Aff document Map

Saudi proliferation ensures regional proliferation and nuclear war — it escalates and draws in other powers.

There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This "Islamabad option" could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own.

Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India.

The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan's weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India's reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT.

N-Player Competition

Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multipolar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack.

More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents' forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine-based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to "launch on warning" of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war.

Meanwhile, states outside the Middle East could also be a source of instability. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a nuclear arms race that other nations were essentially powerless to influence. In a multipolar nuclear Middle East, other nuclear powers and states with advanced military technology could influence -- for good or ill -- the military competition within the region by selling or transferring technologies that most local actors lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors, enhanced missile-guidance systems, warhead miniaturization technology, early warning systems, air and missile defenses. Such transfers could stabilize a fragile nuclear balance if the emerging nuclear powers acquired more survivable arsenals as a result. But they could also be highly destabilizing. If, for example, an outside power sought to curry favor with a potential client state or gain influence with a prospective ally, it might share with that state the technology it needed to enhance the accuracy of its missiles and thereby increase its ability to launch a disarming first strike against any adversary. The ability of existing nuclear powers and other technically advanced military states to shape the emerging nuclear competition in the Middle East could lead to a new Great Game, with unpredictable consequences.

Only the plan reverses the trend in time to solve — the Middle East could pass the brink for nuclear war at any moment.

London 10 — Herbert I. London, President of the Hudson Institute, Professor Emeritus at New York University, Ph.D. from New York University, 2010 (“The Coming Crisis In The Middle East,” Gatestone Institute, June 28^th, available online at http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/1387/coming-crisis-in-the-middle-east, Accessed 6-22-15)

The coming storm in the Middle East is gaining momentum; like conditions prior to World War I, all it takes for explosive action to commence is a trigger.

Turkey's provocative flotilla, often described in Orwellian terms as a humanitarian mission, has set in motion a gust of diplomatic activity: if the Iranians send escort vessels for the next round of Turkish ships, which they have apparently decided not to do in favor of land operations, it could have presented a casus belli. [cause for war]

Syria, too, has been playing a dangerous game, with both missile deployment and rearming Hezbollah. According to most public accounts, Hezbollah is sitting on 40,000 long-, medium- and short-range missiles, and Syrian territory has been serving as a conduit for military materiel from Iran since the end of the 2006 Lebanon War.

Should Syria move its own scuds to Lebanon or deploy its troops as reinforcement for Hezbollah, a wider regional war with Israel could not be contained.

In the backdrop is an Iran, with sufficient fissionable material to produce a couple of nuclear weapons. It will take some time to weaponize the missiles, but the road to that goal is synchronized in green lights since neither diplomacy nor diluted sanctions can convince Iran to change course.

From Qatar to Afghanistan all political eyes are on Iran, poised to be "the hegemon" in the Middle East; it is increasingly considered the "strong horse" as American forces incrementally retreat from the region. Even Iraq, ironically, may depend on Iranian ties in order to maintain internal stability.

For Sunni nations like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, regional strategic vision is a combination of deal-making to offset the Iranian Shia advantage, and attempting to buy or develop nuclear weapons as a counterweight to Iranian ambition. However, both of these governments are in a precarious state; should either fall, all bets are off in the Middle East neighborhood. It has long been said that the Sunni "tent" must stand on two legs: if one, falls, the tent collapses.

Should this tent collapse, and should Iran take advantage of that calamity, it could incite a Sunni-Shia war. Or feeling empowered, and no longer dissuaded by an escalation scenario, Iran, with nuclear weapons in tow, might decide that a war against Israel is a distinct possibility. However implausible it may seem at the moment, the possible annihilation of Israel and the prospect of a second holocaust could lead to a nuclear exchange.

The only wild card that can change this slide into warfare is an active United States' policy. Yet, curiously, the U.S. is engaged in both an emotional and physical retreat from the region.

Despite rhetoric which suggests an Iran with nuclear weapons is intolerable, the U.S. has done nothing to forestall this eventual outcome. Despite the investment in blood and treasure to allow a stable government to emerge in Iraq, the anticipated withdrawal of U.S. forces has prompted President Maliki to travel to Tehran on a regular basis. Further, despite historic links to Israel that gave the U.S. leverage in the region as well a democratic ally, the Obama administration treats Israel as a national security albatross that must be disposed of as soon as possible.

