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1ac Yemen Oil Prices



First, signature strikes are inevitable but faulty intelligence creates civilian casualties which destabilize and create anti-american sentiment.


Greenfeild 13 — Danya Greenfield, deputy director of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council, where she leads the Yemen Policy Group, M.A. in International Studies and Middle East Studies from John Hopkin’s University, B.A. in International Relations from Tufts University, 2013 (“The Case Against Drone Strikes on People Who Only 'Act' Like Terrorists,” The Atlantic, August 19th, accessible online at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/the-case-against-drone-strikes-on-people-who-only-act-like-terrorists/278744/, accessed on 6-25-15)

As Mark Bowden discusses in this month's Atlantic cover story, there is great debate about whether drone strikes should be a core component of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy. Of all the the arguments in favor, those those emphasizing effectiveness of signature strikes are particularly dubious. The term "signature strike" is used to distinguish strikes conducted against individuals who "match a pre-identified 'signature' of behavior that the U.S. links to militant activity," rather than targeting a specific person. The United States should not allow signature strikes because the cost of these attacks far outweighs the potential benefit. Leaving aside significant concerns about the legality of such strikes, there are serious questions about the efficacy of this approach in undermining terrorist networks.



The problem with signature strikes is that they open the door to a much higher incidence of civilian casualties--and this is where the danger lies. If the United States is choosing targets based on suspicious activity or proximity to other known-terrorists, this falls short of the threshold for drone strikes set by the Obama Administration, perpetuates a disastrous U.S. image in Yemen, and serves to invigorate the ranks of those groups the United States aims to disable.

In response to increasing criticism, President Obama outlined his counterterrorism policy in May 2013 with a speech at National Defense University. Obama noted that the U.S. will only act against "terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people, and when there are no other governments capable of effectively addressing the threat." He did not, however, directly address the use of signature strikes, leaving open the prospect that they could be used in the ongoing fight against terrorism. This would be a mistake. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, extensive signature strikes sparked a significant increase in anti-American sentiment. After years of drone strikes, 74 percent of Pakistanis considered the U.S. an enemy by 2012 (up from 64 percent in 2009) according to a Pew Research Center poll. The White House authorized signature strikes for Yemen, but U.S. officials insist that they have not employed this tactic to date. If true, the incidence of civilian and non-combatant casualties in Yemen means that faulty intelligence and targeting failures are to blame, which is perhaps even more worrisome.


Second, this is specifically true of Yemen — targeted strikes solve blowback and AQAP recruitment — it’s reverse causal.


Greenfeild 13 — Danya Greenfield, deputy director of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council, where she leads the Yemen Policy Group, M.A. in International Studies and Middle East Studies from John Hopkin’s University, B.A. in International Relations from Tufts University, 2013 (“The Case Against Drone Strikes on People Who Only 'Act' Like Terrorists,” The Atlantic, August 19th, accessible online at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/the-case-against-drone-strikes-on-people-who-only-act-like-terrorists/278744/, accessed on 6-25-15)

In waging the drone campaign, the United States occasionally hits precisely the wrong person. A U.S. strike in August 2012 supposedly killed three al-Qaeda militants in Yemen. Among the casualties, however, was an anti-Qaeda imam and a policeman he had brought along for protection. The imam was working to dismantle al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), making him precisely the sort of local ally the U.S. desperately needs in a place like Yemen. Yemeni Nobel Prize laureate Tawakkul Karman warned that Yemeni tribal leaders in areas where civilians have been killed in drone strikes say that these attacks drive more Yemenis to turn against Washington. During his testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Yemeni writer Farea al-Muslimi recounted an incident where the eldest son of a man killed by a drone joined AQAP because he identifies the U.S. as his father's killer and wants revenge. As the deaths and injuries mount, dangerous anti-American sentiment grows. When drone strikes occur and non-combatants are killed, Yemenis lash out with protests demanding justice and accountability from the United States--which has not been forthcoming.

