1ac heg Advantage Scenario 1 is Leadership


Solvency: Forward Presence



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Solvency: Forward Presence



Potential advantage/maybe different plan mandate- SBMD, solves deterrence

Frederick 9 – Lt Col Lorinda A. Frederick, USAF, BA, Michigan State University; MBA, Regis University; Master of Military Operational Art and Science, Air Command and Staff College; Master of Airpower Art and Science, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 9/1/09, “Deterrence and Space-Based Missile Defense,” Air and Space Power Journal, Fall 2009

Many characteristics of SBMD could create uncertainty in the minds of potential adversaries about whether or not they could achieve their aims.48 Space provides access to threats in areas that terrestrial, maritime, and airborne defenses cannot reach. SBMD is capable of destroying ballistic missiles over the enemy’s territory before they release multiple reentry vehicles or countermeasures designed to thwart defenses. The constant forward presence of SBMD could allow the United States to limit its military footprint on foreign soil and support many military operations simultaneously. Land- and sea-based interceptors have to be placed in areas where they can provide credible protection from ballistic missile attacks. Pre-positioning infrastructure, supplies, and equipment may shorten response times when hostilities erupt, but they are costly and difficult to sustain. SBMD allows a nonintrusive forward presence because it does not require the pre-positioning of assets on other territories. Furthermore, employing SBMD is not contingent on approval from another nation. The continued presence of US assets on foreign soil depends on the host nation’s accepting or approving the mission that those assets support. If defenses are not in position, deterrence is reduced. Stationed in the right orbits in the right quantities, SBMD could deter or defend against attacks around-the-clock, especially if used in concert with other sea- and land-based missile defenses.



Solvency: Space Leadership


Space Leadership--- private sector innovation and control over space
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 9 – Chaired by Dr. Robert L Pfaltzgraffi Jr., Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies, and Dr. William R. Van Cleave Professor Emeritus at Department of Defense and Strategic Studies Missouri State University, 2009, “Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century” Independent Working Group, online: www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf

Access to a secure space environment is indispensable if the United States is to deploy a robust, layered missile defense. It is essential not only to assure that the United States will be able to use space for missile defense, but also to develop the means to protect other space-based assets and infrastructure. Space has become an arena of crucial importance to the United States both for commercial purposes and for national security. Just as it must maintain capabilities to defend its interests in the air, at sea, and on land, the United States needs to defend its space-based assets. At the same time we must deny the hostile use of space by our enemies. Just as land, the seas, and the air have been conflict arenas, space is changing how wars are fought and where they will be fought. This section addresses the role of space in twenty-first century U.S. national security strategy and its essential contributions to future missile defense. Space offers unique opportunities for a global missile defense. The obstacles to space-based missile defense lie primarily in the political arena rather than in technological limitations. This section examines issues that must be addressed if the United States is to deploy a missile defense that includes space-based interdiction capabilities. Present U.S. Space Strengths The United States is the leading space power, and as such it depends more on space than does any other nation, a situation that leads inevitably to both vulnerabilities and opportunities. The U.S. position in space has grown out of numerous strengths developed over more than five decades. These strengths fall into two broad, overlapping categories: (1) military force enhancement; and (2) commercial utilization of space. Because of the dual-use nature of these technologies, it is not easy to separate their military applications from their commercial ones. Therefore, the failure of the United States to remain in the forefront of space technologies would have both military and commercial implications. Advances in the military or civilian sectors will overlap, intersect, and reinforce each other. Consequently, the development in the United States of a dynamic and innovative private-sector space industry will be indispensable to future U.S. space leadership. Nevertheless, the ability of the U.S. military to contribute to, and benefit from, such a space technology base will depend on its focus and priorities. The availability of technologies does not lead inevitably to their exploitation. America may fail to move forward to exploit technological opportunities and breakthroughs. Such choices may be based on political or other considerations, whether well founded or the product of mistaken assumptions about what competitors or adversaries will or will not do. Just as control of the seas has been essential to the right of innocent passage for commerce, the ability of the United States to maintain assured access to space and freedom of action in space will depend on space control. Given the already extensive importance of space for commercial and military purposes, as well as its prospective role in missile defense, the United States must maintain control of space in the twenty-first century. This commitment to space control is neither new nor destabilizing, despite claims to the contrary.



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