As a consequence, the U.S. is perceived in the region as the "weak horse," the one dangerous to ride. In every Middle East capital the words "unreliable and United States" are linked. Those individuals seeking a moderate course of action are now in a distinct minority. A political vacuum is emerging, one that is not sustainable and one the Iranian leadership looks to with imperial exhilaration.

It is no longer a question of whether war will occur, but rather when it will occur, and where it will break out. There are many triggers to ignite the explosion, but not many scenarios for containment. Could it be a regional war in which Egypt and Saudi Arabia watch from the sidelines, but secretly wish for Israeli victory? Or will this be a war in which there aren't victors, only devastation? Moreover, should war break out, what does the U.S. do?

This is a description far more dire than any in the last century and, even if some believe that it is overly pessimistic, Arab and Jew, Persian and Egyptian, Muslim and Maronite tend to believe in its veracity -- a truly bad sign.

Oil Price Spikes

Instability causes AQAP positioning in Yemen that causes seizing of the Bab El-Mandeb strait.

Anzinger 14 — Niklas Anzinger, Ph.D. Candidate in International Relations at Syracuse University, 2014 (“Jihad At Sea - Al Qaeda’s Maritime Front in Yemen,” Maritime Executive, February 25^th, accessible online at http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/Jihad-At-Sea--Al-Qaedas-Maritime-Front-in-Yemen-2014-02-25, accessed on 6-22-15)

Yemen’s state weakness due to fragmentation and ongoing conflicts allowed Al Qaeda and affiliates to take and hold territory, possibly enabling them to seize the Port of Aden. If Al Qaeda establishes safe havens in the southern Abyan province, supported by local Yemeni inhabitants, attacks at sea or in near by ports similar to the “USS Cole bombing” in 2000 could become a threat, increasing the danger to Red Sea shipping. Yet Al Qaeda is of secondary concern for the Yemeni government, with secessionist insurgencies in the north and the south threatening the state’s unity. Only a stable Yemen can effectively deny Al Qaeda a stable base in the long run.

In recent years, international shippers taking the Red Sea route have been primarily concerned with attacks by Somali pirates. Those attacks went down from 237 in 2011 to 15 in 2013 due to the Somali governments’ increased ability to fight and deter piracy, among other causes. However, another threat to international shipping in the Gulf of Aden looms. Yemen’s southern coastline is on the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb which links the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, a critical maritime choke point where roughly 8.2% of global oil supply passed through in 2009. Its oil exports, accounting for 70% of Yemeni government revenue, make the country highly dependent on its declining reserves. Yemen is an Al Qaeda stronghold, second only to Pakistan (and possibly Syria more recently). It was a target of the U.S. “drone campaign,” with 94 strikes between 2002 and 2013 (Pakistan: 368). Al Qaeda aims to enforce rigid Islamic legislation in Muslim countries and establish a global Islamic Caliphate. According to its 20-year plan, Al Qaeda aims to subdue “apostate” Muslim regimes such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen. It hosts a franchise in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), establishing safe havens in the governorates of Al Bayda’, Ma’rib, Shabwah, Lahji and Abyan, where it exerts considerable influence.

Yemen’s weak central state

Yet the Yemeni government, headed by Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi since February 2012 after the 33-year rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh came to an end, has to deal with more than Al Qaeda. In 1990, the Yemen Arab Republic in the north united with the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in the south. United in name, Yemen, however, remained a fragmented entity rife with internal divisions. In 1994, a civil war between Saleh’s north and the secessionist south broke out. In 1997, a group called “Ansar Allah”, emerging from a Zaidi Shia religious organization, confronted the Yemeni government leading to armed uprisings and several rounds of fighting between 2004 and 2010. In late March 2011, the defection of General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, the chief military commander in north Yemen, led to a security vacuum in the northwest that Ansar Allah seized to take control of Saada city where it continues fighting Sunni-Salafist tribes. His defection may, however, only be a symptom of the Yemeni state’s retreat to Sana’a, neglecting the north and the south. As a consequence, Hadi has to cope with internal struggles and two rebel movements, constraining his ability to fight AQAP.

Al Qaeda’s terrorism at sea

Al Qaeda’s terrorism at sea emanating from Yemen has a tradition and method. Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, an eminent jihadi strategist, defined several choke points as a target and outlined methods for disruption: blocking the passages using mines or sinking ships in them, threatening movement at sea through piracy, martyrdom operations and weapons.