In a place like Yemen, although the American drone program is universally hated, many Yemenis will admit they would support targeted assassinations if there is clear intelligence that an individual is a senior operative within AQAP and plotting a specific and imminent act of terror against Americans. The problem with signature strikes is that they do not meet this threshold--not even remotely-- and they open the door for the U.S. to make grievous targeting mistakes and be seen as taking sides in a domestic insurgency. Signature strikes target low-level militants who might be nasty characters, but they are not necessarily planning an imminent act of terror or hold a leadership position.

Beyond signature strikes, there is a more fundamental question that we should be asking--a question of overall strategy: is the current drone program achieving our national security objectives? It is not just civil libertarians and human rights advocates that are sounding the alarm; a group of 30 foreign policy experts sent a letter to President Obama in March 2013 calling for an end to the current drone strategy. Even senior retired members of the military, including General Stanley McChrystal, believe drone strikes are counterproductive because of the blowback they foment among the local population.

Targeted killings may eliminate key al-Qaeda leaders, but when civilians die along with them, these strikes ensure that a generation of Yemenis, Pakistanis, or Somalis will blame the U.S. for killing innocent community members, exacerbating America's serious image problems abroad and creating a space for extremist ideology to take root. In short, the U.S. drone program not only undermines the long-term national security of the United States by fostering widespread anti-U.S. sentiment, it also undermines the legitimacy of the host country government, whose support the U.S. needs, and it provides fodder for jihadi rhetoric that strengthens the very groups the U.S. seeks to destroy.

Third, Yemen is a test case — success over AQAP prevents regional terror and instability, but failure emboldens radical groups and inflames regional rivalries.


Jarrell 14 — Matthew Jarrell, Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at Brown University, 2014 (“Yemen: The Importance of Success in a Failed State,” Brown Political Review, October 30th, accessible online at http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2014/10/yemen-the-importance-of-success-in-a-failed-state/, accessed on 6-22-15)

Regional Reverberations



As Yemen deals with this latest round of domestic upheaval, the visible reciprocal relationship between the nation and foreign interventionists remains. World and regional powers have consistently had a negative impact on Yemeni internal affairs, and in turn, Yemen’s problems are hardly confined within its borders. There are numerous parallels between Yemen and other Middle Eastern nations’ struggles: intense regionalism embodied by the north versus south dynamic is reminiscent of Libyan civil strife, and the Sunni-Shia sectarian tensions harken back to Syrian divides. The Islamic State, a powerful terrorist group with international ambitions, has derailed a domestic political order in Iraq in a similar manner as AQAP in Yemen. As a nation that is plagued by all of these different dilemmas, it follows that a “solution” in Yemen could help immensely in shedding light on how to counter terror in the region as a whole.

The first step to a more stable society is loosening the grip of destructive foreign interests. The lessons that can be learned by examining repeated foreign missteps in Yemen are many: Britain’s colonial division, Saudi Arabian and American unflinching backup of Saleh, and Iran’s meddling in the Houthi issue should all have been avoided. Furthermore, if any hope of a resolution exists in this war-weary republic, it will manifest itself through domestic dialogue between the competing factions; perhaps the recent entrance of the Houthis into mainstream political discussion will enable that. Ideally, all Yemenis should form a common front against AQAP, eliminating one of the world’s most active terrorist groups and serving as a model for national integration to the entire Middle East.

Fourth, instability causes AQAP positioning in Yemen that causes seizing of the Bab El-Mandeb strait.


Anzinger 14 — Niklas Anzinger, Ph.D. Candidate in International Relations at Syracuse University, 2014 (“Jihad At Sea - Al Qaeda’s Maritime Front in Yemen,” Maritime Executive, February 25th, accessible online at http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/Jihad-At-Sea--Al-Qaedas-Maritime-Front-in-Yemen-2014-02-25, accessed on 6-22-15)

Yemen’s state weakness due to fragmentation and ongoing conflicts allowed Al Qaeda and affiliates to take and hold territory, possibly enabling them to seize the Port of Aden. If Al Qaeda establishes safe havens in the southern Abyan province, supported by local Yemeni inhabitants, attacks at sea or in near by ports similar to the “USS Cole bombing” in 2000 could become a threat, increasing the danger to Red Sea shipping. Yet Al Qaeda is of secondary concern for the Yemeni government, with secessionist insurgencies in the north and the south threatening the state’s unity. Only a stable Yemen can effectively deny Al Qaeda a stable base in the long run.

