's not going to be some huge Project Apollo that will get us back to the Moon,'' he said. That program cost an estimated $150 billion in current dollars, he said -- a price that America is unlikely to pay. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 1.32 Mb. Share with your friends:
|