On the Earth, there are five (5) important straits, four of them are in the countries of the Arabs and the Muslims. The fifth one is in America, and it is the Panama Canal. These straits are: 1. The Strait of Hormuz, the oil gate in the Persian Gulf. 2. The Suez Canal in Egypt. 3. The Bab el Mandib between Yemen and the African continent. 4. The Gibraltar Strait in Morocco. Most of the Western world’s economy, in terms of trade and oil, passes through these sea passages. Also passing through them are the military fleets, aircraft carriers and the deadly missiles hitting our women and children … It is necessary to shut these passages until the invader campaigns have left our countries. […]. — Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, “The Global Islamic Resistance Call”.

Yemen instability spikes oil prices via straight cut off — perception alone triggers the impact.

Rosen 15 — Armin Rosen, Freelance journalist who has written in publications like The Atlantic, US News & World Report, and The Wall Street Journal — Internally citing an EIA report on the Bab el-Mandeb Straight, 2015 (“War In Yemen Could Threaten One Of The World's Most Important Oil Chokepoints,” Business Insider, March 26^th, accessible online at http://www.businessinsider.com/war-in-yemen-could-threaten-one-of-the-worlds-most-important-oil-choke-points-2015-3, accessed on 6-21-15)

Oil prices are surging after Saudi Arabia began a military operation against Iranian-supported Houthi rebels in neighboring Yemen:

Yemen isn't a world-shaking oil producer, churning out a mere 133,000 barrels a day in 2013. Prices may have been jolted by the strong possibility that Saudi Arabia, which produces 11.6 million barrels a day, is entering a risky military conflict.

The situation in Aden, a strategically decisive port city on Yemen's southern coast, was so bad that President Adb Rabbu Mansur Hadi reportedly had to flee the city, and the country, by boat rather than by air.

This means that Houthi rebels are contesting areas along the Bab el-Mandeb, the straits at the opening of the Red Sea and one of the world's crucial oil chokepoints.

According to the US Energy Information Administration's (EIA) fact-sheet on global oil chokepoints, 3.8 million barrels of oil and "refined petroleum products" passed through the Bab el-Mandeb each day on its way to Europe, Asia, and the US, making it the world's fourth-busiest chokepoint.

The strait controls access to multiple oil terminals and to a oil pipeline co-owned by state companies from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar that transits oil between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, called the Suez-Mediterranean or SUMED pipeline.

The Bab el-Mandeb is 18 miles wide at its narrowest point, "limiting tanker traffic to two 2-mile-wide channels for inbound and outbound shipments," according to the Energy Information Administration.

The closure of the straits — or the perception of added risk of closure — could have huge consequences for the global oil market.

"Closure of the Bab el-Mandeb could keep tankers from the Persian Gulf from reaching the Suez Canal or SUMED Pipeline, diverting them around the southern tip of Africa, adding to transit time and cost," the EIA fact-sheet explains. "In addition, European and North African southbound oil flows could no longer take the most direct route to Asian markets via the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb."

Sudan and South Sudan would also have their only oil terminal cut off from Asia-bound trade, as the countries' shared pipeline terminates in Port Sudan. And it would cut off Indian Ocean access to the Mediterranean sea as well as the SUMED pipeline, which can transit 2.24 million barrels of oil per day — more than the daily output of all but 13 of the world's countries.

Price shocks cause global economic collapse — causes a domino effect of economic decline.

Rentschler 13 — Jun Rentschler, Analyst at the World Bank, Consultant at the European Bank for Development, Ph.D. in Economics from the University College, London, 2013 (“Oil Price volatility – its risk on economic growth and development,” World Bank, July 18^th, accessible online at http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/oil-price-volatility-its-risk-economic-growth-and-development, accessed on 6-22-15)

Oil price shocks (i.e. sudden changes) can be transmitted into the macro-economy via various channels. In the private sector, a positive oil price shock will increase production costs and hence restrict output – with price increases at least partially passed on to consumers. Moreover, as prices for gasoline and electricity increase, households face higher costs of living, with the poor being particularly vulnerable. These impacts can have further significant knock-on effects and repercussions throughout the economy, affecting macro-indicators such as employment, trade balance, inflation and public accounts, as well as stock market prices and exchange rates. Thereby, the nature and extent of such knock-on effects depend on the structural characteristics of an economy; for instance, the more a country engages in oil trade, the more it is exposed to price shocks on global commodity markets. Countries relying on a high fossil fuel share in their energy mix, or on energy intensive industrial production, are also more vulnerable. Furthermore, oil price shocks on the international market might be amplified in specific countries, depending on the respective Dollar exchange rate and prevailing inflationary pressures.