In recent years, international shippers taking the Red Sea route have been primarily concerned with attacks by Somali pirates. Those attacks went down from 237 in 2011 to 15 in 2013 due to the Somali governments’ increased ability to fight and deter piracy, among other causes. However, another threat to international shipping in the Gulf of Aden looms. Yemen’s southern coastline is on the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb which links the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, a critical maritime choke point where roughly 8.2% of global oil supply passed through in 2009. Its oil exports, accounting for 70% of Yemeni government revenue, make the country highly dependent on its declining reserves. Yemen is an Al Qaeda stronghold, second only to Pakistan (and possibly Syria more recently). It was a target of the U.S. “drone campaign,” with 94 strikes between 2002 and 2013 (Pakistan: 368). Al Qaeda aims to enforce rigid Islamic legislation in Muslim countries and establish a global Islamic Caliphate. According to its 20-year plan, Al Qaeda aims to subdue “apostate” Muslim regimes such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen. It hosts a franchise in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), establishing safe havens in the governorates of Al Bayda’, Ma’rib, Shabwah, Lahji and Abyan, where it exerts considerable influence.

Yemen’s weak central state

Yet the Yemeni government, headed by Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi since February 2012 after the 33-year rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh came to an end, has to deal with more than Al Qaeda. In 1990, the Yemen Arab Republic in the north united with the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in the south. United in name, Yemen, however, remained a fragmented entity rife with internal divisions. In 1994, a civil war between Saleh’s north and the secessionist south broke out. In 1997, a group called “Ansar Allah”, emerging from a Zaidi Shia religious organization, confronted the Yemeni government leading to armed uprisings and several rounds of fighting between 2004 and 2010. In late March 2011, the defection of General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, the chief military commander in north Yemen, led to a security vacuum in the northwest that Ansar Allah seized to take control of Saada city where it continues fighting Sunni-Salafist tribes. His defection may, however, only be a symptom of the Yemeni state’s retreat to Sana’a, neglecting the north and the south. As a consequence, Hadi has to cope with internal struggles and two rebel movements, constraining his ability to fight AQAP.

Al Qaeda’s terrorism at sea



Al Qaeda’s terrorism at sea emanating from Yemen has a tradition and method. Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, an eminent jihadi strategist, defined several choke points as a target and outlined methods for disruption: blocking the passages using mines or sinking ships in them, threatening movement at sea through piracy, martyrdom operations and weapons.

On the Earth, there are five (5) important straits, four of them are in the countries of the Arabs and the Muslims. The fifth one is in America, and it is the Panama Canal. These straits are: 1. The Strait of Hormuz, the oil gate in the Persian Gulf. 2. The Suez Canal in Egypt. 3. The Bab el Mandib between Yemen and the African continent. 4. The Gibraltar Strait in Morocco. Most of the Western world’s economy, in terms of trade and oil, passes through these sea passages. Also passing through them are the military fleets, aircraft carriers and the deadly missiles hitting our women and children … It is necessary to shut these passages until the invader campaigns have left our countries. […]. — Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, “The Global Islamic Resistance Call”.

Fifth, Yemen instability spikes oil prices via straight cut off — perception alone triggers the impact.


Rosen 15 — Armin Rosen, Freelance journalist who has written in publications like The Atlantic, US News & World Report, and The Wall Street Journal — Internally citing an EIA report on the Bab el-Mandeb Straight, 2015 (“War In Yemen Could Threaten One Of The World's Most Important Oil Chokepoints,” Business Insider, March 26th, accessible online at http://www.businessinsider.com/war-in-yemen-could-threaten-one-of-the-worlds-most-important-oil-choke-points-2015-3, accessed on 6-21-15)

Oil prices are surging after Saudi Arabia began a military operation against Iranian-supported Houthi rebels in neighboring Yemen:

Yemen isn't a world-shaking oil producer, churning out a mere 133,000 barrels a day in 2013. Prices may have been jolted by the strong possibility that Saudi Arabia, which produces 11.6 million barrels a day, is entering a risky military conflict.