While a given oil price increase may be perceived positively by oil exporting countries and negatively by importers, an increase in oil price volatility (i.e. consecutive positive and negative oil price shocks) increases perceived price uncertainty for all countries – regardless of their trade balance. Such oil price volatility reduces planning horizons, causes firms to postpone investments, and may require expensive reallocation of resources. Formulating robust national budgets becomes more difficult, as importing countries face uncertainty regarding import costs and fuel subsidies levels, and exporters face volatile revenues. This may be a particularly profound problem in budget constrained developing countries, which rely on oil exports as a main source of public revenue. In order to protect firms and households against price volatility on international markets, particularly in developing countries, governments often allocate large parts of their budgets to subsidizing fuel. These subsidy systems not only expose governments to significant budgetary risks, but result in significant environmental costs, benefit mainly the wealthier, create disincentives for energy efficiency, and crowd out resources from education, health and other investments in development.

Global economic decline risks nuclear war.

Merlini 11 — Cesare Merlini, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Insitution, 2011 (“A Post-Secular World?,” Survival, Volume 53, Issue 2, April, pgs. 117–130, accessible online at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396338.2011.571015, accessed on 6-22-15)

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism.

AT: “AQAP Weak/Status Quo Intelligence Solves”

AQAP is strong and our intelligence in the region is weak.

Knutsen 15 — Alexis Knutsen, Analyst for the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project, Publis Fellow at the Claremont Institute, 2015 (“As America pulls out of Yemen, ISIS and AQAP move in,” American Enterprise Institute, March 24^th, accessible online at https://www.aei.org/publication/as-america-pulls-out-of-yemen-isis-and-aqap-move-in/, accessed on 6-24-15)

The United States began withdrawing its remaining personnel from Yemen Saturday, citing deteriorating security conditions. About 100 American troops, including the special operations forces assisting the Yemeni military in the fight against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), were evacuated. The move diminishes America’s intelligence footprint in Yemen and abandons the country to AQAP, the Iranian-backed al Houthis, and, now, the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). What does the Obama administration intend to do about the threat from Yemen? So far, not much.

Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Yemen, AQAP, is nowhere close to being defeated, and is, in fact, benefiting from Yemen’s chaos. Yemen has slowly collapsed into two rival governments – one in northern Yemen controlled by the Zaydi Shia rebel group known as the al Houthis, and the other in southern Yemen under former President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, whom the US still recognizes as Yemen’s president. As both the Hadi and al Houthi governments are drawn further into armed conflict, both sides will likely be less able to commit forces to fighting AQAP. AQAP, furthermore, has also been able to embed its fighters within local populations opposed to the al Houthis, giving AQAP more operating room throughout the country.

AT: “Wahaishi Weakens AQAP”

Recent death of Wahaishi doesn’t weaken AQAP

Cook 6/16 (Joana, 2015, Doctoral Candidate in the Department of War Studies. She is also the current Editor-in-Chief of Strife and a Research Affiliate with the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS,) “Wahaishi is gone, but AQAP will thrive in absence of political solution,” http://strifeblog.org/2015/06/16/wahaishi-is-gone-but-aqap-will-thrive-in-absence-of-political-solution/)//RTF

News broke this morning of the death of Nassir al-Wahaishi, the second in command of al-Qaeda, and the leader of its strongest affiliate group, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Penninsula (AQAP). Wahaishi was reportedly killed in a drone strike, said to have taken place in the port city of Mukallah, Yemen. While this strike is certainly significant, especially in its symbolic value, it is unlikely to quell the threat AQAP poses as long as a political solution in the country remains out of reach. Officially formed in January 2009 from Saudi and Yemeni branches of al-Qaeda, AQAP is often cited as the most lethal branch of the organization, largely due to the bomb-making skills of Ibrahim al-Asiri. Al-Asiri has been the key figure from AQAP linked with the many threats that have emanated from the country in recent years. These have included the 2009 underwear bomber who attempted to detonate a device on a commercial liner over Detroit on Christmas Day, as well as the 2010 cargo plane plot which saw explosives hidden in US-bound printers. Most recently, AQAP had claimed responsibility for the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris. The death of Wahaishi follows on from other significant blows for the organization in recent years, such as the death of Anwar al-Awlaki, the US-born English-speaking cleric who was killed in a drone strike in September 2011. Even post-mortem, Awlaki has continued to be one of the most influential figures in encouraging Westerners to travel abroad and engage in violence – through recordings of his speeches and his writing – and is cited by many traveling to Syria and Iraq to fight today. Drone strikes have also consistently cut down AQAP leaders like regional leader in the Baitha province Qaed al-Thahab in August 2013, and more recently this year Nasr Ibn Ali al-Ansi, who announced the Charlie Hebdo attack. However, such deaths have not reduced the strength of the organization, which has only continued to grow in capacity and membership. AQAP has proven its ability to thrive in Yemen, where the central government has been unable to provide basic governance and accountability to its citizens. In 2011, now ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh recalled troops from areas such as Jaar and Zinjibar to secure his position in the capital against peaceful protestors when his position came under threat during the Arab Spring. The removal of government forces in this period left a power vacuum that AQAP filled, quickly installing their own version of law and order when the government proved unable to do so. AQAP was able to hold these positions for just over a year, allowing it plenty of space to regroup and strengthen. In March 2015, the failing security situation in the country left an open opportunity for AQAP to seize a significant foothold in the important port city of Mukallah, in Hadhramaut province. Here, they released over 300 prisoners from the city’s central prison, including other important members of AQAP such as Khalid Bartafi. The advance into Mukallah was another case of the organization capitalizing on the unrest in the country, and the additional strength it has been able to gain in such situations. Drone and air strikes targeted at the organization, which are often used as band-aid solutions, have also severely impacted local populations. According to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, hundreds of civilians have been caught up in these strikes and killed, often perpetuating a cycle of resentment for the government and its partners, and driving further recruitment for AQAP. AQAP has been shown to thrive in periods when the reach of the central government has been restricted, and in periods when discontent with the government has risen. What’s more, local recruitment has not always been premised on individuals who aspire to attack the West, but is often driven by grievances against the government; AQAP has been seen to step in at times of vulnerability and provide services, law and order, and accountability for victims and frustrated parties that the central government has been unable to provide. While the death of al-Wahaishi will certainly provide some short-term interruption for the organization, they have already named Qassim al-Rimi as the group’s new leader. However, like the many strikes before it, Wahaishi’s death will not provide a lasting solution to depleting AQAP in the country. To ensure lasting stability in Yemen, current initiatives like those in Geneva that have brought the Yemeni government and Houthi rebels to the table, are the primary hope for peace and stability in the country. The country’s population is increasingly suffering from a desperate humanitarian situation that has left upwards of 80% of the population reliant on humanitarian aid. Tens of thousands have been internally displaced, while fighting and air strikes continue across the country, overshadowing the great hope that the National Dialogue Conference once presented to the country. To challenge groups like AQAP in Yemen, and ensure others such as ISIL do not also try and gain a foothold in the country, only national peace and unity in the form of an inclusive, political solution will provide the necessary remedy.

AT: “Yemen Stable/Not Key”

Yemen instability is on the brink — if the rebels take Aden, AQAP will have a client state.

The Economist 15 — The Economist, large magazine and news source, 2015 (“On the Run,” The Economist, March 25^th, accessible online at http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21647159-defeat-presidents-forces-may-lead-more-conflict-not-less-run, accessed on 6-22-15)

This week Mr Hadi, now president, found himself replaying the events of 1994 with roles reversed. On March 26th the Houthis, a Zaydi Shia militant group from Yemen’s northern highlands, reportedly captured an airbase less than 40 miles from Aden, a southern port city in which Mr Hadi had taken refuge. The base had only recently been used in counterterror operations by American military forces, which evacuated a few days before. Mr Hadi's whereabouts are not currently known. Though some reports suggest he left the country bound for Riyadh ahead of the Houthi assault on Aden, other sources said he remained in Yemen.

If ongoing chaos bears a resemblence to the events of 1994 there are nonetheless key differences. Allegiances have shifted dramatically over the last two decades. The few military units still loyal to Mr Hadi, mostly southerners, are augmented by the same secessionists he helped suppress two decades ago along with some of the men who fought jihad abroad before crushing the southern rebellion. Mr Saleh, who was booted out of power just four years ago, is now backing the Houthis, a group he warred against as president.