The situation in Aden, a strategically decisive port city on Yemen's southern coast, was so bad that President Adb Rabbu Mansur Hadi reportedly had to flee the city, and the country, by boat rather than by air.



This means that Houthi rebels are contesting areas along the Bab el-Mandeb, the straits at the opening of the Red Sea and one of the world's crucial oil chokepoints.

According to the US Energy Information Administration's (EIA) fact-sheet on global oil chokepoints, 3.8 million barrels of oil and "refined petroleum products" passed through the Bab el-Mandeb each day on its way to Europe, Asia, and the US, making it the world's fourth-busiest chokepoint.

The strait controls access to multiple oil terminals and to a oil pipeline co-owned by state companies from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar that transits oil between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, called the Suez-Mediterranean or SUMED pipeline.

The Bab el-Mandeb is 18 miles wide at its narrowest point, "limiting tanker traffic to two 2-mile-wide channels for inbound and outbound shipments," according to the Energy Information Administration.

The closure of the straits — or the perception of added risk of closure — could have huge consequences for the global oil market.

"Closure of the Bab el-Mandeb could keep tankers from the Persian Gulf from reaching the Suez Canal or SUMED Pipeline, diverting them around the southern tip of Africa, adding to transit time and cost," the EIA fact-sheet explains. "In addition, European and North African southbound oil flows could no longer take the most direct route to Asian markets via the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb."

Sudan and South Sudan would also have their only oil terminal cut off from Asia-bound trade, as the countries' shared pipeline terminates in Port Sudan. And it would cut off Indian Ocean access to the Mediterranean sea as well as the SUMED pipeline, which can transit 2.24 million barrels of oil per day — more than the daily output of all but 13 of the world's countries.

Sixth, price shocks cause global economic collapse — causes a domino effect of economic decline.


Rentschler 13 — Jun Rentschler, Analyst at the World Bank, Consultant at the European Bank for Development, Ph.D. in Economics from the University College, London, 2013 (“Oil Price volatility – its risk on economic growth and development,” World Bank, July 18th, accessible online at http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/oil-price-volatility-its-risk-economic-growth-and-development, accessed on 6-22-15)

Oil price shocks (i.e. sudden changes) can be transmitted into the macro-economy via various channels. In the private sector, a positive oil price shock will increase production costs and hence restrict output – with price increases at least partially passed on to consumers. Moreover, as prices for gasoline and electricity increase, households face higher costs of living, with the poor being particularly vulnerable. These impacts can have further significant knock-on effects and repercussions throughout the economy, affecting macro-indicators such as employment, trade balance, inflation and public accounts, as well as stock market prices and exchange rates. Thereby, the nature and extent of such knock-on effects depend on the structural characteristics of an economy; for instance, the more a country engages in oil trade, the more it is exposed to price shocks on global commodity markets. Countries relying on a high fossil fuel share in their energy mix, or on energy intensive industrial production, are also more vulnerable. Furthermore, oil price shocks on the international market might be amplified in specific countries, depending on the respective Dollar exchange rate and prevailing inflationary pressures.

While a given oil price increase may be perceived positively by oil exporting countries and negatively by importers, an increase in oil price volatility (i.e. consecutive positive and negative oil price shocks) increases perceived price uncertainty for all countries – regardless of their trade balance. Such oil price volatility reduces planning horizons, causes firms to postpone investments, and may require expensive reallocation of resources. Formulating robust national budgets becomes more difficult, as importing countries face uncertainty regarding import costs and fuel subsidies levels, and exporters face volatile revenues. This may be a particularly profound problem in budget constrained developing countries, which rely on oil exports as a main source of public revenue. In order to protect firms and households against price volatility on international markets, particularly in developing countries, governments often allocate large parts of their budgets to subsidizing fuel. These subsidy systems not only expose governments to significant budgetary risks, but result in significant environmental costs, benefit mainly the wealthier, create disincentives for energy efficiency, and crowd out resources from education, health and other investments in development.

Finally, global economic decline risks nuclear war.


Merlini 11 — Cesare Merlini, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Insitution, 2011 (“A Post-Secular World?,” Survival, Volume 53, Issue 2, April, pgs. 117–130, accessible online at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396338.2011.571015, accessed on 6-22-15)

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism.




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