If the Houthis manage to push Mr Hadi out they will be able to impose their own terms, much as they did in September of 2014 after seizing control of Sana’a, Yemen’s ancient capital in the northern highlands. The miliants struck a peace deal with Mr Hadi after their victory, and prepared plans to form a presidential council to replace him through a series of UN mediated negotiations. But in February Mr Hadi fled Sana’a after a month under house arrest. He denounced the earlier deal, prompting the Houthis to return to war. If Mr Hadi is in fact gone, the presidential council may resume in coming days.

Even if the Houthis can complete their power grab they will not be in for an easy ride. Mr Hadi is not popular in the south, and the coalition around him in Aden owes more to Sunni distaste for the Houthis than faith in his leadership. Southerners widely believe the Houthis have worse repression in store for the south than Mr Saleh ever attempted. To back down, says Saadadeen bin Taleb, minister of trade under Mr Hadi, would be “suicidal for the south”.

The Houthis and the president's men are not the only forces pulling at Yemen. It is also home to a thriving al-Qaeda franchise that has vowed to defeat the Houthis, and a nascent Islamic State offshoot that killed as many as 140 people in the bombing of Zaydi mosques on March 20th. Neighbouring Saudi Arabia views the Houthis as a noxious Iranian proxy and was willing to underwrite Mr Hadi’s campaign against them. That strategy will remain unchanged with or without Mr Hadi in Aden, but Riyadh may take additional action if the Houthi advance continues. Saudi military forces are now moving toward the border with Yemen.

Should the Houthis secure Aden an end to the conflict is anything but assured. They might then move on the oil rich province of Mareb in central Yemen, which they see as being key to control of the country. With the end of the Houthi action in sight the ties between the Houthis and Mr Saleh—a wily and power-hungry figure not long ago their enemy—could fray. Mr Saleh, who famously described the job of governing Yemen as like “dancing on the heads of snakes”, has long been among the nimblest of Yemeni operators. It is hard to believe that he is not looking to manipulate the Houthi advance into a new bid for power. Yemen’s troubles, it would appear, are only just beginning.

Yemen instability undermines US strategy for the region — it’s a vital training ground and ally.

Shrinkman 15 — Paul Shrinkman, Security writer for US News & World Report, M.A. in Political Science and International Relations, 2015 (“Yemen Instability Threatens U.S. Terror Fight,” U.S. News & World Report, February 11^th, accessible online at http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/02/11/yemen-instability-threatens-us-drone-commando-campaign-against-aqap, accessed on 6-23-15)

“There’s no question as a result of the political instability in Yemen that our counterterror capabilities have been affected. I couldn’t stand up here and tell you that they haven’t been,” he said. “Of course they have been.”

Such counterterrorism missions only work with the cooperation of the host nation government as an effective and reliable partner, Kirby said.

“Right now, that country, the Yemeni security forces and the government to which they report is very much in flux right now,” he said. “We understand that. I wouldn’t say there’s been no adjustments made.”

The U.S. relies almost exclusively on regional alliances for its secretive work hunting Islamic extremists in the region. It retains a covert drone base in Djibouti and key military bases in Bahrain and Qatar, along with a critical alliance with the oil-rich Saudi Arabia. All of these countries are predominantly Sunni and abhor the increasingly expeditionary presence of Shiite Iran in and around their neighborhood.

On the ground, instability in Yemen means American shadow forces likely will have more difficulty gathering the critical intelligence they need to keep flying drone missions overhead.

And the closure of the U.S. Embassy in Sana’a signals an inability to help corral allied regional powers into some sort of agreement that maintains a strong American influence there.

“Yemen exemplifies why American diplomats need to take personal risks in our national interest,” four influential former ambassadors to the region – Ryan Crocker, Robert Ford, James F. Jeffrey and Ronald Neumann – wrote in a column published in The Hill last week. “Yemen teeters on the edge of civil war. The fight there with Al-Qaeda is far from successful but is not yet lost.

“At this critical time engagement and judgment on the ground are essential to try to stabilize the situation before Yemen slides into such complete chaos that outsiders are helpless to influence the situation.”

Still in question is who will maintain control of the tenuous situation. The Houthis have no apparent plan for shared governance of the country, where Sunni Muslims are a slight majority. But they also won’t allow for a return of the U.S.-allied government that was key to fighting terrorism there, despite a shared disdain for Sunni extremists.

“That relationship has worked, and that’s the relationship that the Houthi takeover endangers,” says Mike Lewis, a professor at Ohio Northern University who flew F-14 fighter jets during the Gulf War.

The Houthis have tremendous work before them to establish a government that could lead to the re-establishment of formal relations with the U.S. – if they even desire to do so.

“There’s no way the Houthis by force of arms are going to control most of the rest of Yemen,” Lewis says. “Yemen is headed toward a failed-state scenario unless you can find some sort of meaningful cooperation between a number of political entities there – quite honestly, warlords and tribal chiefs who are going to have to get along and back somebody.”

Any chance of stability in Yemen, and hopes for a continued U.S. mission to defeat AQAP where it operates, rests on finding some way around the current chaos. And with so many other powerful forces looking at Sana’a, the U.S. can only hope the situation doesn’t get any worse.

AT: “Drone Strikes Not Key”

Civilian death tolls in Yemen make AQAP stronger and cause mass instability

Wiener-Bronner 13 (Danielle, December 13th 2013, reporter for The Wire, “Latest Drone Strikes Shows How U.S. Strategy in Yemen Is Backfiring,” http://www.thewire.com/global/2013/12/yemen-drones/356111/)//RTF

Targeted drone killings are defended by the United States as means to combat al-Qaeda in the most effective way possible. If attacks are carried out correctly, they should minimize civilian casualties, eliminate risk to our own forces, and remove dangerous militant operatives, ideally dismantling terrorist groups from a safe distance. But if the attacks are not carried out correctly, as they often aren't, the results can backfire, which is exactly what's been happening in Yemen, according to Reuters: Tribal leaders, who have a lot of influence within Yemen's complex social structure, warn of rising sympathy for al Qaeda. Awad Ahmed Mohsen from Majallah, a southern village hit by a drone strike that killed dozens in 2009, told Reuters that America had brought hatred with its drones. Asked if more people joined al Qaeda in the wake of attacks that killed civilians, Mohsen said: "Definitely. And even those who don't join, now sympathize with al Qaeda because of these strikes, these violations. Any American they see, they exact revenge, even if it's a civilian." On Thursday, 14 Yemeni civilians were killed by a U.S. drone strike that mistakenly targeted a wedding convoy, according to Yemeni national security officials. Another official, however, said AQAP militants may have been traveling with the wedding party, but in either case it seems that civilians were not the original targets have been killed. The CIA didn't comment on the strike, per standard procedure. The attack threatens to undo the U.S.'s efforts to scale back its drone program, while making it more palatable to the countries it affects. Reuters reports that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has started traveling in smaller groups to avoid the aerial strikes, which may actually make it more difficult to track their motions. And the strikes are angering some Sunni Muslims upset about strikes that kill their supporters, rather than anti-government Shi'ite rebels, fueling sectarian tensions which are already high in the region. If those killed in this week's attack are confirmed to be civilians, according to the Associated Press, it could mean a surge of anti-American sentiment in Yemen: Civilian deaths have bred resentments on a local level, sometimes undermining U.S. efforts to turn the public against the militants. The backlash in Yemen is still not as large as in Pakistan, where there is heavy pressure on the government to force limits on strikes — but public calls for a halt to strikes are starting to emerge. In May, President Obama promised to increase transparency on the drone strike program and enhance guidelines on their use. But the Bureau of Investigative Journalism found in November that the six months following Obama's speech actually saw an increase of drone strike casualties in Yemen and Pakistan. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reported in October that civilian casualties of drone strikes are higher than the U.S. admits. Around the same time, a U.N. human rights investigator said 400-600 of the 2,200 people killed by drones in the past decade were noncombatants. And in 2012, reports emerged that the Yemeni government works to help the U.S. hide it deadly errors. Data on drone strikes, like all counter-terrorism efforts, is necessarily shrouded in mystery, making it difficult to measure success. But if drone strikes continue to indiscriminately kill civilians, moderates in Yemen may be driven towards more extremist positions. Even governments working with Washington to coordinate the strikes could turn against the U.S. if drone casualties are not scaled back or eliminated. Drone strikes may very well be an effective means of fighting terrorism, but for now they remain a controversial experiment in warfare that could possibly be drastically, dangerously failing to keep people safe.

Directory: file -> view
view -> Western Europe after wwii
view -> Author study: paul fleischman
view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide
view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg
view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh
view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce
view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy
view -> Table of Contents Lesson #
view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad

Download 0.86 Mb.

Share with your friends: